JERRY PETERSON, Appellant (Petitioner), v. LARAMIE CITY COUNCIL, Appellee (Respondent).
S-23-0149
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
February 28, 2024
2024 WY 23
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023.
Representing Appellant: Cassie Craven, Longhorn Law Limited Liability Company, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: J. Mark Stewart, Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be madе before final publication in the permanent volume.
KAUTZ, Justice.
[¶1] Jerry Peterson filed a declaratory judgment complaint against the Laramie City Council (City Council or Council), claiming it violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act by holding its meetings remotely during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court dismissed the complaint based on laches. We reverse and remand.
ISSUE
[¶2] The dispositive issue on appeal is: Did the district court err by dismissing Mr. Peterson‘s declaratory judgment complaint against the City Council on the basis of laches?
[¶3] The district cоurt granted the City Council‘s motion to dismiss under
[¶4] In March 2020, the City Council began prohibiting in-person attendance at its meetings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 24, 2020, it issued Resolution 2020-17, which, in accordance with the Governor‘s and the Wyoming State Health Officer‘s Public Health Ordеrs, closed “places of public accommodation” and prohibited gatherings of “10 or more people” in “a single confined space at the same time.” On April 21, 2020, the Council passed Resolution 2020-24, which allowed it to meet remotely through “telephone or web conferencing.” The City Council used the Zoom web-conferencing platform, and the public apparently had the opportunity to comment through Zoom during the meetings. Resolution 2020-24 was “effective and retroactive [to] Marсh 1, 2020[,] and until Public Health Orders restricting gatherings of 10 people or more [were] lifted or expire[d].” The Governor lifted the ban on gatherings of 10 or more people in May 2020, but the City Council continued to prohibit in-person meetings. The City Council passed Resolution 2021-07 in January 2021, reiterating the prohibition on in-person meetings based on its mistaken understanding that gatherings were still restricted to fewer than 10 people.
[¶5] In January 2022, the City Council passed resolution 2022-2 again forbidding in-person meetings and allowing attendance “only [through] tеlephone or web conferencing.” The order was to remain in effect “until rescinded by [the] Council or the end of the COVID-19 pandemic . . . .” On March 14, 2022, the Governor signed an executive order formally “declaring the end to the State of Emergency and Public Health Emergency relating to the COVID-19 pandemic.” The City Council, however, continued to meet remotely throughout 2022 and did not provide the opportunity for in-person attendance at its meetings.
[¶6] Mr. Peterson filed his declaratory judgment complaint on January 4, 2023.1 He alleged the City Council violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act,
[¶7] The City Council filed a motion to dismiss under
[¶8] After a hearing, the district court granted the City Council‘s motion to dismiss. Although it did not convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, it considered information outside the complaint by taking “judicial notice” of it. The court grouped all of Mr. Peterson‘s claims together and ruled they were barred by laches because they “ripened” in May 2020, and the injury and prejudice whiсh would result from “undoing nearly three-years’ worth of decisions” by the City Council was “manifest and need[ed] no further elaboration.” Mr. Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶9] The district court dismissed Mr. Peterson‘s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” under
[¶10] The parties suggest the district court‘s decision on laches should be reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard. In doing so, they ignore that the district court dismissed this case under
DISCUSSION
[¶11] The district court dismissed Mr. Peterson‘s complaint after concluding his claims were barred by laches.
“Laches bars a claim when a party has delayed in enforcing its rights to the disadvantage of another. Windsor Energy Grp., L.L.C. v. Noble Energy, Inc., 2014 WY 96, ¶ 12, 330 P.3d 285, 288 (Wyo. 2014) (citing Dorsett v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 9, 61 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Wyo. 2003)). The defense of lachеs is based in equity and whether it applies in a given case depends upon the circumstances. Id., ¶ 12, 330 P.3d at 288–89 (quoting Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 123, 226 P.3d 889, 929 (Wyo. 2010)). Two elements must be proven to establish laches: 1) inexcusable delay; and 2) injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the defendants or others. Id., ¶ 12, 330 P.3d at 289 (citing Moncrief [v. Sohio Petroleum Co.], 775 P.2d [1021,] 1025 [(Wyo. 1989)]). The existence of laches is primarily determined not by lapse of time but by considerations of justice. Merrill v. Rocky Mountain Cattle Co., 26 Wyo. 219, 181 P. 964, 974 (1919) (citation omitted).”
EOG Res., Inc. v. JJLM Land, LLC, 2022 WY 162, ¶ 33, 522 P.3d 605, 614-15 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Tram Tower Townhouse Ass‘n v. Weiner, 2022 WY 58, ¶ 44, 509 P.3d 357, 367 (Wyo. 2022)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also, United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001) (“In order to prove the affirmative defense of laches, the defendant must demonstrate that there has been an unreasonable delay in asserting the claim and that the defendant was materially prejudiced by the delay.“) (emphasis omitted). “Laches, in legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another.” Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d at 1208.
[¶12] Because of the fact-dependent nature of a laches defense, “[t]he strictures of Rule 12(b)(6), wherein dismissal of the claim is based solely on the complainant‘s pleading, are not readily applicable to [its] determination[.]” Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 988 F.2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See also, Jordan v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 3 F.Supp.3d 917, 929 (D. Kan. 2014) (a
[¶13] The district court held that the first element of laches was satisfied because Mr. Peterson inexcusably delayed filing his complaint. It determined “the earliest time” he could have asserted his claims was May 2020, after the Governor lifted the ban on gatherings of 10 or more people and Resolution 2020-24 expired on its own terms. The district court declared “there [was] no plausible excuse” for Mr. Peterson‘s delay of “more than two and one-half years” in filing his January 2023 complaint. This determination completely ignores that Mr. Petersоn‘s claims relate to actions taken at different times by the City Council. Many of the City Council meetings addressed by the complaint occurred closer in time to January 2023. Mr. Peterson could not have alleged, in May 2020, that those meetings violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act because they had not yet occurred.
[¶14] We explained in Tram Tower Townhouse Ass‘n, ¶ 45, 509 P.3d at 367:
“[T]here is no set length of delay that will be considered undue or inexcusable; the circumstances of each case must be considered in making that determination.” Windsor, ¶ 25, 330 P.3d at 292 (citations omitted); see also Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 13, 88 P.3d 1050, 1058 (Wyo. 2004) (“Laches does not depend on thе passage of time alone; the plaintiff must be chargeable with lack of diligence in failing to
proceed more promptly.” (citation omitted)). To determine whether the [plaintiff]‘s delay was undue or inexcusable, we must identify the earliest time the [plaintiff] could have brought its claim and then analyze whether the time that passed between then and when the [plaintiff] first asserted its claim was unreasonable. See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 151, Westlaw (Mar. 2022 Update).
“Laches may . . . be invoked only after the plaintiff discovers or with reasоnable diligence could have discovered the facts giving rise to his or her cause of action[] and will not be invoked absent knowledge or notice of the wrong.” 27A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 139 (2024). To suggest that all Mr. Peterson‘s claims accrued at the same time, in some cases years before the City Council took the actions he objected to, misreads and misinterprets his claims. Furthermore, the court‘s determination that there was “no plausible excuse” for his delay is not readily apparent from the face of his complaint. His complaint simply does not address the reasons, if any, for his delay in raising his objections to the City Council‘s separate actions from May 2020 through November 2022, or provide a basis for concluding, as a matter of law, his delay was unreasonable.
[¶15] The district court also determined the second element of laches was met because Mr. Peterson‘s requested relief of declaring the Council‘s May 2020 to November 2022 meetings illegal and every action taken in those meetings “null and void” would prejudice and injure thе City Council and its “citizenry.” In arriving at its decision, the district court took judicial notice of facts set forth in the City Clerk‘s affidavit showing
the City Council ha[d] taken numerous actions since May 15, 2020[,] and . . . those actions d[id] not just involve the City Council. The numerous examples of action[s] taken by the City Council include[d] approving payments to vendors, renewing business licenses, and other actions affecting the citizenry of the City of Laramie in both their personal and business lives. The injury and prejudice that would result from a declaration that evеry meeting conducted between May 15, 2020[,] and November 16, 2022[,] [a]s illegal and undoing every decision of the City Council during that period is manifest and needs no further elaboration. The City Council, but more importantly those that have relied upon the actions of the City Council during the period at issue, would be significantly prejudiced and injured by a declaration undoing nearly three-year[s‘] worth of decisions.
[¶16] We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the district court to consider facts stated in the City Clerk‘s affidavit attaсhed to the City Council‘s motion to dismiss. When addressing a motion to dismiss under
If, on a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6) or12(c) , matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.
[¶17] The district court took into consideration two different types of information not attached to Mr. Peterson‘s complaint in deciding the City Council‘s motion to dismiss. First, it considered the City Council‘s resolutions we described above. Mr. Peterson referred to these resolutions in his complaint, but he did not attach hard copies of the documents to his complaint; instead, he included internet hyper-links to them. We need not address whether providing an internet link qualifies as an attachment incorporated into a complaint which may be properly considered when ruling on a
[¶18] The second type of information the district court considered was not referenced in Mr. Peterson‘s complaint. The court apparently took judicial notice of the City Clerk‘s affidavit, which recited her “personal knowledge of . . . actions taken by the City Council at [its] meetings” during the relevant time period, including a specific list of actions taken by the Council in August 2022 and hyperlinks to the general sections of the City of Laramie‘s website where the city ordinances and City Council‘s meeting minutes were posted http://www.cityoflaramie.org/Ordinances and http://www.cityoflaramie.org/agendacenter. The links were nоt to specific ordinances or meeting minutes, so anyone seeking the relevant documents would have to search for them. Because Mr. Peterson did not reference this information in his complaint, it does not qualify for consideration under the same principle as the resolutions.
[¶19] Instead of identifying specific meeting minutes or ordinances, the district court generally took judicial notice of the City Council‘s “numerous actions in furtherance of the business and governance of the City . . . during the period аt issue” and “that those actions do not just involve the City Council.” The district court cited a United States Supreme Court case discussing
[¶20] Wyoming has limited authority about the use of judicially noticed information in ruling on Rule 12 motions to dismiss. We have recognized the use of judicially noticed faсts when deciding a motion to dismiss based upon res judicata or collateral estoppel. In In re Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1991), we followed “‘the modern trend‘” that a defendant can raise res judicata or collateral estoppel through a motion to dismiss if “‘the information necessary for decision is available to the court by judicial notice.‘” Id. (quoting Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857, 858 (1987), reconfirmed, 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1988)). The district court in JRW took judicial notice of a parentage ruling from an earlier divorce proceeding between the parties in concluding the father was barred from relitigating the
[¶21] This case, obviously, does not involve judicial notice of court records from a related proceeding. It is, instead, more like Sweetwater Station, ¶ 10, 522 P.3d at 621-22, where the defendants, in their motion to dismiss, asked the district court to take judicial notice of a recorded plat, minutes from a Rock Springs City Council meeting, and a recorded amendment to subdivision covenants. In response, the plaintiff asked the court to take judicial notice of minutes from a separate Rock Springs City Council meeting. Id. Although the district court did not rule on either request for judicial notice, its order referenced information from the materials. Id. We noted that, “[b]еcause the court considered materials outside the complaint in ruling on its motion to dismiss, it should have converted the motion to one for summary judgment.” Id., ¶ 11, 522 P.3d at 622 (citing
[¶22] We need not establish a general rule in this case about the propriety of using judicially noticed facts when deciding a
[¶23] We emphasized in Cockreham v. Wyo. Prod. Credit Ass‘n, 743 P.2d 869, 872 (Wyo. 1987), that it is important for a party requesting judicial notice of facts to give written notice to the court, so it is “clear what matters the . . . court ha[s] the opportunity to consider.” See also, Gaston v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2021 WY 74, ¶ 11 n.1, 488 P.3d 929, 935 n.1 (Wyo. 2021) (recognizing the importance of identifying documents subject to judicial notice). In addition,
[¶24]
[¶25] By using judicial notice as a vehicle for considering evidence outside the complaint, the district court skirted the
[¶26] Furthermore, the district court did not simply take judicial notice of the City Council‘s actions. It also made a subjective factual determination that the prejudice to the City Council and its “citizenry” from Mr. Peterson‘s delay in bringing his action was “manifest” and “need[ed] no further elaboration.” In Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d at 1200, 1207, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court‘s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ request for return of seized property on the ground of laches because the court did not require the government to show mаterial prejudice from the plaintiffs’ delay in bringing their claim. The government argued it was “obvious” and “apparent” it was materially prejudiced by the plaintiffs’ delay in bringing the claim. Id. at 1208. Specifically, it asserted the delay was prejudicial because “[m]emories fade, [the] forfeited property ha[d] been disposed of[,] and retrieval of the records [would] be unnecessarily difficult and potentially impossible in some instances if records ha[d] been destroyed.” Id. The Tenth Circuit said the “conclusory allegation of prejudice [was] insufficient to establish material prejudice” to the government. Id. See also, Malibu Media, LLC v. Cuddy, No. 13-CV-02385-WYD-MEH, 2015 WL 1280783, at *6 (D.Colo. 2015) (“material prejudice is not shown by conclusory allegations or mere speculation“). Here, too, the court‘s non-specific, conclusory determination that the City Council and its citizenry would be prejudiced by Mr. Peterson‘s delay in bringing his action does not satisfy the second element of laches.
CONCLUSION
[¶27] To determine if a claim is barred under the doctrine of laches, the court must conduct a fact-intensive inquiry, which is typically not subject to resolution on a motion to dismiss. The district court in this case improperly took judicial notice of the City Council‘s evidence. Because it considered matters outside the complaint, it should have converted the City Council‘s motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment and allowed Mr. Peterson to present evidence that laches did not apply. In any event, the district court erred by declaring Mr. Peterson inexcusably delayed in bringing his claims because they all accrued in May 2020, and by making the conclusory determination that the prejudice to the City Council from Mr. Peterson‘s delay in bringing his action was manifest.
[¶28] Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision.