IN THE MATTER OF JUAN P. SAN NICOLAS and JOHN J. SABLAN, Petitioners-Appellants, v. EDWARD BIRN, in his official capacity as Director for the DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, Respondent-Appellee, and GUAM FIRE DEPARTMENT, Real Party in Interest-Appellee.
Supreme Court Case No.: CVA19-025; Superior Court Case No.: SP0088-17
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM
11/29/2022
2022 Guam 8
Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam. Argued and submitted on May 26, 2021 via Zoom video conference.
Appearing for Petitioners-Appellants: Jacqueline Taitano Terlaje, Law Office of Jacqueline Taitano Terlaje, P.C., 284 W. Chalan Santo Papa, Hagatna, GU 96910
Appearing for Respondent-Appellee: James L. Canto II, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Litigation Division, 590 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 802, Tamuning, GU 96913
MARAMAN, J.:
[1] In 2005, Petitioners-Appellants Juan P. San Nicolas and John J. Sablan (“Petitioners“) began decades-long proceedings with the Department of Administration (“DOA“), the Civil Service Commission (“CSC“), and the Superior Court to obtain back pay for the years they spent performing duties beyond their formal Firefighter I position. In June 2017, the Superior Court entered a final judgment on the matter. Days later, the Petitioners filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus, arguing the Petitioners are statutorily entitled to a promotion for the duties performed beyond their Firefighter I position. The trial court denied the writ, and the Petitioners appealed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[2] The Petitioners are former Guam Fire Department (“GFD“) employees. This appeal follows two special proceedings—Superior Court Case Nos. SP0189-10 and SP0088-17—in which Petitioners claimed they were not compensated for performing duties above their positions. This appeal is from the judgment entered in SP0088-17.
[3] Beginning in 2001 and 2002, respectively, Petitioners San Nicolas and Sablan were employed as “Firefighter I” but performing duties above that title before being promoted in 2008. Record on Appeal (“RA“), tab 1 at 2 (Pet. Writ Mand., June 22, 2017), Ex. 1 at 1-2 (Mem. DOA to Fire Chief, May 21, 2008) (“[I]t is clear to us that they have performed duties above that of a Firefighter I.“); San Nicolas v. Guam Civ. Serv. Comm‘n, SP0189-10 (Dec. & Order at 9-11, (Apr. 12, 2013)).1 In 2005, Petitioners requested that DOA perform a desk audit, claiming they were performing the duties of Fire Captain and were entitled to promotion and the related compensation. In May 2008, DOA found Petitioners were performing duties above their positions, but not at the supervisory level of Fire Captain. DOA explained that it could not classify Petitioners into any other position because no appropriate one existed. DOA recommended financial compensation at the Fire Service Specialist position level, not reclassification.2 In June 2008, Petitioners appealed the results to DOA without effect. SP0189-10 (Dec. & Order at 2 & n.1, 9, 12 (Apr. 12, 2013)). Meanwhile, Petitioners filed grievances seeking an appeal to the CSC from April to June 2008. The CSC declined jurisdiction.
[4] Remaining uncompensated, in 2010, Petitioners filed SP0189-10 in the Superior Court against GFD and DOA. Petitioners requested judicial review of the CSC‘s jurisdiction and a writ of mandamus requiring, inter alia, DOA and GFD to determine back pay owed and to compensate Petitioners such back wages for performing Fire Captain duties. In their answers, GFD and DOA maintained that Petitioners were never “detailed” to an assignment above Firefighter 1 and denied
[5] While awaiting the CSC review, in 2014 Petitioners moved for the court to require DOA to promote Petitioners to Fire Specialists as a separate obligation from any CSC determinations under
[Rendering Appointments Permanent.] A Guam Fire Department employee who has occupied the position of Firefighter II or Fire Service Specialist on a temporary basis for more than five (5) years shall be deemed to be promoted to and occupy said position on a permanent basis. The Director of Administration shall execute the necessary personnel actions to document such promotions.
SP0189-10 (Mot. Writ Mand. at 1, 3 (Mar. 20, 2014) (claiming Petitioners occupied positions of Fire Service Specialists));
[6] The court denied the writ of mandamus, being “unable to find that [the CSC] is not currently providing Petitioners with an adequate remedy” and lacking a factual finding until the CSC determined Petitioners’ compliance with regulations and Respondents’ defenses. SP0189-10 (Dec. & Order at 4 (June 25, 2014)).
