JAMES G. DAVIS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Appellant, v. HRGM CORPORATION, Appellee.
No. 15-CV-950
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
October 6, 2016.
Argued March 15, 2016
147 A.3d 332
Craig A. Holman, with whom William C. Perdue was on the brief, for appellee.
Before: Washington, Chief Judge; and Beckwith and Easterly, Associate Judges.
BECKWITH, Associate Judge:
This case involves a dispute over attorney‘s fees. Appellant James G. Davis Construction Corporation and appellee HRGM Corporation entered into a Joint Venture Agreement for the purpose of performing renovation work on McKinley Technical High School in the District. After completing the project, the parties became engaged in a series of disagreements concerning the management of the Joint Venture and the parties’ respective obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement. HRGM eventually sued Davis, and Davis counterclaimed. After a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of HRGM, awarding the company $5,056 in compensatory damages and $70,500 in punitive damages. The jury also rejected Davis‘s counterclaim. HRGM then filed a post-trial motion for attorney‘s fees and costs under
Davis now challenges this award on several grounds, arguing primarily that the trial court erred in awarding HRGM attorney‘s fees under the Joint Venture Agreement. Davis also contends that even if such an award were proper, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding HRGM an unreasonable amount of fees. Unpersuaded by Davis‘s arguments, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts
Appellant James G. Davis Construction Corporation and appellee HRGM Corporation are commercial construction companies that entered into a Joint Venture Agreement in August 2002 for the purpose of serving as general contractor on a project to renovate McKinley Technical High School in Northeast D.C. Under the Agreement, Davis was the managing venturer with responsibility for supervising the project and maintaining the accounting records. Davis was accordingly assigned 80 percent of the project‘s profits (or losses), and HRGM was assigned 20 percent. The Joint Venture Agreement required that
During and after the project, HRGM had raised concerns about Davis‘s management of the Joint Venture, including improper charges to the entity, self-dealing, and a failure to comply with its accounting duties as well as the periodic and final audits required under the Joint Venture Agreement. In March 2007, Davis sent HRGM a letter explaining that HRGM owed the Joint Venture $111,223 for unpaid capital contributions. Believing that this demand was improper under the Agreement, HRGM responded by filing suit against Davis on May 14, 2008, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and a full and complete accounting. HRGM claimed in particular that Davis breached the Joint Venture Agreement by among other things improperly charging personnel, equipment, supplies, and other costs to the Joint Venture; “[f]ailing to comply with its accounting obligations” through maintaining accurate records; “[i]mproperly appropriating . . . opportunities belonging to the Joint Venture“; “[e]ngaging in improper self-dealing“; “[d]emanding payment of amounts to the Joint Venture from HRGM without the required final audit“; and generally “[m]ismanaging the Joint Venture such that Davis alleges that the Joint Venture lost money” on the project. In support of its breach of fiduciary duty claim, HRGM alleged that Davis “willfully and maliciously” engaged in the conduct underlying its contract claim. HRGM requested $2.5 million in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages.1 Davis filed a verified Answer and Counterclaim in which it alleged a breach of contract and sought to recover from HRGM the $111,223 in unpaid capital contributions.
A two-week trial began on January 24, 2011. Before jury deliberations commenced, the trial court provided a standard punitive damages instruction—which both parties had agreed on in their Joint Pretrial Statement—that told the jury to consider “any attorney‘s fees that [HRGM] has incurred in this case” as one factor in its calculation of punitive damages.2 See Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 16-3 (2007 ed. rev.). On February 9, the jury returned a verdict for HRGM on its breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims while rejecting Davis‘s breach of contract counterclaim. The jury awarded HRGM $5,056 in compensatory damages and $70,500 in punitive damages for the fiduciary duty breach, but no additional damages for the contractual breach. HRGM filed a motion for a new trial on damages, which the trial
court denied on August 11, 2011. HRGM
After the jury rendered its verdict, HRGM also filed a post-trial motion for attorney‘s fees under
XXI. SCOPE OF VENTURER‘S AUTHORITY; INDEMNIFICATION
No Venturer shall take any action on behalf of or in the name of the Joint Venture, or enter into any commitment or obligation binding upon the Joint Venture, except for actions expressly provided for in this Agreement or authorized by the Venturers in the manner set forth herein.
It is understood and agreed that none of the parties hereto nor any of the designees shall have the power to borrow monies for, in the name of, or to pledge the credit of the other party to this Agreement or on their joint credit, or to otherwise obligate the other party to this Joint Venture Agreement to third party creditors.
Each Venturer shall indemnify and save harmless the other Venturer and its affiliates, directors, employees and officers from and against any and all claims, demands, losses, damages, liabilities, lawsuits and other proceedings, judgments and awards, and costs and expenses (including but not limited to reasonable attorneys’ fees) arising directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, out of any breach of the foregoing provisions by the Venturer or its affiliates, officers, agents or employees.
(Emphases added).
Davis opposed the motion, arguing that HRGM failed to satisfy the conditions for the recovery of fees under Article XXI and that HRGM could not in any event pursue post-trial attorney‘s fees because the jury had already considered and awarded such fees as part of its punitive damages calculation. On March 26, 2012, the trial court issued an order permitting HRGM‘s post-trial motion for attorney‘s fees to proceed. The court determined that “on its face [Article] XXI authorizes HRGM‘s request for fees and costs” and that “the jury awarded damages to HRGM as a result of actions taken by Davis ‘on behalf of or in the name of the Joint Venture,’ or as a result of ‘commitment[s] or obligation[s] binding upon the Joint Venture,’ which were a ‘breach of the foregoing provisions‘” of Article XXI. The court also held that the award of attorney‘s fees and costs in this case was an issue for the court to resolve rather than an issue that HRGM should have submitted to the jury as an element of damages. Because the jury was instructed to consider attorney‘s fees as part of its punitive damages award, moreover, the court concluded that the jury did factor these fees into its damages calculation. The court therefore made clear that the punitive damages award “may [be] adjusted (by remittitur or set off) in light of the attorneys’ fee award, as necessary to avoid double recovery.”
On August 7, 2014, after extensive discovery, the court granted HRGM‘s motion and awarded the company $736,152.76 in attorney‘s fees. The court made a separate award of $39,344.67 in costs on July 24, 2015. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
Davis advances four main arguments on appeal. First, it contends that the trial court erred in granting HRGM‘s post-trial motion for attorney‘s fees where the jury had already considered such fees as part of
A. Punitive Damages and Attorney‘s Fees
Before jury deliberations began, the trial court instructed the jury, at the parties’ request, that if it determined that HRGM was entitled to punitive damages, the jury could consider “the cost and duration of the litigation, and any attorney‘s fees that [HRGM] has incurred in this case” in calculating the damages award. The jury assessed $70,500 in punitive damages against Davis. Davis asserts that because HRGM pursued and recovered attorney‘s fees as part of the jury‘s punitive damages award, HRGM was barred from seeking such fees under the Joint Venture Agreement in a post-trial proceeding. Davis accordingly contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding HRGM $736,152.76 in attorney‘s fees, an award that amounted to an impermissible double recovery for HRGM. We disagree that the trial court erred.
Under the American Rule, a prevailing party in a lawsuit does not recover attorney‘s fees incurred in the litigation. St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 568 A.2d 35, 38 (1990); see also 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.10 (3), at 401 (2d ed. 1993). But courts have recognized exceptions to this rule, including where “(1) parties to a contract have an agreement to that effect; (2) there is a statute which allows the imposition of such fees; or (3) the wrongful conduct of a defendant forces a plaintiff into litigation with a third party.” St. Luke, 568 A.2d at 39 (citations omitted). Relying primarily on St. Luke, Davis argues that these exceptions represent “three primary but separate, alternative avenues,” and that “HRGM had to strategically elect which one of the possible avenues it would travel—HRGM could not take multiple roads.” By requesting a punitive damages instruction that permitted the jury to consider attorney‘s fees, Davis contends, HRGM “made its choice” and therefore could not as a matter of law seek recovery of fees after trial.
We are unpersuaded that St. Luke controls the outcome in this case, as the court there held only that “whenever punitive damages are appropriate, the amount of reasonable attorney‘s fees incurred in the pending litigation may be considered by the jury.” Id. at 36; see also Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.11 (3), at 482 n.23 (characterizing the St. Luke court as “recognizing that in a sense the award of attorney fees as a measure of punitive damages is compensatory but also . . . punitive” and noting that “[t]he plaintiff‘s attorney fee costs at least represent one item to consider in fixing the amount of the punitive award“). The court in St. Luke had no occasion to address the question whether a party may pursue attorney‘s fees under a contractual agreement where the jury was allowed to consider such fees in calculating its punitive damages award, and Davis cites no authority construing St. Luke‘s brief discussion of the three exceptions as preclud-
Davis also relies heavily on Central Armature Works, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 520 F.Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1980). It is true that the D.C. District Court held in Central Armature that since the plaintiff had already received punitive damages for the defendant‘s breach of contract, and since “punitive damages are awarded in part to reimburse a plaintiff for litigation expenses,” the court would not “make a separate award of attorney fees as an element of compensatory damages,” as such an award “would constitute a double recovery.” Id. at 297. But there was no indication that the parties in that case had agreed by contract to provide for the recovery of fees, and the court appeared to base its decision in large part on the fact that the jury‘s $2 million punitive award, which the court deemed “excessive” and therefore reduced by 50 percent, “more than adequately compensate[d] the plaintiff for its litigation costs.” Id. at 290, 296-97; see also id. at 290 (noting that even after the court reduced the “excessive” punitive award, “the punitive judgment remain[ed] substantial,” and “[f]or this reason, a separate award of attorney fees [was] unwarranted“). For these reasons, and in view of this court‘s case law, we decline to read Central Armature as establishing a rule that would bar a court from awarding attorney‘s fees if punitive damages have already been assessed. See Jemison v. Nat‘l Baptist Convention, USA, Inc., 720 A.2d 275, 285 (D.C. 1998) (rejecting the notion that “punitive damages could not also be awarded in addition to attorneys’ fees” and explaining that “we see no reason why a court may not award punitive damages” as a civil sanction for bad-faith litigation); Weisman v. Middleton, 390 A.2d 996, 999 (D.C. 1978) (rejecting the argument that “it was error for the trial court to allow the jury to consider attorney‘s fees . . . and punitive damages as proper elements of its damage award” on a malicious prosecution claim).3
In defending the trial court‘s fee award, HRGM contends that punitive damages and contractual attorney‘s fees “serve wholly different purposes” in that punitive damages are designed to punish and deter whereas contractual attorney‘s fees are intended to compensate for the harm suffered. In support of this assertion, HRGM cites other state court decisions in which trial courts were permitted to award attorney‘s fees even though the jury had considered the expense of litigation in awarding punitive damages. See Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Abbick, 243 Kan. 513, 757 P.2d 304, 307 (1988) (rejecting the argument that because “the jury was allowed to consider the expense of litigation under the punitive damages instruction,” “the attorney fee award under the [Kansas Consumer Protection Act was] duplicative“); Berry Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Bliskey, 850 S.W.2d 644, 669 (Tex. App. 1993) (rejecting the contention that “because the court instructed the jury by its exemplary damage instruction . . . that it could consider attorneys’ fees as part of the exemplary damage amount . . . the court awarded [the plaintiff] a double recovery of her attorneys’ fees“); see also Dist. Cablevision Ltd. P‘ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 728 (D.C. 2003) (citing Abbick). Davis responds that Abbick, Bliskey, and other similar cases are distinguishable because they “arise under state consumer protection acts, securi-
ties acts, deceptive trade practices acts or
Here, the trial court, after deducting more than $70,000 from the amount requested, awarded HRGM attorney‘s fees under the provision in the Joint Venture Agreement specifying that “[e]ach Venturer shall indemnify and save harmless the other Venturer” from any expenses arising out of “any breach of the foregoing provisions” of the Agreement. This award under the indemnification clause was compensatory in nature, in contrast with the jury‘s award of punitive damages. Although the jury was instructed that it could consider attorney‘s fees incurred alongside other factors, its goal was to produce an award “sufficient to punish the defendant for his or her conduct and to serve as an example to prevent others from acting in a similar way” rather than to make HRGM whole. Thus there was no double recovery although HRGM benefited from two separate monetary awards based on overlapping factors.
