Jasmine M. WINSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT; Mike Vansant; D.R. Sawyer, Corporal; W.J. Willis, Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 10-30012
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Aug. 12, 2010.
390 F. Appx 379
In considering whether the requisite amount in controversy has been met, “[i]t has long been recognized that unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.” Greenberg, 134 F.3d at 1253 (internal quotation marks omitted). “To justify dismissal, it must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Richey‘s complaint, however, does not list a specific amount that she seeks to recover. Thus, we note that Greenberg‘s “legal certainty” test does not apply here. See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1409 (5th Cir.1995) (“This court has indicated that the legal certainty test does not apply in a remand situation where the plaintiff has alleged an indeterminate amount of damages.“). “Accordingly, we hold that if a defendant can show that the amount in controversy actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount, the plaintiff must be able to show that, as a matter of law, it is certain that [s]he will not be able to recover more than the damages for which [s]he has prayed in the state court complaint.” Id. at 1411.
In the present case, Wal-Mart has presented the district court with substantial evidence to support its claim that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Although Richey vigorously disputes the district court‘s conclusion that the requisite amount is satisfied, she has not provided evidence to refute that conclusion. The evidence in the record shows that Richey‘s hourly wage was $12.54. Thus, Richey could reasonably expect to earn $26,083.20 annually. Notably, Richey‘s First Amended Complaint requests actual damages of lost wages and benefits, loss of future earnings and benefits in the past, mental anguish in the past and future, prejudgment interest, court costs, and exemplary damages. Even if Richey sought future lost wages for only three years, that amount alone would exceed $75,000—and that calculation does not take into consideration the amounts she seeks to recover for her actual lost wages and benefits, or her mental anguish in the past and future.
Given these calculations, we find no clear error in the district court‘s reasoning. The facts in the record are sufficient to invest the district court with jurisdiction. Accordingly, we conclude that
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Douglas Lee Harville, Harville Law Firm, L.L.C., Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Edwin H. Byrd, III, Joseph Samuel Woodley, Pettiette, Armand, Dunkelman, Woodley, Byrd & Cromwell, L.L.P., Shreveport, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before BENAVIDES, PRADO, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jasmine M. Winston appeals the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer W.J. Willis and former Interim Chief of Police Mike Vansant on her
On appeal, Winston argues that (1) no reasonable officer could have believed there existed probable cause to arrest her for any of her charged crimes, and thus Officer Willis is not entitled to qualified immunity on her false arrest claim; (2) she has sufficiently demonstrated that Chief Vansant failed to train and supervise his
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2007, Shreveport police officers, including Officer Willis and Corporal D.R. Sawyer, responded to a request to assist with crowd control of a riot type situation at a local downtown nightclub known as “Club Ice.” Approximately 1,500 people were inside the club attending a concert, and an additional 500 gathered outside. Based on the large number of people, dispatchers requested that all available officers from all four areas of Shreveport respond. Between twenty and forty uniformed, undercover, and off-duty officers assisted to keep several disturbances in the crowd from erupting into violence.
A Shreveport fire investigator determined that Club Ice‘s occupancy had exceeded its capacity, and the officers were instructed to prevent anyone from entering the club. In response, the officers issued commands to the crowd to disperse, both verbally and over patrol car PA systems. The commands continued for approximately thirty minutes, and at times, the officers physically pushed people away from the entrance of the building. After some time had passed, part of the crowd had dispersed, but approximately 150–200 people remained outside the club.
After Officer Willis had been present at the club for about a half-hour, Winston, who had previously been drinking at a night club next door, attempted to gain entrance to Club Ice through a side door. Officer Willis watched as Winston tried to maneuver around another, unidentified police officer. Officer Willis then stepped between Winston and the unidentified officer, using his baton to push Winston away from the club.
According to Officer Willis and Corporal Sawyer, Winston struck Officer Willis twice: once in the jaw, and again on top of his head. Winston alleges that she simply flailed her arms as she lost her balance and did not mean to strike Officer Willis, but concedes that the officers could have construed this as an attack. Corporal Sawyer responded by grabbing Winston around the shoulder area and forcing her to the ground, where she struck her face on the sidewalk, injuring her lips and teeth. The officers then arrested Winston and removed her from the scene, and she was subsequently charged with refusal to disperse, resisting arrest, and battery on a police officer.
Winston filed suit, alleging false arrest and excessive use of force claims against Officer Willis and Corporal Sawyer; Monell claims for unlawful policies and practices, which allegedly caused or contributed to her injuries, against the City of Shreveport, the Shreveport Police Department, and Chief Vansant; and pendent state law claims based on direct and vicarious liability. The defendants collectively moved for summary judgment, asserting that Corporal Sawyer and Officer Willis were shielded by qualified immunity and that Winston produced no evidence to support a Monell claim.
The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Willis, the Shreveport Police Department, and Chief Vansant. As to Officer Willis, the district court found that (1) he had probable cause to arrest Winston for failure to disperse, and was thus entitled to qualified immunity on Winston‘s false arrest claim;2 and (2) Winston failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Willis used excessive force, and he was thus entitled to qualified immunity on that claim as well.3 As to the Shreveport Police Department and Chief Vansant, the district court found the record entirely devoid of evidence demonstrating failure to train, supervise, or discipline Officer Willis, and that any alleged failure did not amount to deliberate indifference. Finally, the district court found that because Officer Willis acted reasonably under the circumstances, Winston‘s state law claims for direct and vicarious liability failed. Winston timely appealed.4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.” Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 228-29 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir.2008)). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal Winston advances several arguments. First, she contends that no reasonable law enforcement officer would have, or could have, believed that there
A. False Arrest Claim against Officer Willis
Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). In order to determine whether qualified immunity shields an official, the Supreme Court, in Saucier v. Katz, mandated a two-step analysis, in which a court must determine whether “the facts alleged show the officer‘s conduct violated a constitutional right.” 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). A court must also ask “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant‘s alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 816 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). The Supreme Court has recently held that “[t]he judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 818.
The second step involves a determination of whether “the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time that the challenged conduct occurred,” and that “[t]he touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law.” Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir.2001) (citations omitted) “This means that ‘[e]ven law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly [commit a constitutional violation] are entitled to immunity.‘” Id. (quoting Goodson v. Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir.2000) (alteration in original)).
Because “[t]he constitutional claim of false arrest requires a showing of no probable cause,” Club Retro L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir.2009) (citation omitted), Officer Willis is entitled to qualified immunity “if officers of reasonable competence could disagree” that Officer Willis had probable cause to arrest Winston for any of the crimes for which she was charged. See Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has defined probable cause as the “facts and circumstances within the officer‘s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (citations omitted). Furthermore, this Court has stated that probable cause “does not demand any showing that [the belief that an offense was committed] be correct or more likely true than false,” because “the probable cause analysis only requires that we find a basis for an officer to believe to a ‘fair probability’ that a violation occurred.” Piazza v. Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir.2000) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
Any law enforcement or peace officer or public official responsible for keeping the peace may issue a command to disperse under the authority of
R.S. 14:329.1 -14:329.8 if he reasonably believes that riot is occurring or about to occur. The command to disperse shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to be communicated to the assemblage.Whoever willfully fails to comply with a lawful command to disperse shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of
R.S. 14:329.7 .
[A] public disturbance involving an assemblage of three or more persons acting together or in concert which by tumultuous and violent conduct, or the imminent threat of tumultuous and violent conduct, results in injury or damage to persons or property or creates a clear and present danger of injury or damage to persons or property.
Winston contends that no reasonable officer could have believed that a riot was occurring or about to occur at the time of the encounter, and that no reasonable officer could believe that Winston had been given a lawful command to disperse. Both the record and her own testimony, however, belie her argument. Officer Willis responded to “riot type” conditions where up to forty officers were trying to prevent a volatile situation involving approximately 500 people from escalating. When he arrived, officers were trying to dispel several disturbances in the crowd and attempting to prevent others from commencing. Even after approximately 300 individuals from the crowd had dispersed, Winston herself testified that at the time of her encounter with Officer Willis, the scene “kind of exploded,” and officers were both screaming and in the process of physically detaining those around her. Based on these circumstances, the officers were well within their authority to conclude that a riot, as defined by
Additionally, Winston stated in her deposition that she was aware that Officer Willis directed her to move back, and that she did not do so. Under these circumstances, Officer Willis reasonably believed that he had probable cause to arrest Winston for failure to disperse. As such, he is entitled to qualified immunity on Winston‘s false arrest claim.5
B. Supervisory Liability Claim against Chief Vansant
Supervisory officials may not be held liable under
We have held, with respect to the third prong, that “‘deliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action,” and that “for an official to act with deliberate indifference, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[d]eliberate indifference requires a showing of more than negligence or even gross negligence,” and “[t]o satisfy the deliberate indifference prong, a plaintiff usually must demonstrate a pattern of violations and that the inadequacy of the training is obvious and obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation.” Id. (citations and quotations marks omitted).
Here, Winston offered the testimony of an expert who opined that the technique employed by Corporal Sawyer to throw Winston to the ground after she struck Officer Willis was unwarranted, and that if the Shreveport Police Department taught and Chief Vansant approved the technique, the system was flawed. Winston also offered the deposition testimony of Corporal Sawyer who asserted that he believed that he used a proper technique because it was in accordance with the technique taught to him at the Shreveport Police Academy. Based on this evidence, Winston contends that Chief Vansant should have properly supervised the officers, withdrawn the policy, and offered proper retraining.
Winston, however, has failed to offer any additional evidence that would tie Corporal Sawyer‘s activity with any alleged failure by Chief Vansant personally to train, supervise, or discipline his officers. At no point does she assert that Chief Vansant trained Corporal Sawyer at the Academy, or implemented, endorsed, advocated, or was even aware of his officers’ use of the challenged technique. Likewise, she does not advance any evidence that Chief Vansant was “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm” existed should this technique continue to be used, nor has she demonstrated that Chief Vansant, in fact, “dr[e]w the inference.” Id. Additionally, Winston fails to demonstrate any “pattern of violations“; rather she offers her own sole incident with Corporal Sawyer. See id. Winston‘s failure to offer any proof of a pattern of violations demonstrates that any alleged wrongdoing on the part of Chief Vansant could be characterized as merely negligence, rather than the requisite deliberate indifference. As such, we hold that the district court correctly found that Winston‘s
C. State Law Claims
Under Louisiana law, we apply the same “reasonableness” standard to Winston‘s
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Officer Willis reasonably believed that he had probable cause to arrest Winston for refusal to disperse, he is entitled to qualified immunity on Winston‘s false arrest claim. Additionally, because Winston has not demonstrated that Chief Vansant failed to adequately train Corporal Sawyer, or that any alleged failure to train rose to the level of deliberate indifference, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Chief Vansant on Winston‘s supervisory liability claim. Finally, because Louisiana law adopts the same “reasonableness” standard used in determining whether qualified immunity applies, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Willis and Chief Vansant on Winston‘s state law claims for false arrest, excessive force, and vicarious liability. We therefore affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.