Jаmes R. VANDERGRIFF et al. v. PARKRIDGE EAST HOSPITAL et al.
No. E2014-02347-COA-R3-CV
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, AT KNOXVILLE.
June 30, 2015 Session FILED AUGUST 21, 2015
548 S.W.3d 545
H. Dean Clements and Brie Allaman Stewart, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellees, ParkRidge East Hospital.
F. Laurens Brock, Rocklan W. King III, and Donna L. Boyce, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Richard J. Bowers, M.D., Elizabeth M. Bowers, M.D., and Chattanooga Women‘s Specialist, P.C.
Arthur P. Brock and Drew H. Reynolds, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellees, Shawn P. Stallings, M.D. and Regional Obstetrical Consultants, P.C.
OPINION
FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JJ., joined.
The parents of a minor child filed a pro se complaint asserting claims on behalf of their daughter and individual claims by each parent. The complaint alleges that the daughter was born with brain injuries and remains severely disabled due to the failure of health care providers to treat her mother for a severe womb infection during two hospitalizations preceding birth. Plaintiffs also allege that the complaint was filed timely, although it was filed ten years after their daughter‘s birth, because the defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that the mother was not treated for the infection. The complaint states that the parents learned of the infection in 2012 when they obtained medical records that included a previously-undisclosed placenta pathology report. The defendants responded to the complaint by filing
James R. Vandergriff (“Father“) and Samantha J. Vandergriff (“Mother“) are the parents of a daughter, Catherine, who was born with severe disabilities allegedly as the result of the negligence of ParkRidge East Hospital and several health care providers (collеctively “Defendants“).1
On March 10, 2004, while Mother was pregnant with Catherine, Mother was admitted to ParkRidge East Hospital (“ParkRidge“) after problems developed with her pregnancy. Mother remained at ParkRidge from March 10-17, 2004. The tests conducted on Mother during that time revealed that she was suffering from an infection. Although the discharge summary from this hospital stay indicates that Mother was treated for this infection, Plaintiffs contend that the discharge summary was intentionally falsified and that Mother did not actually receive the proper treatment.
On March 21, 2004, Mother was readmitted to ParkRidge. Catherine was born very prematurely later that day. Catherine remained in the NICU ward for more than two months until she was discharged on June 10, 2004. It is undisputed that Catherine was born with brain damage and will be severely disabled for the rest of her life.
Ten years later, on August 25, 2014, a pro se complaint was filed by “James R. Vandergriff, individually, as (father and legal guardian) of Catherine E. Vandergriff and Samantha J. Vandergriff, individually, as (mother and legal guardian) of Catherine E. Vandergriff....” The complaint, which asserted separate claims on behalf of the parents and Catherine, alleged that Catherine‘s injuries were the result of Defendants’ failure to treat Mother‘s infection during her March 10-17 hospital stay.2 Mother and Father signed the
As stated in the complaint, Plaintiffs attributed the delay in filing the lawsuit to fraudulent cоncealment of the medical treatment Mother did and did not receive during her March 10-17 hospital stay. In relevant part, the complaint states:
34. We never knew about the severe infection that was present at our daughter‘s birth because the truth was hidden from us. At the time, were [sic] not aware of the severe womb infection because the information was never documented into the medical records we received.
35. In 2012, we learned about the severe womb infection. We obtained medical records for the second time, which the second set of medical records had a placenta pathology report not previously disclosed to either Samantha J. Vandergriff nor [sic] myself, James Vandergriff.
36. The placenta pathology report states (Acute Chorioamnioitis Funitis and villous necrosis). This is a very severe womb infection which was longstanding because Samantha J. Vandergriff was left untreated during her March 10, 2004 to March 17, 2004 [stay] at ParkRidge East Hospital.
Defendants responded to the complaint by filing motions to dismiss. They contended that the parents’ individual claims were barred by the statute of limitations because they had been brought more than one year after Plaintiffs discovered the alleged injury. See
On October 14, 2014, the trial court entered an order dismissing all claims. The court concluded that the parents’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court noted that Paragraph 35 of the complaint established that the parents learned of the infection that caused Catherine‘s injury on or before December 31, 2012; therefore, the one year limitation period would have begun on that date at the latest. Assuming Mother and Father filed the required pretrial notices on the last possible date, December 31, 2013, the statute of limitations would have been extended to April 30, 2014.3 See
With regard to Catherine‘s claims, the trial court concluded that they were time-barred by the statute of repose. The trial court reasoned that, although fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of repose, any fraudulent concealment was uncovered on or before December 31, 2012 when her parents learned of the infection that caused Catherine‘s injuries.4 Accord-
ingly,
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that it was error to dismiss the parents’ claims as barred by the statute of limitations and to dismiss Catherine‘s claims as barred by the statute of repose.
ANALYSIS
I. PRO SE LITIGANTS
We are mindful of the fact that Father and Mother are representing themselves in this litigation although they have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system. Parties who represent themselves (pro se litigants) are entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts; nevertheless, “the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant‘s adversary.” Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003). Therefore, courts may “not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.” Id. As we have explained:
The courts give pro se litigants who are untrained in the law a certain amount of leeway in drafting their pleadings and briefs. Accordingly, we measure the papers prepared by pro se litigants using standards that are less stringent than those applied to papers prepared by lawyers. . . . Pro se litigants should not be permitted to shift the burden of the litigation to the courts or to their adversaries. They are, however, entitled to at least the same liberality of construction of their pleadings that
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 7 ,8.05 , and8.06 provide to other litigants.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
II. TENNESSEE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Before discussing the substance of Plaintiffs’ arguments, it is important to acknowledge that we may only consider “those facts established by the evidence in the trial court and set forth in the record and any additional facts that may be judicially noticed or are considered pursuant to Rule 14.” See
The statements contained in these documents are not properly the subject of “judicial notice.” In order for a fact to be judicially noticed, it must be “one not subject to reasonable dispute” that is either “generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court” оr “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
We now turn to the substance of the issues Plaintiffs have raised on appeal.
III. CATHERINE‘S CLAIMS
In the complaint, Mother and Father asserted claims on behalf of Catherine, as her parents and legal guardians, in addition to the individual claims they asserted themselves. The complaint, which was prepared by Father, was signed by Mother and Father but not by a licensed attorney. Indeed, none of the pleadings filed by Plaintiffs were signed by an attorney. Father additionally served as Catherine‘s advocate in the trial court procеedings and during oral argument in this court.
We note with great respect and admiration Father‘s love and devotion for his daughter, Catherine, and for Mother, which are evident from his tireless efforts to advocate on his daughter‘s behalf in these proceedings. Unfortunately, as we explain below, because neither Father nor Mother is a licensed attorney, they were not authorized to assert Catherine‘s separate claims unless a licensed attorney also signed the complaint.
Under Tennessee law, any person may conduct and manage his or her own case in any court of this state.
We are mindful of the fact that parents may “sue or defend” a suit on behalf of their minor children in certain circumstances, see
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a represеntative, such as a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent person does not have a duly appointed representative, or if justice requires, he or she may sue by next friend.
A “next friend” is “[a] person who appears in a lawsuit to act for the benefit of an incompetent or minor plaintiff, but who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not appointed as a guardian.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 897 (9th ed.2010); see March v. Levine, No. 01-A-01-9708-PB00437, 1999 WL 140760, at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Mar. 17, 1999) (“A next friend is someone who is capable of protecting the interests of the person under the legal disability, who will be liable for the costs, and against whom the court can make and enforce its orders.“). Although parents may raise the claims of their children, their status as “next friends” does not make them “technically [or] substantially a party” to the minor‘s claims. See Holley, 2012 WL 4799053, at *4 (quoting Williams v. Gaither, 139 Tenn. 587, 202 S.W. 917, 918 (1918)).
While
Federal law is consistent with Tennessee on the subject of a pаrent asserting claims of a minor child. Individuals have the right to represent themselves in federal court. See
Neither Mother nor Father is a licensed attorney. Therefore, they may not file a pro se complaint that asserts claims on Catherine‘s behalf or appеar in court as a legal advocate for her. See Old Hickory Eng‘g, 937 S.W.2d at 786; Petition of Burson, 909 S.W.2d at 776-77; see also
Something that is “void” has no legal effect. See Black‘s Law Dictionary 1349 (9th ed.2010). Another legal dictionary defines “void” as “absolutely null,” going on to describe an order that is “void ab initio” as “that which is void in the beginning, [which] cannot be cured by waiver, acquiescence or lapse of time.” Bryan A. Garner, A Modern Legal Dictionary 920 (2d ed.2005).
Because the complaint was void as to Catherine‘s claims, it was insufficient to commence an action on her behalf, and neither Catherine nor her claims were properly before the trial court. See
For the reasons stated above, neither Catherine nor her claims were before the trial court; therefore, the trial court‘s judgment is void to the extent it ruled on the merits of Catherine‘s purported claims.7 See Gentry, 924 S.W.2d at 680.
IV. FATHER AND MOTHER‘S INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS
Defendants filed
When adjudicating a
The parents’ claims were dismissed as time barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to health care liability claims. See
Defenses based on the statute of limitations require us to consider both the accrual of the cause of action and the applicability of any tolling doctrines. See Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 456. Generally, a cause of action for an injury accrues when the injury occurs. See Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). However, when the alleged injury in a health care liability cause of action “is not discovered within [the one-year statute of limitations period], the period of limitation shall be one (1) year from the date of such discovery.”
