IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD v. Clovis BOWLES
No. 10-1288
Supreme Court of Iowa
Feb. 11, 2011.
HECHT, Justice.
Clovis Bowles, Lisbon, pro se.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a complaint against the respondent, Clovis Bowles, alleging he engaged in a sexual relationship with a client in violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. After a hearing, a division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa found Bowles had committed multiple violations of his ethical duties as an Iowa lawyer. A majority of the commission recommended Bowles’ license to practice law be suspended for three years.2
On August 6, 2010, the board filed a complaint against Bowles alleging he violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j) (prohibiting sexual relations between a lawyer and client except in circumstances not relevant here), 32:1.14(a) (requiring a lawyer to properly maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with a client whose capacity to make adequately considered decisions was diminished), 32:8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 32:8.4(a) (defining professional misconduct to include any violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct).1
We review disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Iowa 2010). We give respectful consideration to the findings and recommendations of the commission, but we are not bound by them. Id. This court gives special weight to the commission‘s findings concerning the credibility of witnesses. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 695 (Iowa 2006). It is the board‘s burden to prove attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id. “This burden is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance standard required in the usual civil case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof‘l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004). If this court finds the board has proven misconduct, we may impose a lesser or greater sanction than that recommended by the commission. Id.
Upon our review of the record in this case, we make the following findings of fact. In August of 2007, Bowles met with a woman (“the client“) and her male friend in his law office. The client revealed she had been discharged that day from a mental health facility where she had been treated after a recent suicide attempt. Her three children had been removed from her custody following an investigation by the Iowa Department of Human Services, and she sought Bowles’ professional services in the related juvenile court proceedings.
Bowles agreed to represent the client and scheduled a second meeting a few days later in his office. On this occasion, the client came alone. While discussing the removal of her children, the client became emotional. During the conversation about the client‘s fitness as a parent, they discussed her history as a prostitute and her abuse of crack cocaine and alcohol. Bowles asked if he could kiss her. They embraced and had sexual relations in Bowles’ office on that occasion.
Bowles had sex with the client on subsequent occasions while he represented her. However, both the lawyer-client and the personal relationship between Bowles and the client soon broke down. The client filed a complaint with the Iowa Supreme Court Disciplinary Board on September 10, 2007, alleging Bowles had engaged in ethical misconduct when he engaged in sex acts with her in his law office and at her home. She retained new counsel.
When the board requested him to respond to the complaint, Bowles denied the allegation of a sexual relationship with the client. In his defense, he relied in part on an affidavit executed by the client falsely denying she had engaged in sexual relations with him. The affidavit, which Bowles knew to be false, was prepared with his assistance and signed by the client before a notary public.
Bowles and the client renewed their personal relationship after the ethical complaint was filed. Believing her chances of regaining the custody of her children would be improved if she were married to an attorney, the client married Bowles on October 1, 2007. The détente was short-lived though, as the marriage was dissolved on November 14, 2007.
Later the same day, Bowles approached a district court judge and requested to speak to him. He appeared to be emotionally upset at the time and admitted he had engaged in a sex act with a client in the courthouse earlier that day. The judge told Bowles to report his ethical misconduct to the board, advised him to seek legal counsel and mental health treatment, and cautioned him against further representation of the client under the circumstances. Ignoring the judge‘s admonitions, Bowles appeared in court the next day with the client and made legal arguments on her behalf.
Although he persisted in his denial of the sexual relationship prior to the hearing before the commission, Bowles admitted at the hearing that he had sex with the client during the existence of the lawyer-client relationship.
A. Rule 32:1.8(j)—Sexual Relationship with Client.
Rule 32:1.8(j) provides: “A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client ... unless the person is the spouse of the lawyer or the sexual relationship predates the initiation of the client-lawyer relationship.” Bowles violated this rule when he had sex with the client at his law office and on at least one other occasion when he had sex with the client at her home. After the client filed an ethical complaint and consulted other counsel, Bowles again participated in a sex act in the courthouse library with the client who sought to induce him to represent her in a hearing scheduled for the following day. Bowles appeared in court the next day with the client and made legal arguments on her behalf. We conclude the clear and convincing evidence establishes Bowles violated this rule by engaging in sexual relations with the client on at least three occasions.
B. Rule 32:1.14(a)—Representing Client with Diminished Capacity.
Rule 32:1.14 requires lawyers, “as far as reasonably possible, [to] maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship” with a client whose capacity to make adequately considered decisions is diminished. Iowa R. Prof. Conduct 32:1.14(a). The plain language of this rule addresses the obligation of lawyers to be attentive and responsive to circumstances in which a client‘s mental or legal capacity is impaired and to take “reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client, and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian