Jackson, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Jackson, Et Al. v. City of Joliet Et Al.

See case details

TRANS-CANADA ENTERPRISES, LTD., ET AL. v. MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE ET AL.; and PORT OF TACOMA v. PUYALLUP INDIAN TRIBE

No. 83-833; No. 83-958

Supreme Court of the United States

1049

challenges therefor“);

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 156 (1879) (“The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest“). See also

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 218 (1982) (findings of trial court on juror bias entitled to presumption of correctness in federal habeas action under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)). I see no reason why different principles should apply when the alleged bias concerns the juror‘s feelings about the death penalty.¹¹

The question presented in this case is important, and the Court should provide better guidance to other courts faithfully striving to apply Witherspoon. Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

No. 83-833. TRANS-CANADA ENTERPRISES, LTD., ET AL. v. MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE ET AL.; and

No. 83-958. PORT OF TACOMA v. PUYALLUP INDIAN TRIBE. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Washington Land Title Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 83-958 granted. Certiorari denied. JUSTICE WHITE would grant certiorari. Reported below: No. 83-833,

713 F. 2d 455; No. 83-958,

717 F. 2d 1251.

See case details

JACKSON, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JACKSON, ET AL. v. CITY OF JOLIET ET AL.

No. 83-853

C. A. 7th Cir.

1983

Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.

Petitioners, representatives of the estates of individuals killed in a one-car accident in Joliet, Ill., filed complaints in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. V), contending that various county and city officials violated decedents’ constitutional rights by failing to save decedents from the burning automobile. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that two minutes after the car swerved off the road and burst into flames, one of the respondents, a police officer, arrived on the scene and began directing traffic around the car. Firemen were summoned, and the fire was extinguished; yet no efforts were made to remove decedents from the car, nor was an ambulance called until some 45 minutes after the accident occurred. The complaint alleged that decedents were still alive when the fire was doused and that had adequate rescue measures been taken at the outset, decedents would have survived.

The District Court denied respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, reversed, concluding that an attempt by state officers to assist at an accident does not result in the deprivation of a constitutional right when the attempt fails because of the negligence or gross negligence of the officers.

715 F. 2d 1200 (1983).

In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that “[n]o problem so perplexes the federal courts today as determining the outer bounds of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 ....”

Id., at 1201. Section 1983 actions have been brought in a variety of contexts by those injured as a result of a state official‘s failure to exercise adequate care in carrying out his duties.

Clark v. Taylor, 710 F. 2d 4 (CA1 1983);

Morrison v. Washington County, 700 F. 2d 678 (CA11), cert. denied,

464 U. S. 864 (1983);

Hull v. Duncanville, 678 F. 2d 582 (CA5 1982);

Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F. 2d 1252 (CA9 1982);

Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 649 F. 2d 134 (CA2 1981), after remand to District Court,

709 F. 2d 782 (CA2 1982), cert. denied sub nom.

Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U. S. 864 (1983). The results in these cases have not been entirely consistent. While the Court of Appeals in the present case determined that the State‘s failure to provide adequate rescue services was not actionable under § 1983, other courts have permitted relief under that section when a foster parent‘s abuse of his foster child was permitted by the state agency‘s failure adequately to monitor the foster care environment,

Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, and when a patient‘s death was allegedly caused by the manner in which he was discharged by a state hospital,

Morrison, supra. The inconsistent results below are attributable, at least in part, to the lack of definitive guidelines for determining when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional tort. This Court should attempt to resolve this “perplexing” issue, and this case provides us with an opportunity to do so. Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for oral argument.

No. 83-1039. KINNETT DAIRIES, INC. v. DAIRYMEN, INC. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of National Independent Dairy-Foods Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5792. GRIFFIN v. TEXAS. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

No. 83-5818. CREECH v. IDAHO. Sup. Ct. Idaho;

No. 83-5836. WILLIE v. LOUISIANA. Sup. Ct. La.;

No. 83-5849. CLINES ET AL. v. ARKANSAS. Sup. Ct. Ark.;

No. 83-5897. SHRINER v. WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. C. A. 11th Cir.;

No. 83-5905. FITZPATRICK v. FLORIDA. Sup. Ct. Fla.;

No. 83-5909. HARICH v. FLORIDA. Sup. Ct. Fla.;

No. 83-5924. JOHNSON v. FLORIDA. Sup. Ct. Fla.;

No. 83-5939. DUNKINS v. ALABAMA. Sup. Ct. Ala.;

No. 83-5942. KNAPP v. ARIZONA. Super. Ct. Ariz., Maricopa County;

No. 83-5955. KNIGHTON v. LOUISIANA. Sup. Ct. La.;

No. 83-5973. LIGHTBOURNE v. FLORIDA. Sup. Ct. Fla.;

No. 83-5977. MASON v. FLORIDA. Sup. Ct. Fla.;

No. 83-5980. SONNIER v. MAGGIO, WARDEN. C. A. 5th Cir.;

No. 83-5999. OSBORN v. WYOMING. Sup. Ct. Wyo.; and

No. 83-6009. HAYES v. ARKANSAS. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-5792,

665 S. W. 2d 762; No. 83-5818,

105 Idaho 362, 670 P. 2d 463; No. 83-5836,

436 So. 2d 553; No. 83-5849,

280 Ark. 77, 656 S. W. 2d 684; No. 83-5897,

715 F. 2d 1452; No. 83-5905,

437 So. 2d 1072; No. 83-5909,

437 So. 2d 1082; No. 83-5924,

438 So. 2d 774; No. 83-5939,

437 So. 2d 1356; No. 83-5955,

436 So. 2d 1141; No. 83-5973,

438 So. 2d 380; No. 83-5977,

438 So. 2d 374; No. 83-5980,

720 F. 2d 401; No. 83-5999,

672 P. 2d 777; No. 83-6009,

280 Ark. 509, 660 S. W. 2d 648.

JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth

Notes

11

In

Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S., at 46, we had occasion to discuss the circumstances under which a potential juror could be excluded under the very Texas statutory scheme at issue in this case.

“If the juror is to obey his oath and follow the law of Texas, he must be willing not only to accept that in certain circumstances death is an acceptable penalty but also to answer the statutory questions without conscious distortion or bias. The State does not violate the Witherspoon doctrine when it excludes prospective jurors who are unable or unwilling to address the penalty questions with this degree of impartiality.”

This enunciation of the standard for exclusion makes clear the factbound nature of the inquiry and, hence, the appropriateness of deferring to the judgment of the trial court.

Case Details

Case Name: Jackson, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Jackson, Et Al. v. City of Joliet Et Al.

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Feb 21, 1984

Citation: 465 U.S. 1049

Docket Number: 83-853

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS