Boutin v. LaFleur

7H rights outstanding lack notice of others’ Chergosky v. property. Crosstown Inc.,

Bell, (1990)). (citing Minn.Stat. Finally, emphasize ac exception merger knowledging an doc subsequent, trine for conditions we are mere ly saying presumption merger that no law, respondents,

exists to bar as a matter of asserting their claims. contract It will task of court be the the district on remand parties’ competing evaluate the claims and appellant respon owes determine whether duty re-convey dents a contractual property. appeals’ we affirm the court of grant summary reversal of the trial court’s judgment appellant, for and remand this case proceedings.

to the district further Affirmed and remanded. Timothy BOUTIN, petitioner, Appellant, LaFLEUR,

Gothriel Commissioner of Corrections, al., Respondents. et

No. C1-97-1490. Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April

OPINION ANDERSON, A. J.

RUSSELL Timothy with two of criminal sexual conduct in the third counts degree in violation of Minn.Stat. (1998), one count of assault degree in third violation of Minn.Stat. (1998), § 609.223 and one count of misde- degree in meanor assault in the fifth violation 1(1) (2) and of Minn.Stat. (1998) involving as the result of an incident girlfriend. pleaded guilty to his Boutin third-degree assault. Prior to his release confinement, from Boutin was informed required Minn. he would be (1998) § 243.166 as a offend- Stat. challenges Boutin now the constitutional- er. ity requiring him to under the statute. 1994, living Boutin was

On November County apartment in an in Isanti with his approxi- girlfriend, Denise Rathman. At a.m., mately Rathman returned home 2:30 Rathman, evening out. from Unknown waiting up and Boutin was home for her her, having accusing her of sexual confronted argument An relations with another man. pushed Rathman into a ensued and Boutin wall, injury causing a serious to the back of head that several stitches. her later, Rathman, according to A short while forced her to have sexual intercourse Boutin later, approximate- with him. A few hours a.m., again ly alleged that Boutin Rathman intercourse with had nonconsensual sexual interview, During subsequent Boutin her. inter- police that he had sexual admitted Rathman, stating “[s]he said course with guess.” I did it I didn’t want to and still she frequently said claimed that Rathman Boutin intercourse not want to have sexual she did cooperated as she did on but that she often Law, Colbert, Attorney at St. Bradford police Boutin also told this occasion. Paul, appellant. “abuse,” only guilty he was felt that “rape.” not of III, Humphrey, Minnesota At- Hubert H. General, Paul, DeSanto,

torney As- St. Sara trial, por- Rathman recanted Prior to Paul, General, Attorney for re- St. sistant story in which she said tion of her spondent. with him. her to have sex Boutin forced guilty agreed plead

Boutin then up- third-degree and to charge of assault pre- departure from the ward durational constitutional, we exercise presumed to 40 utes are of 25 months sumptive sentence unconstitu- guilty plea, power our to declare During his months. only aggravating cir- when were two tional with extreme caution there agreed that upward necessary. Haggerty, for an du- absolutely allowed re which cumstances (1) sentencing: past (citing City departure rational 448 N.W.2d Rathman; history abuse of domestic No. v. Local Richfield of 42, (2) Rathman (Minn.1979)). having sexual intercourse party chal- inflicting assaulting substantial her “very heavy after lenging statute has the burden to 40 bodily Boutin was sentenced harm. demonstrating beyond doubt a reasonable remaining and the confinement months is unconstitutional.” State that the statute charges (Minn.1990). were dismissed.1 Merrill, 450 N.W.2d confinement, to Boutin’s release Prior court, argues: appeal to this On him manager informed that he would case his register despite requiring him to that register as a offender have to convicted of a “sex fact that he was not regis- by required section 243.166. is, words, and unrea- in his “absurd offense” brought and then instructed tered as (2) sonable”; registra- by requiring that his of Correc- against action the Commissioner 243.166, the Commissioner tion under section registra- seeking that the a declaration tions right Boutin’s to substantive due has violated violated his constitutional requirement tion by infringing presumption of on his permanently asking the court to rights and (3) innocence; reg- by requiring his and enjoin requiring from his the Commissioner 243.166, the Commis- istration under section Following a hear- registration in the future. proce- Boutin’s sioner has violated summary judgment, ing on cross-motions have an process because he did not dural due granted the the trial court Commissioner’s charges against opportunity to confront affirmed, appeals and of motion. The court him. petition for further re- granted Boutin’s we view to determine whether II. § requirements 243.166 violate of Minn.Stat. begin description of the first with a We rights. affirm. Boutin’s constitutional We 243.166, registration requirements of section provides: which I. summary judgment, we appeal On from person register under this section A shall if there are review the record to determine if: genuine of material fact and whether issues charged peti- with or person was of application erred in its district court felony violation of or at- tioned for a University the law. v. See Offerdahl following, tempt any of the and to violate Clinics, 425, 427 Hosps.

Minn. & 426 N.W.2d adjudicated delinquent convicted of or (Minn.1988). the material facts In this case offense or of another offense for that dispute and the are not in and both Boutin arising out of the same set of circum- they are entitled Commissioner contend * * * stances: summary judgment of law. as matter (iii) under sec- criminal sexual conduct interpretation of statutes is [1-3] The 609.342; 609.343; 609.344; or tion In question which review de novo. of law * * 609.345 *. (Minn.1993) Blilie, re 1(a) (1998). § subd. Minn.Stat. (citation omitted). Accordingly, we are not charged with and con- an offender is by interpretation of Once bound a lower court’s ele- a crime that satisfies these stat- victed of statutes. id. Because Minnesota See state, sentence, by having physical challenging weakened sexu- appealed victim’s 1. Boutin his length sentencing upward immediately inflicting dura- of the court's unpublished after al relations with her decision, harm, departure. tional particular bodily act of was an substantial appeals Boutin, C8-95-1708, the court ing determined that the sentenc- cruelty.” No. State discretion in sentenc- court did not abuse its (Minn.App.1996). at *2 WL Boutin, noting "taking advantage (1998). merits, § be intent. 645.16 the offender must notified See Minn.Stat. If duty register. statutory language plain unambiguous, notice can Such be accom plain only meaning court must look First,' ways. plished in one of the sen two statutory of the language. See Minn.Stat. person tencing duty court can “tell 645.16; Revenue, Wegener v. Comm’r of person register” “read and have that (concluding N.W.2d duty sign stating a form of the may beyond plain that a language look * * * person explained.” has been only meaning if the literal of a statute leads instruct, Or, if to so Id. the court fails “the utterly departs to an absurd result that assigned agent notify shall corrections legislative purpose). person requirements registra of [the of the 1(a)(1) section Subdivision statute].” tion Id.2 person states that a shall if the duty regarding reg- Once instructed person felony “a violation ister, comply must with three offender any” attempt of or to violate enumerated requirements. First, the offender must sub- offense, felony adju- was “convicted or signed registration mit a form3 which con- delinquent dicated for that offense another tains “information the bureau of arising offense out of the same set of circum- apprehension,” along finger- criminal with “a 1(a)(1). stances.” Minn.Stat. card, print person photograph 1991, Upon only its enactment in this statute person’s taken at the the time of release required persons that of convicted certain or, person from if the incarceration was not felony register upon enumerated offenses re- incarcerated, person initially at time the the 1, 1991, prison. lease of See Act June registered section.” under this Minn.Stat. (1998). 285, 13(a), 4(a) §§ Second, § ch. 3 and 1991 Minn. Laws subd. 1325, legislature sign return 1329. In offender must an annual 1993 the amended require person register address verification form. See Minn.Stat. the statute to that 4(c)(1) § Finally, subd. felony if convicted of an or “an- enumerated notify law offender must enforcement offi- arising other offense of the same set out days writing prior any cials in five least 20,1993, May circumstances.” See Act of ch. change See address. 326, 10, 1,1993 art Minn. Laws 2090. 3(b) (1998). statutory language The of section III. logical plain meaning, par 243.166 has a argument We turn to Boutin’s next ticularly when context of the read that he should not be forced to 1993, amendment. From 1991 provisions of section because the 243.166 do persons required registration only of convict require register. not that he Boutin con adjudicated delinquent ed of or for an enu require tends that does not section 243.166 1, 1991, felony. merated See Act June ch. him register because was convicted 285, 13(a), 1325, §§ Minn. 3 and Laws felony of one of the enumerated offenses legislature 1329. 1993 the amended the 1(a)(1) listed in section 243.166. require person register if statute to that a felony convicted object statutory enumerated or another interpreta The legislative arising tion is to same set of circum- ascertain and effectuate offense out of the case, accurately by caption phrased In this Boutin was not informed while the is not as as sentencing requirement registra- be, pleaded of the it could which Boutin offense to by assigned assault, tion but was instead notified guilty, third-degree and the sentence he agent. corrections received, precisely are on the form. In identified addition, print the form also indicates in bold captioned, registration 3. Boutin's form is "Sex "PRIVATE DATA FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT Registration Offender Notification and Form law USE.” We are satisfied that enforcement will Including State of Minnesota Statute 243.166.” caption not be misled caption the term "Sex in the Offender” form. indicating form could be misunderstood However, Boutin was a sex offense. convicted of offense, charged predatory we conclude initially charged with enumer- stances4 provi- May required eh. Act of he was ated offense. 1,1993 10, § Minn. Laws 2090. sions of section 243.166. art statutory argues IV. arising out of the offense phrase, “another question of turn to the We next read to should be of circumstances” same set registration statute is constitu whether the mean, predatory] of [enumerated “another argues applied to Boutin. Boutin tional as of circum arising of the same set fense out violates his constitutional that section 243.166 amend contends stances.” process by infring to substantive convicted only aimed at offenders ment was ing presumption of innocence because on his predatory offense” of another “enumerated guilty of an presumes that he is the statute of circum of the same set which arose out though predatory offense even enumerated charged enumerated as another stances The of such an offense. he was not convicted logical that the It is not predatory offense. both the Minnesota Due Process Clauses of language it legislature would have chosen provide that States Constitutions United Inserting was intended. did if such a result person of government deprive cannot predatory phrase enumerated “another “life, liberty, property without due statute, argues, as Boutin in this offense” V, XIV; amends. of law.” U.S. Const. By simply language redundant. makes the I, pro Minn. art. 7. Both clauses Const. statute, person convicted applying the govern arbitrary, wrongful hibit “certain predatory offense aris another enumerated actions, regardless of the fairness of ment circumstances same set of out of the procedures implement them.” used register. The already be would Burch, Zinermon v. U.S. enu differentiate between statute does not (1990) (citation L.Ed.2d 100 S.Ct. offenses, simply it re merated omitted); Harnischfeger see also Sartori if quires person register convicted of that a (Minn.1988) (stat 448, Corp., 432 N.W.2d 453 - regard any predatory offense enumerated protection provid process “[t]he that the convic less of which set of circumstances the Minnesota Constitution is iden ed under many other enumer tion arises out of or how guaranteed process to the due under the tical charged or result predatory offenses are ated States.”). of the United Constitution in Minn.Stat. 243.166. conviction. See therefore makes the interpretation Boutin’s implicates a If section 243.166 superfluous. Such phrase “another offense” right, must show a fundamental the state contrary reason and interpretation an is compelling abridg legitimate and interest for statutory that “a principle construction right. Blodgett, In re 510 ing that See construed, possible, so that statute is to be (Minn.1994) 910, (discussing fun 914 N.W.2d word, superfluous, phrase, is no or sentence being physical damental interest free void, Duluth Fire insignificant.” or See restraint). right fundamental is at Where no Duluth, City v. 361 men’s Ass’n Relief stake, judicial scrutiny exacting is not (citation 381, omit N.W.2d 385 requires only substantive due ted). arbitrary capricious; in not be or statute words, provide Therefore, charged must a rea other because Boutin objective. permissible means to a predatory with offense and sonable an enumerated (Minn. Behl, 560, v. 564 N.W.2d 567 another offense which arose See State was convicted of Hardwick, 1997) (citing v. 478 U.S. as the Bowers out of the same set of circumstances charge supported the of crimi- dissenting opinion and re- cumstances that 4. The would reverse degree. a mand because the trial court failed to make finding Bout- nal in the third sexual misconduct of, admitted, Boutin was convicted plea, offense at the time that he entered his assault, degree out the same set of third arose aggravated were that the circumstances circumstances as the offense of criminal with Rathman fact that he had sexual intercourse degree. in the third We are sexual misconduct satisfied, inflicting assaulting substantial after her and record, that the offense of third on bodily harm. degree set of cir- assault arose out of the same

