IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO ESTATE NO. 2959 (formerly a part of Estate No. 49) nka “LOT NO. 10191” MUNICIPALITY OF DEDEDO.
Supreme Court Case No. CVA22-004
Superior Court Case No. LR0005-19
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM
2023 Guam 6
CARBULLIDO, P.J.; CASTRO, J. Pro Tempore; MANGLONA, J. Pro Tempore
OPINION
Cite as: 2023 Guam 6
Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
Argued and submitted on February 22, 2023
Hagåtña, Guam
Appearing for Petitioner-Appellant:
Glenn B. Nelson, pro se
P.O. Box 181
Hagåtña, GU 96932
Appearing for Objector-Appellee Bayview IV, LLC:
Mitchell F. Thompson, Esq.
Thompson Thompson & Alcantara, P.C.
238 Archbishop Flores St., Ste. 801
Hagåtña, GU 96910
Appearing for Objector-Appellee Blue Ocean Development, LLC:
Jon A. Visosky, Esq.
Roberts Fowler & Visosky, LLP
865 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 201
Tamuning, GU 96913
CARBULLIDO, P.J.:
[1] Petitioner-Appellant Glenn B. Nelson appeals the grant of summary judgment by the Superior Court. He argues there are genuine issues of material fact, and therefore, his case should proceed to trial. He focuses on the fact that no previous court case explains how Estate 2959 became part of current Lots 10113-3 and 10113-R3. However, as pointed out by Objectors-Appellees Bayview IV, LLC and Blue Ocean Development, LLC (“Objectors“), at this stage, the questions before this court are simply whether Glenn Nelson‘s current Petition was properly filed and whether res judicata applies.1 It was not, and res judicata does apply. Therefore, the decision of the Superior Court finding the same must be affirmed.2
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[2] This dispute began in 1978 when Calvo‘s Insurance filed an application to register a tract of land in Tumon (Case No. LR0017-78). This land was known as Lot 10113-R2, and it was later subdivided into separate lots, Lot 10113-3 and Lot 10113-R3. Unmentioned in this action was
[3] Decades later, Theodore Nelson (hereinafter, “Theodore“), father to Glenn, filed a Motion to Reopen the Estate of Juan De Torres Espinosa, Sr. (Case No. PR0193-48), claiming ownership of Estate 49 (“Probate Action“). The Superior Court denied this motion, finding that Theodore “fail[ed] to establish a claim of ownership and . . . that Bayview and Hanil Development (Blue Ocean‘s predecessors [in interest]) were bona fide purchasers for value of the property.” Record on Appeal (“RA“), tab 62 at 3 (Dec. & Order, Feb. 1, 2022). This decision was never successfully appealed.6
[4] Shortly after the Decision and Order in the Probate Action was issued, Objectors (or, in the case of Blue Ocean, its predecessor in interest) became involved in a civil action (Case No. CV0779-08) to quiet title on their tracts of land (“Quiet Title Action“). In that action, Theodore disclaimed any interest on Bayview‘s tract (Lot 10113-3), and the court found that “[Theodore] Nelson‘s claim to Lot 10113-R3 [Blue Ocean‘s tract] was barred by the Guam Land Title
[5] The present case began when Glenn filed a Petition for Registration of Title of Land on September 18, 2019. A few months later, Objectors filed an objection to Glenn‘s proposed land registration. After discovery had closed, Objectors moved for summary judgment, arguing the Petition did not conform to
[6] Glenn does not appear to have ever responded to the statutory argument at the trial court level. As for the res judicata argument, Glenn argued there was no final judgment on the issue he is now raising and there is no privity between him and the parties involved in the past cases.
[7] The trial court agreed with Objectors on both counts. First, it found that Glenn‘s Petition did not conform to
II. JURISDICTION
[8] This court has jurisdiction over an appeal from final judgment.
[9] A final judgment disposes of the case by determining the rights of the parties in an action. Marriott v. Marriott, 2014 Guam 28 ¶ 7;
“[I]t must be remembered that the [separate document] rule is designed to simplify and make certain the matter of appealability. It is not designed as a trap for the inexperienced. . . . The rule should be interpreted to prevent loss of the right of appeal, not to facilitate loss.”
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be “construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”
Bankers Tr. Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 386-87 (1978) (per curiam) (first and third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
[10] Importantly, this court “takes into account the public policy favoring disposition of a case on its merits.” Quitugua v. Flores, 2004 Guam 19 ¶ 20. As such, this court looks to Glenn‘s intent in filing his appeal, and we find his intent sufficient to proceed with the appeal of the final judgment.
