In the Matter of the Estate of: Mathew Joseph Tomczik, Deceased.
A21-1420
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed May 23, 2022
Slieter, Judge; Dissenting, Segal, Chief Judge
Hennepin County District Court, File No. 27-PA-PR-21-479
Karen R. Cole, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants Calvin and Patricia Headley)
Chad M. Roggeman, Matthew W. Moehrle, Rajkowski Hansmeier, Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent Michael Tomczik)
Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
SYLLABUS
When a wife is named as a devisee in an unambiguous will, a devise to “my wife‘s heirs” does not fail solely because the marriage is dissolved and revocation of the wife‘s devise occurs pursuant to
OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
This is an appeal of the district court‘s judgment concluding that appellants—parents of decedent‘s former wife—are not devisees pursuant to decedent‘s will. Appellants argue they are devisees pursuant to the unambiguous residual clause of the will, which devises one-half of the residual estate to the heirs of decedent‘s former spouse.
Pursuant to
FACTS
The facts of this case are not disputed. Decedent Mathew Joseph Tomczik (Mathew) and Sara Headley (Sara) married in 1992, and the district court dissolved their marriage in 2019. Mathew did not remarry and had no children before his death on January 31, 2021. Sara is currently living, has no children, and her heirs, pursuant to the intestate-succession statute, would be her parents, appellants Calvin and Patricia Headley (the Headleys).
The will names Sara, if she survives Mathew, as the primary beneficiary of the residue of his estate. If she does not survive Mathew, the residue of his estate is to be distributed as follows:
3.4 If any interest is not effectively disposed of by the preceding provisions of this article, one half (1/2) to my heirs-at-law and one-half (1/2) to my wife‘s heirs-at-law. The heirs-at-law of each of us shall be determined (as of the date of death of the survivor of my husband2 and me) under, and take the shares prescribed by, Minnesota statutes of intestate succession
in force at the execution of this Will, applied as if each of us had then died intestate.3
(Emphasis added.)
The will nominates Mathew‘s brother, respondent Michael Tomczik (Michael) as personal representative. Following Mathew‘s death, Michael petitioned the district court for a formal probate of the will and for his appointment as personal representative. The petition identified Mathew‘s siblings as heirs and devisees,4 identified Sara as having no legal interest, and did not identify the Headleys. The Headleys objected to the petition because, as Sara‘s heirs, they had been wrongfully omitted as devisees.
The Headleys and Michael cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Michael‘s motion for summary judgment based on its determination that the will‘s devise of one-half of the residue of the estate to the Headleys as Sara‘s heirs failed as a matter of law. The Headleys appeal.
ISSUE
Does the statutory revocation of a devise to a former spouse pursuant to
“[Appellate courts] review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Questions of law involving the interpretation of a statute are reviewed de novo. In re Est. of Jotham, 722 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn. 2006).
Similarly, this court reviews de novo whether the language of a will is ambiguous. In re Zagar, 491 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Minn. App. 1992) (“Whether the language of a will is ambiguous is a question of law which the reviewing court may determine.“); Novack v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. App. 1995) (concluding that questions of law are reviewed de novo). “It is the cardinal rule of will construction that the intention of the testator, as expressed in the language used in the will, shall be controlling if it is not inconsistent with the rules of law.” McNiff v. Olmsted Cnty. Welfare Dep‘t, 176 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. 1970) (citing In re Ordean‘s Will, 261 N.W. 706, 708 (Minn. 1935)). “[I]ntention which the testator may have had, but did not express in his will, cannot be considered.” In re Cosgrave‘s Will, 31 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Minn. 1948). When the intent of the testator is clear from the language of a will, we do not consider “what he meant to say and did not or what he might have said if he had thought of it.” In re Silverson‘s Will, 8 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Minn. 1943). Doing so would add words to the will, and “the court cannot supply words to bring about a claimed result.” In re Lutzi‘s Est., 123 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Minn. 1963).
The district court ruled that Mathew‘s will is unambiguous, and this conclusion is not challenged on appeal. Additionally, the district court concluded that the phrase “my wife” was an express term indicating an intent that the devise to “my wife‘s heirs” was contingent on Mathew and Sara remaining married. Because the will unambiguously expresses Mathew‘s intent that Sara‘s heirs are to receive a devise, the district court erred by concluding otherwise.
