Jeffrey Olson, Relator, vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent.
A20-1048
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
December 30, 2020
McKeig, J.
Tax Court
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, John M. O’Mahoney, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
S Y L L A B U S
The Department of Revenue’s notice of a tax order sent to the taxpayer by regular, non-certified, mail satisfies due process.
Affirmed.
MCKEIG, Justice.
This case considers whether notice of a tax order sent by regular mail satisfies due process under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. The Department of Revenue sent relator Jeffrey Olson a tax order assessing sales and use taxes covering a 3-year period. This tax order was sent by regular (i.e. non-certified) mail. Olson maintains that he either did not receive this order or he overlooked it and only learned about the order once the Commissioner of Revenue levied his bank account. Olson appealed the tax order to the tax court, where he asserted that regular mail provided insufficient notice and therefore violated procedural due process. The Commissioner moved to dismiss, arguing that regular mail satisfies due process under our precedent in Turner v. Commissioner of Revenue, 840 N.W.2d 205, 209–10 (Minn. 2013). The tax court agreed with the Commissioner and dismissed the appeal. Because we conclude that sending a tax order by regular mail provides constitutionally sufficient notice, we affirm.
FACTS
Relator Jeffrey Olson runs a farming operation and heavy construction business as a sole proprietorship. The Commissioner first sent Olson a letter on April 27, 2017, to his home address, which is also his business address, informing him that he had been selected for a sales and use tax audit. There was no response to this letter. The Commissioner then sent Olson a letter on May 19, 2017, to the same address, informing him that the Department’s staff had tried multiple times to reach him by phone to schedule an appointment so that he could participate in the audit. The audit conference was scheduled
The Commissioner then sent a preliminary audit report to Olson on July 28, 2017, showing that Olson owed $120,541.01 in unpaid sales and use taxes relating to his business. Olson again failed to respond.
The Department sent Olson a tax order by regular mail—as authorized by the Legislature, see
Olson asserts he first became aware of the tax liability in January 2018, when his bank account was levied on by the Commissioner. After an unsuccessful courtesy review within the Department, Olson appealed to the tax court from the September 6 tax order. In his amended notice of appeal, Olson alleged that there was no regular audit, that he did not actually receive any mailings from the Commissioner, and he disputed all amounts assessed by the Commissioner. He told the tax court that he “receive[s] a substantial amount of
The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that Olson’s appeal was untimely. See
The tax court allowed Olson to file an amended notice of appeal so that he could raise his constitutional claims. In addition to asserting the constitutional claim, Olson further declared that he “would not have been able to pay off the taxes at issue in this case in full, without substantial personal and business hardship.”
The tax court granted the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Olson’s appeal was untimely. Olson v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 9376-R, 2020 WL 3455828, at *6 (Minn. T.C. June 15, 2020). Olson then appealed to us by writ of certiorari. See
The Legislature authorized the Commissioner to notify taxpayers of a tax assessment by mail, “postage prepaid.”
We review “orders of the tax court to determine whether the tax court lacked jurisdiction, whether its decision was not justified by the evidence or did not conform to the law, and whether the tax court otherwise committed an error of law.” Turner, 840 N.W.2d at 207; see
The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that the government cannot deprive a person of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999) (quoting
Olson contends that regular mail notice is insufficient because a better alternative exists (certified mail) and the amount at issue (over $150,000) warrants more sophisticated notice procedures. Olson admits he may have “overlooked” the tax order, but maintains that his inability to dispute the underlying tax assessment—because he did not contest the tax order in 60 days—requires more effective notice of the tax order. Olson argues that the glut of junk mail in modern times means that “most people no longer monitor the mail for important notices the way they once did.” He points us to several cases holding certified mail to be constitutionally sufficient. See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002). Olson also suggests that federal tax law, which generally requires certified mail, is evidence that Minnesota’s procedures are deficient. He further maintains that our language commenting on the sufficiency of regular mail in Turner was dicta.
The Commissioner responds first by noting that Olson received numerous letters and phone calls regarding his audit, none of which he responded to, and then cites Mullane,
As an initial matter, Olson is correct that Turner does not necessarily control this case. In Turner, notice of a tax assessment was sent by both email and regular mail to Turner, who was living abroad at the time. 840 N.W.2d at 210. We stated that both forms were “entirely reasonable in context.” Id. The context was that Turner was in regular contact with the Department by email while living abroad, and that his wife was living at their home in Minnesota at the time. We also noted that regular mail would “normally” satisfy due process, which left open the possibility of scenarios when some other form of notice may be required. Id. Accordingly, because our statement on regular mail did not foreclose all possible factual circumstances, Turner does not preclude Olson’s constitutional challenge.
On the facts before us, however, the Commissioner is nevertheless correct that notice by regular mail was constitutionally sufficient here. Setting aside Olson’s concession that he may have received the September 6 notice and overlooked it, his
Olson does not assert, nor is there any evidence to suggest, that the Commissioner knew Olson had not received notice of his tax liability. None of the letters sent by the Commissioner to Olson were returned as undeliverable, and he lived at the address to which each letter was sent. And aside from general statements in his brief about complications arising from pervasive junk mail, Olson provides no evidence that regular mail is not “reasonably calculated” to reach the address and person to which it is sent. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318. Nor does Olson cite any persuasive authority that holds that regular mail is insufficient notice.
To the contrary, persuasive authority has held that regular mail provides sufficient notice to, for example, property owners. See, e.g., Roslyn Jane Holdings, LLC v. Jefferson, 42 N.Y.S.3d 61, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (“Since the first class mailing addressed to the petitioner was not returned, there was no reason for L & L to believe that notice had not been received.”); cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that regular mail notice to opt out of class action satisfied due process).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the tax court.
Affirmed.