[¶ 1] D.O. appeals from a juvenile court’s order granting the State’s motion to transfer D.O.’s case to the district court and denying D.O.’s suppression motion. D.O. argues that law enforcement offered false or misleading testimony in support of the search warrant, that insufficient probable cause existed to justify the search warrant’s issuance, that the juvenile court relied on out-of-court statements in violation of his statutory right to confrontation and that his case was inappropriately transferred to the district court. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] A series of burglaries occurred over several months in Bismarck involving more than $65,000 in stolen property and property damage. D.O. is a juvenile thought to be involved with the crimes. While investigating D.O.’s involvement, Detective Matthew Fullerton performed a probation search of D.O.’s residence, obtained infоrmation from a tipster and a confidential informant, searched publicly available information on D.O.’s Facebook page and performed a “cell tower dump” showing cell phone activity in the area of the burglaries at the time they occurred.
[¶ 3] Fullerton filed search warrant affidavits on January 16, 2013 for Facebook information and for text message content. According to Fullerton’s Faсebook affidavit, the cell tower dump revealed D.O.’s phone was near three burglary sites at the time they occurred. The text message affidavit states that during a probation search of D.O.’s residence Fullerton found items similar to those reported missing during a gas station burglary. Fullerton also found a backpack containing light-colored latex gloves, dark clothing and tools. Fullerton testified that surveillance from the robberies showed culprits wearing light-colored gloves and dark clothing, but that the items found could not be matched definitively to the footage. The Facebook affidavit also indicates D.O.’s publicly available Facebook information showed comments about “robbin shit like a thug crook,” “snitches” and pictures of large sums of money.
[¶ 4] Fullerton sought access to all known Facebook informatiоn, including basic subscriber information, expanded subscriber information — such as wall posts, *645 friend lists and status updates — user photos, and private messages using Face-book’s instant messaging service from July-20, 2012 until the time he filed the affidavit. Fullerton sought all knovrn data associated with photos posted on D.O.’s wall on December 12, 2012, when a photo depicting large sums of money was posted. Fullerton requested text message сontent for D.O.’s cell phone because he believed relevant texts were sent and received after the burglaries and after D.O.’s probation search.
[¶ 5] The State filed a juvenile court petition on April 16, 2013, alleging numerous acts of criminal mischief and burglary. The State then moved to transfer the proceeding to district court. D.O. opposed transfer to district court, moving to suppress evidence frоm the search warrant because he alleged law enforcement provided false or misleading information to support their search warrant request and the affidavit did not establish probable cause for the warrant. The juvenile court held a transfer hearing encompassing D.O.’s Franks issue and probable cause issue. The court denied D.O.’s motion to suppress evidence, finding law enforcement did not provide false or misleading information in its affidavit requesting the Facebook search warrant and probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. The juvenile court also found probable cause for transferring the case to the district court.
II
[¶ 6] This Court’s standard of review of a juvenile court’s order is well-established:
“Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), this Court reviews a juvenile court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneоus standard of review, with due regard given to the opportunity of the juvenile court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence to support it, if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, or if the finding was induced by an erroneous view of the law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo.”
Interest of R.A.,
Ill
[¶ 7] D.O. argues law enforcement offered false or misleading testimony regarding matching shoe prints in support of the search warrant. He asserts that, because the information was relevant to the judge’s determination of probable cause, the offending statements should be stricken from the affidavit.
[¶ 8] When a defendant believes false or misleading testimony has been offered in support of a search warrant, a defendant can request a
Franks
hearing.
State v. Donovan,
[¶ 9] D.O. argued Fullerton’s Facebook affidavit falsely stated D.O.’s shoe prints were found at the burglary scenes. Examination of the search warrant affidavit reveals Fullerton twice referenced shoe prints found at the crime scenes. Fullerton claimed the burglaries were connected because “[t]wo distinct sets of footprints have been found on at least three (3) incidents.” He then stated:
“That I am requesting a search warrant be obtained for these individuals’ accounts basеd on known Facebook activity, and other factors, including but not limited to: Crime stopper’s tips being received that these subjects are involved, a Confidential Informant, who has been proven to be a reliable source, relaying information pertaining to their involvement, known cell phone activity in the area of the burglaries, and matching shoe prints at the burglary sites.”
(Emphasis added.) Fullerton listed matching prints as one of several reasоns justifying a search warrant for the four named individuals’ Facebook accounts. Reading the affidavit in its entirety shows the mention of the shoe prints connected the burglaries to one another, rather than specifically to D.O. At most, this suggested the matching shoe prints possibly belonged to one of the four named individuals against whom Fullerton sought the warrant. This is not enough to show intentional fraud or reckless disregard of whethеr the affidavit was misleading.
[¶ 10] We also must ask whether the affidavit would not have been sufficient to support finding probable cause if the omitted information was included.
Poitra,
[¶ 11] The juvenile court was not clearly erroneous in finding D.O. failed to show Fullerton supported his search warrant affidavit with false or misleading information.
IV
[¶ 12] D.O. argues insufficient probable cause existed to issue the search warrant.
[¶ 13] “The existence of probable cause [to issue a search warrant] is a question of law.”
State v. Dodson,
[¶ 14] The “totality-of-the-circumstances” regarding D.O. include a confidential informant’s tip and an anonymous tip about his involvement, his cell phone activity around the sites at the times of the burglaries, his publicly available Facebook postings and pictures, information garnered from a probation search of his residence and matching shoe prints found at three burglary sites. Although the matching footprints were not successfully linked to D.O., probable cause deals with probabilities; a reasonable theory of probable cause is not retroactively disproved simply because hindsight reveals the theory was in error.
State v. Driscoll,
[¶ 15] Fullerton also filed a search warrant affidavit for the text message content from D.O.’s cell phone at the same time he filed his Facebook search warrant affidavit. The second affidavit included information about the results of the probation search of D.O.’s residence, which revealed a backpack with tools, white latex gloves and dark-colored clothing. These items were consistent with surveillance video, showing burglars wearing light-colored gloves and dark clothing.
[¶ 16] “We consider all information for probable cause together, and we test affidavits executed in support of a warrant in a commonsense and realistic fashion.”
Proell,
[¶ 17] Probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the Facebook search warrant.
V
[¶ 18] D.O. argues his statutory right to confrontation was violated when the juvenile court admitted hearsay evidence during the transfer hearing and when the State failed to provide notice of the witnesses it intended to call.
[¶ 19] Section 27-20-27, N.D.C.C., provides a statutory right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at transfer hearings. In
Interest of R.A.,
this Court discussed that “the right to confrontation is a trial right and does not apply to the same extent at pretrial hearings.”
“A juvenile does not receive greater evi-dentiary protections during a juvenile transfer hearing than other criminal defendants receive during pretrial criminal proceedings. ‘A juvenile court transfer hearing is equivalent to a preliminary examination in a criminal case which has relaxed standards for admission of evidence.’ N.D.R.Ev. 1101, explanatory note. The rules of evidence do not apply during a transfer hearing. See N.D.R.Ev. 1101(d); see also In re C.R.M., 552 N.W.2d 324, 327 (N.D.1996) (the rules of evidence do not apply at a transfer hearing and hearsay testimony is admissible).”
Interest of R.A.,
at ¶ 31. This Court in
Interest of C.R.M.
allowed a detective to present hearsay testimony based on statements of others made during his investigation because the detective was available for cross-examination.
[¶ 20] Reading the statute together with this Court’s precedent, and considering the relaxed evidentiary standards in pretrial matters, the juvenile court did not err in admitting out-of-court statements at *649 the hearing. As in C.R.M., Fullerton was available for cross-examination and was an adverse witness contemplated under section 27-20-27, N.D.C.C. This also was an early hearing, and it would not curtail D.O.’s ability to cross-examine witnesses at trial.
[¶ 21] D.O. alleges the State did not provide sufficient notice of the witnesses it intended to call at the transfer hearing. While the State did not provide the names and addresses of the witnesses in its response, all witnesses had been disclosed during the discovery process. Further, when the State’s two witnesses were called, D.O. did not object to either witness, but only objected to their hearsay testimony. D.O. also conflates notice of the hearing with providing notice of witnesses because he cites
State v. Grenz
for the proposition that notice of witnesses is an integral part of transfer proceedings, when that case discussed notice of the hearing itself.
[¶ 22] D.O.’s statutory right to confrontation was not violated during presentation of testimony at the transfer hearing.
VI
[¶ 23] D.O. аrgues his case was inappropriately transferred to the district court.
[¶24] To transfer D.O.’s case to the district court, the State must show reasonable grounds exist to believe that:
“(a) The child committed the delinquent act alleged;
(b) The child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available programs;
(c) The child is not treatable in an institution for individuals who are intellectually disabled or who are mentally ill;
(d) The interests of the community rеquire that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline; and
(e) If the child is fourteen or fifteen years old, the child committed a delinquent act involving the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm.”
N.D.C.C. § 27 — 20—34(l)(c)(4). Sub-parts (c) and (e) are not applicable to this case.
[¶ 25] This Court previously discussed the “reasonable grounds” burden:
“The Legislature has set forth a ‘reasonable grounds’ standard for waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer of juveniles to adult court in section 27-20 — 34(l)(b)(4), NDCC. The standard of reasonable grounds has been compared to a showing of probable cause. Draper v. United States,358 U.S. 307 [79 S.Ct. 329 ,3 L.Ed.2d 327 ] (1959); In Interest of A.D.L.,301 N.W.2d 380 (N.D.1981). Probable cause is a minimal burden of proof. It is generally employed in the judicial decision-making process when the effect of the determination has temporary or short-term consequences. Healy v. Healy,397 N.W.2d 71 (N.D.1986). We have held that if it appears to be so or there is a definite probability based on substantial evidence, the standard of probable cause has been met. Woehlhoff v. State,487 N.W.2d 16 (N.D.1992); In Interest of R.R.,305 N.W.2d 38 (N.D.1981) (citing State v. Persons,201 N.W.2d 895 (N.D.1972)). Therefore, a waiver-of-jurisdietion hearing is decided upon whether or not there is probable cause, ‘reasonable grounds’, that the factors listed in section 27-20-34(l)(b)(4), NDCC, are met. The State bears the burden of persuasion on these issues. A.D.L., supra.”
Interest of M.D.N.,
[¶ 26] D.O. concedes that should his suppression motion and confrontation ob- *650 jeetion fail, probable cause likely would exist as to the alleged offenses. We have determined D.O.’s suppression motion and confrontation objection fail. Fullerton offered testimony regarding his investigation to determine whether D.O. committed the alleged delinquent acts, including information from a cell tower dump, tipster information, confidential informant informatiоn, a search of publicly available Facebook information and a probation search of D.O.’s residence. The State provided sufficient evidence supporting probable cause that D.O. committed the alleged delinquent act. N.D.C.C. § 27-20-34(l)(c)(4)(a).
[¶27] In support of the State’s argument that D.O. is not amenable to treatment under section 27-20-34(l)(c)(4)(b), N.D.C.C., Juvenile Court Officer Doug Sailer testified about D.O.’s extensive reсord, including three formal juvenile proba-tions and one informal probation, his continued substance abuse and his general failures in prior treatment. Sailer opined D.O.’s placement with the Division of Juvenile Services was not a viable option. The juvenile court judge noted that D.O. will turn eighteen at the end of 2013 and that, although jurisdiction can run until a child tons twenty, options for treatment and rehabilitation reduce significantly following the eighteenth birthday. On this evidence, we conclude the juvenile court did not err by finding D.O. is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available programs. N.D.C.C. § 27-20-34(l)(c)(4)(b).
[¶ 28] The juvenile court judge also noted the severity of the crimes D.O. was accused of committing.
“The Court notes that the nature and circumstances of the alleged offenses involve several months of premeditated, pre-planned, glorified, and callous criminal actions involving burglaries, attempted burglaries, and criminal mischief totaling in excess of $65,000.00 in stolen property and property damage, showing elevated mental capacity and maturity levels. The testimony also revealed that the alleged felonious criminal conduct is of a high degree of criminal sophistication with great care taken to аvoid apprehension, including using latex gloves and disguises to avoid detection.”
The judge explicitly recognized that the severity of the allegations require D.O. be placed under legal restraint or discipline for the best interests of the community. Sufficient evidence existed supporting probable cause that the interests of the community require the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline. N.D.C.C. § 27-20-34(1) (c)(4)(d).
VII
[¶ 29] We conclude that the juvenile court was not clearly erroneous in denying D.O.’s suppression motion for failing to show Fullerton supported his search warrant affidavit with false or misleading information, that sufficient probable cause existed to justify the search warrant’s issuance, that the juvenile court did not violate D.O.’s confrontation rights and that the case was properly transferred to the district court. We affirm the juvenile court’s order granting the State’s motion to transfer D.O.’s case to the district court and denying D.O.’s suppression motion.