By making this allegation, Plaintiffs havе invoked the discovery rule. Under the discovery rule, a health care liability cause of action accrues when “one discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, both (1) that he or she has been injured by wrongful or tortious conduct and (2) the identity of the person or persons whose wrongful conduct caused the injury.” Sherrill v. Souder, 325 S.W.3d 584, 595 (Tenn.2010); see Burk v. RHA/Sullivan, Inc., 220 S.W.3d 896, 900-01 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006). The discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations until plaintiffs actually know that they have a cause of action. Pero‘s Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614, 621 (Tenn.2002). Instead, plaintiffs are “deemed to have discovered the right of action when [they] become[] aware of facts sufficient to put a reasonable pеrson on notice that he or she has suffered an injury as a result of the defendant‘s wrongful conduct.” Id. (citing Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 733 (Tenn.1998)). Thus, the discovery rule does not allow plaintiffs to delay filing their complaints until they know the specific type of legal claim they have or all the facts that affect the merits of a claim. Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 459. “Neither actual knowledge of a breach of the relevant legal standard nor diagnosis of the injury by another medical professional is a prerequisite to the accrual of a [health care liability] cause of action.” Sherrill, 325 S.W.3d at 595.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ allegations have invoked the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, a tolling doctrine closely related to the discovery rule. See Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn.2001) (“In a discovery rule case, the plaintiff may claim that the defendant intentionally prevented him from discovering his injury. Where that claim is proved true, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applies.“) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations when the defendant purposefully engages in conduct intended to conceal the plaintiff‘s injury or the identity of the person who caused the plaintiff‘s injury. See Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 462. Like the discovery rule, the effects of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment cease when the plaintiff “discovers or should have discovered the defendant‘s fraudulent concealment or sufficient facts to put the plaintiff on actual or inquiry notice of his or her claim. . . .” Id. at 463 (emphasis added). Therefore, under both the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, Plaintiffs were required to file their lawsuit within one year from the time they
Here, it is clear that Plaintiffs had actual or constructive knowledge of their claims in 2012 because their complaint states:
35. In 2012, we learned about the severe womb infection. We obtained medical records for the second time, which the second set of medical records had a placenta pathology report not previously disclosed to either Samantha J. Vandergriff nor [sic] myself, James Vandergriff.
36. The placenta pathology report states (Acute Chorioamnioitis Funitis and villous necrosis). This is a very severe womb infection which was longstanding because Samantha J. Vandergriff was left untreated during her March 10, 2004 to March 17, 2004 [stay] at ParkRidge East Hospital.
These paragraphs establish that Plaintiffs knew sufficient facts to put them on notice that they had been injured as a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct in 2012. See Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 459. According to the complaint, by 2012 Plaintiffs knew that an injury had occurred because of an infection that existed as a result of Defendants’ failure to properly treat Mother. Plaintiffs may not have known the extent of their injuries or of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, and Mother‘s medical records may not have been reviewed by an attorney or medical expert, but the absence of these things does not allow a potential plaintiff to delay filing suit. See id.; Sherrill, 325 S.W.3d at 595. Based on the complaint, the facts that Plaintiffs knew in 2012 were sufficient to provide them with notice that they were injured by Defendants’ negligence.
Plaintiffs contend that their cause of action did not accrue until May 2013 when they received additional medical records and a letter from an attorney opining that Defendants were negligent. According to Plaintiffs, although the placenta pathology report they obtained in 2012 revealed the existence of the infection that caused Catherine‘s disabilities, it did not indicate that this infection was present because Defendants failed to treat Mother during her March 10-17 hospital stay. Plaintiffs argue that their claims could not have accrued until they learned that the infection existed because of Defendants’ negligence. The complaint does not contain any factual allegations that support this argument. It does not allegе that Plaintiffs received any new medical records in 2013 or that Plaintiffs discovered any new facts after 2012.
The foregoing notwithstanding, assuming that the only new fact discovered in 2012 was that a previously-undisclosed infection was present when Catherine was born, this discovery, in conjunction with the other facts previously known to Plaintiffs in 2012, was sufficient to “put a reasonable person on notice that he or she has suffered an injury as a result of the defendant‘s wrongful conduct.” Pero‘s, 90 S.W.3d at 621; see Sherrill, 325 S.W.3d at 595. Specifically, in 2012 Plaintiffs knew: (1) that Mother had been hospitalized twice at ParkRidge after experiencing similar symptoms; (2) that Catherine had been born with brain damage during Mother‘s second hospitalization; (3) that Mother was being treated for an infection of unknown origin when Catherine was born; and (4) that the placenta pathology report indicated that the placenta was infected. Accordingly, the facts known to Plaintiffs in 2012 were sufficient to put them on notice that they had suffered an injury as a result of Defendant‘s wrongful conduct.
Thus, Plaintiffs discovered their cause of action and uncovered any fraudulent con-cealment
IN CONCLUSION
Because neither Catherine nor her representatives were properly before the trial court, and a decree is void as to any person not to have been before the court in person or by representation, see Gentry, 924 S.W.2d at 680, the trial court‘s judgment, to the extent it ruled on the merits of Catherine‘s purported claims, is vacated and this matter is remanded for entry of an order consistent with the foregоing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.
Costs of appeal are assessed against James R. Vandergriff and Samantha J. Vandergriff.