[8] In January 2016, Petitioners entreated DOA by letter that under law, “the obligation to execute the necessary personnel actions to document [Petitioners‘] promotions is vested in you” and requested confirmation of intent to comply with
[9] In July 2016, Petitioners renewed their SP0189-10 motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus by requesting the court mandate DOA‘s compliance with
[10] Thereafter, Petitioners filed Superior Court Case No. SP0088-17, petitioning for a writ of mandamus to order DOA to promote Petitioners to Fire Service Specialist under
[11] Meanwhile, in June 2017, Respondents moved to enter judgment in SP0189-10, asserting the government would compensate Petitioners as ordered only upon final judgment and that Petitioners had not responded to requests to execute a proposed judgment. SP0189-10 (Mot. J. at 2-3 (June 15, 2017)). The court terminated SP0189-10 “according to the court‘s Decisions and Orders.” SP0189-10 (Judgment at 2 (July 13, 2017)); id. (Final Judgment (July 18, 2017)). Petitioners did not appeal.
[12] In November 2017, DOA answered in SP0088-17 asserting, inter alia, that
On or about [2001-02 to] 2008, Petitioner[s] San Nicolas [and Sablan] held the position classification of Firefighter I within GFD. Petitioner[s] San Nicolas [and Sablan], while assigned to the Fire Prevention Bureau, occupied the position of FIRE SERVICE SPECIALIST by performing the duties thereof on a temporary basis for more than five (5) years.
RA, tab 1 at 1, 3, 6 (Pet. Writ Mand.); see also RA, tab 7 at 1 (Am. Answer, Nov. 3, 2017).
[13] Respondents also denied paragraphs 25-26, each of which contain the premise “that Petitioners have occupied the position of Fire Service Specialist on a temporary basis for more than five (5) years.” RA, tab 1 at 4-5 (Pet. Writ Mand.); see also RA, tab 7 at 1, 2 (Am. Answer). Respondents further denied paragraphs 27 and 28, which allege that pursuant to ”
[14] On May 9, 2019, the court denied Petitioners’ SP0088-17 writ petition on the basis of statutory interpretation and res judicata. The court held that
[15] The court denied Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, upholding the denial of the SP0088-17 writ petition. In its decision, the court relied on interpreting
II. JURISDICTION
[16] This court has jurisdiction over an appeal from final judgment.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[17] We will reverse the denial of a writ of mandamus only upon finding an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 6 (citation omitted). “[T]he trial court‘s conclusions of law, such as whether the legal requirements for mandamus are met and issues of statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo.” See id. (quoting Agana Beach Condo. Homeowners’ Ass‘n v. Mafnas, 2013 Guam 9 ¶ 11); see also Port Auth. of Guam v. Civ. Serv. Comm‘n (Javelosa), 2018 Guam 9 ¶ 15 (underscoring de novo review of statutory interpretation).
[18] We review de novo whether res judicata bars a proceeding. Cristobal v. Siegel, 2016 Guam 27 ¶ 37.
[19] We review the trial court‘s determination of judicial admissions for abuse of discretion. MacDonald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 110 F.3d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1997).
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[20] Petitioners argue the trial court erred in relying on res judicata because DOA‘s duty to promote Petitioners under
[21] Petitioners also assert that the trial court erred in failing to apply strict construction to the interpretation of
[22] We hold that Petitioners’ SP0088-17 claim was litigated in SP0189-10 and is precluded by res judicata. Further, the trial court did not err in interpreting
[23] Having determined this suit is barred and the statute inapplicable, we need not address claims regarding statutes of limitation or unsought administrative remedies. See Hemlani v. Hemlani, 2015 Guam 16 ¶ 33 (“As a general appellate principle, a court will not address issues unnecessary to the resolution of the case before it.“).
A. The Petitioners’ Claims Are Barred by Res Judicata
[24] First, we consider the trial court‘s application of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata gives a conclusive effect to prior judgments by barring subsequent litigation of the same controversy. Zahnen v. Limtiaco, 2008 Guam 5 ¶ 10. A claim is precluded where an identical
[25] Because the trial court‘s Decision and Order in SP0088-17 established its res judicata holding, we analyze it directly and de novo.
