INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 18 v. CNR TRUCKING INCORPORATED, ET AL.
No. 98935
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
May 23, 2013
[Cite as Internal. Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 v. CNR Trucking Inc., 2013-Ohio-2094.]
BEFORE: Keough, J., Jones, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED; Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-769170; RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 23, 2013
Timothy R. Fadel
Wuliger, Fadel & Beyer
1340 Sumner Court
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
For CNR Trucking, Inc.
Cara L. Santosuosso
Laubacher & Company
Westgate Towers, Suite 626
20525 Center Ridge Road
Rocky River, Ohio 44116
For Laborers’ International Uniоn of North America, Local 310
Andrew A. Crampton
Susan L. Gragel
Goldstein Gragel, L.L.C.
526 Superior Avenue, East
Suite 1040
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 (“Local 18“) appeals from the trial court‘s judgment dismissing its complaint against defendants-appellees CNR Trucking, Inc. (“CNR“) and Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local 310 (“Local 310“) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶2} On May 16, 2009, CNR agreed to be bоund by the terms and provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between Local 310 and the Construction Employers Association, effective May 1, 2009 to April 30, 2012.
{¶3} On August 31, 2011, CNR entered into two “addendum agreements” to the collective bargaining agreement between Local 18 and the Construction Employers Association, effective May 1, 2009 to April 30, 2012 (“Local 18 CBA“). The addenda required CNR to “abide by аll the terms and conditions contained in the [Local 18 CBA] as to hours, wages, fringes, and other conditions of employment” and to pay a minimum number of hours of fringe benefits on behalf of each employee at rates set forth in the Local 18 CBA. CNR‘s execution of the addendum agreements was a condition precedent to CNR‘s participation in and assent to the Local 18 CBA. The next day, September 1, 2011, CNR agreed to be bound by the terms and provisions of the Local 18 CBA.
{¶4} Local 18 subsequently filed suit against CNR and Local 310. In its complaint, Local 18 alleged that on September 27, 2011, CNR sent correspondence to Local 18 that repudiated the CBA and its addenda. Local 18 further alleged that Local 310 intentionally and without justification caused CNR‘s repudiation of its agreements with Local 18. In its complaint, Local 18 set forth claims for breach of contract against CNR and tortious interference with contract against Local 310. Local 18 sought compensatory damages from both CNR аnd Local 310, punitive damages from Local 310, and specific performance of the agreements from CNR.
{¶5} After answering, both Local 310 and CNR filed
{¶6} On August 21, 2012, the newly-assigned judge issued an opinion and judgment entry dismissing the matter without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that Local 18‘s claims against Local 310 and CNR were preempted by federal law; specifically,
{¶7} Local 18 now appeals from the trial court‘s judgment dismissing its complaint.1
{¶8} In its single assignment of error, Local 18 аrgues that the trial court erred in finding that its state-law claims against Local 310 for tortious interference with contract were preempted by
{¶9} Because the issue of whether a trial court has subjеct matter jurisdiction involves a question of law, we review a trial court‘s judgment dismissing claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. State ex rel. Rothal v. Smith, 151 Ohio App.3d 289, 2002-Ohio-7328, 783 N.E.2d 1001, ¶ 110 (9th Dist.). When reviewing a matter de novo, we afford no dеference to the trial court‘s decision. BP Communications Alaska v. Cent. Collection Agency, 136 Ohio App.3d 807, 812, 373 N.E.2d 1050 (8th Dist.2000).
{¶10} The doctrine of preemption in labor law was developed to prevent state court interference with the federal regulatory schеme set forth in the NLRA. Bldrs. Assn. of E. Ohio & W. Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Commercial Piping Co., Inc., 70 Ohio St. 2d 9, 10, 434 N.E.2d 271 (1982). “‘The overriding goal of preemption has been to promote a uniform application of the NLRA by a centralized administrative agency, thereby avoiding potential сonflict of rules of law, of remedy, and of administration,’ promulgated by different tribunals.” Id., quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959).
{¶11} The NLRA contains no express preemption provision. Ohio State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 98 Ohio St. 3d 214, 2002-Ohio-7213, 781 N.E.2d 951, ¶ 46. Further, “Congress has neither exercised its full
{¶12} Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has recognized two types of preemption by the NLRA. The first, known as Garmon preemption, fоrbids state and local regulation of activities arguably protected under
{¶13} In this case, we find that Local 18‘s tortious interference сlaims are preempted under Garmon because the conduct alleged is arguably subject to
{¶14} Under
forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization * * * rather than to employees in another labor organization * * *.
This language condemns the “prototypical jurisdictional dispute” in which two rival unions have collective bargaining agreements with one employer, eaсh claims that its members are entitled to perform a particular task for that employer, and the employer “seems perfectly willing to assign work to either if the other will just let him alone.” NLRB v. Radio & Televisiоn Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212 (Columbia Broadcasting Serv.), 364 U.S. 573, 579, 81 S.Ct. 330, 5 L.Ed.2d 302 (1961) (“CBS“). Employers involved in a jurisdictional dispute may file for a jurisdictional hearing with the NLRB pursuant to
{¶15} This case presents such a jurisdictional dispute. Both Local 18 and Local 310 have сollective bargaining agreements with CNR, and Local 18 is alleging that Local 310 “wrongfully, intentionally, and without justification” procured CNR‘s breach of its agreement with Local 18. In short, Local 18 is alleging that Loсal 310 coerced CNR to repudiate its agreement with Local 18 and assign the disputed work to Local 310‘s members, conduct that is arguably prohibited by
{¶16} Local 18 contends that this case does not involve a jurisdictional dispute, however, because such a dispute requires that each union have a contract with the same employer, and it has no agreement with CNR due to CNR‘s repudiation. But a repudiation of a contract does not rescind a contract; it merely results in the breach of that contract. Am. Bronze Corp. v. Streamway Prods., 8 Ohio App.3d 223, 228, 456 N.E.2d 1295 (8th Dist.1982); Daniel E. Terreri & Sons, Inc. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 152 Ohio App.3d 95, 2003-Ohio-1227, 786 N.E.2d 921 (7th Dist.). Moreover, there could be no repudiation by CNR unless it did, in fаct, have a contract with Local 18.
{¶17} Local 18 also argues that pursuant to CBS and its progeny, in order for there to be any jurisdictional dispute within the exclusive purview of
{¶18} Local 18 next argues, citing Cleveland ex rel. O‘Malley v. White, 148 Ohiо App.3d 565, 2002-Ohio-3633, 774 N.E.2d 337 (8th Dist.), that a state court may not find lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to federal preemption unless the National Labor Relations Board has rendered a decision regarding thе same subject matter. But O‘Malley does not stand for the proposition argued by Local 18. While the O‘Malley
{¶19} Finally, at oral argument, Local 18 argued that the trial court improperly considered material outside the pleadings in deciding Locаl 310‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Specifically, Local 18 argued that its complaint made no mention of competing collective bargaining agreements such that the trial court‘s finding that Lоcal 18‘s “claims concern conflicts between two CBA‘s involving the same employer” was necessarily based on information outside the record. However, in ruling on a
{¶20} Finding no merit to Local 18‘s arguments, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm the trial court‘s judgment dismissing Local 18‘s claims against Local 310 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
{¶21} Affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR