JENNIFER BRINKMANN, Aрpellant, vs. TYRON FRANCOIS, etc., et al., Appellees.
No. SC14-1899
Supreme Court of Florida
[February 4, 2016]
This case is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Francois v. Brinkmann, 147 So. 3d 613, 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), which declares invalid
STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS
The Fourth District set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
Five candidates for Broward County Commissioner for District 2, all Democrats, qualified to have their names printed on the ballot for the August 2014 primary election. No Republican or Independent cаndidates filed qualifying papers. [Tyron] Francois, a sixth candidate and also a Democrat, filed qualifying paperwork to run as a write-in candidate. As a duly qualified write-in candidate, a blank space on the ballot for the November 2014 general election would have been provided to allow voters to write in Francois‘s name as their vote for the county commissioner to serve District 2. Francois‘s status as a qualified write-in candidate would constitute “opposition,” as that term has been interpreted in relation to the Universal Primary Amendment (UPA), Article VI, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitutiоn, thus requiring that the primary election be closed. See Telli v. Snipes, 98 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
Appellee [Jennifer] Brinkmann, a resident voter, filed a complaint in the circuit court, alleging that Francois was not properly qualified to be a write-in candidate because he did not physically live within the boundaries of the district as required by
section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014) . Brinkmann also sought an order forcing the primary election to be opened to all voters pursuant to the UPA. Francois conceded below, as he does on appeal, that he did not live in the district at the time he filed papers to qualify as a write-in candidate. However, he cоntends thatsection 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional because it conflicts with the Florida Constitution and violates equal protection. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found thatsection 99.0615 is constitutional and disqualified Francois as a write-in candidate. The circuit court also entered an injunction that opened the primary election to all registered voters.
Francois, 147 So. 3d at 614 (footnotes omitted).
The Fourth District reversed the circuit court‘s order, concluding that ”
Brinkmann raises three distinct issues in this case. Her first contention is that the circuit court should not have been required to address Francois’ facial challenge as to the constitutionality of
Preservation of Constitutionality Claim
Brinkmann contends that the issue regarding the constitutionality of
Constitutionality of Section 99.0615
The crux of this issue is whether
This Court has long-instructed that statutes may not impose qualification requirements for public office over and above those set forth in the Florida Constitution. See Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1056 (quoting State ex rel. Askew v. Thomas, 293 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1974) (“We have consistently held that statutes imposing additional qualifications for office are unconstitutional where the basic document of the constitution itself has already undertaken to set forth those requirements.“)); Wilson v. Newell, 223 So. 2d 734, 735-36 (Fla. 1969) (“Section 99.032, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional, invalid and ineffective because it prescribes qualifications for the office of County Commissioner in addition to those prescribed by the Constitution.“). See also Levey v. Dijols, 990 So. 2d 688, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“Any statute that restricts eligibility beyond the requirements of the Florida Constitution is invalid.” (citing Miller v. Mendez, 804 So. 2d 1243, 1246 (Fla. 2001))). As such, if any provision of the Florida Constitution provides qualifications for an office of county commissioner, then the Legislature is prohibited from imposing additional qualifications. Brinkmann argues that
The Florida Constitution sets forth residency requirements for various public officers. See, e.g.,
COMMISSIONERS. Except when otherwise provided by county charter, the governing body of each county shall be a board of county commissioners composed of five or seven members serving staggered terms of four years. After each decennial census the board of county commissioners shall divide the county into districts of contiguous territory as nеarly equal in population as practicable. One commissioner residing in each district shall be elected as provided by law.
In Grassi, we reviewed the district court‘s decision affirming the dismissal of misdemeanor charges brought against a county commissioner candidate who filed qualifying papers for a particular district‘s election but resided in another district at that time. Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1055. The State sought review on the ground that
In light of this decision, we have already determined that candidates for an office of county commissioner are constitutionally required to establish their residency within that office‘s district only at the time of electiоn. In other words, the qualification period is not the last opportunity for the candidate to move into the office‘s representative territory. Notably, in interpreting
The law at issue in this case is strikingly similar to the one invalidated in Grassi.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Fourth District correctly determined that
Closing of the Democratic Party‘s Primary Election
Finally, Brinkmann argues that even if
The rules governing statutory interpretation generally apply with equal force to the interpretation of constitutional provisions. Coastal Fla. Police Benevolent Ass‘n, Inc. v. Williams, 838 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2003). Accordingly,
this Court “endeavors to construe a constitutional provision consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters.” Zingale [v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 2004)] (quoting Caribbean Conservation Corp. [v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm‘n, 838 So. 2d 492, 501 (Fla. 2003)]). In ascertaining
the intent of the voters, the Court may examine “the purpose of the рrovision, the evil sought to be remedied, and the circumstances leading to its inclusion in our constitutional document,” In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d [1040, 1048 (Fla. 1982)], with the view that a constitutional amendment must be assessed “in light of the historical development of the decisional law extant at the time of its adoption.” Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980).
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 614 (Fla. 2012).
Still, “[a]ny inquiry into the proper interpretation of a constitutional provision must begin with an examination of that provision‘s explicit language. If that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written.” Fla. Soc‘y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass‘n, 489 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1986). Indeed, “the law is settled that when constitutional language is precise, its exact letter must be enforced and extrinsic guides to construction are not allowed to defeat the plain language.” Fla. League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1992). “[U]nless the text of a constitution suggests that a technical meaning is intended, words used in the constitution should be given their usual and ordinary meaning because such is the meaning most likely intended by the people who adopted the constitution.” Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503, 512 (Fla. 2008). This Court has advised that “a dictionary may provide the popular and common-sense meaning of terms presented to the voters.” Id. (quoting Advisory Op. to Governor—1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1997)). Constitutional provisions should be provided “a broader and more liberal construction” but not construed “so as to defeat their underlying objectives.” Coastal Fla. Police Benevolent, 838 So. 2d at 549 (quoting Fla. Soc‘y of Ophthalmology, 489 So. 2d at 1119) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, it should be noted that this Court champions a strong public policy against judicial interference in the democratic process of elections. Fla. League of Cities, 607 So. 2d at 400. Bearing these principles in mind, we first turn to the constitutional provision at issue.
Universal Primary Amendment
The Universal Primary Amendment (UPA) was passed in the 1998 general election and amended
Two courts have determined that a write-in candidate constitutes “opposition” for purposes of opening a primary election under the UPA. See, e.g., Lacasa v. Townsley, 883 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242-43 (S.D. Fla. 2012). In Telli, three candidates were qualified to run in the Democratic Party‘s 2012 primary election for the Office of Broward County Commissioner. Two other candidates—one Democrat and one Republican—also qualified particularly as write-in candidates and were represented in the November 2012 general еlection by a blank line on the ballot. A Republican-registered voter filed suit to open the Democratic Party‘s primary election to all registered voters, and the trial court dismissed the suit with prejudice. Telli, 98 So. 3d at 1285.
[This] Court will not consult a crystal ball to determine when and whether a given write-in candidate constitutes “real” or mere illusory opposition. The question is not whether [the write-in candidates] will likely prevail in the general election over the winner of the Democratic Party (or even garner a significant percentage of the vote), but whether, under the current framework set forth by the Florida Constitution, they could.
Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at [1243] (emphasis [in] original). Under the current framework, a write-in сandidate could prevail in the general election, provided he or she receives the most votes.
The Telli court‘s interpretation of the UPA‘s plain language is consistent with the common usage of “opposition” and related terms around the time the amendment was adopted. According to dictionary definitions, “opposition” meant “a position confronting another or placing in contrast; that which is or furnishes an obstacle to some result.” Black‘s Law Dictionary, 1093 (6th ed. 1990). It was also defined as an “act of opposing,” a “hostile or contrary action or condition,” and “something that opposes,” or “a political party opposing and prepared to replace the party in power.” Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary 816 (10th ed. 1998). The act of “opposing” was “appli[cable] to any conflict” and synonymous with “set[ting] oneself against someone or something.” Id. Conversely, someone or something was “opposed” if he, she, or it was “set or placed in opposition.” Id. Additionally, an “opponent” was “one that takes an opposite position (as in a debate, contest, or conflict).” Id. at 815.
From these definitions, it appears that the usual and ordinary meaning of “opposition” as intended by the people who adopted the UPA contemplated an individual qualified to compete against a political party‘s primary winner in hopes of prevailing in a contest for public office. This naturally encompasses a write-in candidate—especially considering that subsection (b) does not specify the type of “opposition” one must encounter in a general election.
Brinkmann maintains that interpreting “opposition” to include write-in candidates would not coincide with the UPA‘s intended purpose. Specifically, she argues that the amendmеnt was adopted in order to allow all registered electors to vote in a primary election when the winner of that election effectively would be the person elected to office. This argument overstates the UPA‘s purpose. According to amendment commentary:
The [UPA] was proposed by the Constitution Revision Commission in an effort to address the low numbers of Florida voters who participate in elections. The Commission found that, prior to the amendment, in counties where a large majority of registered voters is registered with one political party, an election was often won at the primary level. Members of the minority party, as well
as members of minor parties and those with no party affiliation, would not have the opportunity to participate in the electoral process.
William A. Buzzett & Deborah K. Kearney, Commentary to 1998 Amendment,
The federal district court in Lacasa found that current election laws effectuate the UPA‘s purpose by giving all registered voters in a given county an opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Writing for the court, Judge Zloch explained:
Further, Plaintiffs’ argument that the write-in candidates do not constitute “opposition” justifying the closed election is inconsistent with the structure of Florida‘s election laws. If a candidate in a general election is unopposed, meaning that if there are no other candidates, whether write-in candidates or party-supported candidates, “the candidate [is deemed] to have voted for himself or herself” and thus “the names of [the] unopposed candidates shall not appear on the general election ballot.”
Fla. Stat. § 101.151(7) . It is this type of primary that is, by definition, a de facto general election because there will actually be no opportunity to vote at all in the general election—the election for the office of Miami-Dade State‘s Attorney will be absent from the general election ballot.
Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. Based on the record before it, the court found that
the situation Plaintiffs decry here is much different. In the November general election, all Miami-Dade County voters will have the opportunity to vote for the [sic] either the winner of the Democratic Primary . . . [or one of the two write-in candidates]. While Plaintiffs may claim that the write-in candidates are not “real” or legitimate candidates, their presence does not diminish Plaintiffs’ and all other duly registered voters’ right to cast a vote in the general election.
These passages demonstrate that, even in branding write-in candidates as “opposition” for purposes of closing a party‘s primary election, Florida‘s election laws still guarantee all registered electors meaningful opportunities to vote at the general election level. Accord Telli, 98 So. 3d at 1287 (“Come November 6th, all duly-registered voters will have the opportunity to participate in the electoral process by voting for either the winner of the Democratic Primary or one of the write-in candidates; and the candidate receiving the most votes in the general eleсtion will be elected to the office of Broward County Commissioner.“). Brinkmann simply conflates the write-in candidate‘s chances of winning the general election with the elector‘s chance to participate at all in the electoral process. See Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (refusing to consider the likelihood of a write-in candidate prevailing, or even garnering a significant percentage of votes, in a general election).
Brinkmann further contends that “the circumstances leading to the adoption of
such section of the Constitution contemplates laws regulating primary elections as well as general elections because of the inevitable relationship of the two classes of elections to each other. Thus, the Legislature is authorized by said section of the Constitution to enact laws designed to confine participations in party primary elections to bona fide recognized members of the political parties required by law to participate in such legally sanctioned and regulated primary elections as may be provided for by statute.
Id. Although a duly registered elector is entitled to exercise suffrage, there is a counterbalancing expectation that the elector will “comply with such other requirements of law as may be imposed upon him [or her] as a matter of policing the process by which he [or she] is authorized to cast his [or her] vote . . . .” Id. at 858; see, e.g., State ex rel. Hall v. Hildebrand, 168 So. 531, 532 (Fla. 1936) (“The primаry election laws of this state clearly require participants in primary elections, whether as voters or candidates, to specially register for that purpose.“);
Hence, the Legislature established the primary election mеchanism to permit a given political party to select a representative whom that party genuinely intended to support in a general election for public office. See Wagner, 74 So. 2d at 91; State ex rel. Andrews v. Gray, 169 So. 501, 505 (Fla. 1936). This Court has explained that
[t]he purpose of a primary election is to give vitality to the constitutional guaranty of a free and untrammeled ballot by affording freedom of choice of candidates to the individual party voter who may be expected to support the party nominees at the ensuing general election. The honest conduct of a primary election is therefore not
less important than freedom in expression of choice as between candidates on the final election is generally regarded as indispensable.
Id. Thus, primary elections are “essential to the functioning of popular free government” and “an integral part of the election machinery of this State[.]” Wagner, 74 So. 2d at 90-91.
Additionally, federal courts have identified legitimate regulatory interests that are furthered by the closing of a primary election. In Lacasa, the district court accepted the State‘s “proposition that keeping a political party‘s primary election closed will preserve the рarty as [a] viable and identifiable interest group[], insuring that the results of [its] primary election, in a broad sense, accurately reflect the voting of the party members.” Lacasa, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (citing Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 594-95 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further “recognize[d] the importance of . . . party building efforts and the interest in
Further, Brinkmann‘s position embraces an interpretation of the UPA that would yield unintended openings of primary elections.
Based on the above, we conclude that, for purposes of opening a primary election under the UPA, the plain and obvious meaning of “opposition” includes write-in candidates. Therefore, we must determine whethеr the Fourth District correctly ordered the Democratic Party‘s primary election to be closed.
This Case
Under Florida law, a primary election for public office will not be opened to all registered voters unless two conditions are met: “(1) all candidates for the office must have the same party affiliation; and (2) the winner of the primary will have no opposition in the general election.” Telli, 98 So. 3d at 1286 (citing
Here, the record reflects that five candidates qualified by filing a fee or submitting a petition to run in the Democratic Party‘s primary election in August 2014: Lisa Aronson, Mark Bogen, Carmen Jones, Charlotte E. Rodstrom, and Terry Williams-Edden. The record also reflects that Francois, a sixth candidate who qualified by the write-in process, was a registered Democrat at all relevant times. Therefore, all candidates for the Office of Broward County Commissioner, District 2, shared the same party affiliation. Cf. id. at 1241-42 (concluding that UPA would not work to open the Democratic primary for the state attorney‘s office tо all registered voters because three candidates were registered Democrats but one of the two write-in candidates was a registered Republican).
Nevertheless, Brinkmann cannot satisfy the second prong necessary for opening a primary election. Because we have determined today that
Accordingly, we conclude that it was appropriate and constitutionally mandated for the Democratic Party‘s primary election to be closed to only Democratic-registered voters.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Fourth District‘s decision in Francois.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal – Statutory or Constitutional Invalidity
Fourth District - Case No. 4D14-2739 (Broward County)
William R. Scherer of Conrad & Scherer, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Bruce S. Rogow and Tara A. Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant
Robert C. L. Vaughan of Kim Vaughan & Lerner, LLP, Fort Lauderdale Florida; Mark Herron, Robert J. Telfer, III, and Joseph Brennan Donnelly of Messer Caparello, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee Tyron Francois