JANEY BROWN; BING GUO; JUNXIAN ZHANG v. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC; STEPHEN C. DURINGER; PETER WONG; JUDY WONG
No. 22-55700
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
November 21, 2023
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-10971-DOC-AGR
OPINION
Argued and Submitted September 11, 2023 Pasadena, California
Filed November 21, 2023
Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., MICHELLE T. FRIEDLAND, and ERIC D. MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.
SUMMARY*
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The panel reversed the distriсt court‘s summary judgment, which held that an action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings.
Janey Brown and other tenants filed suit against the Duringer Law Group, PLC, and Stephen C. Duringer, alleging that Duringer violated the Act by filing a memorandum of costs in state court proceedings concerning an unlawful-detainer judgment.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, by vesting jurisdiction over state-court appeals in the U.S. Suprеme Court,
district court proceedings commenced and (4) inviting district court review and rejectiоn of those judgments.
The panel concluded that the tenants’ action did not challenge a memorandum of costs on which the state court already had rendered judgment, but rather a later memorаndum. Because there was no relevant state-court judgment purporting to adjudicate the validity of the costs in the later memorandum, Rooker-Feldman did not apply.
COUNSEL
Louis P. Dell (argued), Law Office of Louis P. Dell, Burbank, California, for Plaintiffs-Apрellants.
Edward L. Laird II (argued) and Stephen C. Duringer, The Duringer Law Group PLC, Anaheim Hills, California; Curtis T. Greer IV, Kimball Tirey & St John LLP, Irvine, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
OPINION
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Janey Brown, Bing Guo, and Junxian Zhang (collectively, Tenants) filed suit against the Duringer Law Group, PLC, and Stephen C. Duringer (cоllectively, Duringer) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In their complaint, Tenants allege that Duringer violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2005, Peter and Judy Wong (the Wongs) leased an apartment to Tenants. The lease agreement stated that “[i]n the event of a default by Tenant hereunder, Tenant shall pay to Landlord all costs incurred by Landlord ... including attorneys’ feеs.” In 2010, Tenants breached the lease agreement by failing to pay rent, and the Wongs hired Duringer to initiate an unlawful-detainer action pursuant to
$2,705, composed of $1,785 in back rent and incidental damages, $500 in attorneys’ fees, and $420 in other costs.
For over nine years, Duringer did not attempt to enforce the judgment on behalf of the Wongs. Thеn, in February 2020, Duringer filed an application for renewal of the judgment pursuant to
In July 2020, the Wongs applied for a writ of execution. See
In November 2020, Duringer received the levied funds on behalf of the Wongs, which fully satisfied the writ stemming from the renewal of judgment and the February 2020 memorandum of costs. Howevеr, shortly before receiving those levied funds, Duringer filed a second
memorandum of costs, seeking $2,750 in accrued interest and $3,780 in costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in litigating the first memorandum of costs. Duringer never аpplied for a writ of execution to enforce this second memorandum of costs, and thus the court never took any further action regarding the claimed costs.
On December 2, 2020, Tenants filed suit against Duringer, alleging violations of the FDCPA. Tenants moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of Duringer‘s liability for these violations. Duringer cross-moved, arguing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the district court of jurisdiction and that, in any event, Tenants’ FDCPA claims failed on the merits as a matter of law. The district court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Tenants’ claims and granted Duringer‘s cross-motion for summary judgment without reaching the merits of those сlaims. It did not adjudicate Tenants’ motion for partial summary judgment. Tenants timely appealed.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction pursuant to
ANALYSIS
doctrine provides that
In this case, the district court interpreted Tenants’ FDCPA claims as attacking the validity of the costs Duringer claimed in its February memorandum of costs, on which the Superior Court already rendered judgment. We disagree with the district court‘s interpretation. A fair reading of Tenants’ complaint and the subsequent record shows that Tenants seek to remedy the harms caused by Duringer‘s filing of the October memorandum of costs, not the February memorandum, as the district court assumed. For instance, in their complaint, Tenants аllege that the October memorandum “claimed duplicat[ive] interest and unreasonable collection costs.” At summary judgment, Tenants conceded that the Superior Court had already rejeсted Brown‘s motions relating to the costs in the February memorandum.
Once we properly construe Tenants’ action as challenging the October memorandum, our Rooker-Feldman analysis becomes straightforward. Therе is no relevant state-court judgment purporting to adjudicate the validity of the costs in the October memorandum. Brown never filed a motion to tax costs, so the state court never used that vehicle to decide the accuracy of the costs. Moreover, Duringer did not apply for a writ of execution, so Brown never moved to quash—giving the state court no opportunity to assess the cоsts claimed in the memorandum. Simply put, the October memorandum was not the subject of any state-court judgment.
Duringer‘s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, Duringer argues that we should broadly interpret “judgment” in our Rooker-Feldman аnalysis to include the original 2010 unlawful-detainer judgment and that because Tenants “undoubtably lost the state court Eviction Action,” they are state-court losers. However, even if we were to adopt Duringеr‘s broad conception of “judgment” at prong one of our analysis, Duringer would still fail to meet prongs two and four. Since the 2010 unlawful-detainer judgment does not purport to rule on the accuracy of the costs claimed in the October memorandum (as would have been impossible given that the judgment was entered over a decade earlier), Tenants would be neither complaining of injuries caused by the state-court judgment (i.e., prong two) nor inviting district court review and rejection of that judgment (i.e., prong four).
Second, Duringer posits that Tenants’ claims “necessarily require[] the [federal] court to determine the accuracy of the amount approved by the state court on the Writ of Execution” enforcing the February memorandum of costs. However, Tenants’ claims assume the accuracy of the costs obtained through the February memorandum and
accompanying writ; Tenants challenge only the allegedly duplicative interest and unreasonable attorneys’ fees Duringer claimed in the October memorandum. Because there is no relevant state-court judgment addressing those issues to improperly appeal, we reverse the district court‘s holding that Rooker-Feldman precludes it from exercising jurisdiction over Tenants’ FDCPA claims.
After this appeal was briefed, we sua sponte raised the question whether Tenants
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court‘s summary judgment order is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opiniоn.