In the Matter of: The Year 2019 Salary of Freeborn County Sheriff.
A19-1363
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS
May 26, 2020
Jesson, Judge
Freeborn County District Court File No. 24-CV-18-2138. Karen K. Kurth, Joan M. Quade, Tyler W. Eubank, Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant Freeborn County). Steven J. Hovey, Hoversten, Johnson, Beckmann & Hovey, LLP, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent Kurt Freitag). Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
S Y L L A B U
- When a sheriff seeks judicial review of a county board’s salary determination under
Minnesota Statutes section 387.20, subdivision 7 (2018), he or she bears the burden of proving that the board acted in a manner prohibited by the statute. - A county board of commissioners may consider other relevant factors when setting the county sheriff’s salary, provided that it also considers the sheriff’s experience, qualifications, and performance, and the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff’s office as required by
Minnesota Statutes section 387.20, subdivision 7 . - To evaluate whether a county board sufficiently took into account a sheriff’s responsibilities and duties and his or her experience, qualifications, and performance, a district court must consider whether the county board possessed more than a summary knowledge of the required statutory factors.
O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Unhappy with his 2019 salary as set by the Freeborn County Board of Commissioners, respondent Kurt Freitag—the Freeborn County Sheriff—appealed the county board’s salary decision to the district court. After conducting a trial, the district court determined that the county board acted in an arbitrary manner and lacked a sufficient understanding of the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff’s office. But in reaching these conclusions, the district court excluded relevant considerations relied upon by members of the board after erroneously interpreting the applicable statute. And the commissioners showed more than a summary knowledge of the required statutory factors involving a sheriff’s responsibilities and duties. The district court’s findings and legal conclusions to the contrary are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTS
Respondent Kurt Freitag is the Freeborn County Sheriff. Before becoming sheriff, Freitag worked in law enforcement for more than 20 years. After winning a contested election, Freitag became sheriff in January 2015. He was reelected to the position in 2018.
The Freeborn County Board of Commissioners (the board) establishes the county sheriff’s salary annually. When Freitag first assumed the position of sheriff, the board set his salary at $75,000. This amount reflected Freitag’s requested salary.
In November 2018, the board began considering 2019 salaries. Freitag presented his salary request at a county board workshop attended by all the commissioners. Freitag spoke for about 15 minutes. He also presented written materials to support his requested salary of $113,952. This amount represented an approximately 23% increase from Freitag’s 2018 salary. Freitag calculated this amount by averaging two figures: the median salary of sheriffs in the surrounding area and the median salary of sheriffs in comparable counties across the state. According to Freitag, the board did not discuss his salary request and asked him only “superficial questions” about his proposal.
A few weeks later, the board held a public meeting to set the 2019 salaries for elected officials, including the sheriff. During the public meeting, the board did not discuss Freitag’s salary request. Nor did it explain how it calculated the ultimate amount. A commissioner proposed setting the sheriff’s salary at $97,020. By a vote of four to one, the board passed a resolution setting Freitag’s salary at that amount. Freitag’s salary for 2019, as set by the board, represented about a 5% increase. Other elected officials in the county—including the county attorney, auditor/treasurer, and county recorder—received raises in a similar range.
Under Minnesota law, a sheriff can appeal a county board’s salary determination to the district court.
At the trial, Freitag testified about his responsibilities and his performance as sheriff. Freitag’s duties as sheriff include supervising around 90 employees, approving training, and assessing the budget for the sheriff’s office. He also explained that he has responsibilities related to equipment, vehicles, and public relations and is on-call every weeknight.1 Changes Freitag instituted included reimplementing the K-9 program, purchasing a drone to enhance search capabilities, increasing water and snowmobile patrol, and enacting a body-camera policy. And to increase revenue, Freitag negotiated an increase in the per diem amount Freeborn County receives from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to house detainees at the county jail.
During his testimony, Freitag acknowledged that he is the highest-paid sheriff in the county’s history and that his raises since taking office amount to an overall raise of 30%. But Freitag believed that he was underpaid. In support of this assertion, Freitag introduced documentation that he provided to the board regarding the salaries of sheriffs in surrounding and similar counties. And according to Freitag, pay signifies authority.2
Freitag requested
Appellant Freeborn County presented testimony from three members of the board regarding the board’s determination of Freitag’s salary. Each board member described the factors contributing to the salary determination, including concerns from constituents, the amount of the raise requested, and the county’s economic condition. In their testimony, all three commissioners acknowledged that there was no discussion about Freitag’s salary on the record at the public meeting. And the testifying board members confirmed that a fellow commissioner (who did not testify) came up with the $97,020 figure, and they were unsure exactly how he reached that amount.
Finally, the county administrator testified, providing context about the county’s economic condition. And although the county administrator experienced some problems with the sheriff, he opined that Freitag was doing an “outstanding” job. But he also noted that there is no requirement that the county pay Freitag the same as sheriffs in surrounding counties. He believed the salary as set by the board was fair, and that the board was working within its budget.
The district court ruled in favor of Freitag. First, it determined that the board acted in an arbitrary manner when setting Freitag’s salary. It pointed to the fact that there was no explanation of how or why the board arrived at the $97,020 figure. Nor did any public discussion about the increase take place.4 And the court gave no weight to testimony provided by board members that they considered budgetary challenges, constituent concerns, and other elected officials’ reactions because those factors were not included in the statute. Indeed, the district court concluded that because “none of these are statutory factors to consider in setting [Freitag’s] salary, the [c]ourt declines to address these arguments.”
Second, the district court concluded that the commissioners lacked a “full understanding” of the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff’s office. Accordingly, the district court determined that the board did not sufficiently consider “the extent of the responsibilities and duties of [Freitag’s] office, as well as [Freitag’s] experience, qualifications, and performance as the [s]heriff of Freeborn County.” As a result, the district court determined that an appropriate salary was $113,952 and set Freitag’s salary at that amount, retroactive to January 1, 2019. The county appeals.
ISSUES
- Was the county board’s salary determination arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive?
-
In setting Freitag’s salary, did the board fail to sufficiently consider the extent of the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff’s office and Freitag’s experience, qualifications, and performance?
ANALYSIS
At the outset, we recognize that members of a community maintain great interest in the salaries of their county officials. Amdahl v. County of Fillmore, 258 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Minn. 1977). Such decisions regarding salaries for county officials or budgets for their offices are legislative or administrative in nature, not judicial. Id. at 873. Accordingly, the Minnesota Constitution constrains permissible judicial review of county board salary determinations to the question “of whether the salary was set in an arbitrary or unreasonable fashion.” Id.
But an exception to this general rule exists for officers of the court. Id. And a sheriff, as a quasi-judicial officer, falls in that category. Id. Therefore, after conducting a de novo review, a district court may set a sheriff’s salary if it determines that a county board “acted in an arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or unreasonable manner or without sufficiently taking into account the extent of the responsibilities and duties of the office of the sheriff, the sheriff’s experience, qualifications, and performance.”5
To seek this de novo review from the district court, a sheriff must follow the procedure set forth in
Cognizant of this procedure, we first address the question of which party bears the burden of proof in a sheriff’s salary appeal. Based on the language of the statute permitting a sheriff to appeal a county board’s decision, we conclude that a sheriff bears the burden of proving that a county board acted contrary to the statute. The statute provides that “[t]he sheriff, if dissatisfied with the action of the county board in setting the amount of the sheriff’s salary . . . may appeal to the district court” on certain grounds. Id. Because this language gives the sheriff an opportunity to appeal a salary determination, we interpret it as imposing the burden of proof on the sheriff as well.
Caselaw bolsters this conclusion. In Amdahl, the supreme court determined
With this clear understanding of the statutory requirements for a sheriff’s salary appeal and the applicable burden of proof in mind, we turn to Freitag’s case. This appeal requires us to assess both the district court’s factual findings and its application of the statute governing salary appeals from a sheriff. As such, we must apply two standards of review. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we consider de novo. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). But we evaluate the district court’s factual findings for clear error. See Amdahl, 258 N.W.2d at 875 (reviewing a district court’s order finding that a county board acted unreasonably in setting a sheriff’s
salary for clear error); see also In re Hutchinson, 440 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn. App. 1989) (“Where the trial court reviewing an agency decision makes independent factual determinations and otherwise acts as a court of first impression, this court applies the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review.”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 9, 1989).
