In thе MATTER OF the Application of J.M.M. o/b/o Minors for a Change of Name
A16-0646
Court of Appeals of Minnesota
February 13, 2017
890 N.W.2d 750
We also conclude that, with respect to Fox‘s past childcare expenses, the CSM erred. While Fox submitted documents describing childcare options, she also submitted documentation of amounts she аctually spent on childcare, including two checks for childcare camp, a check payable to her mother for a week of childcare, and two cash receipts showing payments to the in-home sitter. Because Fox produced documentation of amounts she actually spent on work-related childcare,3 we conclude that the CSM erred in finding that Fox failed to provide documentation of actual childcare expenses.
Both in front of the CSM and in this appeal, Beckendorf raised a number of challenges to the weight and credibility of Fox‘s documentation. The CSM, however, did not explicitly address these matters, and, on the record currently before this court, it is unclear whether the CSM did not address these matters because the CSM thought that Fox‘s motion was otherwise fatally defective or whether she implicitly rejected these challenges. We cannot address these matters on appeal. See Kucera v. Kucera, 275 Minn. 252, 254, 146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (1966) (stating that “[i]t is not within the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal“); Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 338 (Minn. App. 2014) (reversing and remanding where “findings are missing“). On remand, the CSM shall expressly address these matters.
On remand, the CSM, applying the appropriate standard, should determine whether Fox has produced sufficient “documentation of child care expenses” to award childcare support.
DECISION
Because Fox produced documentation of both past and prоspective childcare expenses, the CSM erred in finding that Fox submitted no “documentation of child care expenses” for purposes of seeking childcare support under
Reversed and remanded.
Katherine S. Barrett Wiik, George D. Carroll, Mohammadee Summra Shariff, Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant J.M.M.).
Rana S. Alexander, Battered Women‘s Legal Advocacy Project, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus curiae Battered Women‘s Legal Advocacy Project).
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant J.M.M. applied to the district court to change the surnames of her three minor children. The Minnesota Change of Name Act,
On appeal, J.M.M. argues that the district court (1) erred in interpreting
FACTS1
Appellant J.M.M. is the mother of three minor children, ages six, four, and two at the time of the applications, who share a biological father.2 The biological father is not listed on the children‘s birth certificates, but the children share his surname. J.M.M. and the biological father have never been married, and no court has ever adjudicated the paternity of the children. The biological father does not pay child support, has not seen any of the children since March 2013, and has not met the youngest child.
J.M.M. filed name-change applications on behalf of each of her minor children, requesting that each сhild‘s surname be changed from the biological father‘s surname to J.M.M.‘s surname. Staff at the Hennepin County Self-Help Center provided J.M.M. with an application form and informed her that she was not required to provide notice to the biological father if paternity had not been previously established. Based on that information, J.M.M. wrote “no other legal parent” in the space asking her to provide the “name and last known address of the non-applicant parent.” Beneath this question, four checkboxes ask the applicant to select all of the descriptions that apply to the non-applicant parent:
- The name on the birth certificate
- The person acting as the non-applicant parent
- The biological parent
- The non-applicant parent is not known and his/her/their name(s) is/are not shоwn on the birth certificates.
J.M.M. checked “[t]he non-applicant parent is not known and his/her/their name(s) is/are not shown on the birth certificate.” J.M.M. did not check the box for “[t]he biological parent.”
When the district court law clerk contacted J.M.M. to schedule a hearing, J.M.M. informed the clerk that “she knew the identity of the father but did not know his current whereabоuts.” The district court told J.M.M. that she must notify the biological father of the name-change applications at least 30 days before the hearing or the applications would be dismissed.
With the assistance of counsel, J.M.M. submitted to the district court an affidavit and a letter arguing that she should not be required to notify the biological father. In her affidavit, J.M.M. stated that she is the only parent listed on the children‘s birth certificates and that no father has been adjudicated their parent. J.M.M. stated that the biological father had not seen any of the children for over two years, that he
The district court dismissed J.M.M.‘s name-change applications without prejudice on February 23, 2016, because J.M.M. did not provide notice to the biological father. In a memorandum accompanying the order, the district court interpreted the statutory language concerning “both parents having notice,”
J.M.M. appeals.
ISSUE
Did the district court err in interpreting
ANALYSIS
This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009). The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascеrtain the intention of the legislature. Marks v. Comm‘r of Revenue, 875 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Minn. 2016); see also
We first examine whether
The term “parent” is not defined by the statute. We may use Black‘s Law Dictionary to assess the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory term. Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 755, 759 n.2 (Minn. 2010). That dictionary presents numerous definitions of “parent“:
The lawful father or mother of someone • In ordinary usage, the term denotes more than responsibility for conception and birth. The term commonly includes (1) either the natural father or the natural mother оf a child, (2) either the adoptive father or the adoptive mother of a child, (3) a child‘s putative blood parent who has expressly acknowledged paternity, and (4) an individual or agency whose status as guardian has been established by judicial decree. In law, parental status based on any criterion may be terminated by judicial decree. In other words, a person ceases to be a legal parent if that person‘s status as a parent has been terminated in a legal proceeding.
Black‘s Law Dictionary 1287 (10th ed. 2014); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (defining “parent” by the responsibilities of parenthood). These varied dictionary definitions alone do not resolve the question of whether “parent” refers to a child‘s biological father. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 625 (Minn. 2016) (discussing conflicting dictionary definitions in statutory interpretation).
“When a word has a variety of meanings, we examine the context in which the word appears.” Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 625. In context, “both” does not clarify the meaning of the statute. We generally construe statutes to give meaning to each word. Goodman, 777 N.W.2d at 758. But “both” does not necessarily mean that two biological parents must have notiсe of the name-change application. Under Minnesota law, not every child has two biological parents. See
When confronted with an ambiguous statute, we use other interpretive tools to discern the meaning of the statute. Brua, 778 N.W.2d at 300; see also
A logical place to look to determine the meaning of “parent” is the Minnesota Parentage Act,
This interpretation of “parent,” which would exclude a biоlogical father who has no legal relationship with a child, is in harmony with the Minnesota Adoption Act. Minnesota‘s adoption act defines “parent” to mean “the natural or adoptive parent of a child.”
We have considered whether the absence of a notice requirement for a biological father who does not hаve a legal relationship with a child conflicts with a putative father‘s liberty interest in the preservation of the parent-child relationship. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Although the issue has not been raised or briefed, we perceive no constitutional infirmities. A putative father who fails to “accept some measure of responsibility for the child‘s future” does not have a prоtected interest in the preservation of the parent-child relationship. Heidbreder, 645 N.W.2d at 373 n.12, 382 (citing Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262). A father with no protected interest in preservation of the parent-child relationship is unlikely to have any due-process interest in a name-change application. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. Moreover, a biological father always has a
We hold that, for purposes of the name-change act, notice is required to be given to a biological father only if he has a parent-child relationship under the Minnesota Parentage Act. See
DECISION
Because we hold that
Reversed and remanded.
Pamela MASLOWSKI, Respondent,
v.
PROSPECT FUNDING PARTNERS LLC, Defendant,
Prospect Funding Holdings LLC, Appellant.
A16-0770
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Filed February 13, 2017
