JACKSON v. THE STATE
S23A0628
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
August 21, 2023
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court‘s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court‘s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
Joseph Jackson appeals his malice murder conviction for the stabbing death of Claudine Hargrove.1 Jackson argues that (1) the trial court erred in failing to take curative action after the prosecutor commented on his post-arrest silence by questioning him about why he waited until trial to assert that he acted in self-defense; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial after this questioning; and (3) the cumulative harm from these errors warrants a new trial. Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we conclude that any error by the trial court in
The trial evidence showed the following. In August 2018, Jackson and Hargrove lived together at an extended-stay hotel in Gwinnett County. Jackson‘s fathеr and brother were also staying at the same hotel but in a different room.
On the night of August 10, Jocelyn Walker, who was staying in a room next to Jackson and Hargrove, heard a man and a woman arguing in Jackson and Hargrove‘s room. Walker testified that she initially heard “fussing” but soon heard what seemed like furniture moving and “pounding” and “kicking” on the walls. Walker could not hear what thе man was saying, but she heard the woman say repeatedly, “I‘m not lying.” Walker called security, saying, “This is not a fight . . . I think she‘s getting beat down.” As she waited for security to arrive, Walker heard the woman next door say, “Oh, no; oh, my God, no; oh, my God.”
When a security guard arrived, he was directed to Jackson and Hargrove‘s room. He knocked on the door and stayed there for about a minute. Walker heard the security guard talking to someone. The surveillance video from the hotel does not show the door ever opening while the security guard was there. Walker later looked out her window and saw a man with a dripping towel wrapped around his left hand.
At some point that night, Jackson‘s father went to Hargrove‘s room because seсurity informed him that there had been complaints of an argument coming from that room. Jackson left the room, quickly shutting the door behind him, and walked with his father to his father‘s room, at which point Jackson‘s father noticed that Jackson‘s hand was bleeding. Jackson‘s father grabbed a towel and asked Jackson what happened, but Jackson refused to talk about it. Jаckson called his brother and said he was bleeding from several injuries to his hands, but Jackson did not mention how he sustained those injuries or that Hargrove had been injured in any way.
Jackson called 911 for his bleeding hand. A responding medic noticed severe lacerations on Jackson‘s hands that Jackson claimed were sustained while doing a magic trick with a knife. A police officer arrived shortly thereafter and found Jackson in an ambulance with his hands wrapped with a bandage soaked with blood. The police officer asked Jackson what happened, and he responded that he had cut himself “doing knife tricks” and denied that he had been attacked. Jackson provided no other information and was transported to a hospital. There, he told medical providers that he was injured while doing a magic trick.
While Jackson was at the hospital, his brother asked security to check Hargrove‘s room because he was still concerned about Jackson‘s phone call and wanted to know what happened at the hotel. No one responded to knocks on the door, so security opened the door, went inside the room, and found Hargrove on the floor. Security called 911, and police found Hargrove‘s dead body on the floor next to the bed and a knife blade under her body. The blade was about 7.5 inches long, was bent, and was covered in blood. The handle was located on a nearby tаble.
After Hargrove‘s dead body was found, a detective interviewed Jackson at the hospital. Other than the injuries to Jackson‘s hands, the detective did not notice any other injuries to Jackson, and Jackson never reported any. After asking some background questions and getting more detailed information about the claimed knife trick, the detective asked Jackson whether anyone else was with him at the time he was injured. Jackson said he was alone in his room at the time. The detective informed Jackson that Hargrove had “a cut on her” and asked Jackson if he knew anything about it. Jackson began asking questions about Hargrove‘s injury suggesting that he did not know anything about it, at which point the detective read Jaсkson his Miranda2 rights. After asking more questions about Hargrove and being informed
Hargrove‘s autopsy revealed 13 different cut and stab wounds, with many injuries to the left side of her body, including her face, neck, and chest. One stab wound severed her carotid artery and was sо large that her spine was visible. Another stab wound completely severed Hargrove‘s jugular vein, and another reached her heart. These wounds would have caused massive blood loss and death within minutes. Hargrove also sustained wounds to her hand and arm that were consistent with defensive wounds and had fractures to her nose and jawbone that were determinеd to have occurred around the time of her death. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was sharp-force injuries to the neck and chest, with other significant conditions being sharp-force injuries to the head and arm and blunt-force trauma of the head and face.
Jackson testified at his trial and claimed that he aсted in self-defense. Jackson said that Hargrove had been drinking, became upset by something he said about her children, grabbed a knife, and swung it at him. Jackson stated that he grabbed the knife blade, causing the cut to his hand, and that a struggle ensued, during which time he began “passing out.” Jackson said he punched Hargrove a couple of times, gained control of the knifе, and began swinging “aimlessly” at her. On cross-examination, Jackson admitted that he lied to everyone he talked to following the stabbing when he reported that he was injured doing a knife trick. Jackson also “guess[ed]” that he had enough strength to break bones in Hargrove‘s face despite feeling like he was about to pass out. Later, the following exchange оccurred:
PROSECUTOR: And you would admit, Mr. Jackson, that in four years [from the time of the crime to the time of the trial], this is the first time you have told anybody that this was self-defense?
JACKSON: That it was — I never talked about it to anybody except my lawyer.
PROSECUTOR: But no one ever called me, right?
JACKSON: Huh?
PROSECUTOR: You didn‘t call me. Your family never contacted me. Nobody ever contacted me.
