Jessica Hagen, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Appellant, vs. Steven Scott Management, Inc., ...
A.L. Brown, Joshua R. Williams, Marcus L. Amon, Capitol City Law Group, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Andrew E. Tanick, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
Under the
Under the plain meaning of
O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of her claims that respondent violated the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act (MFLSA),
FACTS
Appellant Jessica Hagen has worked as a property caretaker since April 2015 at an apartment complex owned by respondent Steven Scott Management, Inc. (Scott). Hagen lived at the complex during the time she worked as a property caretaker. During her assigned shifts,1 Scott requires Hagen to be on call at times; Scott provides Hagen with a cellphone and requires
arises. Scott also requires Hagen to be on site for parts of her on-call shifts, such as when tenants move in or out of the complex. During this on-site on-call time, there are periods when Hagen has to be on site but also has to wait before she can perform required duties. Scott does not compensate Hagen for time spent on call but not performing duties.
Scott compensates Hagen primarily with rent credits at a rate equivalent to $8.50 per hour worked. If and when Hagen works more than 99.75 hours in a month, Scott compensates Hagen with a paycheck at the hourly rate.
Hagen sued Scott, alleging (1) failure to pay minimum wage, in violation of the MFLSA, in violation of
The district court granted Scott‘s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Hagen‘s complaint with prejudice. It determined that (1) the MFLSA allows for rent credits as a means of paying the minimum wage; (2) caselaw forecloses Hagen‘s claim that, under the PWA, Scott improperly deducted the rent credit from her wages; and (3) Hagen‘s on-call time spent waiting to work but not working is not compensable under
ISSUES
- Did Scott violate the MFLSA by paying Hagen with rent credits?
- Did Scott violate the PWA by paying Hagen with rent credits?
- Is Hagen‘s time spent on call and on site available to perform duties but not actually performing any duties compensable under the MFLSA or MFLSA rules?
ANALYSIS
“We review a district court‘s summary judgment decision de novo. In doing so, we determine whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted).
When interpreting statutes, our goal is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Milner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 748 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn. 2008). When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. In re Buckmaster, 755 N.W.2d 570, 576 (Minn. App. 2008). We also construe agency rules according to their plain meaning, which we interpret de novo. See, e.g., St. Otto‘s Home v. Minn. Dep‘t of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 39, 43 (Minn. 1989) (stating interpretation of regulations presents question of law and reviewing plain meaning of agency rule).
A district court should grant summary judgment when the record shows an absence of genuine issues of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
The moving party has the initial burden to demonstrate an absence of genuine issues of material fact. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 1988). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W. 2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show a material fact exists to preclude summary judgment. Bixler by Bixler v. J.C. Penney Co., 376 N.W. 2d 209, 215 (Minn. 1985).
Neither party argues that
I. Scott did not violate the MFLSA by paying Hagen with rent credits.
Hagen argues that the MFLSA does not allow employers to pay their employees wages using rent credits, and that, even if it does, a genuine dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment. We disagree.
compensation due to an employee by reason of employment, payable in:
(1) legal tender of the United States;
(2) check on banks convertible into cash on demand at full face value;
(3) . . . direct deposit to the employee‘s choice of demand deposit account; or
(4) an electronic fund transfer to a payroll card account . . . .
Even though
industry to adopt rules “defining and governing . . . allowances as part of the wage rates for board, lodging, and other facilities or services furnished by the employer and used by the employees.” See also
Hagen and Scott dispute whether Scott requires Hagen to live at the complex as a condition of her job. Hagen‘s employment contract provides that “[y]our compensation will be paid to you in the form of Rent Credit . . . Rent Credit is available and offered by [Scott] to an employee who is a resident of a property managed by [Scott]. The employee must be a resident of the property where he/she works and must be in a position that requires the employee to live on site in order to qualify for rent credit.”
Hagen acknowledges that, according to her work contract, “[i]n order to receive the rent-credit I have to live in a property managed by [Scott].” Moreover, Hagen acknowledges that “[Scott] has never provided me, or any other caretaker that I am aware of, the option of being paid in any other form than a rent-credit.” Since Scott compensates Hagen with rent credits, which an employee may not receive unless they are in a position that requires them to live on site, the record, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Hagen, shows that Scott requires Hagen to live on site. Hagen may not “rest on mere averments” to the contrary. See DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). Similarly, Hagen‘s averment that she knew of a different caretaker who Scott did not
require to live on site is unsubstantiated and insufficient to preclude summary judgment. See id.
