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Inre: Packard
751 F.3d 1307
Fed. Cir.
2014
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 1307 States, on who related to 378 silent bears the cost Motor F.3d Co. United (Fed.Cir.2004). DuPont, production disposal avgas-related of In we held parties byproducts indicates in- agreement “to hold that the Government’s by tended the borne cost to be Oil loss, any ex- against harmless [DuPont] Companies. any ... kind pense damage ... or of ” sufficient include whatsoever was to Indeed, in plaintiffs this case are (em- F.3d at liability. CERCLA sophisticated “surely companies would added). Co., In Ford Motor phasis we know how to draft [negotiate and] broad liability that CERCLA was similarly held clauses hold harmless indemnification ex- provision requiring a reim- covered tending perpetuity if that were their costs,” of all “allowable includ- bursement intent,” during even wartime. Shell Re- damage ing or destruction “loss Decision, mand at 425. Fed.Cl. Our out of or in property may as arise connec- in DuPont and previous decisions Ford tion work performance with the provide of this very Motor Co. evidence under at 1319 this contract.” F.3d Companies’ opportunity fact. The Oil best added). (emphasis provision No such ex- clean-up to recover costs from the their ists in this case. the CERCLA through Government was California, should litigation not Yet, majority’s analysis entire rests by fitting now allowed to recover a that a term requiring on the conclusion peg majori- square into a round hole. payment “charges” or “costs” is suffi- ty straightforward errs interpreting require cient broad indemnification. “Taxes” a catch-all indemnifica- clause as Maj. But the clause Op. at 1294. “Taxes” Therefore, provision. tion I must dissent. concepts indicating lacks any reference parties intended enter into a indemnity provision; broad terms like

“loss,” “destruction,” “damage,” “liability,” harmless,” “injury”

“indemnify,” “hold Although

are to be found. I nowhere majority that

agree “special give required

words” are effect to id., indemnification,

promise of that does can

not that the contract be devoid mean any objective parties’ indicia of the in- generally liability

tent to allocate between Oxnard, See, City

them. F.2d e.g., view, my avgas at 347. contracts In re PACKARD. Thomas G. lack of such intent. any evidence 2013-1204. No. case, If history purpose serves a this Appeals, United Court of States 1940s, today,

it is to show that in the Federal Circuit. avgas production byproducts, results some are wastes. Waste created of which 6,May petrochemicals repre- production case producer, sents a cost on the

the Oil That the contracts are Companies. *2 Tompros,

Louis W. Wilmer Pick- Cutler Dorr, ering LLP, Boston, Hale and Massachusetts, argued appellant. With him on the brief were Proshanto Mukherji Looby. Caitlin R. Kelley, K. Deputy Nathan General Property Counsel for Intellectual Law and Solicitor, United States Patent and Trade- Office, Alexandria, mark ar- Virginia, gued appellee. him the With brief L.R. B. Stacy were Sawert and Mar- Kristi golies, Associate Solicitors. Of counsel Lamarca, Attorney, was William United Office, States Patent Trademark Alexandria, Virginia. PLAGER, O’MALLEY,

Before

TARANTO, Judges. Circuit filed

Concurring opinion Circuit

Judge PLAGER.

PER CURIAM. important question: case raises an

This indefiniteness should for

what standard Trademark Office Patent and

(“USPTO”) claims? apply pre-issuance no case in which we parties point to

The question. this

previously have addressed Appeal Trial and Board

The Patent

(“Board”) applied-for Packard’s held Mr. indefinite, not and therefore

patent claims statutory drafting compliance 112(b), § which of 35

requirements U.S.C. conclude specification that the with

provide pointing particularly more claims

“one or subject distinctly claiming” the

out and Packard, the invention.1 Mr. on

matter of court, the Board insists that

appeal to this the standard of indefiniteness misapplied a frontal view of the Figure shows grounds indefinite on by finding his claims Figure 2 shows a cross-section of card and phrases words or “contain[] the card. J.A. 37. 14. meaning is unclear.” J.A. He whose that, the Board believes had rejected Mr. Packard’s The examiner ambiguous” standard his “insolubly lack application grounds: on three original claims, would not have been those claims in- description, claim adequate written held indefinite. definiteness, 145- and obviousness. J.A. explain, we the reasons we shall For Mr. Packard Following rejection, 47. rejection of Mr. Pack- affirm the Board’s original claims and all of his cancelled claims. ard’s numbered a new set of claims substituted through 37. J.A. 95-99. Background appeal in this covers application The in this through 37 are at issue Claims 28 coin J.A. 24. The change coin holder. claims 29 and 34 are appeal, of which that has four plastic is a thin card holder representative: surface for channels on its front different small, thin, plane, flat I claim a 28. coins, as shown storing types different card and change holding rectangular figures reproduced below. in the with purse construction J.A. wallet/billfold 112(b). § of cur- designated For the benefit prior to the patent in this case was filed 1. The 4(c) readers, September adopted date current 2012 effective we have rent Leahy-Smith Invents Act America part designation text in relevant as the 112-29, ("AIA”), replaces which Pub.L. No. unchanged. newly U.S.C. 112 with paragraph 2 of 35 flat top comprising the front side of card surface of card and can also raised, straight, obliquely partially overlapping. stored parallel, double three raised, flanged separators two J.A. 95-98. flanged double straight, parallel, side examiner, rejection, his final edges edge side end and raised there- again pending found claims invalid side, by forming parallel, four side grounds: the same three claims 28-33 flanged holding coin channels or rows of description, 37 for lack of written widths, length the same different indefiniteness, 28-37 for 28-37 and claims dimes, quarters, one for one one for J.A. 108-14. Regarding obviousness. nickels, pennies, and one for that are description, written the examiner noted similarly at one side edge by blocked required change while the claims *4 edge raised side end with the other side wallet, holding card to attached to a open except of the channel/rows supported by this feature was not the writ- flexible, small, fixed, moveable, partially description. Regarding ten J.A. 109. in- plastic rubber or retainers that are at- definiteness, examiner pointed the out tached to the and topside ends of the limitations several claim failed to the meet separators flanged double such that 112(b) requirements of 35 U.S.C. be- coins can be on the retained card and cause or lacked antecedent basis yet freely slide the above surface of the were otherwise unclear. J.A. 109-10. overlap card and obliquely necessary as appealed Mr. Packard the examiner’s within the between the channel/rows Board, rejection final the af- which separators bottom, while the back side firmed the written description examiner’s wallet, of the card is constructed with a rejections, and indefiniteness while revers- purse extending billfold or from it. ing rejection. the 7-19. obviousness J.A. 29. change holding wallet, card In affirming the course of the examiner’s billfold, 28, purse of claim wherein the rejection, the indefiniteness Board change is holding card constructed as the review set forth in the Manu- billfold, part wallet, purse of the or and al Examining of Patent Procedure affixed to a and surface contained within (“MPEP”) 2173.05(e), namely, claim “[a] wallet, purse. the billfold or it indefinite when contains words phrases meaning whose is unclear.” J.A. I claim a thin uniformly small flat rehearing, 14. On the Board declined plane rectangular holding coin card modify its J.A. decision. 2-5. Comprising edge retainers, side a retainer, closed side small in- appeals Mr. Packard deci- Board’s clined/sloped protrusions, end multiple response sion. its Mr. Packard’s parallel, straight raised and double opening appeal, brief fo- on USPTO flanged separators, small channel/row issue, noting cused on the indefiniteness flexible protruding top retainers on the that, issue, if we affirm the Board on that side ends of the separators, channel/row claims, adequa- which applies to all the all arranged of which are on the upper cy description, applicable written surface of the such that a card various claims, only some of becomes a moot denomination of coins can be held and suggestion issue. We the USPTO’s accept retained on within respective the card a that we first the claim indeflnite- address slide freely and can within ness issue it relates to all of the channel/row because flanges slightly necessarily double implicates above the claims and it explain, For reasons we written de- shall content question scription. we believe the case can be before us addressing resolved without the broad is are re Actions of the USPTO sues Mr. Packard. conclude raised We with the re by us accordance viewed initially when the issued USPTO Proce of the Administrative quirements well-grounded rejection a identifies seq.; § 701 et see Act. 5 U.S.C. dure ways language — in a is am which U.S.-, Hyatt, Kappos v. S.Ct. incoherent, biguous, oth vague, opaque, or (2012) 1694, 1690, (citing 182 L.Ed.2d describing defining erwise unclear Zurko, 150, 152, v. Dickinson (1999)). invention, and the claimed thereafter L.Ed.2d 143 119 S.Ct. law, interpreted Questions ap- applicant provide satisfactory as fails to given plenary agency, are plied response, reject can properly the USPTO Eshhar, appeal. Capon review failing the claim to meet (Fed.Cir.2005). 1349, 1351 Indefi- F.3d 112(b). requirements §of The satisfacto niteness, as a of claim construc- subset ry response applicant by the can take the tion, of law which this court form a modification without Kinetic Con- reviews deference. unclear, a separate identified as definition Inc., Sky Grp., Inc. v. Med. cepts, Blue or, language, appropri in an unclear (Fed.Cir.2009). *5 554 F.3d 1022 case, explanation ate a for the persuasive jurisdiction this appeal over We record of is not why at issue 1295(a). § to 28 pursuant U.S.C. us, actually On the before unclear. facts uphold rejection this to holding suffices

Discussion here. occurred 1. 2. appeal his

Petitioner Packard casts First, grounds. he contends that broad grounds this from holding derive by this court applied the standard for de- a of the USPTO’s examination combination of a in a termining indefiniteness term § and seq. function 35 U.S.C. et under 131 112(b) governed § under 35 is U.S.C. the substantive standard 35 U.S.C. ambiguous.” by phrase “insolubly Un- 112(b). assigned § Congress to the USP- us, standard, tells claim is not der this he applica- to responsibility TO the examine any give meaning if a court can indefinite the statu- compliance tions to with ensure context disputed term in the tory patent. issuance of a criteria for claim. USPTO, appli- In the an U.S.C. 131. Second, Mr. contends that the Packard be, is, supposed is to ex- cant’s “claim or “insolubly standard ambiguous” amined, scrutinized, limited, made to and for indefiniteness is mandated not court Key- he is to.” conform to what entitled only deciding for our use in cases in which Co., 95 stone Co. v. Phoenix Iron Bridge already being has issued and (1877). 274, 278, 24 L.Ed. 344 cases”), challenged (“post-issuance but also Congress provided also for examination yet in which for cases issued process, it com- to be interactive which applied-for and in which claims are rejections objec- monly is. more or One or (“pre-issu- being by evaluated the USPTO by based on identified tions an examiner cases”). that this standard ance He states by more problems are followed one or more to his case than the favorable applicant that address responses from the by to his the USP- by revis- problems, whether identified TO. (CCPA 1976) (“When 1048, by furnishing information ing claims F.2d why prima obviousness the initial- facie is established and explanation shows rebuttal, evidence is the deci submitted ly perceived problems problems are not sion-maker must start An 132; over.... earlier after all. 35 U.S.C. see also id. not, here, decision should as it was be 133, system §§ The examination reg- concrete, appli set in considered as interaction ularly involves substantive with be cant’s rebuttal evidence then evaluated relying on their distinctive in- applicants, ability.... on its knockdown final [A] enhance centives abilities to under- finding of obviousness course be help and to the USPTO standing ensure reached, finding upon but such will rest statutory with standards.2 compliance evidence, all evaluation of facts in uninflu The USPTO must able to make any enced earlier conclusion congressionally created examination reached____”)); Jung, see also In re process so that it fulfills its purpose work (Fed.Cir.2011). 1356, 1362 F.3d producing patents whose claims meet approach making The same the exam standards. We earlier ap process ination work appropriate is an one proved procedural mechanism for the addressing indefinite this, to use in doing USPTO which we ness. We have elsewhere noted that in “prima refer as the facie case.” See In rejections definiteness USPTO Piasecki, (Fed.Cir.1984). re 745 F.2d 1468 posture arise a different from that of “In prosecution patent, of a the initial challenges pat indefiniteness to an issued on the burden falls PTO [examiner] set ent. & Eng’g See Exxon Research v. rejection.” any forth the basis for Hyatt States, (Fed. United 265 F.3d (Fed.Cir. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1369-70 Cir.2001). sense, good It makes for defi 2007). The USPTO thus meets its obli clarity validity niteness and as for other gation explain adequately the shortcom requirements, initially for the USPTO *6 ings perceives applicant it so that the is reject claims based on a pri well-founded notified properly respond. and able to (in ma clarity facie case of lack of its notified, applicant “Once the is so the bur forms) several based on perspective the of den shifts to the applicant rebut the ordinary one of skill in in the art view of prima facie case with evidence ar and/or the description entire written and develop gument.” Id. Then, ing prosecution history. if appli the “prima The facie case” determination is adequately cant does not respond to that a purely procedural operates device at case, prima rejection facie to confirm that clarify the examiner level to how the inter- on the having substantive basis of failed to proceeds. action process Thereafter any 112(b). meet requirements the Fur rejection by examiner, final and any thermore, we can reach that conclusion rejection, review of the whether present and decide the regard case without through courts, appeal Board or proper judicially- formulation of the turns on substantive indefiniteness standard that rejection. Piasecki, merits In re be appropriate post-issuance assess Rinehart, 745 at 1472 (citing indefiniteness, F.2d re ment of a currently matter See, States, e.g., Star Request Fruits S.N.C. United for Comments on Issues Related 2. 1277, (Fed.Cir.2005) (uphold- 393 F.3d 1284 During to the Identification of Prior Art demand, ing examiner under 37 Application, C.F.R. of a 64 Examination Patent Fed. 1.105, 28803, (1999) applicant (stressing Reg. "information that the is 28805 that "in- position cheaply provide”); position in the best generally most are in ventors the best to be USPTO, also, art”). see Hearing Notice of Public aware of the state

1313 See of the role that the USPTO can in Supreme play review Court. under Instruments, Nautilus, Inc., ensuring patent Inc. v. claims are clear and Biosig (Fed.Cir.2013), grant cert. in unambiguous. example, 715 F.3d 891 For In re —ed, -, 896, Zletz, 319, (Fed.Cir.1989), U.S. 134 S.Ct. 187 893 F.2d 321-22 (2014). case, patent L.Ed.2d 702 interference the court said: during patent prosecution claims can [ ] statutory language “particu- As the amended, ambiguities be should be rec- indicates, lar[ity]” and “distinct[ness]” ognized, scope and breadth of language in required are to be cast clear—as explored, imposed.... and clarification ambiguous, vague, indefinite— opposed purpose patent An essential examina- notify terms. It is the claims that precise, tion is to fashion claims that are public protections of what is within the clear, correct, unambiguous. Only See, e.g., patent, and what is not. way in this can uncertainties of claim Yeomans, 568, 573-74, Merrill v. 94 U.S. removed, much scope possible, as (1876); Carbon Co. v. L.Ed. 235 United during process. administrative Co., 228, 236, Binney & Smith (1942). 165, L.Ed. 232 S.Ct. Servs., in Recently, Energy Halliburton LLC, Inc. v. M-I 514 F.3d time, requirement At the same is (Fed.Cir.2008) (affirming the district precision. not a demand for unreasonable finding “fragile gel” court’s that the term requirement, applied to the real world indefinite), was the court said: not technology, of modern does contem- patent note that the drafter is in the every in of We plate precision case verbal position ambiguity best to resolve the the kind found in mathematics. Nor could claims, it patent system actually patent highly in a desir- it do so works, practice, provide pro- effective able that examiners demand modern-day applicants appropriate tection for inventions. Rath- do so circum- er, clarity required how much necessari- stances so that the can be amend- ly invokes some standard of reasonable than at- during prosecution ed rather precision in the use of ambiguity to resolve the tempting context of the circumstances. See Geor- litigation. Plywood

gia-Pacific Corp. Corp., v. U.S. (2d Cir.1958) (“[Pjatent-

258 F.2d always cannot be described able inventions applicant Given the role of the *7 measurements, symbols in terms of exact implementa it is a reasonable process, formulae, and and the necessari- applicant as responsibility, tion of the examination ly meager by must use the tools provided USPTO, 112(b), § upon to for the applied language, admittedly tools which lack exac- providing applicant well-grounded claims, If in precision. titude and read clarity problems, to de identification light specifications, reasonably of the pain persuasive responses on of re mand in the art apprise those skilled both case, jection. approach That decides this invention, and scope utilization and Mr. Packard did not offer a satis because subject precise if the is as indefi factory response well-grounded can demand no permits, matter the courts rejections ex niteness this case. The more.”). here, having ample grounds, set aminer variety ways in which he found forth a USPTO, an examining applica- confusing, some tion, imprecise the claims for rea- obliged is to test the claims understandable, consider not even according princi- to these times precision sonable description. ing light them of the written ples. recognized importance We (June 2010); J.A. 146-47 or See J.A. 109-12 incoherencies within them. Because (Feb.2011); 2011); (July 172-73 J.A. J.A. Mr. Packard an opportunity bring had (Feb.2012); also the more detailed see clarity to claim language, his we affirm the Judge Plager’s con- factual discussion findings Board’s as to indefiniteness under curring opinion. the MPEP properly applied by standard USPTO, the standard which we have respond adequately not Mr. Packard did approved. here group language problems. to this of claim others, ignored entirely. He some As to our judgment upholding view of explanations he offered brief of what he Board’s applied-for determination that the thought certain material the written de- patent claims are invalid failure to scription figures showed. But he did 112(b), comply requirements with the difficulties, claim-language not focus on the requirement “particularly that a claim propose clarifying changes nor did he or point[ distinctly out and ] claim[ the sub- ] why, scrutiny, on existing show close ...,” ject matter we need not address the really claim language reasonably was as problems further issue of the with the precise permitted. as the circumstances 112(a).3 written description under (Nov.2010); (May See J.A. 126 J.A. 151 2011); (Nov.2011); J.A. 190-193 J.A. 244 Conclusion (Sept.2012). We affirm the Board’s decision on indef- The Board relied on this failure of re- initeness and approve applica- the Board’s sponse to the well-grounded examiner’s re- tion of the on which it is based. jections in affirming on the merits the AFFIRMED rejection. examiner’s final The Board re- agreed viewed and with the examiner’s PLAGER, Judge, Circuit concurring. identification of the prob- indefiniteness join I per curiam opinion of the lems that constituted Mr. Packard’s failure court, fully support the conclusion adequately comply stated therein. per While the curiam requirements 112(b), §of and for which opinion right and, reaches the result as far satisfactory there had response been goes, reasons, as it right it decides from Mr. Packard. J.A. 14-16. On recon- grounds the case on argued by not either sideration, the Board stood its affir- party. rejection, mance of the noting the crucial I separately write because I am of the distinction between what Mr. Packard ar- petitioner view that a gued seeking this court required what is address problem: indefiniteness reversal of a decision Mr. Packard’s “ar- is entitled to an guments focus on what is explanation why contained in the arguments disclosure, whereas the indefiniteness to which he relied appeal for his did not 112(b) which [§ ] the lan- prevail. I also significant believe that the guage of the claims.” J.A. 5. issues raised Mr. Packard deserve to be *8 directly. addressed

In some it enough cases is difficult As the per opinion for curiam explained, courts to construe the claims when the Board, draftsperson applying has every understanding made effort to be its concise, clear and let alone when USPTO standard clarity the in claim draft- readily MPEP, observable ambiguities ing contained in the held Mr. 2, paragraph 3. to paragraph plained Similar previously, adopted 1 of 35 we have the cur- replaced § newly desig- U.S.C. 112 was with designators. rent 112(a) 4(c) AIA; § by nated as ex- have to patent claims indefi- cable we would decide the correct- applied-for Packard’s ness of the phrases regarding words or Board’s conclusion they “contain!] nite — effect, applicant’s patent indefiniteness of the this meaning whose is unclear.” worse, suspense claims. For better or the they finding by the USPTO was regarding part gone— of the case is compliance were not per opinion curiam has announced who particularly “claims requirement wins; help explain the outcome I will distinctly the sub- point[ claim[ ] out and ] only add at the end some additional salient ject matter the invention.” 35 U.S.C. [of] facts to those contained in the per curiam 112(b).1 opinion. Packard, court, appeal to this Mr. is the proper insists that the standard A. standard, “insolubly ambiguous” which he Addressing arguments pressed then the invariably applied by this court

believes is Packard, judicial- Mr. I turn first to the challenges to claim construction involv- ly crafted law—both of this court and the terms, of and not the ing indefiniteness Supreme regarding the standard Court — case different standard his clarity patent. of claims an issued the Board. He believes had the 1853, addressing As far back as when advocates, applied the standard he Board requirement patents, definiteness of indefi- his claims would not have been held Supreme emphasized overriding Court nite. un- policy considerations that claims must appeal To decide Mr. Packard’s on the any ambiguously define invention over the presents requires terms he an examination art, prior provide public. notice to the court’s ‘indefiniteness’ standard as this Fiske, See Brooks v. 15 How. applied by well the one the Board. If (1853). 212, 14 require- L.Ed. 665 The differ they significant ways, a determi- specificity ment of claim was central “so propriety, made as a nation must be public may they that the know what are law, the Board’s choice of matter of prohibited doing [during from the term of standard. patent] are to have at what important point I note at the outset an term, the end of the as consideration for judicial process. Supreme Court grant.” Id. at 214-15. The Court recently agreed to address the emphasized paten- Brooks also that “[t]he apply standard for this court to proper distinctly it ought tee to state what is for raising the court an coming cases before which he claims and describe issue, including ‘indefiniteness’ the role of warning ... purpose limits for the “insolubly ambiguous” person, using other purchaser, innocent Fortunately, it is jurisprudence. machine, court’s Id. infringement....” of his fully in Mr. possible explore the issues at 215. transgressing appeal Packard’s without emphasis by Supreme This Court

upon Supreme territory Court’s —more has remained consistent over the last cen- on this later. tury Supreme a half.2 The Court’s appeal, the merits of the once we most recent case to date on indefiniteness On clarity appli- conclude what standard of review is and claim is United Carbon Co. See, Dunbar, 47, 52, e.g., per opinion, White v. 119 U.S. 1. As we did in the curiam since (1886) (reiterating not S.Ct. 30 L.Ed. 303 the relevant substantive *9 pre- designators patent must "define changed I current for an inventor’s claims will use the is,” ambigú- cisely what his invention because the sections of the statute. 1316 Co., 228, 236, understanding requirement this 317 U.S. 63

Binney Smith & (1942).3 clarity precise on the lan- 165, Here the claim focused 232 87 L.Ed. S.Ct. claim, of and related to a theo- guage that: wrote Supreme Court pat- in the art —the person retical of skill particular- of statutory requirement man— ent law version of the reasonable only met in claims is ity and distinctness person and how that would understand the clearly distinguish what is when language. claim went before claimed from what clearly circumscribe what to art and The statute referred United (1932), § A enterprise. from future Carbon case was 35 U.S.C. foreclosed 112(b). § uncertainty today’s and That sec enterprise predecessor of which zone language almost identical only enter at the tion included experimentation applicant requirement the current infringement of claims would dis- risk —the patent particularly point a “shall out and only a little less than courage invention distinctly part, improvement, claim the foreclosure of the field. unequivocal he claims as his inven Moreover, combination which claims reason- must be § discovery.” 35 U.S.C. 33.5 Even tion or ably clear-cut to enable courts to deter- 1932, before the Act of 1836 had similar novelty and invention are mine whether language, stating patent claims “shall vagueness of genuine.... Whether particularly specify point part, out the language the claim has its source in the improvement, or combination which he employed or in the somewhat indetermi- discovery.” claims as his own invention or claimed to nate character of the advance Co., 350, 354, See Miller v. Brass 104 U.S. art materi- have been made is not (1882). Thus, throughout 26 L.Ed. 783 capable al. An invention must be history patents, lan definition, and it must be accu- accurate regarding clarity claim remained guage rately patentable.4 defined largely unchanged, and indeed so did the pointed The United Carbon case further understanding what the statute re out that claims are “so indefi- patent quires. give required by nite as not to the notice statute be in direct contraven- would After the 1952 enactment of the current (U.S. Act, public Congress tion of the interest which Act Patent Patents U.S.C. 19, 1952)), sought protect.” (July §§ recognized seq., therein et 66 Stat. before, 112(b),6 § now cases contin- at 63 S.Ct. 165. As which includes claiming ity "unjust public” patentee is both and “an what the was law.”); invention, litigation evasion of the see also Merrill v. Yeo- the civil as its and in mans, 568, 570-74, 24 confusion, 94 U.S. L.Ed. 235 To avoid unless sense lawsuit. (1876) (finding distinct is "of otherwise, specifically I will use the stated primary importance, in the effort to ascertain "claim” in the unmodified term precisely patented”); what it is that Gen. sense. Appliance Corp., Elec. 304 U.S. Co. Wabash 364, 372, (1938) 58 S.Ct. L.Ed. 1402 112(b) § 5. states in The current version (analyzing whether or not the specification conclude with full: "The shall meaning "conveyed definite to those particularly pointing out one or more claims art”). in the [relevant] skilled distinctly claiming subject matter regards joint inventor which the inventor or above, 3. As noted and cited in footnote 10 112(b) (2012). § below, the invention.” 35 U.S.C. Supreme currently Court has be- raising fore it a case the issue of the standard 112(b). § earlier, 4(c) for indefiniteness under explained pursuant 6. As AIA, 112(b) replaced paragraph 2 section excerpt 4. In this the Court used the term of 35 U.S.C. "claim” in two different senses: to mean *10 court—the of Federal language, and trial Court Claims— the focus on the ued the motion. granted in the art would ordinary skill what one mean, in viewed the claim to understand court appeal, On this reversed. The in the written light any language the court conceded that a number of the terms explained that or defined description patents ambiguous in the were trial —“the banc, court in Phil- Sitting en this claim. fault Exxon pat- court was correct to Corp., 415 F.3d 1312-13 lips v. AWH lacking specificity ents as in in several (Fed.Cir.2005) princi- the basic “restat[ed] Nevertheless, in respects.” Id. at 1376. said, We “We ples of claim construction.” pursuit way of a to construe the claims so moreover, clear, that ordi- made uphold validity as to their court em- —the nary customary meaning of a claim and phasized the fact that the Patent Act cre- meaning that the term would term is the presumption validity ated a for issued in the art person ordinary have to a skill lengthy claims—the court undertook a ex- question in at the time of the inven- in patents amination of the terms that ...” tion. challenged. The concluded were court that, (the though patentee a close appeal, argues In his Mr. Packard easily ambiguity by “could have cured the may have whatever the historical standard adding single phrase word been, the for indefiniteness of a standard 1383), ...” at claims id. nevertheless by in governed term a claim is now fatally were not flawed. Id. at 1384. ambiguous,” and that un- phrase “insolubly if a claim is not indefinite der this standard beginning At the of the relevant section give any meaning a court can to the dis- opinion addressing of the Exxon the indef- (there of the claim. puted term the context multiple initeness issue were issues “insolubly that the am- case), He is of the view again in the and at the conclusion of biguous” applies how this full court opinion, stated tradi- Further, he court decides indefiniteness. tional for claim construction: whether test standard is mandated for argues, this ambiguous the claims were so one of deciding both our use cases which reasonably in the art could not under- skill already being has issued scope. id. at stand their See cases”), and challenged (“post-issuance However, opinion in the course of the yet also in cases which no only court that claims need “be opined applied-for construction, issued but which the amenable to however difficult being (“pre- be,” are the USPTO evaluated and that a claim is task cases”). “insolubly ambigu- issuance He believes invalid when it is than ous, standard is more favorable to his case narrowing construction can ordinary the traditional test of what one of adopted.” Id. at 1375. properly be understand, in the art would skill phrase “insolubly ambiguous” The was than the standard clearly more favorable new; two cases cited neither to him the USPTO. phrase, pre- and no support contained authority Supreme of this court or the opinion Packard cites as the 2001 vious Mr. interesting it. It Engineering employed Exxon Research and Court had case of later, States, years that four when the court Company v. United 265 F.3d 1371 note (Fed.Cir.2001). restate, Exxon, on our purported en banc based the Govern- cases, principles of claim summary judg- prior filed a motion for basic ment had construction, made of ei- at no mention was seeking patents ment to have the two “insolubly phrase ther Exxon or of the issue held invalid for indefiniteness. *11 1318 Spate Phillips, 415 F.3d at Halliburton: The Recent Patent

ambiguous.” See of Invalidations and the for Indefiniteness Holders, Implications Patent 75 Pat. in may Exxon Whatever the court (BNA) Trademark & J. Copyright 456 “insolubly ambiguous” by the intended (2008). noted, however, study The is not phrase, Packard alone his Mr. there increase in sharp was invalidations what it employment of it and seemed Datamize, after 2005 and issuance of of later mean. A cases in this number Inc., Software, LLC v. Plumtree 417 F.3d dealing court with indefiniteness issues re- (Fed.Cir.2005). 1342, 1347 Id. version of the cited both the traditional court Datamize the cited to the Exx- test was what one of doctrine —that “insolubly ambiguous” language, but art would ordinary skill in the understand objective then added that “[s]ome mean, the claim limitation some vari- must provided be order to allow the ant of that then at some —and public to of scope determine point Exxon employed the notion of “inso- invention,” 1350; claimed id. at conse- lubly ambiguous” claims need quently phrase the court held the “aesthet- —that construction, be amenable to however diffi- ically fatally pleasing” ambiguous. 417 The may cult task F.3d at 1356. author of the for a court that be. Given dis- trict study court reads this addition as affairs, it this state of should come as no standard, undercutting and, the Exxon ac- not surprise always that it clear was which cording to study, indefiniteness invali- test, factors, version of the or what other dations in the courts nearly district rose dictated actually have the result percent the 30 months following some of these cases.7 Datamize, compared pre- the 30 months I For note that completeness, per- (The ceding it.8 other study case the ceived in this court’s articula- differences thought significant, Energy Halliburton tion of the indefiniteness standard is said Servs., LLC, Inc. M-I F.3d 1244 to have had an on the effect behavior of (Fed.Cir.2008), affirmed a district court’s the trial well. In a study courts as of holding “fragile gel” fatally was am- years district standard.) court cases in the biguous, immediate- citing the Datamize ly (2001-2005), following Exxon the author Thus, the “insolubly ambigu- over time study during stated that years those phrase ous” alleges Mr. Packard “district sparingly pat- courts invalidated the only correct test indefiniteness has ents for lack of definiteness.” See David taken on a own. generat- life of its It has Kelley, A. controversy,9 In the ed Wake Datamize and considerable and has now Laser, 9.See, Crouch, e.g,, “Insolubly 7. See Christa J. A Definite Claim on Dennis Is Am- Empirical Study Claim An Indefiniteness: biguous" the Standard Correct Indefinite- Definiteness Cases the Past Decade with a ness?, 21, 2013), (Sept. http:// PATENTLY-0 Focus on the Federal Circuit and the Insolu- patentlyo.com/patenl/2013/09/isinsolubly Standard, bly Ambiguous 10 Chi.-Kent J. In- ambiguous-the-correct-standard-for- 2010) (Fall ("These Prop. tel!. differ- indefiniteness.html; Comm’n, Federal Trade [among analyzed] partially ences the cases Evolving Marketplace: Aligning IP Patent result incorporating from the Federal Circuit Competition, with Notice and Remedies 94- evidentiary 'insolubly burden into the am- (March 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ biguous’ inconsistently applying standard and evolving-ip-marketplacealigning-patent- standard."). 'insolubly ambiguous’ notice-remedies-competition; David A. Loew- Shuman, Clyde enstein and United States: Kelley, 8. See also David A. In- Indefiniteness “Insolubly Ambiguous’’ The Federal Circuit’s Sharply validations Continue to Rise (BNA) 576, Indefiniteness, Copyright Standard 77 Pat. Trademark & J. Mondaq Business Briefing (2009). 26, 2008), (Nov. http://www.mondaq. the issue of what law for the Board to apply proposed led to this case which deter- might argued mean is claims under USPTO review. phrase appellant’s patent rights. minative B. recently petition it has led to a And most further, proceeding Before there are Court, that the Supreme Court *12 questions definitional require some granted, challenges the funda- now clarification. far I So have used the term validity “insolubly ambigu- mental “indefiniteness” shorthand for the com- ous” standard.10 plex of issues surrounding require- particular importance Of discus- drafting ments for clear in It patents. case, sion and to the outcome among patent practitioners, custom though argument Mr. Packard’s is to the well, and the courts as to refer to some- contrary, purposes deciding this case thing general- called “indefiniteness” as a necessary it is not to determine whether drafting ized recognized, error when employed by the traditional test courts for will invalidate a patent, patent or a claim determining has or has not indefiniteness However, in particular. the term “indefi- superseded by been modified or Exxon’s (or variants) grammatical niteness” its “insolubly it ambiguous” phrase. Nor is subsumes several different and distinct is- necessary, assuming “insolubly therefore require separate analysis. sues that ambiguous” from differs the traditional test, First, test a as a legal terminology to address whether matter of is, law, permissible reading statutory of the re- statutory there under current quirement “particularly point[ requirement, that claims reference to a definiteness ] distinctly subject statutory mat- provision claim[ ] out and nor a that invalidates a noted, patent patent ter” of the invention. As the Su- or a claim for “indefinite- has decided that it is the preme require- Court ness.” relevant found, noted, proper questions, forum for those and it ments are as earlier in sec- inappropriate would be at this time for a tion 112 of the Patent Act. This section is (a) opinion. “Specification.” them in an lower court to address entitled Subsection specification section states that “the Fortunately, go I need not there in or- description contain a written shall judge arguments. der to Mr. Packard’s invention,” specific and sets out criteria because, having This is now identified judging adequacy its must be set out —it arguably controlling ap- these two tests ” “full, clear, concise, and exact terms.... by this court to cases on review from plied (2011). 112(a) § 35 U.S.C. courts, enough it will the district (b) tests, noted, previously that both of show whatever their As subsection be, scope Specification respects provides differ material shall “particu- from the test to Mr. Packard’s conclude with one or more claims then, larly distinctly claiming claims the Board. And it will be out and pointing only necessary subject which inventor ... to decide whether USP- matter test, materially regards it invention.” though TO even differs as the U.S.C. 112(b) (2011). ours, Thus, written de- permissible from is a one under the Instmments, Nautilus, Inc., 10. Biosig + Federal Inc. v. com/unitedstates/x/70266/Patenl/The Insolubly+Ambiguous (Fed.Cir.2013), + Circuits + + granted, 715 F.3d 891 cert. Indefiniteness; Yeager, Standard + Of+ Eric -, 134 S.Ct. 187 L.Ed.2d 702 Claim Whose Undefined Terms Are Reason- (2014), argued April Invalid, ably Not 67 Pat. Discernable Is (BNA) (2004). Copyright & J. Trademark (which presumptively dispute, party includes construction in which each scription significant parts expert related in a suit will provide testi- mony allegedly ordinary to claim construction other than the claims from one of skill themselves) art in support party’s and the themselves of that con- term, specific criteria a separate disputed each have struction of hopes adopted by must meet.11 that it will be the court favor, in ruling party’s and result in the There is a second level of distinction regarding validity infringe- whether important recognize any given that is ment, or both. inadequacy descrip- case. terms of applicable statutory tiveness to meet the The interpretive issue in these claim standard, whether for a description disputes presents poli- written construction several claim, or for a phrase may cy options, including: term or *13 of shortcomings: may ambig- one two it 1) controlling weight policy Give to the (For uous, itor be incoherent. sim- of upholding the USPTO’s decision to issue plicity, I in- hereafter will use “term” to a presumptively patent, valid with substan- i.e., “phrase,” clude to include one or more tially less concern for the notice function of words.) Thus, patents. a possible meaning find

An incoherent term preserves validity means there is patent reasonably claim, meaning particular understandable without regard for what the term in appears. the context in which it competitors public might or the un- correctly, derstood, i.e., More it means that one of ordi- what would be understood nary skill in the art any cannot ascertain those art skilled involved at the meaning reasonable of the term as used. time of the invention.12 patent litigation labeling disput- of a Since construction is a matter of ed claim term as “incoherent” is given law with no formal deference to the rarely seen. Tech, judge (Cybor Corp. trial v. FAS term, Inc.,

An ambiguous hand, (Fed.Cir.1998)) (en on the other 138 F.3d 1448 banc); is a term that offers to one of skill in Lighting see also Ballast Control art more than one meaning, Philips reasonable LLC v. N. Corp., Elees. Am. each of which meanings may (Fed.Cir.2014), have more or F.3d 1272 under this inter- justification less being context for pretive option “right” what construction will intended, was and each of which meanings definitively only be known when the Court (or Court) would result patently-distinc- Appeals different judges Supreme tive outcomes. This is the oft-seen claim choose it. regard terminology,

11. With requirements governing the casual use both the "written de- by practitioners, including scription” counsel in this and the "claims.” The late hon- case, Rich, "specification” Judge when what is meant is ored and beloved Giles one of the Act, actually description” principal the "written is incor- architects of the 1952 Patent rect, though widely profession's practiced. statutory decried the constant misuse of "specification” term these terms. includes both the written description and the claims. The use of the "specification” broader term when what ("While Phillips, 12. But see 415 F.3d at 1327 specifically meant description” is "written acknowledged we have the maxim that claims poten- adds to verbal confusion as well as the preserve validity, should be construed to their thought Importantly, tial for confusion. there we principle broadly, have not statutory requirements govern- are no certainly regime as such and we have not endorsed a ing adequacy something "spec- validity analysis regular compo- called a in.which is a ification,” construction.”) specific statutory while there are nent of claim 2) notice function weight invoking to the the traditional Give standard —what patents, recognizing while still the role of ordinary one of skill in the art would un- Thus, validity. presumption choose necessarily derstand —that dictates which among meanings the from the available of these latter interpretive options controls accord with what one that seems best case, given in a or even whether there one of skill the art would reasonable policy option should be an established intended, understand to be and which the all post-issuance cases. public, including competitors, would as- reading.

sume to be correct When C. more than one such understand- there is The discussion thus far has focused on case, ing, appears as sometimes to be the of this court’s standard for a preference this could lead to for the review of compliance understanding preserves validity requirement they appear for claims as claim.13 patents, post-issuance issued situation. 3) full weight importance Give of This examination necessary by was made patents, recognizing the notice function of Mr. Packard’s insistence that this court drafter/patentee that it is the claim who is cases, a singular standard for such ultimately responsible problems creat- materially that this standard differs from by ambiguous ed terms. Wdien confronted *14 applied by the standard the Board to his patent with a claim that has several rea- case, and that our standard is the that one meanings patent sonable for which the it- by must be used the Board. (and self demonstrates no preference cer- However, the above discussion reveals term), tainly true of an incoherent the currently singular there is not one option result of this be a holding would by standard used this court but rather a ambiguous that an term definition fails standards, complex though complex comply statutory requirements range whose nevertheless can be de- Thus, for claim if a drafting. member of remains, scribed. The then is the the public pat- order understand the substantively Board’s standard different guess meaning ent claim must about the standard(s) ostensibly from the term, ambiguous the claim would not be and, so, this court if is it nevertheless patentable and is otherwise invalid.14 permissible. addressing Wfiien “indefiniteness” in an argues Mr. Packard is correct when he (a case), post-issuance

issued these (or complex that this court’s “standard” among interpretive options are the avail- understood) standards, however for indefi- Mr. judges. argument able Packard’s in post-issuance niteness cases differs ma- regarding “insolubly ambiguous” stan- terially from the standard for indefinite- essentially incorporates dard the first of applied by to pre-issuance ness the Board interpretive options. these As between opinion In its in this case the interpretive options, the second and third cases. Board, earlier, appears nothing there to be in the cases as noted invoked as its Alts., Inc., Mfg., interpretive option Athletic Inc. v. Prince 14. For a statement of this See Canada, (Fed.Cir.1996), by the courts in see Lord Loreborn’s 73 F.3d for a sub- test, three-part Wegner, cited in Harold C. choosing option, set of this the narrowest 112(b) § Lord Lorebom's Test meaning upholds patent, thus maxim- Indefinite- for ness, Paper presented at the Second Annual izing opportunity competitors for to de- Conference, Naples Experts Midwinter Patent sign infringing. around it without 10-11, 2014). Naples, (February FL stood) determining compliance option with second tradi- standard —or —the 112(b) §of the standard requirements ordinary tional “one of skill” test —dis- a claim is indefi- set forth in the MPEP: earlier, cussed application USPTO’s phrases words or nite it contains when the traditional goes beyond well is unclear. MPEP meaning See whose apply what this court is known to to claim 2173.05(e). interpretation post-issu- when the issue is 112(b). compliance ance with effect, the USPTO reads the statuto- ry “particularly that claims requirement remaining Thus the issue to be decided distinctly claim the sub- point[ [ ] out and ] Board, law, is whether the as a matter of ject ambiguity matter ...” to mean apply interpretive op- entitled third inadvertent, claiming, whether intended understanding tion to its of the traditional The acceptable.15 is not examiner’s test indefiniteness. Mr. Packard ar- duty applicant is to insist that the remove gues that the Board not do that. He perceived ambiguity by precisely more propounds that in his case ap- the Board of the claim. defining scope And plied wrong standard for indefiniteness rejection grounds should an examiner’s on First, ways. in two argues Mr. Packard noncompliance with the statute be taken “person ordinary that a skill the art is Board, up appeal on the Board will deemed to read the claim term not position enforce the same standard. This particular the context of the claim in which comports closely most to the third of the disputed appears, term but in the con- policy options preceding outlined patent, including text the entire .of section. specification.” Appellant’s (citing Br. 35 Packard, response From its to Mr. I 1313). Board, Phillips, 415 at F.3d he position understand the Board to be that it argues, refused to do and instead applies pro- the traditional test to claims analysis solely stated its focused posed by patent applicant, namely, *15 claims, “the ... [not] reasonably whether what is claimed is un- what is contained in the disclosure.” Id. at ordinary derstood skill in one the art. However, applying this test the Board Second, does so a manner —the “lower thresh- and more to point, Mr. old”—that uniquely applicable argues Packard that wrongly the Board pre-issuance situation. invoked its own “lower threshold” for in- definiteness, rather than this court’s “inso-

A post-issuance review of our cases re- lubly ambiguous” standard. Mr. Packard veals that when this court has been called argues that it is an error for the Board to upon to challenge, decide indefiniteness adopt a test for indefiniteness that differs yet no opinion expressly adopted has from what he describes as this court’s third interpretive option previ- described ” “long-established ambiguity’ ‘insoluble ously, essentially the one that the USPTO test. Appellant’s now Br. 18. He further ar- precedents uses. Thus our make gues clear that ignore whether our the “Board cannot this standard is thought precedent to be either the option— [c]ourt’s first or substitute its own (however “insolubly ambiguous” under- test for indefiniteness this [c]ourt’s Props, Tredegar Corp., 15. See 3M Innovative degree claims are drafted with a of indefinite- (Fed.Cir.2013) (Plager, 725 F.3d argue ness so as to leave room to later for a J., ("[sjometimes concurring) ambiguity such interpretation capture designed broad la- to drafting] sloppy claim [in is the result of ter-developed competition.”). drafting, appears and sometimes it that Overall, statute, analysis.” they particularly point Id. at 39. Mr. Pack that out view, consistently distinctly “this claim subject [e]ourt ard’s matter single standard for claim defi applied regards which the inventor as the inven- niteness, post-issu pre-issuance both tion. ance,” argues and Mr. Packard “[t]he IAs noted at the end of introductory [cjourt’s rejection ‘insolubly

Board’s of this A, above, section permissi- the issue of the appli and its ambiguous’ implicit ble pre-issuance test USPTO indefi- ambiguity’ cation of a ‘lower threshold of niteness cases can be decided without re- pursuant Miyazaki was error.” Id. at solving whether this court’s current test (citing Miyazaki, Ex Parte 38-39 89 for post-issuance indefiniteness is the tra- (B.P.A.I.2008)). 1207, 1211 U.S.P.Q.2d standard, ditional focused on what one of USPTO, in Pack- response Mr. understand, skill in the art would or the point, argues ard’s first that the Board’s allegedly “insolubly different ambiguous” clearly attempted decision shows that it it, standard as Mr. Packard views or some light read the claims in of the written because, combination of the two. This is description. specification “But the [read as the above discussion makes clear and as description] written added to the am- Mr. argues, proposed by Packard the test claims, biguity of the because it describes the Board for in pre-issuance its use claim the features of the coin-holder in a manner disputes materially differs from this internally both inconsistent and inconsis- (or both) application court’s of either tent Appellee’s with the claims.”16 Br. 8. question those standards. On this I agree

Second, with Mr. Packard. addressing question, the main proper test for the Board to D. use, says the USPTO it “asks the same I turn underlying then to Mr. Packard’s assessing as this [c]ourt argument, i.e., test of a indefiniteness whether a claim— to pre-issuance Board matters of claim reasonably skilled artisan could discern the interpretation ap- cannot differ from that metes bounds the claim.” Id. at 9. But, USPTO, says ap- plied by post-issuance while their court to proach answering question during disputes. explained construction As prosecution may effectively above, in a result low- proposes apply the Board court’s, er threshold for ambiguity than a traditional standard but third of *16 approach provides legitimate their means the interpretive policy options outlined ferreting prior for out indefinite claims Namely, ordinary earlier. if one of skill in issuance. art, considering the after the information provided by applicant including the the argues patent sys-

The USPTO that the description, putting written and after the tem works claim ambiguity best when is disputed pro- term the context of the examination, during resolved than rather posed patent, claim finds the to contain litigation to await to determine the actual phrases meaning words or whose is un- scope Accordingly, says of a claim. the USPTO, clear, require then the examiner is to the agency ability the must have the applicant precisely to “more define the require applicants to amend their claims concise, clear, to ensure that the of the claimed claims are metes bounds inven- unambiguous, by issuing rejection. or in the words of the tion” an indefiniteness pointed upholding rejection 16. The USPTO also out the the Examiner's rely upon Miyazaki Appellee’s Board did not the claims for indefiniteness. decision Br. 21. 1324 U.S.P.Q.2d process, plays ensuring at 1211. And its examination Miyazaki,

See Board, the appeal appli- should quality patents and compliance with the needed provide cant fail or refuse to statutory requirements. clarification, apply the Board will the same problem patent The of indefiniteness in interpretation requirement. claiming major has been a concern of (and my per view curiam courts, commentators,18 as well as and ef- court), authority it is within the forts improve USPTO to the situa- interpret applicable to so USPTO stan- certainly tion are to encouraged. Further, my it dard. view as good why unnecessary There are reasons matter, policy support this court should ambiguity incoherence and in claim con- with, doing. begin in so To I the USPTO structions disapproved: should be nothing precludes find the statutes that (cid:127) they generate many of claim con- adopting from such guidance USPTO disputes struction that plague the for the examiners and the Board.17 Be- courts;19 yond that, precedent of this court or of (cid:127) they increase the society cost to the Supreme addressing patent Court products study new and ideas. As one suggests construction issues claim it, put quality patents “[How are those a position part such on the of the USPTO protect inventions limited nov- beyond authority would be its prop- elty provide overly or that pro- broad er administration of governing stat- ..., costly tection which can be contrary, pointed utes. On the as out society,” Patents and Innovation: per opinion, curiam this court in In re Zletz, (Fed.Cir.1989), Policy OECD, Trends and Challenges, 893 F.2d 319 and in Halliburton, (2004), 1244 highlighted 514 F.3d http://www.oecd.org/science/ USPTO, role that important through sci-tech/24508541.pdf; regarding 17. There is no issue claiming argu the USPTO’s Jeanne Fromer’s central ments); rulemaking authority. application Hartung, of a Kirk M. Claim Construc ambiguity “lower threshold” for is an inter- tion: Another Matter Chance and Confu sion, pretive policy regarding 831, already existing 88 J. Pat. & Soc'y Trademark Off. (2006) standard. It is not the (“Unfortunately, establishment claim construc previously of a new non-existent substantive tion still is a matter of chance and confusion owners, patent standard such as would be at infringers issue in a Chev- for accused type analysis. ron- patent attorneys. their And the matter is worse.”); getting Jay Plager, Challenges S. (“The Phillips, Property Twenty-First Intellectual at Law in the F.3d role of the Problems, Century: specification Indeterminacy and Other in claim construction has been (2001) ("The 2001 U. Ill. L.Rev. an issue in law chal decisions in this coun centuries.”); Laser, lenge try help judges, here is nearly how to trial as well supra two ourselves, (An being understand what empirical study note at 25 claimed so that finding there is less room for misun definiteness cases that the Fed derstanding.”). inconsistently eral applies Circuit the "insolu bly ambiguous” evaluating standard when *17 Fromer, 19.See, clarity.); Claiming e.g., Jeanne Barney C. James R. and Charles T. 719, CollinsChase, Property, Intellectual Empirical Analysis 76 U. Chi. L.Rev. An Dis- of (2009) Decisions, (arguing 772-781 for a to return ‘cen trict Court Claim Construction Jan- 2009, claiming departure tral’ and a ‘periph uary from to December 2011 Stan. Tech. cases); 2, also, claiming (2011); patent eral’ in Monica C. L.Rev. 7 see David L. Dutra, Schwartz, Tony Moran and Suggests Empiri- Practice Makes An Professor Perfect? Patent, Supplementing Copyright Claiming Study to cal Claim Construction Reversal of Innovation, Cases, 223, Stimulate 77 Pat. & Trademark Rates in Patent 107 Mich. L.Rev. (BNA) 41, (2008) Copyright (Nov.2008). (analyzing J. 41 (cid:127) Furthermore, they opportunity design- interpretation by inhibit the courts. unlike legitimate competition. prosecution and courts which have a full

arounds consider, Study record to the prosecution A Federal Trade Commission record before the overly patent development that an broad USPTO is and observed examination, not during fixed competition “can ... and harm and the block rely USPTO innovation,” interpreting does not on it for Federal Trade Commis- sion, claims. To Promote Innovation: The

Proper Competition Balance and The fact that yet this court has not seen A Policy, Report by Patent Law and apply fit to the same interpretive policy Commission, at the Federal Trade option post-issuance cases as the USP- (October 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/ apply pre-issuance TO wishes to cases is sites/default/fíles/doeuments/reports/ USPTO, why reason given its promote-innovation-proper-balance- unique and central patenting role competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/ process, should not be able to apply it innovationrptpdf;20 dealing with pre-issuance patent applica- (cid:127) they judicial and waste scarce re- tions. sources on claim construction cases short, there are no legal obstacles to that should never necessary have been proposed interpretation, USPTO’s and litigate, supporting encouraging and compelling there are why, reasons as a litigation the kinds of that have made matter, policy pre- this court should not (Patent dirty “patent trolls” words. clude or otherwise interfere with the USP- variety trolls are also known carrying TO responsibilities out its full “patent other names: assertion enti- Further, under the Patent Act. there is no (PAEs), “non-practicing ties” entities” why reason those employed trained (NPEs).)21 patent the art of claim drafting reasons,

Beyond persuasive policy these cannot comply require- with the USPTO legal ments, as a matter the recognizing USPTO does not that the nature of the presumption have to deal with the particular valid- invention and the art involved ity grant post-issuance pat- the statutes degree precision will affect the to which possible.22 ents—sometimes said hinder such an Maskus, Bessen, al., Reforming years,”); 20. See also Keith E. U.S. James et The Private and Trolls, Policy: Getting Right, Regulation Patent the Incentives Social Costs Patent RELATIONS, 26, (Winter 2011-2012) ("To COUNCIL ON FOREIGN CSR the extent (Nov.2006), http:// opportunistically ‘fuzzy No. at 19 available at ... NPEs assert firms, www.cfr.org/content/publications/ patents’ against technology real ntCSR.pdf hold- can decrease the C'[P]atent incentives for these firms to attachments/Pate innovate.”); platform Lemley ers with broad claims on technolo- Mark & A. but see A. Melamed, gies may try discourage Douglas Missing to use those claims to The Forest For Trolls, (2013) competitors through licensing restrictions and 113 Colum. L.Rev. ("trolls litigation against technologies symptom larger on similar are a flaws in the products.”) patent system ... those who have focused on have, effect, missing been trolls forest See, President, trolls.”). e.g., Executive for the Office of Innovation, at 9 Patent Assertion and (June 2013), Suddendorf, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ generally 22.See Thomas ("Even default/files/docs/patent report.pdf Gap: Separates if The Science What Us from — Books, (Basic 2013) (the prevail assertion entities do not in the Other Animals differ- courtroom, significantly ultimately actions can re- is the of authors to their ence motivation litigation symbols grammar duce incremental innovation while create to share what *18 know). ongoing, persist a situation that can finding that the claim “a E. Board’s terms ” edge ... end edge” raised and “the end opin- curiam Finally, per as noted the Lastly, agree indefinite. I that it is are with ion, *19 TECHNOLOGIES, INC., InTOUCH Health,

doing business as InTouch

Plaintiff-Appellant, COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

VGO

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2013-1201. Appeals,

United States Court

Federal Circuit. 9, 2014.

May a few notes I offer additional edge” whether “one side unclear refers of Mr. Packard’s regard to flanged side edges” back to “double compliance and proposed claims their with previously introduced in the claim or if it the USPTO the standard review entirely. something refers to else There- apply. chosen fore, I Board’s finding would affirm the disputed phrases arguments and this term is indefinite. and the are outlined Mr. Packard USPTO I have considered each of Mr. Packard’s agree 1.1 with the Board Appendix remaining arguments and find them un- Mr. top “front is indefinite. the term side” Mr. ten persuasive. pages Packard’s over “front might Packard used either explanatory briefing illustrates that the way “top side” so in a side” or and done requisite lacks the itself terminology consistent with the that was clarity minimum to define the boundaries description. Using different the written claims. By leaving of the am- portion refer to the terms to same biguous, public the courts are left top side” and “surface of card—“front boundaries, clarify patent’s direct Thus, ambiguity. its own I card”—creates requirements conflict case finding would affirm the Board’s See, Carbon, e.g., law. United U.S. at side” top terms “front and “surface of 63 S.Ct. card” are indefinite. with at agree beginning I also the Board Mr. As stated of this opin- ion, ambiguity created an in his claims I arrive at Packard the same conclusion as we ... opinion. when he introduced “a raised end arrived at I per curiam then “the ... edge” get by way referred later to there both of the “narrow” per It is not these in the edge opinion, end.” clear whether route curiam which I join, addressing refer to or to also phrases way two the same “end” Mr. arguments two “ends.” Packard should directly; different Mr. Packard’s rea- ambiguity during pros- explained have corrected this sons I I find latter unavail- Therefore, ing. ecution. I would affirm APPENDIX 1

Case Details

Case Name: Inre: Packard
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date Published: May 6, 2014
Citation: 751 F.3d 1307
Docket Number: 2013-1204
Court Abbreviation: Fed. Cir.
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