ISAAC W. CAPPS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEVIN DRAKE et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-1876
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
June 29, 2018
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 14-cv-441 — Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge & Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge. ARGUED APRIL 5, 2018
Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
I. BACKGROUND
Isaac Capps sued six law enforcement officers for failure to intervene in an unlawful search and for use of excessive force, pursuant to
Capps succeeded on eight of the ten claims he brought to trial.* He prevailed on his failure-to-intervene claims against each defendant and on his excessive-force claims
After trial, Capps filed a petition to recover attorney‘s fees pursuant to
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Capps challenges the denial of his petition for fees on two bases. First, he contends the district court lacked the authority to refer his post-trial motion to another judge. Second, he claims the court abused its discretion when it awarded him no attorney‘s fees.
A. The district court had authority to transfer the motion.
No statute or regulation permits a district court judge to refer or transfer a
The referral of a post-trial motion falls within this inherent authority and so the referral of the motion for attorney‘s fees in this case was not beyond the district court‘s authority. Still, the district court must not abuse its discretion when exercising this authority. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 653; see Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1892 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Degan v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24 (1996)) (“[T]he exercise of an inherent power must be a ‘reasonable response to the problems and needs’ confronting the court‘s fair administration of justice ... and cannot be contrary to any express grant of or limitation on the district court‘s power contained in a rule or statute.“). There is no indication the court did so here. Therefore, the district court properly exercised its authority when referring the motion for attorney‘s fees.
That said, we do find the practice of referring post-trial motions concerning, particularly where, as here, the judge to whom the motion is referred has a stated interest in the subject matter of the motion. Judges in the district courts are meant to be generalists. See Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. CPC Logistics, Inc., 698 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 2012). Moreover, the deference we afford the district court‘s decision to grant or deny attorney‘s fees is based on the notion that the judge deciding the motion had tried the case and thus is more familiar with the complexity of the litigation and how it was carried out. See Dobbs v. DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 842 F.3d 1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2016); Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 1998). That reasoning is undermined when the petition is transferred after the trial. We caution the district courts against referring such motions regularly or without greater explanation of why the referral is appropriate.
B. The district court‘s decision not to award any attorney‘s fees was an abuse of discretion.
In civil rights actions, like Capps‘s, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney‘s fee.”
The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that even a party who obtains only nominal
We have not limited the logic of Farrar to just cases in which the plaintiff receives nominal damages. Aponte v. City of Chicago, 728 F.3d 724, 728 (7th Cir. 2013). Instead, the district court should follow Farrar “if the plaintiff was ‘aiming high and fell short, [and] in the process inflict[ed] heavy costs on his opponent and wast[ed] the time of the court.‘” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hyde v. Small, 123 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1997)). “[O]n the other hand,” the court should calculate a reasonable fee if “the case was simply a small claim and was tried accordingly.” Id. (quoting Hyde, 123 F.3d at 585).
In this litigation, Capps is clearly the prevailing party. He obtained a judgment against each of the defendants and received $22,000 in compensatory damages and $10,092 in punitive damages. Yet, the district court determined that this was a case where the plaintiff “aim[ed] high and fell short.” (R. 254 at 12 (quoting Aponte, 728 F.3d at 728).) We disagree.
First, we doubt an award including punitive damages can be considered technical or de minimis. Second, while $32,092 is considerably less than what Capps sought in pre-trial settlement negotiations, the record demonstrates that a large damage award was not Capps‘s primary focus. Capps testified that it was more important to him to take the case to trial and receive a verdict than to accept a large settlement without the officers’ acknowledgment of responsibility, and he made no specific monetary request to the jury, see Hyde, 123 F.3d at 585. The defendants never made a proper pre-trial offer of judgment under
In sum, Capps prevailed in his primary goal—to obtain a judgment of liability—and was awarded a considerable sum, including punitive damages. This is precisely the type of situation for which
We note that the district court based its decision largely on the conduct of Capps‘s attorney and the terms of her contract with Capps, which the court found contrary to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. But this is not an action to enforce the agreement between Capps and his attorney, and
Chief Judge Reagan, anticipating that this court might find the outright denial of Capps‘s petition unwarranted, calculated an award that he deemed would be reasonable. But this analysis suffered many of the same errors as his decision to deny the petition. Namely, the award included no fees for work conducted after the settlement offer was rejected. As discussed, Capps had a right to reject the settlement offer and pursue a judgment against the defendants, a judgment he succeeded in obtaining at trial. Therefore, the district court is instructed to fully recalculate a reasonable fee award on remand, including fees for work done on the trial, post-trial motions, and this appeal. The district court is free to consider whether counsel‘s proposed rate is reasonable and whether her reported hours are accurate when calculating a reasonable fee and adjusting the lodestar amount accordingly.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we REVERSE the district court‘s decision. This case is REMANDED for a determination of the amount of attorney‘s fees, including those incurred at trial, post-trial, and on appeal. If the court Judge Rosenstengel should again decide that the motion should be referred to another judge, she should specify her reasons for doing so.