Given the absence of case law foreclosing an award of both punitive damages and contractual attorney‘s fees, and given our reluctance to disturb what both parties appeared to regard as an entitlement to fees under the Joint Venture Agreement,4 we hold that the trial court did not err in awarding fees under the circumstances of this case. See Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.10 (3), at 402-03 (observing that “[c]ontracting parties [to indemnity and hold harmless agreements] often provide that one of the parties will protect the other from litigation costs or claims brought by third persons as well as from claims between themselves” and that “when [such a right] is established by contract, the contract controls, so that attorney fees are awarded under such contracts with no difficulty“); see
B. Article XXI
Davis next argues that even if the trial court were permitted to award post-
trial attorney‘s fees, the court erred in
Under Maryland law, the question whether an indemnification clause extends to attorney‘s fees in first-party actions “in addition to the standard allowance of attorney‘s fees in defense of suits by third parties” presents a matter of contract interpretation, which the court reviews de novo. Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 405 Md. 435, 952 A.2d 275, 284 (2008); see also Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 3.10 (3), at 401 (noting that “the ‘third parties’ limitation is not accurate; in appropriate cases the plaintiff may also recover for expenses in litigation with the defendant himself“). “If a contract is unambiguous, the court must give effect to its plain meaning and not contemplate what the parties may have subjectively intended by certain terms at the time of formation.” Nova Research, 952 A.2d at 283. In construing the contract, the court “look[s] to the entire language of the agreement, not merely a portion thereof,” considering “the customary, ordinary and accepted meaning of the language used.” Id. (quoting Atl. Contracting & Material Co. v. Ulico Cas. Co., 380 Md. 285, 844 A.2d 460, 469 (2004)).
The Joint Venture Agreement provides indemnity “from and against any and all . . . costs and expenses (including but not limited to reasonable attorneys’ fees) arising directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, out of any breach of the foregoing provisions.” The trial court concluded that Article XXI “on its face . . . authorize[d] HRGM‘s request for fees and costs,” and that “[r]eading the entire contract does not reveal any content inconsistent with this interpretation but, rather, supports it.” In this regard, the court observed that the Joint Venture Agreement contains another indemnity provision, Article XVI, which covers third-party actions in requiring reimbursement for “any liability or . . . loss or losses directly connected with the performance of the Construction Contract.” Because Article XVI already extends to some third-party actions, the trial court declined to construe Article XXI as covering only those actions.
We agree with the trial court that the plain language of Article XXI provides for the recovery of attorney‘s fees in this first-party action between HRGM and Davis.7
As an initial matter, and as the trial court
Davis relies principally on Nova Research in arguing that Article XXI does not contain the “clear and express language” necessary to establish a right to recover attorney‘s fees in first-party actions. In Nova Research, the court set out to address the question “whether [a] contract provision for indemnification includes first party attorney‘s fees, where the contract language does not provide expressly for the recovery of attorney‘s fees.” 952 A.2d at 278. The two indemnity clauses at issue in that case contained no mention of attorney‘s fees,9 and yet the prevailing party had argued on appeal that the court as a general rule “should imply that [an indemnitee] is entitled to recovery of attorney‘s fees unless the indemnity contract provides otherwise.” Id. at 281. The court rejected this argument, declining to imply a fee-shifting provision for first-party actions establishing a right to indemnity where the contract does not expressly include such a provision, as under this ap-
ney‘s fees arising out of HRGM‘s breach of the Agreement.” Both parties made similar representations in the “[r]elief [s]ought” section of the Joint Pretrial Statement, as they requested “[a]ttorneys’ fees to be sought from and awarded by the Court in a post-trial proceeding pursuant to
proach “the presumption of the American
Davis argues that HRGM cannot recover attorney‘s fees under Article XXI because the provision lacks the enforcement language that Nova Research purportedly requires. That argument misconstrues Nova Research. The court there noted only that an agreement indemnifying against loss in the enforcement of the agreement could provide a basis for recovering attorney‘s fees in a first-party action even if the agreement does not contain the express phrase “attorney‘s fees.” Nova Research had no occasion to address the question at issue here—under what circumstances a contract that does expressly make reference to attorney‘s fees authorizes the recovery of such fees in first-party actions. In light of this key difference, the absence of the word “enforcement” in Article XXI is not dispositive, and Nova Research does not bar the award of fees in the circumstances of this case.10
Even accepting Davis‘s reading of Nova Research, however, the first-party action here is more akin to an action to enforce the terms of a contractual agreement like in Atlantic than an action to establish a right to indemnity as in Nova Research. HRGM‘s complaint alleges in part that Davis breached the Joint Venture Agreement by taking certain unauthorized actions, including “[d]emanding payment of amounts to the Joint Venture from HRGM without the required final audit” and maintaining inaccurate accounting records. Although it later withdrew the claim, HRGM also requested in its complaint an equitable accounting to compel Davis “to submit to a full and complete accounting for the handling and use of all sums received by the Joint Venture,” an accounting that HRGM “ha[d] sought . . . over a period of numerous months” without success. In this regard, HRGM can be said to have brought an action to enforce the contract‘s terms through compelling Davis to fulfill its contractual obligations and remedy any accounting defects. See Enforce, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “enforce” as “to compel obedience to“).11
We agree with the trial court that HRGM alleged, and the jury found, that Davis breached “the foregoing provisions” of Article XXI.13 HRGM claimed among other things that Davis “[c]harg[ed] improper amounts to the Joint Venture,” “[c]harged to the Joint Venture numerous costs already covered and paid for by Davis[‘s] management fee or not allowed under the Agreement,” “[d]emand[ed] payment of amounts to the Joint Venture from HRGM without the required final audit,” and maintained inaccurate and incomplete accounting records. Article XXI prohibits the parties from “tak[ing] any action” not “expressly provided for in this Agreement or authorized by the Venturers,” and improperly charging the Joint Venture, de-
The same is true for Davis‘s accounting obligations. The Joint Venture Agreement expressly provides that Davis “shall assume the responsibility of maintaining an accurate account of all job costs and records.” When Davis maintained inaccurate and incomplete accounting records, it did so “on behalf of” or “in the name of” the Joint Venture in its capacity as the majority venturer in charge of accounting. We accordingly hold that HRGM alleged and proved to the jury that Davis breached “the foregoing provisions” of Article XXI.
C. Attorney‘s Fees As an Element of Damages
Davis also contends that even if HRGM were entitled to attorney‘s fees under Article XXI, HRGM was required under
Davis argues that because HRGM sought attorney‘s fees under a contractual indemnification provision rather than a prevailing party provision, HRGM was required to submit the fees as an element of damages to be proved at trial. By granting HRGM‘s post-trial motion for fees, Davis contends, the trial court erred as a matter of law in “fail[ing] to comprehend the distinction made by [this court] between attorneys’ fees claimed as a prevailing party and a claim for contractual indemnification.” Davis relies mainly on our decision in Calomiris to support this claim. In Calomiris, the plaintiff brought a successful action to reform the operating agreement of a limited liability company that he and his siblings had formed. 3 A.3d at 1188-89. The plaintiff then requested reimburse-ment from the company for the attorney‘s
The circumstances of this case are unlike those in Calomiris. As an initial matter, the indemnity provisions are materially different. In Calomiris, recovery depended only on whether the claim arose out of or was incidental to the member‘s involvement in managing company affairs, but here the parties’ entitlement to fees depended upon establishing a “breach of the foregoing provisions“—the apparent basis for the trial court‘s conclusion that Article XXI operated as a prevailing party provision, “as one cannot determine who the prevailing party is [in a breach of contract action] until after the trial is over.” See Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.10 (3), at 401 (recognizing that “courts allow the prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney fees when an express or implied [agreement] between the parties so provides, and hence to recover under indemnity and hold harmless agreements“).14
More fundamentally, the record shows that the parties here understood and intended that the trial court would award attorney‘s fees and costs in a post-trial proceeding under
stances, the trial court committed no re-
D. Reasonableness of the Fee Award
In its final argument, Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding HRGM $736,152.76 in attorney‘s fees after trial, an award many times greater than HRGM‘s compensatory and punitive damages awards.16 See Campbell-Crane & Assocs., Inc. v. Stamenkovic, 44 A.3d 924, 947 (D.C. 2012) (reviewing the trial court‘s fee award for abuse of discretion). Mindful of our deferential standard of review, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and affirm the judgment below.
“In most situations, a reasonable fee is computed by first determining the so-called lodestar—the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate—and then, ‘in exceptional cases,’ making upward or downward adjustments as appropriate.” Fed. Mktg. Co. v. Va. Impression Prods. Co., 823 A.2d 513, 530 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Hampton Courts Tenants Ass‘n v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm‘n, 599 A.2d 1113, 1115 (D.C. 1991)). Trial courts make such adjustments by considering a list of twelve factors that this court and many others have adopted. See Frazier v. Franklin Inv. Co., 468 A.2d 1338, 1341 & n.2 (D.C. 1983) (listing the factors). “Not all of these potentially relevant factors are pertinent in every case, however, and most are subsumed within the basic criterion that the time expended and the rate charged be reasonable.” Fed. Mktg. Co., 823 A.2d at 530.
The trial court here began its analysis by determining the lodestar, multiplying the hourly rates of HRGM‘s attorneys by the number of hours they worked on this case—a calculation that yielded a sum of $899,511.25. The court then reviewed each of the twelve factors, and ultimately made two downward adjustments to the lodestar. First, the court deducted $28,431.80 in
ages in this case . . . which flow directly and proximately from Defendants’ breaches and wrongful conduct and will be presented as evidence during the Plaintiff‘s case in chief“); see also Phillips v. Grendahl, No. CIV. 00-1382 ADM/AJB, 2001 WL 1110370, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 2001) (“The supporting memorandum does not identify the procedural basis authorizing the award of fees. No statute or rule is cited as authority for the award of fees.“).
“fees and costs [incurred] during the pre-
In evaluating the extent of HRGM‘s success in this case,17 the trial court repeatedly acknowledged that HRGM “recovered a fairly small fraction of the compensatory damages it sought,” and that “the jury disappointed HRGM‘s monetary expectations.” But the court rejected using the damages award as the sole benchmark of HRGM‘s success, observing that “there is little or no indication in the record that HRGM‘s case was primarily about money.” In an analysis that spans several pages of its order, the court explained that instead “this case has always been about Davis‘s failure to render an accounting,” as “HRGM has asserted from the beginning of the case that Davis had a contractual and fiduciary duty to perform an accounting and refused to do so,” that “this failure to perform an accounting enabled Davis to declare with impunity that the [J]oint [V]enture had lost more than $550,000 and HRGM owed $111,223 as its share of the losses,” and that “Davis‘s assertions were false.”18 As the trial court noted, “HRGM prevailed on each one of these positions at trial“—“the jury vindicated [HRGM‘s] arguments that it was an innocent party and that Davis acted with willful disregard (or worse) of HRGM‘s rights; and that, far from HRGM owing Davis money, the op-
posite was true.” HRGM “also prevailed on
“In summary,” the trial court concluded, “HRGM achieved 100% of its business reputation objectives, 20% of its damages objectives, and acceptance of its argument that the JVA authorized indemnification for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” This “successful outcome . . . does not justify a dramatic reduction in attorneys’ fees.” Because it was “not a complete success,” however, the court “deduct[ed] 15% from the lodestar in recognition of the significantly inflated financial value HRGM placed on the compensatory damages portion of the case.”
In light of this analysis, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider the degree of success HRGM obtained. See Campbell-Crane, 44 A.3d at 947 (noting that our review of fee awards is “limited” and that “it requires a very strong showing of abuse of discretion to set aside the decision of the trial court” (quoting Watkins v. District of Columbia, 944 A.2d 1077 (D.C. 2008))). After presiding over the pretrial conference, the two-week trial, and the extensive posttrial proceedings, the court engaged in a thorough fee inquiry that considered all aspects of the case,19 including HRGM‘s substantial nonmonetary success as compared to its more limited damages award. See Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass‘n, 930 A.2d 984, 993 (D.C. 2007), as amended (Aug. 30, 2007) (“Where, as here, the judge addressing the fee petition is the same judge who conducted the pre-trial conference and presided over the trial of the case, substantial deference is owed on the issue of relative success of the litigation . . . .“). The court as part of this inquiry explained that it would reduce the lodestar because the case was not a total victory for HRGM. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (noting that the trial court “should make clear that it has considered the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained“). Such an approach was appropriately “tied to the overall degree of success . . . [rather than] a mere mathematical” calculation. See Fred A. Smith Mgmt. Co. v. Cerpe, 957 A.2d 907, 919 (D.C. 2008). Under these circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion. See
III. Conclusion
Having identified no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
So ordered.