[11] In Ward v. Reyes, this court considered whether a Rule 59 motion could be treated as an appeal of the underlying judgment. 1998 Guam 1. The appellant in Ward filed a timely notice of appeal designating only the order denying a motion for reconsideration as the basis of the appeal. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The Ward court looked to the Ninth Circuit for guidance on jurisdiction and reasoned:
In certain situations, the Ninth Circuit treats a Rule 59 motion as an appeal of the underlying judgment. Wash. State Health Facilities, Ass‘n v. Dep‘t of Social & Health Servs., 879 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1989). This is appropriate where there is no prejudice and it could be fairly inferred that the Appellant had intended to appeal the judgment. See id. at 681; Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int‘l Ass‘n, 804 F.2d 1472, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986).
1998 Guam 1 ¶ 6. This court held that the specific facts of Ward warranted considering the “appeal of the order . . . as an appeal also of the underlying judgment.” Id. ¶ 7.
[12] Here, it can be “fairly inferred” that Glenn intended to appeal the final judgment, and the court may consider the appeal of the order as such. The February Decision and Order granting summary judgment disposed of all issues, so there are no other issues for Glenn to appeal. Further, the final judgment simply reduced the content of the February Decision and Order to a separate document, which Glenn did not designate as the basis for his appeal. To dismiss Glenn‘s appeal on this basis would be to “facilitate loss.” Bankers Tr., 435 U.S. at 386. We find that dismissal would not serve the purpose of Rule 58, and we decline to use the rule to “trap” a self-represented litigant.
[13] Glenn‘s intent to appeal the final judgment was clear, and this court has discretion over whether Glenn‘s failure to use the word “judgment” is fatal to his appeal. We conclude it is not, and that Glenn has sufficiently shown his intent to appeal the final judgment. We thus have jurisdiction to proceed with this case.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[14] The standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Hawaiian Rock Prods. Corp. v. Ocean Housing, Inc., 2016 Guam 4 ¶ 13 (citations omitted). “A trial court‘s conclusions of law are also reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Mendiola v. Bell, 2009 Guam 15 ¶ 11). Finally, issues of statutory interpretation are likewise reviewed de novo. People v. Robert, 2019 Guam 2 ¶ 5.
A. Glenn‘s Petition Fails to Conform to 21 GCA § 60509
[15]
[16] Whether the Department of Land Management is consistent in carrying out its statutory mandate or not does not excuse Glenn‘s present failure. Perhaps unfair, the issue was properly raised before the Superior Court. As he does not dispute his Petition fails to conform to
B. Res Judicata Estops Glenn from Litigating Ownership of the Property at Issue
[17] ”Res judicata embraces two doctrines, claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” Reyes v. First Net Ins. Co., 2009 Guam 17 ¶ 20. This case implicates claim preclusion, which is “where a rendered judgment is the full measure of relief accorded between the same parties for the same claim.” In re San Nicolas, 2022 Guam 8 ¶ 28 (citing Reyes, 2009 Guam 17 ¶ 20). The elements
1. There have been final judgments on the merits in earlier suits
[18] The last Decision and Orders of the Superior Court in the Probate Action and the Quiet Title Action disposed of all the issues relating to those actions. This means that the trial judges in those cases addressed all the questions that were adequately put before them. No proper appeals were taken, and it is now well past the deadline to appeal civil cases. See
2. The causes of action in the past suits and the present suit are identical
[19] “The central criterion in determining whether there is an identity of claims between the first and second adjudications is ‘whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.‘” Reyes, 2009 Guam 17 ¶ 26 (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Gospel Missions of Am. v. Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992)) (providing four questions to identify redundant claims).
[20] Here, the same transactional nucleus of facts has governed the Probate Action, the Quiet Title Action, and the present case—do the owners of Lots 10113-3 and 10113-R3 have superior title to the Espinosa Estate? In the Probate Action, the trial court held “that no grounds exist to
[21] True, it does not appear that past court decisions have ever explained how Estates 49 or 2959 became a part of Lots 10113-3 and 10113-R3. This does not prevent those cases from applying to this one. For one, Estate 49 is comprised of land wholly within the current boundaries of Lots 10113-3 and 10113-R3. See RA, tab 1 (Pet. Reg. Title Land, Ex. 6, Sept. 18, 2019); see also RA, tab 33 at 10, 16 (Decl. Cecille A. Flores, May 14, 2021). Second, in these past cases, the Superior Court has clarified that the current owners of Lots 10113-3 and 10113-R3 (or the predecessors-in-interest) have superior title to a claim by the Nelson family acting as administrators of the Espinosa Estate.