We now turn to the district court’s decision. The county argues that two determinations are clearly erroneous: (1) that the board’s setting of Freitag’s salary was arbitrary, and (2) that the board did not sufficiently consider Freitag’s responsibilities as sheriff or his experience, qualifications, and performance. We review each determination in turn.
I. The county board’s salary determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive.
The county maintains that the district court’s determination that the county board acted in an arbitrary manner is clearly erroneous. A decision is not arbitrary and capricious if there is “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” In re Review of 2005 Annual Automatic Adjustment of Charges for all Elec. & Gas Utils., 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). “If there is room for two opinions on a matter,” a decision is not arbitrary, notwithstanding a court’s belief that “an erroneous decision was reached.” Id.
At trial, the board presented significant evidence explaining its salary determination. The board chair—a commissioner for roughly 13 years—testified that he considered a number of factors when deciding Freitag’s salary. Those factors included Freitag’s job performance and the materials he submitted to the board at the workshop. But the board chair also factored into the decision the historical pay in Freeborn County, the county’s budget and tax
The county administrator also provided context for the board’s salary determination. He acknowledged that reports from the county’s finance department indicated that the county’s economic condition was stable and expected to remain so. But those reports do not vary much each year. And the county administrator noted that future reports would reflect the declining value of agricultural land. He also explained potential future problems resulting from a decreasing population. Additionally, 23% of the county’s population is over the age of 65, and land and business development is significantly lower in Freeborn County than in some surrounding counties. And ultimately, the county administrator believed the board was working within its budget.
This evidence provides an adequate rationale for the board’s salary determination. The testimony shows that the board balanced a variety of competing factors—including Freitag’s performance and submitted materials, the county’s economic condition, budgetary constraints, and concerns from constituents—before deciding Freitag’s salary. And Freitag failed to meet his burden of providing sufficient evidence to undercut the county’s rationale.8 Absent evidence to the contrary, the record warrants the conclusion that the board engaged in reasoned decision-making grounded in facts. See CUP Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that “[i]f the agency engaged in reasoned decision-making, a reviewing court will affirm its decision even though the court may have reached another conclusion”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001). Doing so is not arbitrary.
Yet, despite the evidence in the record, the district court determined that the board acted in an arbitrary manner for two reasons. First, based on its interpretation of the statute governing a sheriff’s salary appeal, the district court declined to consider any rationale from board members based on factors not identified in the statute. Second, the district court noted that “no information” was provided to the court about how or why the board reached the $97,020 figure and determined that it was fair and appropriate.
We first address the district court’s interpretation of the statute. It found that the board based its salary determination on factors not identified in the statute, pointing to
testimony about constituent concerns, the amount of the requested raise, and poor economic conditions
Our interpretation of the statute dictates a different result. When engaging in statutory interpretation, where the legislature’s intent is clear, we apply the plain meaning of the statute. Fish v. Ramler Trucking, Inc., 935 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. 2019). Here, reading together two portions of the statute, we discern legislative clarity. See Depositors Ins. Co. v. Dollansky, 919 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Minn. 2018) (explaining that statutory provisions must be read and interpreted as a whole). Under
But subdivision seven of the statute outlines the reasons a sheriff may appeal a county board’s salary. One such ground is if the board acts in an arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive manner.
Read as a whole, the statute provides what a county board must consider—the sheriff’s experience, qualifications, and performance and the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff’s office—but does not prohibit consideration of other relevant factors. Instead, we interpret the statute as providing factors that a county board must evaluate while at the same time allowing a board discretion to assess other relevant considerations. Examples of factors that may be relevant include a county’s economic situation—including budgets and the tax base—concerns from constituents, and salaries of sheriffs in comparable counties.9
Caselaw buttresses our interpretation. In Amdahl, the supreme court explained the importance of permitting the district court to hear testimony and accept evidence in a sheriff’s salary appeal. 258 N.W.2d at 874. Such functions, the supreme court observed, allowed “the factors pertinent to the question at issue” to “be more fully disclosed to the district court.” Id. And, in discussing the salary determination for elected officials other than the sheriff, the supreme court pointed to testimony from board members that the county’s lower population and assessed valuation—which impact a county’s ability to raise revenue through taxes—influenced their salary decisions.10 Id. at 876. The
explicitly stated that “[t]hese are valid factors for the board to consider . . . .” Id. Recognizing that a county board is tasked with the fiscal management of the county, the supreme court concluded that “[b]udgetary decisions are often a matter of discretion, requiring a balancing of many factors.” Id. (emphasis added).
The same rationale applies here. A county board—entrusted with the responsibility of managing the finances of a county—must be afforded the discretion to factor relevant considerations into its decision-making regarding a sheriff’s salary. Accordingly, we conclude that a county board of commissioners may consider other relevant factors when setting the county sheriff’s salary, provided that it also considers a sheriff’s experience, qualifications, and performance, and the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff’s office as required by
Because we reach such a conclusion, it was error for the district court to exclude from its analysis the board members’ reasons for the salary determination. And examination of all the provided reasoning leads us to conclude that the district court’s characterization of the board members providing “no information” about the appropriateness of Freitag’s salary is inaccurate. Through their testimony, each board member provided a rational basis for the salary determination. Notably, the district court did not find that the board members’ testimony lacked credibility. Given the board’s reasoned consideration of a variety of relevant factors when deciding Freitag’s salary, its decision was not arbitrary. The district court’s conclusion to the contrary is erroneous.
Second, we direct our attention to the additional reason the district court determined that the county board acted arbitrarily. The district court pointed out—and Freitag emphasizes in this appeal—that the testifying board members were unable to provide an explanation as to how the board reached the $97,020 figure.
The record is unclear regarding the board’s decision-making process at the time it set Freitag’s salary. But the purpose of the district court evaluating a county board’s salary determination de novo is to provide an opportunity for board members and sheriffs alike to supplement the existing record. See Amdahl, 258 N.W.2d at 874 (noting that permitting testimony allows a district court to better evaluate the decision-making process because “the factors specifically considered by the board” are “more thoroughly revealed” and the sheriff’s “challenge to the appropriateness of the board’s action more pointedly presented”). And the testimony provided during the trial demonstrates that the board members considered a host of factors before deciding on an appropriate salary for Freitag. Further, they testified about how they arrived at the salary range they landed on. Yet Freitag—who again bears the burden of proof in his salary appeal—did not provide evidence that the board’s decision was arbitrary. The board members’ inability to articulate an exact mathematical process used to calculate the dollar amount of Freitag’s salary does not render arbitrary an otherwise well-reasoned salary decision.11
The county also argues that the district court’s finding that the board did not sufficiently take into account statutory factors—the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff’s office and his experience, qualifications, and performance—is not supported by the record. To ground our review, we first analyze what the relevant statutory language—“sufficiently taking into account”—requires. After concluding that it requires a county board to possess “more than a summary knowledge” of the listed statutory factors, we evaluate the district court’s findings.
We begin with the statutory language. The statute permits a sheriff to appeal his or her salary if the county board acted “without sufficiently taking into account the extent of the responsibilities and duties of said office, and the sheriff’s experience, qualifications, and performance.”
Freitag contends that, rather than the “more than a summary knowledge” standard, we should require a county board to be “intimately familiar” with a sheriff’s responsibilities, duties, and performance. In support of this argument, he also relies on Stensland, 365 N.W.2d at 228. In Stensland, the supreme court stated that it previously indicated in cases involving a quasi-judicial officer, “county commissioners should be ‘intimately familiar’ with the duties of the appealing officer to avoid a finding that the board’s action was unreasonable.” Id. at 228. To support this assertion, the supreme court in Stensland cited its prior decision in Busse v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 241 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn. 1976). But the phrase “intimately familiar” is not found in the legal analysis in Busse. Rather, in describing the facts in Busse, the supreme court stated “[t]he county commissioners were not intimately familiar with the specific duties of the deputy clerks.” Busse, 241 N.W.2d at 796. When read together, Stensland and Busse do not establish that “sufficiently taking into account” a sheriff’s responsibilities, experience, and performance requires a county board to be “intimately familiar” with those same responsibilities
While our adoption of the “more than a summary knowledge” standard relies upon this persuasive precedent, it is further informed by the need for judicial restraint. The legislature provides for careful—indeed close—judicial review of a board’s salary determination for a sheriff, but this careful review should not amount to second-guessing. Requiring a county board to hold “more than a summary knowledge” of a sheriff’s
responsibilities when setting a salary strikes the appropriate balance between judicial scrutiny and appropriate deference to a critical local government function.
Satisfied with the “more than a summary knowledge” standard, we assess the district court’s findings in light of the record. At the trial, each of the testifying board members described their understanding of Freitag’s responsibilities and duties as sheriff. Between the three board members, there was testimony that Freitag had responsibilities related to the ICE contract, the dispatch office, and emergency management issues. The board members also understood that Freitag was responsible for courtroom security, running the jail, serving papers, and pursuing criminals. Perhaps more importantly, the board chair testified that the board received a 20-page job description for the position of sheriff in addition to the materials provided by Freitag before determining his 2019 salary. And the chair specifically explained that he considered Freitag’s job performance when determining his salary. Indeed, when describing the board chair’s testimony, the district court found:
[The board chair] testified he feels he has a good understanding of [Freitag’s] office, duties, and responsibilities. He noted ICE increased [Freitag’s] responsibilities, [Freitag] possibly oversees the dispatch office; and [Freitag] is involved in emergency management. [The board chair] further stated he considered Freeborn County’s budget, tax base, the opinions of his constituents, and [Freitag’s] materials and experience level in rendering his decision.13
While the district court characterized this testimony as reflecting only “a cursory understanding” and “a summary knowledge” of the sheriff’s duties, the findings themselves—as well as the testimony in the record—reflect that the board as a whole, particularly its chair, had more than a summary knowledge of the sheriff’s responsibilities.14 In fact, the district court’s order contains approximately 16 paragraphs describing the board members’ testimony in detail. While, as the district court stated, the commissioners may have “lack[ed] a full understanding” of the responsibilities and duties of the office, a full understanding is not required to meet the statutory standard.15 As a result, the district
Still, in support of his argument that the board did not sufficiently consider the statutorily required factors, Freitag cites Besemer v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 357 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Minn. App. 1984). In that case, this court concluded that a county board did not sufficiently consider the responsibilities and duties of the office of the clerk when setting
the salaries of the clerk and deputies. Id. at 367. Rather, it appeared that the county board’s concern “was confined to salary increases that were the same ‘across the board’ for all non-union personnel employed by the county.” Id. And there, the base salary was based on a plan that did not account for the duties and responsibilities of the clerk and her deputies. Id. But Besemer is distinguishable from this case. The problem in Besemer was not the county board’s attempt to deal with employees in a uniform manner. Rather, the error stemmed from the failure to consider the duties and responsibilities of the clerk’s office. Here, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the board members’ testimony demonstrates that the county board did consider Freitag’s responsibilities, duties, and performance, in addition to its concern about giving one elected official a substantially larger salary increase than other elected officials. As such, Besemer does not dictate the outcome here.
In sum, based upon the record and a number of the district court’s factual findings, we are satisfied that the county board sufficiently considered Freitag’s experience, qualifications, and performance, and the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff’s office when determining his 2019 salary. Freitag failed to meet his burden of demonstrating otherwise. The district court’s findings and legal conclusions to the contrary are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse.16
D E C I S I O N
Community members maintain great interest in the salaries of their elected county officials, including the sheriff. Amdahl v. County of Fillmore, 258 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Minn. 1977). The legislature entrusted such decisions to county boards, while also providing a mechanism for judicial review of salary determinations in certain cases. See
We also conclude that, under the plain language of the statute, a county board of commissioners may consider other relevant factors—including budgetary factors—when setting the county sheriff’s salary, provided that it also considers a sheriff’s experience, qualifications, and performance, and the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff’s office as required by
Here, we are satisfied that the county board acted in accordance with the statute. By awarding Freitag a 5% raise, the county board exercised its judgment while simultaneously considering the required statutory factors. The district court’s findings and legal conclusions to the contrary are clearly erroneous.
Reversed.