717 2841, 186, 191-96, 140 at will or even to move out of 92 L.Ed.2d residences 106 S.Ct. (1986)). registering permanent Nor re- state. is only required regis- quirement; Boutin is expressly enumerated in Though not years. update address for 10 ter and constitution, pre recognized the we have (1998). 6(a) Minn.Stat. a fundamental sumption of innocence as Second, historically registration such stat Edwards, 343, right. v. 269 Minn. See State regarded punishment. have utes not been (citations (1964) 623, 348, 626 130 N.W.2d 225, 229, California, v. See Lambert 355 U.S. omitted). However, we have also held (stating 2 L.Ed.2d 78 S.Ct. 228 only applies right such fundamental registration licensing “akin laws are criminal, in punitive, are or statutes which statutes”); Manning, see also State State, Highways v. Dep’t nature. See (Minn.App.1995) (holding N.W.2d Halvorson, 288 Minn. regulatory), rev. that section 243.166 is de 473, (Minn. 20, 1995). July nied legislature enacted section When Third, statute does not the stat it did not indicate whether promote punishment the traditional aims of punitive regulato or ute was intended to be not involve since it does confinement and is ry. necessary in Such a determination is to exact retribution. The stat- not intended to ascertain whether Boutin’s funda order also, case, ute least Boutin’s does not presumption mental of innocence require community any or notification other implicated. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Mar is disclosure, “pri- public but instead involves tinez, 83 S.Ct. 9 L.Ed.2d U.S. “may only vate data” that be used for law (1963), Supreme Court United States purposes.” enforcement following outlined the factors to be used (1998).5 Finally, pri- analysis: such mary purpose of the statute is create an an affirma- the sanction involves Whether registry offender to assist law enforcement restraint, disability it tive whether has investigations. we conclude regarded punish- historically as a been civil, regulatory that section 243.166 is stat- ment, play only whether it comes into on presumption of innocence ute and that scienter, finding operation whether its Simply requiring Boutin to does not attach. promote pun- aims of will the traditional finding guilt amount to a does not - deterrence, ishment retribution offense. There- enumerated applies it whether the behavior to which fore, implicate Boutin’s the statute does crime, already a whether alternative rights. fundamental rationally purpose may to which it be con- However, even if a fundamental it, assignable it nected is and whether right implicated, pass in order to con is not appears in to the alter- excessive relation registration stitutional muster the statute purpose assigned. native meet the rational basis standard of must still omitted) (citations 168-69, Id. at 83 S.Ct. 554 States v. Carolene review. See United (emphasis original). in Co., 153-54, 144, 58 Prods. 304 U.S. S.Ct. (1938) 778, applied (stating that the factors are this 82 L.Ed. 1234 When these case, requires challenged regulatory. that is rational basis test the it is clear the statute First, supported by any registration require legislation not an affir- to be set of facts does restraint, reasonably which be disability only requires it either known or could mative or Osburn, assumed); 955 F.2d person register with law enforce- United States v. that the (11th Cir.) 1500, 1505 (stating “any any change that ratio ment and inform the state of addition, enacting registration Congress In nale ‘could’ have had for address. the legislation, ability change can validate the re- does not restrict Boutin’s the statute information, therefore, challenges this case does not neither cites nor Boutin consti- (1998), tutionality issues addressed in Matter Risk Level of Minn.Stat. which raise the - C.M., (Minn. applicable 578 N.W.2d 391 in some circumstances not to Bout- Determination of - registration App.1998). public in mandates disclosure of 718 319, 335, Congress actually Eldridge, v. 424 96 con Mathews U.S.

gardless of whether 893, S.Ct. 47 L.Ed.2d 18 at the time the bill that rationale sidered denied, 878, 113 506 U.S. passed”), S.Ct. cert. Supreme The Court has stated that a lib- (1992). The rational 223, 160 121 L.Ed.2d a erty implicated when interest is loss (1) act requires: that “the standard basis loss reputation coupled with the of some is (2) public purpose,” that a promote serve Davis, tangible Paul v. other interest. See unreasonable, arbitrary or the act “not be 701-02, 693, 1155, 424 U.S. 96 S.Ct. 47 private with a inter capricious interference” (1976) (adopting L.Ed.2d 405 so-called est, means bear a “the chosen that test). “stigma-plus” argues that he public purpose sought relation rational “stigma-plus” meets the test because he has Herbst, N.W.2d Contos 278 to be served.” reputation coupled suffered loss of with the (Minn.1979). 732, 741 registration complying with the burden statute. standard, Supreme applying Being “predatory is labeled offender” Court noted: Paul, injurious reputation. to one’s required to convince are not States (stating “[i]m- U.S. 96 S.Ct. 1155 that legisla- correctness of their courts of puting to an criminal behavior individual is Rather, challenging judgments. those tive se”); defamatory per generally considered judgment legislative must convince (9th Shimoda, Neal v. 131 F.3d legislative facts on which court that the Cir.1997) (holding there is no doubt apparently could not is based classification consequences the “stigmatizing about of be- by true reasonably be conceived be offender”). ing labeled it true a sex While is governmental maker. decision regarding information Boutin’s case Co., Creamery v. Clover Minnesota Leaf general public is available to the the form 101 S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d U.S. documents, of court is a distinct there differ- omitted). (1981)(citations presence ence between the mere of such conceding that information in court documents and the ac- the state has While predatory tive dissemination of such information to the legitimate registering interest community. state’s law enforcement offenders, that the does claims state registering nonpreda- not an interest in have However, Supreme Court not tory offenders because Davis, procedural bring ed a successful nonpredatory will dilute the list of offenders process challenge person must suffer and minimize its law en offenders injury stigma, reputa more than mere argument This forcement effectiveness. coupled tion must be with the also loss Keeping a persuasive. list of such of Davis, recognizable other some interest. See rationally legitimate related fenders is (stating 424 U.S. at S.Ct. solving crimes. state interest of liberty property interests receive constitu 243.166 does not violate hold that section protection only they have tional been “ini Boutin’s constitutional to substantive tially recognized protected state due process. law”). complying Boutin claims with the requirements recognizable amounts to of a V. the loss inter argument This est. fails because there is no second In Boutin’s constitutional recognizable being in free interest from hav challenge, argues that his he constitutional update to address information. a Such right procedural process to due was violated requirement a minimal burden is and is register required preda he to when was as clearly sufficiently important not the interest tory being offender without confronted first requires. “stigma-plus” the test See id. procedural charges. due such When issue, alternative, urges In the is at we must first determine Boutin liberty step away “stigma-plus” protectable whether a interest is at to from the federal Foster, recognize, and Conservatorship stake. See In re constitutional standard of Constitution, (Minn.1996); protectable lib- N.W.2d see also Minnesota erty reputation presumptive interest in alone. While it is from the sentence of 25 months. Oman, so, power given our v. He for time within to do see State was credit served his since on 522-23 initial 261 Minn. incarceration November (Minn.1961) (holding entering plea this court When guilty is not his and at sentenc- interpretations ing, agreed of ag- bound follow the Su- Boutin that there were two interpreting gravating permitted in preme Court Minnesota circumstances that Constitution), one, recognize pro- upward departure; past we history decline to his of liberty reputation two, complainant, interest in domestic tectable alone abuse of the and “stigma- having instead embrace the federal his and sexual intercourse with the com- Fuller, plus” plainant having standard. See after State assaulted and inflicted (stating bodily upon 726-27 N.W.2d substantial harm her. “cavalierly not construe our constitu- will sentencing At hearing Boutin’s and in its expansively tion more than the United States order, sentencing the court did not make Supreme Court has construed federal finding felony the dismissed criminal constitution”). charges sexual conduct arose out of the same procedural Boutin’s constitutional third-degree set circumstances as- process has not violated. been Further, undisputed sault conviction. it is that the court inform did not Boutin that aas Affirmed. guilty plea required

result of his he would be register predatory as a sex offender under ANDERSON, H. (dissenting). PAUL J. Rather, § prior Minn.Stat. 243.166. his respectfully Timothy I Appellant, dissent. release prison required by and as Boutin, charged was with two counts of felo- statute, the in- Commissioner of Corrections ny in the criminal sexual conduct third de- formed he required Boutin that would be 609.344, gree § in violation of Minn.Stat. predatory as a sex offender. 1(c) (1998), felony subd. one count assault degree in third in violation Minn.Stat. The part reg- relevant the sex offender (1998), § count of one misde- in majority’s istration statute is set forth degree in meanor assault the fifth violation statute, opinion. Under the be Boutin is to 1(1) of Minn.Stat. as a of- sex pleaded guilty Boutin single to the fender, he been must have convicted of either third-degree count of assault the other an offense enumerated the statute or “an- against charges him were dismissed. arising out other offense of the same set appears circumstances.” It the refer- The record is clear that the time he ence same set circumstances con- guilty plea, entered his Boutin did not admit in the tained statute refers to the felony that he committed criminal sexual con- enumerated offense. duct and he makes no such admission on appeal. police He did admit to the that he assault, Third-degree Minn.Stat. complainant had sexual intercourse with the convicted, offense for which was evening morning on both one of the offenses enumerated section question, though complainant even did 243.166; conduct, felony but criminal sexual to have not want intercourse. his state- 1(c), the offense police, guilty ment to he admitted was initially charged for which Boutin was abuse, adamantly guilty but denied he was charge subsequently which dismissed entering of criminal sexual conduct. When plea, pursuant to Boutin’s is an enumerated plea, agreed that guilty he “had offense under section 243.166. complainant some sexual relations” with statute, the third-degree Boutin’s evening early later that and next morn- out assault conviction arose of the same set ing and the court could take this fact of circumstances as the dismissed criminal sentencing when him for into account assault. charges, apparently Boutin sexual conduct May subject registration requirements was in

Boutin sentenced on 1995 to upward prison, departure in months section 243.166. finding that an element of section agreement I in with the essential point, am To this proved that our 243.166 was either admitted or analysis, but it is here majority’s —that felony third-degree of which diverge. Specifi- assault analytical routes respective the Boutin stands convicted arose out majority finds or assumes that cally, the charges finding that same circumstances as dismissed made a district court dismissed, felony criminal sexual conduct. offenses of felo- of later charged, but out of the ny conduct arose criminal sexual consequences There is no doubt that the as the third-de- of circumstances same set and, section 243.166 are serious because con- My review of the record gree assault. consequences, procedural these serious court did not the district vinces me must be followed. The statute the crimi- specific finding either that make a rigor- imposes that are on Boutin conditions which Boutin was conduct with nal sexual confining. pris- Upon and release from ous leading that the events charged occurred or on, register with his corrections must arose out of the same offense to this assigned. agent as soon as one is See Minn. the crime of convic- of circumstances as set 3(a) (1998). If he does Stat. tion, It seems funda- third-degree assault. agent not have a corrections because he is consequences me that if the serious mental to register supervision, not under then he must imposed upon are to be of section 243.166 agency in the with the local law enforcement else, must, at a mini- anyone Boutin or community where he resides. See id. The mum, make require the district court form used for is labeled “Sex appellate finding. As an specific such Registration Notification and Offender unwilling make a factual find- judge, I am of Minnesota 243.166.” Form —State Statute this case. to the outcome of so critical (a) Bureau of The form is sent to Crimi- (b) that, Apprehension correc- mistaking no at the nal offender’s There should be (c) records; complainant, agent; corrections upon the tions CO time of his assault (d) finger- very unsympathetic person. photograph A the offender. Boutin was a history print abuse which card must be enclosed with the form. He had a of domestic 4(a) (1998). jealous possessive in a See Minn.Stat. sübd. found its roots form, complainant. signing He had When the offender must attitude towards acknowledge in that he the follow- seriously her a manner that understands mistreated ing: society cannot countenance. On civilized brutally night question, he assaulted the duty my register I have been notified by throwing against a wall complainant her with Minn. as sex offender accordance severely that her head was

with such force I I 243.166. understand that must Stat. damaged. Later and the wall was lacerated years period for a of ten from the early evening and the next morn- that same initially registered, date that I or until was complainant’s ing, exploited he vulnera- release, my probation, supervised or condi- engaged two occasions ble condition and on period expires, tional release whichever oc- with her. The fact that sexual relations curs later. If I was committed under together” complainant had “been 253B.185, year registra- the ten years, apartment, for seven shared were period period tion does not include the parents one-half-year-old a four and commitment. I understand that I must son, may have been intoxicated and both changes all of address at least 5 excuse, mitigate, much less such does not residence, days prior including changing behavior. moving to another state. I will make this writing my notification current such that Boutin’s behavior was agent, or Federal corrections Minnesota felony charged with criminal sexual conduct or, agent, I if I do not have a corrections felony third-degree and he was convicted notify agency in must the law enforcement charges against But the former him assault. community in I which reside. pursuant plea agreement to a were dismissed Moreover, previ- legally required I I I am agreed understand that state. stated, ously any supply requested data under Minn. the record before us lacks register I fail- also understand that is as sex offender. Stat. 243.166. comply provide procedural safeguard place, false ure to informa- With this gross any sub- undoubtedly tion misdemeanor is Boutin would have more been felony. sequent is a violation fully consequences guilty aware of his provided plea information we tempted I understand that the would not be to make purposes, findings for law stage will be used enforcement factual at of proceed- purposes But, I established law. ings. may other tempting as as it to make be gross is a misde- also understand that it finding upon police reports our own based provide information in the statements, meanor to false and unverified im- do so is completion of this and I to its form attest proper. I conclude that have accuracy of information. appeals no but to reverse choice of and remand this matter to the court. district acknowledgment As the aforementioned forth, sets the offender must for Because I would reverse and remand on years minimum of date period ten grounds district court failed to registration give of and must no- the initial proper finding make a as to an essential changed, every residency time tice is 243.166, § of element Minn.Stat. I conclude writing given must which notice be unnecessary statutory that it is to reach the days five each before move. interpretation and constitutional ad- issues 3(b) (1998). and 6 If the subds. by majority. dressed registration comply offender fails to statute, penalty he faces a substantial —a PAGE, (dissenting). Justice gross misdemeanor conviction. See Minn. join in I of Paul H. dissent Justice Stat. subd. 5 A second Anderson. felony. violation constitutes a See id. Fur- ther, required to at the time Boutin was LANCASTER, (dissenting). Justice register, an offender was deemed to have stayed any longer join moved when address I Paul H. dissent Justice days than three and evinced intent to take Anderson.

up residence there. See Minn.Stat. 3(b) (1996). consequences falling

Because the serious, I, purview of section are majority, unlike the would not use the modifi- “only” referring er to the fact when predator offender must a sexual period or that the lasts years. minimum ten These are serious In Re PETITION FOR REINSTATE person living for a restrictions a free MENT TO the PRACTICE OF LAW OF society worthy such as ours. It is note JOHNSON, Mary Irene Petitioner. separates society that what our from totali- No. C9-99-91. tarian states that we take individual free- seriously deprive doms and will not citizens Supreme of Minnesota. Court of those freedoms without strict adherence procedural requirements Un- the law. April fortunately, finding by absent a the district court, procedural was not in met

this case. ORDER finding made a

Had the district court charges By sexual out order dated March this court criminal conduct arose Mary suspended petitioner set of as- Johnson the same circumstances ás the Irene sault, practice period of 30 I have no doubt that we would have from the of law for a today days. suspension provided order before us the issue whether Boutin The

Case Details

Case Name: Boutin v. LaFleur

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Apr 22, 1999

Citation: 591 N.W.2d 711

Docket Number: C1-97-1490

Court Abbreviation: Minn.