IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: MAJB f/k/a ZJC, minor child, DLB and DAB, Appellants (Petitioners)
S-20-0120
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
December 28, 2020
2020 WY 157
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2020 WY 157
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2020
December 28, 2020
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION
OF: MAJB f/k/a ZJC, minor child,
DLB and DAB,
Appellants
(Petitioners).
S-20-0120
Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County
The Honorable Catherine R. Rogers, Judge
Representing Appellants:
Debra J. Wendtland, Wendtland & Wendtland, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.
Argument by Ms. Wendtland.
Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
[¶1] This appeal comes to us unopposed. On April 12, 2016, DLB and DAB (Petitioners) adopted a minor, MAJB (MB), from the Henan Province, Zhengzhou, People’s Republic of China. The United States Department of State issued a Hague Adoрtion Certificate certifying the adoption. After medical testing in the United States, MB’s pediatrician determined the documented age of the child was incorrect. The testing verified that MB was two years younger than the age listed on the official paperwork. On February 27, 2020, Petitioners filed a Verified Petition for Adoption (Amended Petition). The petition requested the district court enter an order of adoption recognizing MB’s medically established age and directing the issuance of a Wyoming birth certificate with an accurate date of birth. The district court dismissed the Amended Petition, concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to provide the relief requested. The district court also found approval of the adoption was moot because, under federal law, the Hague Convention adoption must be recognized as valid and final. We reverse.
ISSUES
[¶2] The issues are:
-
Does the district court have subject matter jurisdiction to approve the Hague Convention adoption? - Does the district court have the statutory authority to approve the Hague Convention adoption and issue a Wyoming decree of adoption?
FACTS
[¶3] As an infant, MB was abandoned outside of a Chinese village. A couple from the village found the baby and, after unsuсcessfully searching for the parents, took the child into their home. MB remained with them until 2013 when this was no longer possible because both caretakers had died. Chinese authorities then took custody of MB and placed him in an orphanage. After attempts to locate relatives or other persons familiar with MB failed, Chinese authorities designated MB’s birth date as April 15, 2003. This estimated birth date appears on the Chinese and United States adoption paperwork.
[¶4] DLB and DAB, married United States citizens residing in Wyoming, adopted MB on April 12, 2016, using the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect оf Intercountry Adoption (Hague Convention).1 The United States
issued a Hague Adoption Certificate, an IH-3 visa, and a Certificate of Citizenship for MB.2
[¶5] Upon MB’s arrival in the United States, Petitioners arranged for his care by a pediatric physician. On June 1, 2016, pursuant to his doctor’s recommendation, MB underwent a bone scan. The results indicated that MB was approximately two years younger than the age listed on his adoption paperwork.
[¶6] On November 22, 2019, Petitioners filed a pro se motion titled “Petition for Final Decree of Re-Adoption3 and for Change to Minor’s Birthdate” in the First Judicial District Court of Laramie County, Wyoming. The petition sought an оrder of readoption directing the issuance of a Wyoming birth certificate accurately reflecting MB’s age.4 On January 7, 2020, the district court gave notice of its intent to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
[¶7] On February 27, 2020, Petitioners, now represented by counsel, filed their Amended Petition. The Amended Petition requested the district court: (1) approve MB’s adoption; (2) enter a Final Decree that “the Child shall henceforth be regarded and treated in all respects as the Child of both Petitioners”; (3) correct the date of birth from April 15, 2003, to April 15, 2005; and (4) have the Clerk of Court certify the State of Wyoming Report of Adоption and return the report to Petitioners to be filed with the Wyoming Vital Records to procure a Wyoming birth certificate.
[¶8] The district court dismissed the Amended Petition. It determined “Nothing in [
country when the United States Department
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶9] Subject matter jurisdiction, application of the Wyoming Constitution, and statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review:
“Thе existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.” Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, ¶ 14, 331 P.3d 1174, 1178 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Excel Constr., Inc. v. Town of Lovell, 2011 WY 166, ¶ 12, 268 P.3d 238, 241 (Wyo. 2011)). This case requires us to interpret the Wyoming Constitution, Wyoming statutes, and WDOH regulations—also questions of law that we review de novo. Saunders v. Hornecker, 2015 WY 34, ¶ 8, 344 P.3d 771, 774 (Wyo. 2015) (“The interpretation and application of the Wyoming Constitution is a question of law, reviewed de novo.”); Herrick v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 118, ¶ 17, 452 P.3d 1276, 1281 (Wyo. 2019) (“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.”); Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 152, ¶ 9, 243 P.3d 953, 956 (Wyo. 2010) (“[I]nterpretation of the agency rules and regulations implementing statutory directives is a question of law, reviewed de novo.”).
MH v. First Jud. Dist. Ct. of Laramie Cnty., 2020 WY 72, ¶ 4, 465 P.3d 405, 407 (Wyo. 2020).
DISCUSSION
I. Does the district court have subject matter jurisdiction to approve the Hague Convention adoption?
[¶10] “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.” MH, ¶ 5, 465 P.3d at 407 (quoting Devon Energy Prod. Co., LP v. Grayson Mill Operating, LLC, 2020 WY 28, ¶ 11, 458 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Wyo. 2020)). “If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, ‘action taken by that court, other than dismissing the case, is considered to be null and void.’” Id. (quoting Devon Energy, ¶ 11, 458 P.3d at 1205). “However, in construing the subject matter jurisdiction of district courts, we presume that jurisdiction exists and any intent to limit it must be clearly stated.” Id.
[¶11] In MH, we considered whether thе district court had jurisdiction to order a change of gender on a birth certificate. We began by noting:
The Wyoming Constitution grants broad general jurisdiction to the district courts:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in equity and in all criminal cases, of all matters of probate and insolvency and of such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The district court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court.
MH, ¶ 8, 465 P.3d at 408 (quoting
[¶12] Here, the district court based its dismissal on the premise that Wyoming adoption statutes do not address the district court’s role in approving or separately recognizing foreign adoptions (intercountry adoptions).5 The legislature has not expressly limited
II. Does the district court have the statutory authority to approve the Hague Convention adoption and issue a Wyoming decree of adoption?
[¶13] Having determined the district court has jurisdiction, we must turn to the question of its statutory authority to grant the relief sought by Pеtitioners. Statutory construction is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Wyoming Guardianship Corp. v. Wyoming State Hosp., 2018 WY 114, ¶ 7, 428 P.3d 424, 429 (Wyo. 2018).
[¶14] The district court found that the absence of any reference to intercountry adoption in the Wyoming adoption statutes precluded an order granting Petitioners’ request for relief.
[¶15] “When we interpret statutes, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and we ‘attempt to determine the legislature’s intent based primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.’” Wyoming Jet Ctr., LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 6, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 910, 915 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting PacifiCorp, Inc. v. Wyoming Dep’t of Revenue, 2017 WY 106, ¶ 10, 401 P.3d 905, 908 (Wyo. 2017)). “Where legislative intent is discernible a court should give effect to the ‘most likely, most reasonable, interpretation of the statute, given its design and purpose.’” Id. (quoting PacifiCorp, ¶ 10, 401 P.3d at 908).
We therefore construe each statutory provision in pari materia, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence according to their arrangement and connection. To ascertain the meaning of a given law, we also consider all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose and strive to interpret them harmoniously. We presume that the legislature has acted in a thoughtful and rational manner with full knowledge of existing law, and that it intended new statutory provisions to be read in harmony with existing law and as part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence. When the words used convey a specific and obvious meaning, we need not go farther and engage in statutory construction.
PacifiCorp, ¶ 10, 401 P.3d at 908–09 (quoting Nicodemus v. Lampert, 2014 WY 135, ¶ 13, 336 P.3d 671, 674 (Wyo. 2014)).
A. Federal Statutory Background
[¶16] To put this case in context, we begin with a discussion of the Hague Convention and the Accuracy for Adoptees Act (see
federal legislation.6 “The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption is an international treaty between convention member countries [which] provides a framework of rules and procedures for the countries to work jointly to ensure certain intercountry adoption procedures.” Sarah B. Ignatius & Elisabeth S. Stickney, Immigration Law and the Family, § 13:35 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption (2020). “The United States and 66 other countries agreed to the convention in 1993, and the United States [recognized] it on October 6, 2000, with the passage of the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000.” Id.; Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000,
[¶17] More specific to this case, federal law recognizes that the birth dates of children born abroad are not always accurately recorded in the countries where they were born. Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. et al., Accuracy for Adoptees Act, Immigr. Legis. Handbook § 2:21 (West 2020). MB’s certificate of citizenship reflects an inaccurate date of birth. Under the Accuracy for Adoptees Act, inaccurate documents may be amended. See
B. Ambiguity of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-111
[¶18] The district court correctly noted Wyoming’s adoption statutes contain no reference to approval of intercountry adoptions or readoptions. In Wyoming, adoption is addressed by
(a) After the petition to adopt has been filed and a hearing held the court acting in
the best interest and welfare of the child may mаke any of the following orders: (i) Enter an interlocutory decree of adoption giving the care and custody of the child to the petitioners pending further order of the court;
(ii) Defer entry of an interlocutory decree of adoption and order the department of family services or a private licensed agency to investigate and report to the court the background of the child and of the petitioners, and the medical, social and psychological background and status of the consenting parent and putative father. After a written report of the investigation is filed, the court shall determine if the adoption by petitioners is in the best interest and welfare of the child and thereupon enter the appropriate order or decree;
(iii) Enter a final decree of adoption if the child has resided in the home of the petitioner for six (6) months; or
(iv) Deny the adoption if the court finds that the best interests and welfare of the child will be served by such denial.
(b) If the court denies the adoption it shall make an order for proper custody consistent with the best interest and welfare of the child.
[¶19] Here, the statute’s language gives the district court broad discretion to issue an order consistent with the non-exhaustive options described in the statute. It does not preclude the district court from taking any specific action. On the other hand, it does not specifically authorize the recognition of an intercountry adoption. The comprehensive scope of the statute, and the absence of specific language authorizing a Wyoming adoption for a child with an existing adoption finalized in the child’s birth country, open the statute to varying interpretations. See Matter of Estate of Frank, 2019 WY 4, ¶ 8, 432 P.3d 885, 887 (Wyo. 2019) (“[A] statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.” (citations omitted)).
[¶20] Once the language of a statute is determined to be ambiguous, we apply general principles of statutory construction “to construe any ambiguous language to accurately reflect the intent of the legislature.” In re Estate of Meyer, 2016 WY 6, ¶ 21, 367 P.3d 629, 636 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2014 WY 37, ¶ 19, 320 P.3d 222, 229 (Wyo. 2014)). We “read the statutes together, and construe statutes relating to the same subject in harmony.” Meyer, ¶ 21, 367 P.3d at 636 (citing Wyoming Cmty. Coll. Comm’n v. Casper Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶ 16, 31 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wyo. 2001)). To determine the legislature’s intent in enacting a statute, we “must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances . . . to determine the intention оf the lawmaking body.” Id. (quoting Wyoming Cmty. Coll. Comm’n, ¶ 18, 31 P.3d at 1249).
C. Construction of Adoption Statutes
[¶21] We have had many opportunities to construe Wyoming’s adoption statutes in the context of fundamental rights or statutory procedure. “The right to associate with one’s child is protected by both the Wyoming and United States constitutions, therefore adoption statutes are ‘strictly construed when the proceeding is against a nonconsenting parent, and every reasonable [inference] is made in favor of that parent’s
[¶22] We have said that “[a] statute must be viewed in terms of its objective purpose.” Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux & Assocs., 773 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1989). The purpose “of the adoption laws is to make provision for the welfare of children, [and] the better rule is to construe adoption statutes in a manner which will promote this purpose.” Matter of Adoption of BGD, 719 P.2d 1373, 1382 (Wyo. 1986); see also 3A J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 69:4, at 713 (8th ed. 2018) (Remedial statutes, such as adoption laws, are “enacted for the protection of life and property and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good.”); Wright v. Wysowatcky, 363 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Colo. 1961)
(“While courts were formerly inclined to regard adoption statutes as in derogation of the common law and therefore to be strictly construed, the humanitarian purposes of such statutes came to be recognized, and courts generally have evinced a disposition to afford them a more liberal construction.”); Matter of Petition of Phillip A.C., 149 P.3d 51, 58 (Nev. 2006) (“Statutes with a protective purpose should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the intended benefits.”); Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 560 (Cal. 2003) (“The rule is that the adoption statutes are to be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice. Such a construction should be given as will sustain, rather than defeat, the object they have in view.” (citations omitted)).
[¶23] This case is unlike any other we have considered. It does not involve the termination of parental rights, a nonconsenting parent, or the failure to comply with statutory procedures. There is no opposing party. Instead, we are asked to apply Wyoming law to an adoption completed in conformity with stringent intercountry and federal procedural protections, but one that has left a child without a birth certificate or any other record reflecting an accurate birth date.
[¶24] “A liberal construction can expand the meaning of a statute to meet cases which are clearly within the spirit or reason of the law, but courts cannot providе an interpretation inconsistent with the statute’s language.” Sutherland, supra, at 713–14. “Ideologically, states support policies to encourage adoption on humanitarian grounds.” Sutherland, supra, at 698–99. Wyoming laws make adoptive status equal to the natural parent-child relationship, entitling adopting parents to “all of the rights and obligations respecting the child as if they were natural parents” and the adopted child “the same rights as person and property as children and heirs at law of the persons who adopted them.”
D. Interrelationship of Wyoming Vital Records Statutes and Wyoming’s Adoption Statutes
[¶25] The Wyoming vital records statutes are intended to maintain “the integrity and accuracy of vital records,” and directly address the issuance of a birth certificate for a child born in a foreign country.
(e) The state registrar of vitаl records shall establish a new certificate of birth, on a form he prescribes, for a person born in a foreign country upon receipt of a certified copy of the decree of adoption entered pursuant to W.S. 1-22-111(a)(iii) and a request for a new certificate by the court decreeing the adoption, the adoptive parents or the adopted person.
of a Hague Certificate of Citizenship. Fragomen, Jr. et al., supra § 2:21. The question is whether the district court has authority under
E. Harmonizing § 35-1-417 (Vital Records) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-111 (Adoption)
[¶26] In ascertaining the district court’s statutory authority, we also look to the purpose of
[¶27] We cannot ignore the importance of an accurate age on a birth certificate. An official document reflecting a correct date of birth is integral to fundamental rights and privileges of United States citizenship including, inter alia, the right to vote and eligibility for military service. “A person’s age can
[¶28] We find no substantive nor public policy reason to deny the Petitioners’ request for relief in this case. The adoption statutes do not preclude the district court from ordering a Wyoming adoption decree recognizing or approving a Hague Convention adoption certificate.10 Reading the broad language of
the express statutory language of
CONCLUSION
[¶29] The district court has subject matter jurisdiction to approve the Hague Convention adoption, and is statutorily authorized to issue a decrеe of adoption allowing MB to obtain a Wyoming birth certificate with an accurate date of birth. We reverse and remand this matter with instructions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
request that the district court issue a decree of adoption to procure an accurate Wyoming birth certificate and allow the amendment of federal documents presents a live controversy.