At this point, trial counsel objected, arguing that Jacksоn had no obligation to call the prosecutor when he was represented by counsel. Counsel also argued that the question was overly argumentative because Jackson had answered the question. “It‘s his constitutional right,” counsel added. The prosecutor agreed to “move on,” leading to the following inquiry.
PROSECUTOR: But you would agree, Mr. Jackson, that you havе never told anyone from the State back then, that you killed [Hargrove] in self-defense?
JACKSON: No.
PROSECUTOR: All because you didn‘t want to deal with it, right?
JACKSON: Well, I just didn‘t trust to talk to anybody except for my lawyer.
PROSECUTOR: So you waited until now? Now‘s when you decided to tell everybody about self-defense?
JACKSON: I just wanted — I wanted to — I mean, I just — I don‘t — I guess now was — I mean when I talked — now is not the first time, like here, right this second. But talking to my lawyer, it was probably the first time.
1. Jackson argues that the prosecutor improperly “questioned [him] about this post-arrest silence” in the above-quoted cross-examination. Jackson argues that, as a result of the prosecutor‘s remarks, the trial court had a duty under
Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and by all needful and prоper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he
may order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender.
Even assuming that Jackson‘s objection about his “constitutional right”3 was sufficient to preserve the issue, not all of the prosecutor‘s questions or remarks were improper. Before hе was arrested, Jackson did not remain silent, but talked to the police and others. And the prosecutor was entitled to point out inconsistencies between Jackson‘s trial testimony that he acted in self-defense and his pre-arrest statements that he sustained his injuries while doing magic tricks. See Johnson v. State, 292 Ga. 785, 788 (3) (741 SE2d 627) (2013) (permissible for prosecutor to cross-examine testifying defеndant about his failure to mention his fear for his safety to police or others when defendant had talked to police without having invoked his right to remain silent); see also Bradford v. State, 299 Ga. 880, 887 (7) (792 SE2d 684) (2016) (“[T]he prosecutor‘s line of questioning permissibly explored the inconsistencies between appellant‘s trial testimony and his prior statements made to civilians on the scene and thе police soon after the shooting.“)
On the other hand, to the extent that some of the prosecutor‘s questions regarded Jackson‘s failure to come forward after invoking his constitutional right to counsel, this was improper. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (96 SCt 2240, 49 LE2d 91) (1976) (“We hold that the use [even] for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and аfter receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.“). But even assuming that the court erred in failing to take any remedial action, such assumed error was harmless. See O‘Neal v. State, 288 Ga. 219, 223 (702 SE2d 288) (2010) (trial court‘s
Although the prosecutor‘s questioning may have touched on Jackson‘s constitutional right to remain silent, Jackson‘s argument is not directly constitutional in nature; instеad, he argues that the trial court failed to meet its statutory duty under
Here, in conducting that review, we consider only the harm from comments that touched on Jackson‘s failure to come forward following the assertion of his constitutional right, as some of the other questioning was рroper. Considering all of the evidence, as a reasonable juror would, we are convinced the error was harmless. The evidence of Jackson‘s guilt was overwhelming. The trial evidence pointed only to Jackson as the culprit, and Jackson admitted that he stabbed Hargrove. Although Jackson claimed at trial that he acted in self-defense, the claim was not credible. Jackson‘s self-defense claim hinged on his own trial testimony, but that testimony was severely impeached by his prior inconsistent statements. Jackson told various people prior to his arrest that the injuries to his hands were caused by doing knife tricks, not as a result of stabbing Hargrove repeatedly, and the jury was free to use these prior inconsistent statements not only to find him not credible, but also as substantive evidence of guilt. See Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 437 (2) (c) (826 SE2d 7) (2019) (under the current Evidence Code, “a prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence, and is not limited in value only to impeachment purposes” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Moreover, even if Hargrove was the initial aggressor as Jackson claimed, a jury could easily reject his self-defense claim given that Jackson brutally and repeated stabbed Hargrove
2. Jackson next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial based on the prosecutor‘s allegedly improper questioning above. We disagree.
To succeed on his claim, Jackson must establish that his counsel‘s performance was constitutionally deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To show deficient performance, Jackson‘s must “overcome thе strong presumption that counsel‘s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel‘s decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 855 (2) (823 SE2d 325) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[D]ecisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectivenеss claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Richards v. State, 306 Ga. 779, 781 (2) (833 SE2d 96) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). To demonstrate prejudice, Jackson must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been diffеrent. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Mims, 304 Ga. at 855 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). A defendant must meet both prongs of the Strickland test; otherwise, his ineffective assistance claim fails. See Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015).
“When prejudicial matter is improperly placed before the jury, a mistrial is appropriate if it is essentiаl to the preservation of the defendant‘s right to a fair trial.” Lynn v. State, 310 Ga. 608, 612 (3) (852 SE2d 843) (2020). A trial court has broad discretion to grant a mistrial and may consider less drastic alternatives. See Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 325 (1) (676 SE2d 221) (2009). A claim based on the failure to move for a mistrial fails if a defendant cannot show that such a motion would have been granted. See Lynn, 310 Ga. at 613 (4) (a).
Jackson has not shown that his counsel‘s performancе was deficient. As discussed above, the evidence
3. And because there are not multiple errors to aggregate, Jackson‘s cumulative prejudice claim also fails. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (cumulative error claim requires that the defendant first show that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.