86 F.4th 1251
9th Cir.2023Background
- Tenants (Brown, Guo, Zhang) leased an apartment; after a 2010 rent default the California Superior Court entered an unlawful‑detainer judgment for $2,705 (including $500 attorneys’ fees).
- In Feb 2020 Duringer (counsel for landlords) filed a renewal and a memorandum of costs seeking post‑judgment interest and costs; Tenants did not timely object and those costs were added to the judgment; a writ issued and Brown’s motions to quash and for exemption were denied; levied funds later satisfied that writ.
- Shortly before levy, Duringer filed a later (October 2020) memorandum of costs seeking additional interest and attorneys’ fees; that second memorandum was never the subject of state‑court adjudication or an executed writ.
- Tenants sued in federal court under the FDCPA, alleging the October memorandum sought duplicative interest and unreasonable collection fees; the district court granted summary judgment for Duringer, holding the suit was barred by the Rooker‑Feldman doctrine.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded: it held the Rooker‑Feldman doctrine did not apply because the October memorandum was not adjudicated by the state court (so there was no state‑court judgment to attack); the panel remanded for the district court to address Article III standing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker‑Feldman bars Tenants’ FDCPA suit | Brown: FDCPA claim challenges Duringer’s October memorandum, not a state judgment, so federal court may hear it | Duringer: Tenants are state‑court losers and the suit effectively asks federal review of state judgments | Rooker‑Feldman does not bar the suit because the October memorandum was not the subject of any state‑court judgment (prongs two and four fail) |
| Whether Tenants’ status as state‑court losers defeats jurisdiction | Brown: their claim targets a later filing, not the 2010 eviction judgment | Duringer: Tenants lost the eviction action, so doctrine applies broadly | Even if they are "losers," the 2010 judgment did not decide the October costs, so the doctrine’s other elements are unmet |
| Whether the court must decide Article III standing now | Brown: alleges concrete harms and may submit evidence to support standing | Duringer: challenged subject‑matter jurisdiction (Rooker‑Feldman) | Ninth Circuit sua sponte raised standing and remanded for the district court to address standing in the first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (articulates limits of Rooker‑Feldman; bars district court review that would overturn state‑court judgments)
- Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (emphasizes narrow scope of Rooker‑Feldman)
- Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2008) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Singh v. American Honda Fin. Corp., 925 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) (de novo review of subject‑matter jurisdiction)
- Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2004) (district court should address standing in first instance on remand)
- Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (no mandatory sequencing of jurisdictional issues)