Hagen argues that, even if Scott requires her to live on site, a genuine dispute of material fact exists on whether the rent credit represented the fair market
Hagen argues that
that rent credits violate the MFLSA‘s purpose of protecting employees’ buying power. See Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2012) (stating we will “look past the plain language of an unambiguous statute” only when the plain language “utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose”). In sum, because Scott requires Hagen to live on the premises and compensates Hagen with rent credits at fair market value, Scott did not violate the MFLSA by paying Hagen with rent credits.
II. Scott did not violate the PWA by paying Hagen with rent credits.
Hagen argues that the PWA prohibits an employer from making deductions from an employee‘s wages, in the form of rent credits, to recover rent debt. We disagree.
Under the PWA, an employer shall not “make any deduction . . . from the wages due or earned by any employee . . . to recover any [] claimed indebtedness . . . unless the employee, after the . . . claimed indebtedness has arisen, voluntarily authorizes the employer in writing to make the deduction.”
We have previously determined that the limitations in
Hagen argues that Scott may not rely on her consenting to receiving payment via rent credit as a defense to a claim under
Hagen also contends that the district court improperly considered the rent-credit agreement in connection with the motion for summary judgment because
III. Hagen‘s time spent on call and on site available to perform duties but not actually performing any duties was not compensable time under the MFLSA.
Hagen argues that
A. Section 177.23, subdivision 10
Hagen contends that her on-call conditions of carrying a work cell phone and remaining within 20 minutes of the premises qualify as performing compensable duties under
Because we agree with the parties that
Here, Hagen‘s on-call conditions rendered her available to perform her duties of employment, but they are distinct from those duties, which include receiving work assignments and quickly responding to them. Therefore, we hold that, under the plain language of
B. Rule 5200.0120
Hagen next argues that the district court erred by determining that, as a matter of law, her time spent on call was not compensable, because whether she could use her on-
call time effectively presented a question of fact under
The MFLSA rules distinguish between compensable and non-compensable on-site and on-call time and provide that, “[a]n employee who is required to remain on the employer‘s premises or so close to the premises that the employee cannot use the time effectively for the employee‘s own purposes is working while on call.”
Hagen argues that the MFLSA rules focus on proximity to work premises to determine whether an employee can effectively use the on-call time, whereas the FLSA considers conditions more generally, one of which is proximity, to determine whether an employee can do so.5 Hagen concludes that, under the purportedly less employer-friendly MFLSA, a court would be more likely to find Hagen‘s 20-minute proximity condition as
preventing her from effectively using her time. The FLSA rules, however, provide a broader definition of hours worked that is more generous to the employee, not the employer. By considering more than just proximity, the FLSA rules identify more ways that an employee cannot use their time effectively, and thus more ways that an employee‘s time is compensable. See
The district court applied analogous federal caselaw6 assessing even more restrictive on-call requirements and determined that, as a matter of law, Hagen could use her time effectively while on call and did not work while on call. See Myers v. Baltimore County, 50 F. App‘x 583, 587 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding non-compensable on-call time park security personnel spent at park because they could use time for personal pursuits like watching television, eating, and sleeping); Kelly v. Hines-Rinaldi Funeral Home, Inc., 847 F.2d 147, 148 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding non-compensable on-call time funeral-home employees spent living in an apartment and required to answer the phone at any hour and pick up corpses if necessary); Sletten v. First Care Med. Servs., 2000 WL 1196199, at *11-12 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2000) (holding, under both FLSA and MFLSA, non-compensable on-call time paramedics spent staying within five minutes of work site because they could still use their time for personal pursuits); Leonard v. Carmichael Props. & Mgmt. Co., 614 F. Supp.
1182, 1185-86 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding non-compensable on-call time apartment-complex maintenance employee spent carrying pager and remaining close to complex because he could use time for personal pursuits like grocery shopping, attending church, and meeting with friends).7
Here, Hagen‘s on-call conditions of carrying a cell phone and remaining within 20
We hold that, under the plain meaning of
Hagen‘s contention that she submitted an affidavit demonstrating how “this on-call scheme affected her personal life” and prevented her from using her personal time effectively does not affect our analysis because the district court assumed her affidavit averments to be true and applied analogous caselaw holding non-compensable time spent under comparable restrictions. Nor are we persuaded by Hagen‘s argument that the general provision of
D E C I S I O N
Under the plain language of
Under the plain meaning of
The district court therefore did not err by dismissing Hagen‘s complaint at summary judgment after determining non-compensable Hagen‘s time spent on call and on site but not actually performing duties.
Affirmed.