Lead Opinion
Following a jury trial, Frederick O’Neal was found guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and obstruction of a law enforcement officer. During the State’s closing argument at trial, the prosecutor stated:
I’m going to invite y’all to come back to DeKalb County Superior Court courtroom — you can come to this courtroom or any of the other Superior courtrooms — watch trials for the next year. Okay.Come back and see how many times we have this much evidence. 1
O’Neal objected to this argument, and his objection was sustained. However, the trial court did not give a curative instruction as requested by O’Neal, instead simply stating, “All right. All right. Just proceed on.” O’Neal appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to give a curative instruction. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals held that O’Neal’s failure to obtain a ruling on his request for a curative instruction waived the issue on appeal. O’Neal v. State, 299 Ga. App. XXIII (2009). We granted O’Neal’s petition for a writ of certiorari and posed the following questions:
Whether, if a defendant objects to a prosecutor placing prejudicial matters before the jury which are not in evidence and the trial court sustains the objection, the trial court is required by OCGA § 17-8-75 to give a curative instruction even absent a request from the defendant.
If not, whether when the defendant does request a curative instruction, as did O’Neal, that request is sufficient to preserve the defendant’s right to complain of the failure to give a curative instruction even if the trial court fails to rule on the request.
Whether the trial court’s statement to “just proceed on” constituted a denial of O’Neal’s request for a curative instruction.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that, because the plain language of OCGA § 17-8-75 speaks in terms of the trial court’s duty to give a curative instruction when a proper objection is made to the State’s introduction of improper argument on matters that are not in evidence, and because our most recent precedents interpreting the statute make clear that a mere objection is sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that O’Neal waived review of his claim by failing to obtain a ruling on his request for a curative instruction. However, because the trial court’s error in failing to give a curative instruction was harmless, O’Neal’s conviction must nevertheless be affirmed. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the issue of waiver, but affirm the Court of Appeals’ ultimate decision to affirm O’Neal’s conviction.
1. OCGA § 17-8-75 states:
Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender.
In construing this statute,
we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe [the] statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage. At the same time, we must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature.
(Citations omitted.) Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co.,
The plain language of OCGA § 17-8-75 is clear, and represents the best indication of the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. See Van Dyck v. Van Dyck,
Nowhere in the statute is there a requirement for defense counsel to specifically request additional remedies after interposing an objection to the improper statements made by a prosecutor. To the contrary, the plain language of OCGA § 17-8-75 refers to the trial court’s independent duty, after defense counsel’s objection, to rebuke the prosecutor, give an appropriate curative instruction, or grant a mistrial in the event that the prosecutor has injected into the case prejudicial statements on matters outside of the evidence. Consistent with the plain language of OCGA § 17-8-75, this Court’s most recent authorities interpreting the statute have allowed appellate review of a trial court’s failure to rebuke a prosecutor or give a curative instruction where defense counsel did nothing more than interpose an objection to the prosecutor’s improper statements. See Stinski v. State,
Instead of following the straightforward language of OCGA § 17-8-75 and our most recent cases that are entirely consistent with the plain language of the statute, the dissent would ignore or outright disapprove these cases and rely on older case law that is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Compare, e.g., Brooks v. State,
2. Although the trial court committed error and the Court of Appeals further erred by concluding that O’Neal waived review of this error on appeal, this does not end our inquiry. While the trial court did commit an error, “it is fundamental that harm as well as error must be shown for reversal.” (Citation omitted.) Matthews v. State,
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Notes
The record reveals that both of the victims positively identified O’Neal as the person who held them at gunpoint and robbed them, and that O’Neal fled from an officer on foot when he was pulled over by the officer while driving a stolen car. Although the jury found O’Neal guilty of obstruction for fleeing the officer, and found him guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment with respect to one of the victims, the jury was unable to reach a verdict with respect to the charges for aggravated assault and armed robbery of the other victim, and these charges were dead docketed.
Indeed, contrary to the dissent’s contention that this Court is “interfering with the legislative prerogative” by following our most recent authorities interpreting OCGA § 17-8-75, we are instead giving life to what has always been the clear legislative intent of OCGA § 17-8-75 by more closely following the plain language of the statute. It is the older case law upon which the dissent relies which has represented, and continues to represent, an unwarranted departure from the plain language of OCGA § 17-8-75. Because such a departure from the plain language of the statute runs contrary to the basic rules of statutory construction and undermines the legislative intent of the statute as written, it is this older case law that should no longer be followed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The intent of OCGA § 17-8-75 is to prohibit argument which introduces facts that are not put on the record and are calculated to prejudice the accused. Adams v. State,
This interpretation of OCGA § 17-8-75 has been longstanding and the legislature has always acquiesced in it. Indeed, the statute “is not [even] of legislative origin. It has appeared in several of our codes, [but] the principles undoubtedly are taken from four decisions of this court.” Brooks v. State, supra, citing Augusta & Summerville R. Co. v. Randall,
Where a statute has, by a long series of decisions, received a judicial construction in which the General Assembly has acquiesced and thereby given its implicit legislative approval, the courts should not disturb that settled construction. Even those who regard “stare decisis” with something less than enthusiasm recognize that the principle has even greater weight where the precedent relates to interpretation of a statute. A reinterpretation of a statute after the General Assembly’s implicit acceptance of the original interpretation would constitute a judicial usurpation of the legislative function.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Radioshack Corp. v. Cascade Crossing II,
By interpreting the statute anew, the majority is trampling upon more than 120 years of case law and interfering with the legislative prerogative. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Hines join in this dissent.
See, e.g., Morrison v. State,