1. The trial court applied the correct legal framework
[26] The trial court properly cited our res judicata statute,
In other cases, the judgment or order is, in respect to the matter directly adjudged, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing under the same title and in the same capacity, provided that they have notice, actual or constructive, of the pendency of the action or proceedings.
(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) an identity of the causes of action in both the earlier and later suit, and (3) an identity of the parties or their privies in the two suits.
RA, tab 16 at 6 (Dec. & Order, May 9, 2019) (quoting In re Aguon, 2013 Guam 4 ¶ 23). To aid interpretation, the court cited our decision indicating California case law guides
[27] Facially, the trial court employed a credible approach to res judicata analysis. We now apply our own analysis and agree that res judicata bars Petitioners’ claims.
2. Our application of res judicata elements
[28] “Res judicata embraces two doctrines, claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” Reyes v. First Net Ins. Co., 2009 Guam 17 ¶ 20. Here, we analyze claim preclusion—where a rendered judgment is the full measure of relief accorded between the same parties for the same claim. Id. Finding all three elements met, we hold Petitioners are barred from relitigating their claim to promotion under
a. The July 2017 judgment in SP0189-10 was a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit
[29] The Petitioners brought a previous case—SP0189-10—relating to the same set of facts and that reached a final judgment on the merits. The Superior Court issued a final judgment in SP0189-10 on July 18, 2017. Cf. Cristobal, 2016 Guam 27 ¶¶ 38-40. Petitioners did not appeal that judgment, and it is well past the thirty-day time allowance. See
[30] The underlying CSC conclusion used by the Superior Court was a final administrative decision. California law provides that an administrative decision is final when it follows a full hearing, is made on the merits, and the time for appeal passes.5 Castillo, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876. By 2015, the CSC completed its multi-week evidentiary hearing with the Petitioners. SP0189-10 (Stip. Return Peremptory Writ Mand. (Nov. 19, 2015)), Ex. 1 at 2-3 (CSC Dec. & Evid. Hr‘g Peremptory Writ Mand. (Nov. 17, 2015)). This hearing was at the Superior Court‘s order
[31] We now turn to whether the issues decided in SP0189-10 are sufficiently similar to the issues in the present suit.
b. An identity of the causes of action in both the earlier and later suit exists
[32] “The central criterion in determining whether there is an identity of claims between the first and second adjudications is ‘whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.‘” Reyes, 2009 Guam 17 ¶ 26 (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Gospel Missions of Am. v. Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992)) (providing four questions to identify redundant claims).
[33] In SP0189-10 and SP0088-17, the same set of facts controls both claims: which extra duties Petitioners performed between 2001 and 2008. And for thoroughness, we further examine the cause of action.
[35] In both cases, Petitioners raised the de facto promotion to a position higher than their titles, based on the duties performed. In their original 2005 DOA audit request, Petitioners claimed they performed the duties of Fire Captain. DOA denied promotion, recommending only compensation. The DOA audit explains it could not reclassify Petitioners to another title because no appropriate position existed then, and Petitioners did not perform the supervisory duties of Fire Captains. See RA, tab 1 at 2 (Pet. Writ Mand.), Ex. 1 at 1 (Mem. DOA to Fire Chief, May 21, 2008) (finding some of Petitioners’ duties resembled those of the abolished Fire Inspector position). Petitioners then filed SP0189-10 seeking mandamus for “DOA and GFD to pay monetary compensation,” asserting they “performed in an acting capacity the duties of Fire Captain.” SP0189-10 (Pet. Judicial Review & Writ Mand. at 2-3, 9 (Sept. 7, 2010)) (emphasis added). DOA and GFD denied Petitioners had been detailed to any assignment above their Firefighter I classification. SP0189-10 (GFD Answer at 3-6, 9 (May 20, 2011)); id. (DOA Answer at 2-3, 6 (May 20, 2011)). Similarly, the trial court analyzed the “Temporary Assignments” statute,
[36] Petitioners misspeak in summarizing the DOA and CSC findings that they were “occupying the position of a Fire Service Specialist.” See Appellants’ Br. at 2, 6-7; cf. SP0189-10 (Stip. Return Peremptory Writ Mand. (Nov. 19, 2015)), Ex. 1 at 3 (CSC Dec. & Evid. Hr‘g Peremptory Writ Mand. (Nov. 17, 2015)) (“Petitioners were performing the duties of Fire Specialist during the time at issue.” (emphasis added)). According to DOA and the CSC, and as recognized by the court, GFD had breached its duty to fairly compensate Petitioners, and they were awarded back pay. Petitioners later claimed the award was insufficient; rather than take the court‘s suggestion to file a writ to enforce their sought award, they argued for promotion under
[37] Upon a review of the record, we find the Petitioners have not asserted a new cause of action; the harm here is the same as alleged in SP0189-10. Additionally, the underlying dispositive facts in both cases are identical and have been thoroughly examined—the exact duties Petitioners performed for GFD from 2001 to 2008 as related to their titles and duties. We find no reason that Petitioners’ delayed reliance on
c. An identity of the parties or their privies in the two suits exists
[38] Petitioners do not contest that the parties are identical in SP0189-10 and SP0088-17: San Nicolas and Sablan versus DOA and GFD. See Appellants’ Br. at 7. Compare SP0189-10 (Pet. Judicial Review & Writ Mand. (Sept. 7, 2010)), with RA, tab 1 (Pet. Writ Mand., June 22, 2017). This element is met.
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[39] Applying
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Ruling 10 GCA § 72107 Does Not Apply to Petitioners
[40] In its October 2019 Decision and Order, the trial court upheld its May 2019 finding that ”
§ 72107. Rendering Appointments Permanent.
A Guam Fire Department employee who has occupied the position of Firefighter II or Fire Service Specialist on a temporary basis for more than five (5) years shall be deemed to be promoted to and occupy said position on a permanent basis. The Director of Administration shall execute the necessary personnel actions to document such promotions.
[41] The trial court determined a plain reading of the statute requires an individual be appointed to a temporary position before he can benefit from the statute as occupying that position. RA, tab 30 at 4 (Dec. & Order, Oct. 16, 2019). Otherwise, the court reasoned, an employee could quietly over-perform his duties and demand a permanent promotion—an untenable situation not described in the statute and not originally intended. Id. at 4-5; RA, tab 16 at 5 (Dec. & Order, May 9, 2019) (citing Captain Michael Uncango‘s declaration on statute‘s origin).
[42] On appeal, Petitioners argue that strictly interpreted, the statute effectuates automatic appointments where no formal promotion or appointment occurred. Appellants’ Br. at 19.
[43] We need not determine whether
[45] Despite all the disagreement listed above, the record firmly establishes the remedy offered to Petitioners has always been the same: compensation. DOA, the CSC, and the Superior Court have all agreed that Petitioners have done work above that associated with the Firefighter I position and that they should receive payment for that work. As Petitioners cannot show the record supports a conclusion that they occupied the position of Fire Service Specialist,
[46] In addition, we are not persuaded the alleged judicial admissions change this fact. Because the Superior Court limited compensation to after the DOA desk audit began in 2005, the CSC Decision recommends back pay for under three years—until 2008 when Petitioners left their roles without recommending any compensation before 2005. See SP0189-10 (Stip. Return Peremptory Writ Mand. (Nov. 19, 2015)), Ex. 1 at 3 (CSC Dec. & Evid. Hr‘g Peremptory Writ Mand. (Nov. 17, 2015)). That Decision also lacks a finding of “occupation,” instead naming duties Petitioners performed. See id.
However, in briefing to the court, DOA only ever admitted that its desk audit recommended “to compensate Petitioners as Fire Service Specialist and to create a new position or re-instate the Fire Inspector position.” SP0189-10 (Answer & Affirmative Defenses (Fred Nishihira & Benita Manglona) (May 20, 2011)) (emphasis added).
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Writ of Mandamus
[48] A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy; we reverse its denial only upon finding an abuse of discretion. Sorensen Television Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court (Lina‘la Sin Casino), 2006 Guam 21 ¶ 12 (citing
V. CONCLUSION
[50] We AFFIRM the trial court‘s denial of the Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus as the suit is barred by res judicata, and the court did not err in finding
/s/
ROBERT J. TORRES
Associate Justice
/s/
KATHERINE A. MARAMAN
Associate Justice
/s/
F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO
Chief Justice