Kеnneth Dale NICODEMUS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Robert LAMPERT, Director, Wyoming Department of Corrections; Eddie Wilson, Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary; and Dotti Wixson, Appellees (Defendants).
No. S-14-0071
Supreme Court of Wyoming
Oct. 30, 2014
2014 WY 135 | 336 P.3d 671
Representing Appellees: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Susan G. O‘Brien, Sеnior Assistant Attorney General.
Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.
DAVIS, Justice.
[¶1] Inmate Kenneth Nicodemus appeals from the denial of a Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from a district court order that dismissed a civil suit against three employees of the Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC). We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] Nicodemus raises two issues, which we restate as follows:
- Did the district court abuse its discretion by ignoring Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo.2013) (Bear Cloud II), when it denied his Rule 60(b) motion?
- Did his failure to receivе the defendants’ response to his motion deprive him of due process?
FACTS
[¶3] In 1992, Nicodemus pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and one count of felony larceny, for which he was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences and a sentence of eight to ten years to be served consecutively to the life sentencеs. Approximately five years later, while serving the first life sentence, he attempted to escape from the Wyoming State Penitentiary. A conviction for that offense netted Nicodemus an additional sentence of two to four years, to be served concurrently with his first life sentence.1
[¶4] In 2010, the legislature amended
Unless the prisoner is serving a sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole or is subject to mandatory savings under
W.S. 25-13-107(b)(i) , ten percent (10%) shall be credited to the pris-oner‘s personal savings account within the correctional facility‘s trust and agency account, until the prisoner‘s account has a balance of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). Once the prisoner‘s personal savings account balance reaches one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), the income otherwise distributed to the prisoner‘s savings account under this paragraph shall be distributed to the prisoner as provided by paragraphs (ii) through (vi) of this subsection. Funds in the prisoner‘s personal savings account shall be paid to the prisoner uрon parole or final discharge[.]
2010 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 43, § 1. The statute prevents a prisoner from using the first $1,000 he earns for prison labor until he is paroled or released, when it is paid to him. Appellant asserts that the purpose of this statute is to assure that an inmate who has been paroled or finally discharged from his sentence has funds to pay expenses until he can find employment or another source of legitimate revenue so that he is not tempted or forced to steal or commit other crimes to keep body and soul together. He does not expect to ever be paroled or released, and he anticipates that he will die in prison. However, when the amendment went into effect in July of 2010, the DOC began withholding ten percent of Nicodemus’ monthly earnings from penitentiary labor and crediting that amount to his mandatory savings account.
[¶5] On October 20, 2011, Nicodemus filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action in the district court for Carbon County. He asserted that Appellees violated his federal constitutional right to due procеss by placing his earnings in the mandatory savings account, from which he could not withdraw them without a hearing. He contended that Appellees lacked statutory authority to withhold his property from him because he was serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and that he therefore belonged to a class of inmаtes which the newly amended
[¶6] The defendants moved to dismiss the original and an amended complaint. The district court granted the motion on March 14, 2012.2 The court concluded that the legislature‘s use of the phrase “life without the possibility of parole” in
A sentence specifically designated as a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is not subject to commutation by the governor. A sentence of life or life imprisonment which is not specifically designated as a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is subject to commutаtion by the governor. A person sentenced to life or life imprisonment is not eligible for parole unless the governor has commuted the person‘s sentence to a term of years.
1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 73, § 1.
[¶7] The district court noted that Nicodemus’ life sentences were not designated as sentences of “life without parole,” and that the governor could therеfore commute them to terms of years. Citing to Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, 275 P.3d 377 (Wyo.2012) (Bear Cloud I), the court concluded that, although commutation and subsequent parole from such sentences are rare, parole was nevertheless possible. It held that Nicodemus was not therefore serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, and that
[¶8] Nicodemus did not appeal the order dismissing his case. Instead, nearly a year later, he filed a motion for relief from the order of dismissal under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) and (6). He clаimed that the ruling was incorrect because it was based on this Court‘s decision in Bear Cloud I, which had since been vacated by the United States Supreme Court and then supplanted by our
[¶9] In late April of 2013, the district court denied Nicodemus’ Rule 60(b) motion. The court observed that its earlier order of dismissal rested on the distinction in
[¶10] Nicodemus timely appealed the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.
DISCUSSION
The Ruling on the W.R.C.P. 60(b) Motion
[¶11] This Court reviews decisions disposing of Rule 60(b) motions for an abuse of discretion. We must determine whether the trial court‘s decision was reasonable when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to that decision and to the рrevailing party. We will reverse an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion only if the movant establishes that the trial court was clearly wrong. Campbell v. Hein, 2013 WY 131, ¶¶ 8-9, 311 P.3d 165, 167 (Wyo.2013); Barron v. Barron, 834 P.2d 685, 687 (Wyo.1992).
[¶12] Nicodemus argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to recognize the significance of our Bear Cloud II decision to the question posed by his civil rights complaint—i.e., the meaning of the legislature‘s choice of the phrаse “life without the possibility of parole” in
[¶13] Statutory construction presents a question of law that we examine de novo. In interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to determine the legislature‘s intent. We therefore construe еach statutory provision in pari materia, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence according to their arrangement and connection. To ascertain the meaning of a given law, we also consider all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose and strive to interpret them harmoniously. We presume that the legislature has acted in a thoughtful and rational manner with full knowledge of existing law, and that it intended new statutory provisions to be read in harmony with existing law and as part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence. When the words used convey a specific and obvious meaning, we need not go farther and engage in statutory construction. Estate of Dahlke ex rel. Jubie v. Dahlke, 2014 WY 29, ¶¶ 36-37, 319 P.3d 116, 125-26 (Wyo.2014) (citing Rock v. Lankford, 2013 WY 61, ¶ 19, 301 P.3d 1075, 1080-81 (Wyo.2013); Redco Const. v. Profile Props., LLC, 2012 WY 24, ¶¶ 26, 37, 271 P.3d 408, 415-16, 418 (Wyo.2012)).
[¶14] Until 1996, the only sort of determinate5 life sentence available in Wyoming was that characterized in
[¶15] In 1994, the Wyoming Constitution was amended to add Art. 3, § 53, which empowered the legislature to create a penalty of “life imprisonment without parole” that would not be subject to commutation. Two years later, the legislature enacted a statute which permitted a sentence of “life imprisonment without parole” for specific crimes to be designated by statute. 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 73, § 1;
[¶16] Section Two of the law amended
[¶17] When the language of
[¶18] That was the state of affairs in 2010, when the legislature created
[¶19] Relying on
[¶21] Instead, those two decisions and the United States Supreme Court decision in Miller which prompted the second decision dealt with the practical effect of what is known in Wyoming as a life sentence, or life as a matter of law. As noted above, parole from such a sentence is only available in those relatively rare cаses where the sentence is commuted to a term of years. At the risk of oversimplification, the Bear Cloud and Miller opinions concerned whether the possibility of parole presented by such a sentence was sufficiently realistic and meaningful to meet constitutional strictures on the sentencing of juveniles who have committed homicide offenses. Sеe Bear Cloud I, ¶¶ 75-77, 275 P.3d at 407-09; Bear Cloud II, ¶¶ 33-38, 294 P.3d at 45-46. That question is altogether different than the question posed by Nicodemus’ civil suit.
[¶22] For that reason, we conclude that the district court correctly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion in denying Nicodemus’ Rule 60(b) motion.
The Failure to Receive and Inability to Reply to the Defendants’ Response to the Rule 60(b) Motion
[¶23] Nicodemus argues hе was denied due process when, due to his failure to receive the defendants’ response to his motion,8 he was unable to reply to that pleading.9 That argument is based upon W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1), which allows a moving party to reply to a response to his motion. However, a party who claims that his right to due process has been infringed must show that a deviation from procedural rules affectеd protected interests in an impermissible way—i.e., that he was denied fundamental fairness. Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161, ¶ 16, 315 P.3d 648, 653 (Wyo.2013).
[¶24] Nicodemus has not told us what he might have said in a reply which might have affected the outcome, and his discussion of the propriety of that dismissal in this appeal deviates little from the discussion contained in the memorandum he presented to the trial court. Althоugh his appellate brief formatted his argument differently, Nicodemus did not supplement or alter his argument in any significant way. We cannot therefore say that the failure to receive the defendants’ response to the motion and resulting inability to file a reply brief compromised Nicodemus’ ability to argue his position in an impermissible or fundamentаlly unfair way. Consequently, we reject his claim that he was deprived of due process.
CONCLUSION
[¶25] The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Nicodemus’