James OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John EVANS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-1645
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted December 6, 2017. Decided December 13, 2017. Opinion Issued December 28, 2017
879 F.3d 559
Id. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694). The Court further held that Garner had clearly established that “police officers may not fire at non-dangerous fleeing felons.” Id. at 483. The majority attempts to distinguish Kirby on the grounds that “at the time he was shot, no one was in danger and his car was ‘blocked in‘.” This is a curious distinction to draw, when one considers that the majority has concluded that in this case the Plaintiff similarly posed no danger to others.
Officer Phillips presented no evidence that Latits was violent, that he had a weapon, or that he was going to endanger other individuals in the area. All that can be said about Latits’ driving, based on the majority‘s description of the events leading up to the shooting, is that he initiated a chase “in which risk to the public was relatively low,” that he tried to maneuver around officers, like the plaintiffs in Sigley and Kirby, and that his vehicle was struck multiple times by the officers’ vehicles. Moreover, when Officer Phillips shot him, Latits had shown no intention to harm the police officers, and Phillips could see that no officers or other persons were in Latits’ path as he backed away. Under these circumstances, it would have been clear to any reasonable officer that they could not use deadly force against Latits.
Again, applicable case law clearly establishes that an officer should not be protected by qualified immunity when the shooting victim poses no immediate danger to the officer or to the public. Our panel is unanimous in its conclusion that the officer in this case acted in an objectively unreasonable manner and needlessly cost a person his life. Because I also believe that Latits’ right not to be seized by deadly force when fleeing arrest was clearly established at the time he was killed, I respectfully dissent.
James Owens, Pro se.
Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
James Owens, an Illinois prisoner, brought this lawsuit under
Before proceeding, we note that Owens—no stranger to the courts in this circuit—again filed an omnibus complaint against unrelated defendants and with claims arising from alleged conduct at four different prisons. As we have told him before, this scattershot strategy is unacceptable under Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
I. Background
Owens‘s allegations span seven years, four prisons, and 44 defendants. He lists his theories of relief in six counts—obstructing his right to access the courts and conspiring to do so, retaliating against him for filing grievances and lawsuits, hindering various lawsuits by enforcing unconstitutional Illinois Administrative Code provisions governing legal mail, “confiscating” his trust account earnings to recover litigation costs advanced by prison business offices, and failing to investigate and respond to grievances. Owens does not specify which defendants are named for which counts. For the sake of clarity, we summarize prison by prison, as best we can, the allegations in the complaint and the evidence presented during the summary-judgment proceedings.
A. Hill Correctional Center (2006–2008)
Owens alleges violations that first arose in 2007 while he was held at Hill Correctional Center and litigated a lawsuit in Knox County Circuit Court. Because his prisoner trust fund account was significantly overdrawn, Owens asked the prison mailroom to advance him money for postage after the court ordered him to serve the defendants with his pleadings. But the mailroom refused, stating that prisons must advance fees only for legal mail, which under Illinois law does not include legal documents sent to other parties.
Owens also says that defendants at Hill unlawfully limited his access to the library to four hours per month and applied any amount of money deposited in his trust account (like his $10-per-month state pay) to previous litigation costs that the office had advanced. He also asserts that he was not given adequate access to the boxes containing legal materials not kept in his cell to the detriment of his ability to litigate effectively.
B. Big Muddy River Correctional Center (2008–2010)
In 2008 Owens was transferred to Big Muddy River Correctional Center. He asserts that 11 employees at that prison impeded his ability to prosecute two lawsuits. He says they closed the library when the librarian was on vacation and thus denied him sufficient access, confiscated materials from his legal storage boxes, failed to provide him with pens, and did not advance him funds for sending summonses to defendants in one of his state-court suits. One case seems to have
C. Pinckneyville Correctional Center (2010–2012)
Owens was transferred to Pinckneyville Correctional Center in 2010. He continued to have difficulty litigating (although it is unclear which cases he had pending at the time). He alleges that he was denied access to the library when he had a statute-of-limitations deadline approaching and was unable to get access to his legal storage boxes. He also asserts that prison officials confiscated other unspecified legal materials. And he complains that the quantity of supplies he was given pursuant to prison policy—two envelopes, ten sheets of paper, and one pen per month—was insufficient. At summary judgment the defendants produced an affidavit from a law library paralegal stating that Owens received additional supplies from the library when requested. Last, Owens alleged that his access to the library, his storage boxes, and necessary supplies was even more diminished when he was placed in protective custody.
D. Lawrence Correctional Center (2012–2013)
In 2012 Owens was transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center. He asserts that the law librarian, the warden, and a grievance counselor denied him access to his excess legal storage boxes. Some of these boxes had not arrived from his previous facility, and some may have been lost.
II. Procedural History
At screening, see
The remaining Hill and Big Muddy defendants (except for John Evans, a warden at Big Muddy) then jointly moved to dismiss because, they argued, Owens‘s claims in his 2013 complaint, which arose from incidents that took place from 2006 to early 2010, were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The judge granted the motion except as it related to three grievances (all related to postage issues). Owens
On appeal Owens challenges the judge‘s entry of summary judgment as well as the dismissal of several of his claims and named defendants. He principally argues that he adequately alleged actual injury from the defendants’ actions and raised a genuine issue of material fact on that question. He also argues that the judge abused his discretion by denying his three motions for recruited counsel and was biased against him.
