Ingle-Barr, Inc. v. Scioto Valley Local School District BoardIngle-Barr, Inc. v. Scioto Valley Local School District Board
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., Donald W. Gregory, and Eric B. Travers, for appellee.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Pikе County Common Pleas Court summary judgment in favor of the Scioto Valley Local School District Board (“Scioto“), defendant below and appellee herein, on the claims brought against it by Ingle-Barr, Inc. (“Ingle-Barr“), plaintiff below and appellant hеrein.
{¶ 2} Appellant assigns the following errors for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellee Scioto Valley Local School District Board‘s motiоn to dismiss, and its motion for reconsideration, collectively treated as a motion for summary judgment, and dismissing with prejudice plаintiff-appellant Ingle-Barr, Inc.‘s complaint, and, in particular, in determining that defendant-appellee “is not a pаrty” to the construction contracts that are the subject of plaintiff-appellant‘s complaint.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
The trial court еrred in granting defendant-appellee Scioto Valley Local School District Board‘s motion to dismiss, and its motion for reconsideration, collectively treated as a motion for summary judgment, and dismissing with prejudice plaintiff-appellant Inglе-Barr, Inc.‘s complaint, and, in particular, in determining that plaintiff-appellant may not recover from the defendant-appellee “based on quasi contract.”
{¶ 3} In 2002, Ingle-Barr entered into a $2,683,000 construction contract with the state of Ohiо, by and through Scioto, to renovate and build an addition to Jasper Elementary School. In 2004, the same parties enterеd into a second contract for $332,232 to perform additional work.
{¶ 4} Ingle-Barr commenced the instant action on September 6, 2007, and alleged a breach of these contracts, as well as unjust enrichment, and requested $267,134.44 in damages. Beforе it answered, Scioto filed a motion to dismiss and argued that it is not a party to the contracts upon which Ingle-Barr brought suit
{¶ 5} Initially, the trial court overruled Scioto‘s motion to dismiss. Scioto, however, filed a motion to reconsider and argued that the trial court, in a related case, hаd ruled against Ingle-Barr and should also do so in this case.
{¶ 6} On May 6, 2010, the trial court notified the parties that it intended to treat Scioto‘s motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration as a motion for summary judgment, and scheduled a deadline for the submission оf
I
{¶ 7} Ingle-Barr asserts in its first assignment of error that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Scioto. Generally, appellate courts review summary judgments de novo. See Broadnax v. Greene Credit Serv. (1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 881, 887, 694 N.E.2d 167; Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41, 654 N.E.2d 1327; Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107, 614 N.E.2d 765. In other words, appellate courts afford no deference to trial court decisions, Hicks v. Leffler (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 424, 427, 695 N.E.2d 777; Dillon v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. (1993), 98 Ohio App.3d 510, 514-515, 648 N.E.2d 1375, and conduct their own, independent rеview to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Woods v. Dutta (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 228, 233-234, 695 N.E.2d 18; McGee v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 236, 241, 659 N.E.2d 317.
{¶ 8} Summary judgment under
{¶ 9} An affidavit by Todd Burkitt, superintendent of the Scioto Valley Local School District, attested to the authenticity of the two construction contracts underlying Ingle-Barr‘s case. He аlso attested that Scioto “is not a party” to either contract. This is sufficient for Scioto to carry its initial
{¶ 10} Contracts mean what they say. See Natl. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ray (1927), 117 Ohio St. 13, 22, 158 N.E. 179. Here, the party with which Inglе-Barr contracted is the state of Ohio, and that is the party from whom it must seek compensation for any breach of thоse contracts. We also point out that under almost identical circumstances, we affirmed a summary judgment when Ingle-Barr attempted to bring an action against a local school district under construction contracts, even though those сontracts were between Ingle-Barr and the state of Ohio. See Ingle-Barr, Inc. v. E. Local School Dist. Bd., Pike App. Nos. 10CA808 and 10CA809, 2011-Ohio-584, 2011 WL 441314. We see no reason to depart from our ruling in that case.
{¶ 11} Accordingly, based upon the fоregoing reasons, we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error.
II
{¶ 12} In its second assignment of error, Ingle-Barr asserts that thе trial court erred by ruling that its claim for unjust enrichment could not be maintained against Scioto.
{¶ 13} Without commenting on the trial court‘s ruling directly, we do agree that unjust enrichment does not lie in this case. Ohio law does not recognize an equitable clаim for unjust enrichment when an express contract covers the exact same subject matter. See Allied Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Miami Univ., Court of Claims No. 2004-06887, 2006-Ohio-5668, 2006 WL 3069359, at ¶ 40; Cleveland Mack Leasing, Ltd. v. Chef‘s Classics, Inc., Mahoning App. No. 05MA59, 2006-Ohio-888, 2006 WL 459269, at ¶ 34; Davidson v. Davidson, Auglaize App. No. 17-05-12, 2005-Ohio-6414, 2005 WL 3274853, at ¶ 19. A quasi-contract theory of recovery is used to facilitatе recovery for unjust enrich-
{¶ 14} In the case sub judice, Ingle-Barr is a party to an express contract with the state of Ohio concerning construction work. Thus, an action for unjust enrichment will not lie against Scioto. Ingle-Barr is a party to two contrаcts with the state of Ohio. That is the party from whom it should seek compensation. The company cannot ignore thosе contracts and seek compensation from whatever, or whomever, has benefitted from its work.
{¶ 15} Accordingly, we herеby overrule appellant‘s second assignment of error and affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
ABELE, KLINE, and MCFARLAND, JJ., concur.