JACOB LEE CARNEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
No. M2025-01775-CCA-R3-PC
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
July 7, 2026
MATTHEW J. WILSON, J.
Assignеd on Briefs June 16, 2026; Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County; No. CC-2020-CR-1024 William R. Goodman, III, Judge
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.
Gregory D. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jacob Lee Carney.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael J. Hurst, Qualified Law Student (
OPINION
Factual and Procedural Background
In October 2020, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Petitioner for the first degree premeditated murder1 of his grandmother, Mary Carney, and the attempted first
I. The Plea Hearing
During the plea hearing, the State set forth the following facts as the basis for the plea. In the early morning hours of May 11, 2020, Mr. Williard was watching television in his bedroom while Ms. Carney slept by his side. Around 1:00 a.m., Mr. Williard heard noises coming from the kitchen. Knowing Petitionеr was also in the home, Mr. Williard called out for him but received no reply. When Mr. Williard entered the kitchen, a light suddenly came on, and he encountered Petitioner standing there. Petitioner was dressed in black, wearing a mask and gloves, and holding a large knife. Petitioner held the knife up at an angle just like he was ready to stab someone. Petitioner lunged at Mr. Williard, who was weak from a recent heart attack. The two wrestled for control of the knife, but Petitioner prеvailed and began stabbing Mr. Williard in the back.
Ms. Carney awoke to the commotion and rushed to the kitchen. She restrained Petitioner long enough for Mr. Williard to break away. As Mr. Williard stood up, he slipped on the floor, which was soaked with his own blood. Ms. Carney slipped too. Petitioner began stabbing at their legs as they tried to kick him away. Petitioner then began stabbing at Ms. Carney‘s stomach. Ms. Carney initially was able to catch Petitioner‘s wrist before the blade reached her, and she urged Mr. Williard to call 911.
Thinking Ms. Carney had control over Petitioner, Mr. Williard rushed to the bedroom, but Petitioner wrestled free from Ms. Carney and chased after him. Once inside his bedroom, Mr. Williard locked the door and called 911. Petitioner attempted to kick down the bedroom door several times but was unsuccessful. He then returned his attention to Ms. Carney.
Police officers arrived within minutes and broke through the front door to gain entry to the home. Once inside, they discovered Mr. Williard in his bedroom—seriously injured but alive. The officers proceeded to Petitioner‘s bedroom, where they found him lying on his bed, his bloody clothing—including the mask and gloves—nearby. The officers also observed what appeared to be a knife wound to Petitioner‘s hand. In the den, the officers discovered the body of Ms. Carney, and she was pronounced dead at the scene. An autopsy later revealed that Ms. Carney had been stabbed 114 times.
During an interview with police, Petitiоner admitted to the crimes in detail. He said he wore gloves to keep the blood off his hands. As he was stabbing Ms. Carney, the blade of the first knife broke. Petitioner said he retrieved a second knife and continued stabbing her. At the scene, officers discovered a broken knife lying next to Ms. Carney‘s body and a second, bloodied knife nearby. Mr. Williard indicated that the gloves Petitioner wore came from a pickup truck Mr. Williard had sold several weeks before—suggesting Petitionеr secured the gloves well in advance of the attack.
The trial court advised Petitioner of his rights, including his right to proceed to trial, to testify in his own defense, and to be represented by counsel during trial. When asked whether there was anything about the sentence, the agreement, or [his] rights that he did not understand, Petitioner replied, No, and he confirmed that he fully under[stood] everything that [they had] gone over. When asked whether he was satisfied with trial counsel‘s representatiоn, Petitioner replied, Yes, sir. Petitioner then waived his rights and asked the court to accept his negotiated plea agreement, submitting a signed Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Jury Trial and Appeal. The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Petitioner accordingly.
II. Post-Conviction Proceedings
Six months after pleading guilty, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he did not understand the nature and consequences of his guilty plea because his mental state [was] not in the right place; that his trial attorney (Counsel) pressure[d] and scared him into pleading guilty; and that Counsel failed to present evidence of Petitioner‘s past allegations that Mr. Williard had physically and sexually abused him. The post-conviction court appointed counsel for Petitioner‘s post-conviction claims and conducted an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner and Counsel were the only two witnesses to testify at the hearing.
Petitioner testified that he met with Counsel more than five times but fewer than ten. He said that he understood the charges against him at the time of the plea. He also said he understood he could receive a lengthier sentence if he were successful in setting aside his plea.
Petitioner testified that he wished to set aside his plea because he was just in a bad mental state [at the time] and he wasn‘t thinking properly. He explained that Counsel keрt putting in my head that I‘m not going to win at trial or anything like that. He further explained that he felt Counsel wasn‘t putting all the . . . circumstances in the court. Those circumstances included Petitioner‘s disclosure to a therapist that Mr. Williard had molested [him] when he was four years old and had molested and beat [Petitioner] from that point forward. Petitioner said he believed Counsel could have presented evidence of
Despite his misgivings about Counsel, Petitioner acknowledged that he chose to plead guilty. Petitiоner said that the main reason he pleaded guilty was to move on and research . . . [his] case and similar cases to see what [his] best chances [were]. Petitioner agreed that during the guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked whether he was satisfied with his attorney. He explained that he told the trial court he was satisfied only because the trial court had prevented him from firing Counsel on multiple occasions before the plea hearing. When asked to idеntify what Counsel did do that pressured Petitioner into pleading guilty, Petitioner replied, I just wanted to work, and do a bunch of research, and try to get back into court, and fight it all by — by myself.
Petitioner acknowledged that he had been evaluated on three different occasions by three different mental health providers: once while his case was pending in juvenile court and twice after his case was transferred to circuit court. All three providers found Petitioner to be competent and not insane. Petitioner also acknowledged that he had e-mailed Counsel while in custody, asking her to negotiate a plea agreement. He testified that the plea negotiations with the State lasted several months.
Although Petitioner claimed that his statement to police had been coerced, he testified that he was not sure on the exact definition of coercion. He agreed that he had been advised of his Mirandа rights and that he freely chose to speak with police. He also agreed that Counsel reviewed the charges with him and that she explained the evidence against him. At the post-conviction hearing, Petitioner was asked, Did somebody twist your arm, or strong-arm you, or force you to plead guilty? He replied, No.
Counsel testified that she had been a public defender for two years in Boston and then for eighteen years in Montgomery County. During that time, she practicеd criminal law exclusively and handled between 7,000 and 8,000 cases, serving as lead counsel in at least thirty murder cases. She testified that she represented Petitioner over the course of three years, starting just after he was transferred from juvenile court. When asked how many times she met with Petitioner, she said definitely more than 10 [times] . . . I‘m sure I could count it up through jail records, but it was a lot.
Counsel testified that she communicated Petitioner‘s past allegations against Mr. Williard to аll three mental health providers who conducted the evaluations. Once the
Counsel testified that she did not pressure Petitioner to plead guilty. She explained that telling Petitioner, Look, you know, we can do it this way but we‘ve got some problems, you know, is different from refusing to take his case to trial. She said that Petitioner seemed fine, that they discussed the guilty plea fоr quite some time, and that they submitted multiple counter-offers to the district attorney general. Regarding the suppression of Petitioner‘s statement to police, Counsel said that she considered filing a motion to suppress but did not think the issue had merit. She said Petitioner insisted that it . . . be suppressed because he was a minor. But Counsel made clear that Petitioner‘s age was just one of the factors relevant to assessing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statеment. Counsel said that she watched the recording of the confession and that it appeared to be voluntary.
Counsel also testified about securing Petitioner‘s juvenile records from Virginia. She said she went to great lengths to secure those records, and once she reviewed them, it became clear that it was not Petitioner who made the allegations against Mr. Williard but rather Petitioner‘s mother. Further, Petitioner‘s mother made the allegations in the midst of a contentious custody dispute with Petitioner‘s father. Counsel testified that she was clear with Petitioner about her findings and put [these findings] in writing to him. She advised Petitioner that it would be a better strategy to pause any investigation into the allegations against Mr. Williard for now and resume it later if the case went to trial. Petitioner insisted on moving forward and hired his own private investigator. Counsel said that Petitioner prevented her from communicating with the investigator.
Finally, Counsel testified that it was Petitiоner who reached out to her via e-mail asking to negotiate the plea agreement. At first, Counsel proposed a plea to second degree murder, but the State refused. She advised Petitioner that his best shot at . . . parole
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court took the matter under advisement and issued a written order denying relief on November 5, 2025. In the order, the post-conviction court found that Counsel fully explained the legal issues, and possible outcomes [to] Pеtitioner and that Petitioner, having received the benefit of his attorney‘s counsel and advice, voluntarily and knowingly accepted the offer of settlement. On each of Petitioner‘s claims, the court concluded that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof under
Analysis
On appeal, Petitioner argues that Counsel failed to render effective assistance and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. He contends that Counsel did not fully and properly cоnsider the fact that one of the victims [Mr. Williard] had molested and physically abused [Petitioner] as a child. Petitioner further contends that [a]t the time he entered his guilty plea, [he] was not in a good mental state. The State responds that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to any of his post-conviction claims. We agree with the State.
Post-conviction relief is available only when the conviction or sentence is void or voidablе because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.
Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea both present mixed questions of law and fact, which we review de novo. See
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing court begins with the strong presumption that counsel provided adequate assistance and used reasonable professional judgment to make all significant decisions, and the petitioner bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2015) (citation modified). To meet this burden, a petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the facts underlying the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed thе defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Thus, deficient performance is representation that falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as measured under prevailing professional norms. Id. However, counsel has wide latitude . . . in making tactical decisions. Id. at 689. A petitioner must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. (citation modified). A reviewing court must judge the reasonаbleness of counsel‘s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel‘s conduct. Id. at 690. Accordingly, strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. Id.
To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. When the issue is that trial counsel failed to discover, interview, or present witnesses in support of his defense, these witnesses should be presented by the petitioner at the evidentiary hearing. Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757. It is elementary that neither a trial judge nor an appellate court can speculate or guess on the
As to Petitioner‘s argument that Counsel did not fully and properly consider the fact that [Mr. Williard] had molested and physically abused [Petitioner] as a child, we agree with the post-conviction court that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proоf at the evidentiary hearing. See
Even if we were to reach the merits of Petitioner‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the record reflects that Cоunsel‘s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness as measured under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Counsel represented Petitioner over three years. During that time, Counsel obtained records regarding Petitioner‘s allegations against Mr. Williard; communicated that information to the mental health providers evaluating Petitioner; and made a reasonable strategic decision not to further pursue these allеgations. There is no evidence in the record about how Counsel‘s performance fell below prevailing professional norms, much less what those prevailing professional norms would have been.
Finally, Petitioner failed to show that there [was] a reasonable probability that, but for Counsel‘s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. Although Petitioner indicated that he would have rather proceeded to trial, there was no evidence presented about what impact the allegations would have had on any subsequent trial nor any evidence about whether such allegations would have been admissible. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
II. Involuntary and Unknowing Guilty Plea
To satisfy due process, guilty pleas must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. In making this determination, the reviewing court must look at the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Still, a petitioner‘s solemn declarations in open court that a
As to Petitioner‘s argument that his plea was involuntary because he was not in a good mental state and Counsel pressured him into pleading guilty—we again agree with the post-conviction court that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing. See
These statements cannot overcome Petitioner‘s solemn declarations in open court that his plea was voluntary and knowing. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. Indeed, Petitioner‘s declarations at the plea hearing—including his approval of Counsel‘s representation and his affirmation that he fully under[stood] the plea agreement—carry a strong presumption of verity and create a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceeding. Id. On these facts, Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
s/ Matthew J. Wilson
MATTHEW J. WILSON, JUDGE