III. Analysis
A. Claims Dismissed at Screening or Pursuant to Motion
The judge appropriately dismissed Owens‘s claim that the prison unlawfully confiscated his trust account funds to recover litigation expenses that had been loaned to Owens; we have already upheld the provision requiring this. See Gaines, 790 F.2d at 1308; see Eason v. Nicholas, 847 F.Supp. 109, 113 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (“The deferred deduction of legal costs [as provided by Illinois statute] advanced by the state does not violate the Constitution.“).
Owens also challenges the judge‘s decision to dismiss his claims against IDOC and employees at Hill and Big Muddy who were involved only in the grievance process, but this argument has no merit. IDOC was properly dismissed because it is not a person subject to suit under
Owens also argues that the statute of limitations should not bar him from pursuing claims against the employees at Hill and Big Muddy (i.e., his complaints that grievance counselors and librarians denied him access to the library and to legal supplies). Owens was at Hill from 2006 to 2008 and Big Muddy from 2008 to 2010; he filed this complaint on June 14, 2013. He had exhausted all of his administrative remedies by 2009 or 2010. Lawsuits brought under
Owens‘s claims against Wayne Robke and John Evans for failing to advance postage funds were also untimely, even accounting for the prison‘s failure to respond to the grievances on this issue. Robke, the business manager at Hill, refused to advance postage for Owens to serve process in his Jefferson County case
Owens also argues more generally that the definition of “legal mail” under Illinois law is unconstitutional. Inmates with insufficient funds may purchase postage “for reasonable amounts of legal mail” by signing over future funds.
The appellees repeat this court‘s holding that inmates “do not have a right to unlimited free postage,” but that mischaracterizes Owens‘s argument. Gaines, 790 F.2d at 1308. He did not ask for free postage; he wanted the business office to advance him the funds. In Bounds v. Smith, the Supreme Court said: “It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977) (emphasis added). Illinois does provide stamps, but only for a small universe of mail. Arguably, a definition of “legal mail” that hinges on the identity of the recipient, not the nature of the document, could impede the ability of an indigent, unrepresented prisoner to prosecute a case effectively. For starters the definition excludes mail sent to potential witnesses and discovery requests sent to the defendants’ attorneys, except the Illinois Attorney General.
But we need not decide whether the Illinois regulation defining “legal mail” violates Owens‘s right to access the courts because the constitutional harms he alleges occurred in 2007 and 2008; therefore, whatever actual injury he suffered because of this regulation (if any, given the reasons those cases apparently were dismissed) occurred too long ago to allow him to challenge the regulation in this lawsuit.
B. Summary Judgment
Owens‘s claims about his lack of adequate access to prison libraries were properly rejected on summary judgment
Owens‘s claim that he was not given adequate supplies at Pinckneyville are similarly unsupported. Owens argued that the Assistant Warden‘s1 policy of giving indigent inmates two envelopes, ten sheets of paper, and one pen per month did not provide him with enough materials to pursue his lawsuits, but he does not identify any specific negative consequences, nor does he address the evidence in the record that he could request additional supplies at the library as needed.
Owens‘s final argument about his access to courts is that the librarians at Pinckneyville and Lawrence2 denied access to his excess legal storage boxes, but here too he fails to provide evidence of actual prejudice. He asserts that he missed a twice-extended deadline to file a reply brief because he was unable to access caselaw stored in his boxes. But Owens does not explain why he needed the boxes (for example, if the cases were not available at the library) or why not filing an optional reply brief doomed one of his cases.
The judge also properly entered summary judgment for the defendants on Owens‘s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims. Owens did not present any evidence that his protected activity—here, grieving and litigating complaints against prison officials—was a “motivating factor” in the defendants’ conduct. See Novoselsky v. Brown, 822 F.3d 342, 354 (7th Cir. 2016). To the extent that Owens argues that the refusal to send his mail was retaliatory, the officials in the mailroom were following an Illinois statute and guidance from the business office. Owens provides no basis on which to infer that the relevant officials were motivated by anything other than following the law.
Owens‘s conspiracy claim is also doomed for lack of evidence. To survive a motion for summary judgment, he needs to show evidence of an agreement among the conspirators to violate his rights. See Amundsen v. Chi. Park Dist., 218 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2000). On appeal Owens argues that the repeated denials of his grievances are sufficient evidence of conspiracy, but such a conclusory statement cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. He did not adduce evidence that officials at one prison, let alone those at different ones, agreed expressly or tacitly to interfere with his pursuit of grievances and lawsuits. Therefore, the district court properly entered judgment in favor of defendants Dolce, Fritts, Hartman, Lutz (counselors at Pinckneyville), and Kittle and Hodges (the counselor and warden at Lawrence, respectively).
C. Other Arguments on Appeal
Owens also argues that the district court‘s refusal to recruit counsel was an abuse of discretion, but we cannot agree. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Owens did face some obstacles, including multiple prison transfers, which made conducting discovery a chal-
Last, Owens argues that because the judge ruled against him many times, he is biased against him. But adverse rulings, without more, do not prove bias. Trask v. Rodriguez, 854 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2017).
For all of these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. And in closing we once more warn Owens that he cannot use a single complaint to bring unrelated claims against different defendants. And we remind district courts that “[c]omplaints like this one from Owens should be rejected ... either by severing the action into separate lawsuits or by dismissing improperly joined defendants.” Owens, 635 F.3d at 952. If Owens ignores these instructions again, his continual abuse of the judicial process should be sanctioned.
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM