IN THE MATTER OF U.S. CURRENCY TOTALING $14,245.00: ELIAS OROSCO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING
S-21-0152
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
January 31, 2022
2022 WY 15
2022 WY 15
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2021
January 31, 2022
IN THE MATTER OF U.S. CURRENCY
TOTALING $14,245.00:
ELIAS OROSCO,
Appellant
(Claimant),
v.
THE STATE OF WYOMING,
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
S-21-0152
Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County
The Honorable Dawnessa A. Snyder, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Clark D. Stith, Clark Stith Attorney, Rock Springs, Wyoming. Argument by
Mr. Stith.
Representing Appellee:
Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General;
Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Donovan Burton, Assistant
Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Burton.
*Justice Davis retired from judicial office effective January 16, 2022, and, pursuant to
Article 5, § 5 of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-106(f)
(LexisNexis 2021), he was reassigned to act on this matter on January 18, 2022.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers
are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming
82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in
the permanent volume.
FOX, Chief Justice.
[¶1] The State filed a complaint in district court seeking the forfeiture of currency it
seized from Elias Orosco, and Mr. Orosco moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. He asserted that, because the amount of the currency was less than $50,000,
the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the action. The district court found that
the forfeiture statute vested exclusive jurisdiction in district courts and thus denied the
motion. The parties thereafter stipulated to entry of judgment in favor of the State, subject
to Mr. Orosco’s right to appeal the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. We affirm, but
on a basis different from that of the district court.
ISSUE
[¶2] The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the State’s forfeiture complaint even though the amount at issue was less
than the monetary threshold for district court jurisdiction.
FACTS
[¶3] On October 24, 2019, Mr. Orosco was driving west on Interstate 80 in Carbon
County, Wyoming when Trooper Russell of the Wyoming Highway Patrol stopped him
for failing to maintain his lane. Mr. Orosco was the driver and sole occupant of his
vehicle, a 2020 Dodge Caravan. When Trooper Russell asked him about his travel plans,
he stated that he was traveling from Denver to California, but he could not provide
specific travel plans. Trooper Russell also observed that there was no clothing or luggage
in the vehicle, which he found inconsistent with interstate travel. Based on these
observations, Trooper Russell requested permission to search the vehicle, and Mr. Orosco
consented.
[¶4] A second trooper arrived to assist with the search of the vehicle. They detected the
odor of marijuana in the vehicle’s interior and found three stacks of United States
currency bundled with rubber bands in the jack compartment toward the rear of the
vehicle. The vehicle was then towed to a Wyoming Department of Transportation facility
for a further search. While at the facility, Trooper Russell deployed his K9 to conduct a
free-air sniff of the currency, and it alerted to the presence of a controlled substance. The
State applied for and was granted a warrant to seize the currency, which totaled $14,245,
and it thereafter converted the currency to a cashier’s check.
[¶5] On February 13, 2020, the State filed a complaint against the currency seeking to
forfeit it to the State and to terminate any interest that Mr. Orosco, or any other claimant,
might claim in it. Mr. Orosco defaulted but timely moved to set aside the entry of default.
In the same motion, he moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, claiming that because the amount in controversy was less than $50,000, the
circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction. The district court set aside the entry of default but
denied Mr. Orosco’s motion to dismiss. As to the motion to dismiss, the court stated:
This court has exclusive jurisdiction in this matter.
Wyoming Statute § 35-7-1049 states, in relevant part:
. . .
(b) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may
be seized by any law enforcement officer of the state
upon process issued by any district court or district
court commissioner having jurisdiction over the
property.
W.S. § 35-7-1049 (West).
(Emphasis in original).
[¶6] On May 10, 2021, the parties filed a stipulation for entry of judgment, subject to
Mr. Orosco’s right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. The court
thereafter entered judgment, and Mr. Orosco timely appealed to this Court.
[¶7] “We review whether a court has jurisdiction over a case de novo.” Interest of RR,2021 WY 85, ¶ 53, 492 P.3d 246, 261 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Interest of BG, 2019 WY116, ¶ 6, 451 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Wyo. 2019)). This appeal also presents questions of
statutory interpretation, which are questions of law that we consider de novo. Matter ofAdoption of ATWS, 2021 WY 62, ¶ 8, 486 P.3d 158, 160 (Wyo. 2021) (citing Matter ofAdoption of MAJB, 2020 WY 157, ¶¶ 9, 13, 478 P.3d 196, 200-01 (Wyo. 2020)).
DISCUSSION
[¶8] The question in this case is whether the district court or circuit court has subject
matter jurisdiction over a civil forfeiture action where the object of the forfeiture action is
valued at less than $50,000. Which court has jurisdiction is of course critical. We have
said:
The notion that a court must have subject matter
jurisdiction before it can act upon a matter is fundamental to
the operation of our judicial system. It is well established that
a “judgment may properly be rendered against a party only if
the court has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy
involved in the action.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments §11, at 108 (1982); see also Granite Springs Retreat Ass’n v.Manning, 2006 WY 60, ¶ 5, 133 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Wyo.2006). As we have explained, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is
essential to the exercise of judicial power. If a court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction, ‘it lacks any authority to
proceed, and any decision, judgment, or other order is, as a
matter of law, utterly void and of no effect for any purpose.’”
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kunz, 2008 WY 71, ¶ 6,186 P.3d 378, 380 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted); see also
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Blury–Losolla, 952 P.2d 1117,1119 (Wyo. 1998); United Mine Workers of America Local1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1283-84 (Wyo.1989).
Best v. Best, 2015 WY 133, ¶ 10, 357 P.3d 1149, 1152 (Wyo. 2015); see also MH v. FirstJud. Dist. Ct. of Laramie Cnty., 2020 WY 72, ¶ 5, 465 P.3d 405, 407 (Wyo. 2020) (“If a
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, ‘action taken by that court, other than dismissing
the case, is considered to be null and void.’”) (quoting Devon Energy Prod. Co., LP v.Grayson Mill Operating, LLC, 2020 WY 28, ¶ 11, 458 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Wyo. 2020)).
[¶9] Wyoming courts derive their jurisdiction from the Wyoming Constitution and
from statutes enacted by the Wyoming legislature. Woodie v. Whitesell, 2019 WY 115,¶ 9, 451 P.3d 1152, 1155 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Best, 2015 WY 133, ¶ 11, 357 P.3d at1152). The constitution vests judicial power in the “supreme court, district courts, and
such subordinate courts as the legislature may, by general law, establish and ordain from
time to time.”
‘in all cases and of all proceedings,’ except those placed within the exclusive jurisdiction
of another court.” MH, 2020 WY 72, ¶ 8, 465 P.3d at 408 (quoting
§ 10
jurisdiction exists and any intent to limit it must be clearly stated.” MH, 2020 WY 72,¶ 5, 465 P.3d at 407 (citing Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, ¶ 48, 331P.3d 1174, 1188 (Wyo. 2014)).
[¶10] Circuit courts are statutorily created and have only limited original jurisdiction as
provided by statute.
jurisdiction, circuit court jurisdiction is strictly construed. Brown v. State, 2017 WY 45,¶ 25, 393 P.3d 1265, 1275 (Wyo. 2017)).
[¶11] The district court found, and the State argues, that the forfeiture statute grants
exclusive jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings to district courts. Alternatively, the
State contends that the proceedings fall within the broad general jurisdiction of district
courts. Mr. Orosco contends that circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction under their
statutory grant of jurisdiction. We will first address the forfeiture statute, which we
conclude
of the district court’s general jurisdiction.
I. The Forfeiture Statute Does Not Grant Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Forfeiture
Actions to District Courts
[¶12] The district court found that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
forfeiture actions based on the language of
2021)
district court commissioner having jurisdiction over the property.” Mr. Orosco argues
that the court’s reliance on this provision was misplaced because it does not apply to
forfeiture proceedings and instead addresses only the authority to seize property. The
State concedes that no provision in the forfeiture statute explicitly grants district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings, but it contends that given the process
for seizing property and applying for its forfeiture and/or destruction, it makes sense that
the legislature would have intended the district courts to have exclusive jurisdiction.
[¶13] “When we interpret statutes, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature, and we ‘attempt to determine the legislature’s intent based primarily on the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.’” EME Wyo., LLC v. BRWEast, LLC, 2021 WY 64, ¶ 23, 486 P.3d 980, 987 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Wyo. Jet Center,LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 6, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 910, 915 (Wyo. 2019)).
We therefore construe each statutory provision in pari
materia, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence
according to their arrangement and connection. To ascertain
the meaning of a given law, we also consider all statutes
relating to the same subject or having the same general
purpose and strive to interpret them harmoniously. We
presume that the legislature has acted in a thoughtful and
rational manner with full knowledge of existing law, and that
it intended new statutory provisions to be read in harmony
with existing law and as part of an overall and uniform
system of jurisprudence. When the words used convey a
specific and obvious meaning, we need not go farther and
engage in statutory construction.
Id.
[¶14] Based on the forfeiture statute’s plain language, we are unable to find a legislative
intent to give district courts exclusive jurisdiction over forfeiture actions. The statute
specifically designates circuit courts or district courts to act on certain matters, such as
the issuance of warrants, the making of probable cause determinations, and the
destruction of contraband and paraphernalia.
(r)(vi)
forfeiture under this act may be seized by any law enforcement officer of the state upon
process issued by any district court or district court commissioner having jurisdiction
over the property.”
directs that “[w]ithin thirty (30) days of the seizure, a probable cause hearing shall be
held in circuit court, in the county where the property was seized,” and under subsection
(r)(vi), the attorney general may “[a]uthorize any law enforcement officer to apply to the
district court with jurisdiction for an order providing for destruction of the contraband
controlled substances or paraphernalia.”
(emphasis added).
[¶15] On the other hand, the forfeiture statute refers only generally to “the court having
jurisdiction,” in its provision governing forfeiture proceedings themselves.
(d) In the event of seizure pursuant to subsection (b) of
this section, no action for the forfeiture of property pursuant
to this section shall be instituted unless it is brought within
one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of seizure or
within thirty (30) days following the completion of any
criminal prosecution relating to the seizure, whichever is
later. All forfeiture proceedings or actions shall be brought by
the commissioner.(e) Property taken or detained under this section shall not
be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of
thecommissioner subject only to the orders and decrees of
the court having jurisdiction over the proceedings.
[¶16] “When the legislature specifically uses a word in one place, we will not interpret
that word into other places where it was not used.” Wyoming State Hosp. v. Romine, 2021WY 47, ¶ 29, 483 P.3d 840, 848 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Qwest Corp. v. Pub. Serv.Comm’n of Wyo., 2007 WY 97, ¶ 25, 161 P.3d 495, 501 (Wyo. 2007)). The legislature’s
designation of specific courts in some subsections of the forfeiture statute shows that it
knew how to place jurisdiction in a particular court. It did not do so in the provisions
governing forfeiture proceedings, and we are not at liberty to read a grant of exclusive
jurisdiction into those provisions. Id. (“The use of the term ‘malpractice claims’ in the
Medical Review Panel Act demonstrates the legislature knew how to limit the scope of a
statute to malpractice claims. It did not include any such limitation in § 1-39-110 and we
are not at liberty to read one into it.”); see also Harrison v. State, 2021 WY 40, ¶ 7, 482P.3d 353, 356 (Wyo. 2021) (“A basic tenet of statutory construction is that omission of
words from a statute is considered to be an intentional act by the legislature, and this
court will not read words into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include
them.”).
[¶17] Had the legislature intended to place exclusive jurisdiction over forfeiture
proceedings in the district courts, it would have said so. It did not, and therefore the
forfeiture statute itself is not a basis for the district court’s jurisdiction. In that respect, the
forfeiture statute is similar to the Declaratory Judgments Act, which we interpreted in
Best and concluded, “Wyoming’s Declaratory Judgments Act does not create jurisdiction
for either the district courts or the circuit courts. Rather, it provides a form of relief that a
court within its jurisdiction can provide to parties.” Best, 2015 WY 133, ¶ 19, 357 P.3d at1153-54.
[¶18] Likewise, the forfeiture statute provides a form of relief, but it does not create
jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings for either district courts or circuit courts. If
jurisdiction is to be found it must be in the limited grant of statutory jurisdiction to circuit
courts or in the general jurisdiction of the district courts.
II. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128 Does Not Grant Circuit Courts Jurisdiction Over Civil
Forfeiture Proceedings, and District Courts Therefore Have General
Jurisdiction Over the Proceedings
[¶19] The legislative grant of jurisdiction to circuit courts reads in relevant part:
(a) Each circuit court has exclusive original civil
jurisdiction within the boundaries of the state for:(i) An action where the prayer for recovery is an
amount not exceeding fifty thousand dollars
($50,000.00), exclusive of court costs;. . .
(iii) Actions to foreclose or enforce a lien on or
security interest in personal property perfected under
the Uniform Commercial Code,W.S. 34.1-1-101
through 34.1-10-104, when the amount claimed on the
lien or security interest does not exceed fifty thousand
dollars ($50,000.00), exclusive of court costs;. . .
(vi) Actions to foreclose and enforce the following
statutory liens only, when the amount claimed on the
lien does not exceed fifty thousand dollars
($50,000.00), exclusive of court costs:(A) Construction liens as provided by
W.S. ;
29-2-101 through 29-2-113(B) Liens for labor and materials as provided
byW.S. 29-4-101 and 29-4-102 ;(C) Liens for labor and services as provided
byW.S. 29-5-101 through 29-5-106 and 29-7- ; and
101 through 29-7-301(D) Liens for taxes as provided by
W.S. 39- .
15-108(d) and 39-16-108(d)
[¶20] Mr. Orosco contends that the subsection (a)(i) grant of jurisdiction over
“where the prayer for recovery is an amount not exceeding fifty thousand dollars,” gave
the circuit court jurisdiction over this forfeiture proceeding because the currency totaled
less than $50,000. The State argues this provision is not applicable because a forfeiture
proceeding is not an action that seeks to recover damages. We agree with the State.
[¶21] The forfeiture statute states that “[t]he proceedings and judgment of forfeiture
shall be in rem and shall be against the property itself.”
An in rem proceeding is not one for damages. As one court explained:
Forfeiture actions are civil proceedings. See Wille v. Karrh,423 So.2d 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982);
§ 932.704(2), Fla. Stat. (“In each judicial circuit, all civil forfeiture cases shall
(2001)
be heard before a circuit court judge of the civil division . . .
[and] [t]he Florida Rules of Civil Procedure shall
govern. . . .”). However, forfeiture actions are also in rem
proceedings. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274-75,116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (forfeiture
proceedings are in rem because it is the property which is
proceeded against and, “‘by resort to a legal fiction, held
guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of
inanimate and insentient’”); In re Forfeiture of Fifty Five
Thousand Forty-Five Dollars in U.S. Currency, 809 So.2d105, 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“The forfeiture proceeding is a
civil, in rem action filed against the property itself.”). As an
in rem proceeding, a forfeiture action is not a “civil action for
damages.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 793 (6th ed. 1990)
(explaining that the purpose of an in rem proceeding “is to
determine title to or to affect interests in specific property”).
Rosado v. Bieluch, 827 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); see also People v.Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1411, 1414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he forfeiture
action is not a suit for money damages . . . .”); Floyd v. United States, 860 F.2d 999, 1005(10th Cir. 1988).
[¶22]
distinction and its intention to maintain it. While subsection (a)(i) grants circuit court
jurisdiction over actions that assert a “prayer for recovery,” subsections (a)(iii) and (a)(vi)
identify other actions over which the circuit courts have jurisdiction, including actions to
enforce liens where the amount of the lien does not exceed $50,000. Actions to enforce
liens are in rem proceedings. Lasich v. Wimpenney, 278 P.2d 807, 815 (Wyo. 1955)
(action to foreclose mechanics lien is proceeding in rem); 51 Am. Jur. 2d Liens § 84(Nov. 2021 update) (“An action to enforce a lien is usually in the form of a foreclosure
action, which is considered to be a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem.”) (footnotes
omitted). Had the legislature intended a “prayer for recovery” to include in rem
proceedings, there would have been no need to separately provide jurisdiction over lien
foreclosures. Moreover, had the legislature intended to grant jurisdiction over civil
forfeiture proceedings to circuit courts, we can assume it also would have included those
proceedings in the list of in rem proceedings for which it did grant jurisdiction. Harrison,2021 WY 40, ¶ 7, 482 P.3d at 356 (“[The] omission of words from a statute is considered
to be an intentional act by the legislature.”).
[¶23] We thus conclude that circuit courts do not have jurisdiction over forfeiture
proceedings. The district court had general jurisdiction over this civil forfeiture
proceeding. See MH, 2020 WY 72, ¶ 8, 465 P.3d at 408 (District courts have “original
jurisdiction ‘in all cases and of all proceedings,’ except those placed within the exclusive
jurisdiction of another court.”) (quoting
[¶24] Affirmed.