[22] Glenn or his father would have needed to present evidence on the title to Estate 49 in the earlier court actions or else give an exceptionally good reason as to why this new evidence should be accepted now. ”Res judicata ‘prevents litigation of a claim that was not litigated in a previous suit, but could have been.‘” In re San Nicolas, 2022 Guam 8 ¶ 34 (second emphasis added) (quoting Zahnen v. Limtiaco, 2008 Guam 5 ¶ 10). Moreover, “[r]es judicata applies even where new claims are based on newly discovered evidence, unless ‘the evidence was either fraudulently concealed or it could not have been discovered with due diligence.‘” L-Tec Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting Saud v. Bank of N.Y., 929 F.2d 916, 920 (2d Cir. 1991)).
[23] The basis for Glenn‘s current claim appears to be a property map detailing Estate 2959 (formerly a part of Estate 49) showing the coordinates for the property and stating the property was held by Juan Espinosa Torres. Appellant‘s Br. at 3 (July 25, 2022). He also focuses on the fact that Estates 49 and 2959 have never been registered with the Department of Land Management. Id. at 7. He further tries to provide the paper trail detailing the events surrounding the land going as far back as the late 19th century. Reply Br. at 7-8. None of these points supports a finding that this evidence was “fraudulently concealed” or undiscoverable with due diligence at the time of the previous cases. Therefore, any new evidence or legal arguments from Glenn are insufficient for preventing res judicata from applying in the present case.
3. Glenn is in privity with his father, Theodore, who was a party in the past cases
[24] Glenn was not a party in either the Probate Action or the Quiet Title Action. His father, Theodore, was. In the Probate Action, Theodore was acting on behalf of the Espinosa Estate. Objectors assert, and Glenn does not dispute, that Theodore was also involved in the Quiet Title Action in his capacity representing the Espinosa Estate. Appellees’ Br. at 20. Here, Glenn is involved in this proceeding because of the Espinosa Estate. Appellant‘s Br. at 4. “Privity . . . is established when a party‘s interests are fully congruent with a party to the judgment, having an identity of interest that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right, or a mutual or successive relationship to the same right of property.” 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 920 (May 2023 Update) (footnotes omitted). As the trial court correctly observed, “[t]he litigant is the Espinosa Estate, regardless of who brings the action in its name.” RA, tab 62 at 13 (Dec. & Order). This criterion is satisfied.
C. Given its Current Posture, this Court Cannot Reverse Past Decisions of the Superior Court
[26] Glenn argues this case “is a fight to right the wrong of past . . . [sic] to get back what was wrongfully taken from the [Espinosa] Estate.” Reply Br. at 25. He also states that “[c]ourts make mistakes. Decades old cases are being overturned.” Appellant‘s Br. at 11. Old cases can be overturned, but only in the right circumstances.
[27] Typically, when we reverse decisions of the Superior Court, we do so in an appeal from that specific case. Neither the original 1978 land registration case, nor the Probate Action, nor the Quiet Title Action were ever successfully appealed. The time to correct any mistake was while they could still be appealed; that time has gone. This means those decisions are now final, and we are constrained by the doctrine of res judicata. When considering whether res judicata applies, we do not look to see if the past cases were right.
[28] To clarify, nowhere in this Opinion do we determine if the past decisions of the Superior Court were correct. We can even assume they were wrong. We can assume that Glenn is correct that Estate 2959, formerly a part of Estate 49, was wrongfully subsumed into Lot 10113-R2 back in 1978. Even with this assumption, we cannot reverse the past decisions of the Superior Court. Nothing in the analysis of Part IV.B of this Opinion would change, and so those decisions, even if they were wrong, must be allowed to stand.
V. CONCLUSION
[30] Though the history and facts involving the pieces of property in this case are confusing and murky, the questions of law this court faces are straightforward. The Petition for Registration of Title of Land filed by Glenn Nelson in the Superior Court did not conform to statutory requirements. Further, his claims have been litigated in several past court actions; the doctrine of res judicata applies. The grant of summary judgment by the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Justice Pro Tempore
/s/
JOHN A. MANGLONA
Justice Pro Tempore
/s/
F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO
Presiding Justice