Jerolyn Crute SACKMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation; Greg Savelli, in his official capacity as Executive Officer of Parking Enforcement and Traffic Control for the Los Angeles Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-55846
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted February 7, 2017 Pasadena, California Filed February 16, 2017
Jeffry David Sackman, Attorney, Reich, Adell & Cvitan, A Professional Law Corporation, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Ronald S. Whitaker, Los Angeles City Attorney‘s Office, Los Angeles, CA, fro Defendants-Appellees Before: SCHROEDER, PREGERSON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Jerolyn Crute Sackman appeals the district court‘s order dismissing with prejudice her
1. Sackman fails, as a matter of law, to state a claim for a violation of substantive due process. The 72-hour law did not implicate Sackman‘s fundamental rights because the law impacts an economic/property interest. See Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 584 F.3d 1232, 1236 (9th Cir. 2009). Because a fundamental right is not implicated here, the law is subject to rational basis review. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). The 72-hour law is rationally related to the City‘s legitimate objective to
2. Sackman also fails, as a matter of law, to state a claim for a violation of procedural due process based on a purported lack of pre-citation and pre-towing notice. While Sackman contends that posted signs warning of the 72-hour law were required as a matter of due process, a legislature generally provides the requisite level of notice “simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the extent the statute regulates private conduct, affording those within the statute‘s reach a reasonable opportunity to familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements.” Lone Star, 584 F.3d at 1237 (quotation and citation omitted). Here, the City provided further pre-towing notice by attaching a citation to Sackman‘s vehicle two days before it was towed.
Additionally, the procedural due process balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), weighs in favor of the City. Even where the citation and impound of Sackman‘s vehicle impacted a significant private interest, there was a low risk of erroneous deprivation because Sackman was able to contest the propriety of the citation and impound at administrative hearings and seek judicial review in state court1, and the posting of signs on every street would entail a substantial administrative and fiscal burden on the City.
AFFIRMED.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.