Article three of the will states that Mathew “give[s] the residue of my estate . . . [t]o my wife, if she survives me. . . . If my wife does not survive me . . . one-half (1/2) to my heirs-at-law and one-half (1/2) to my wife‘s heirs-at-law.” The will defines “my wife” as follows: “My wife‘s name is Sara Tomczik [now Headley] and all references in this Will to my wife or my spouse are to her only.”
Because
Michael argues that Mathew‘s contrary “intent is made clear by the fact that he described this class of persons [his wife‘s heirs] only in relation to his marital status, as opposed to listing the names of such persons.” It is this fact, Michael claims, which distinguishes this matter from the basis of our conclusion in In re Est. of Kerr, 520 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 14, 1994). Because the reasoning in Kerr is consistent with our conclusion, we are not persuaded.
In Kerr, a will made a devise to “my stepdaughter, Dawn M. Valentine.” 520 N.W.2d at 513-14. Kerr‘s son argued that “stepdaughter” expressed an intent “to make a devise to a person occupying a particular position,” a position which, due to the dissolution of Kerr‘s marriage to the stepdaughter‘s mother, the stepdaughter no longer occupied when Kerr died. Id. at 514. In rejecting that argument, we reasoned: “nowhere in the fifteen-page will or codicil is an intent expressed to exclude the stepdaughter if she ceased to be a stepdaughter because her mother was not married to the testator at the time of his death.” Id. Similarly, Mathew‘s will unambiguously defines his wife as Sara, and expresses his intent that, if she predeceases him, her heirs are to receive a devise. Again, a testator‘s intention is “to be gathered from the language of the will itself . . . [and] intention which the testator may have had, but did not express in his will, cannot be considered.” Cosgrave‘s Will, 31 N.W.2d at 25.
Naming “my wife‘s heirs” would have been impossible when Mathew executed the will because the members of the class were determined on his death, when the will took effect. And, because we must give this provision of the will “effect as if the former spouse died immediately before the dissolution,” we determine Sara‘s heirs no differently than if she had died without the marriage ending in dissolution.
Finally, Michael argues that the district court‘s decision “serves the logical objective of precluding families of ex-spouses from collecting a second time from an estate
The Minnesota Uniform Probate Code is based on the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).
The law is unambiguous that only devises to a former spouse are revoked following dissolution of the marriage, and no other part of the will is revoked by this change in circumstances.
As we have recognized before, “[t]he legislature could have chosen to revoke gifts to relatives of a former spouse, but did not do so.” Kerr, 520 N.W.2d at 514. We cannot “add words to the statute that the Legislature did not supply.” Graphic Commc‘ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 691 (Minn. 2014); see also Hayden v. City of Minneapolis, 937 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied (Apr. 14, 2020) (quoting Christiansen v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 733 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007)). Our “duty is to ‘interpret the policy that the Legislature has already determined in the statutory language at issue.‘”
Many may agree that Michael articulates sound reasoning for his argument that devises to a former spouse‘s heirs should be revoked following dissolution. But the legislature has not adopted a statute reflecting that policy even though this court has previously called attention to the matter. See Kerr, 520 N.W.2d at 514.
DECISION
Because the unambiguous terms of decedent‘s will demonstrate that, upon giving effect to the will as if his former spouse died immediately before the dissolution pursuant to
Reversed and remanded.
In the Matter of the Estate of: Mathew Joseph Tomczik, Deceased.
A21-1420
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the district court‘s order because I conclude that, since Sara Headley (Sara),1 the divorced spouse, is alive and did not in fact predecease Mathew Joseph Tomczik (Mathew), the bequest to Sara‘s heirs-at-law in the residual clause of Mathew‘s will was never triggered.
The residual clause in the will provides that one-half of any residue of Mathew‘s estate will go to “my heirs-at-law and one-half (1/2) to my wife‘s heirs-at-law.” It then goes on to say that “[t]he heirs-at-law of each of us shall be determined (as of the date of death of the survivor of my [wife2] and me) under, and take the shares prescribed by, Minnesota statutes of intestate succession . . . applied as if each of us had then died intestate.” The will identifies “my wife” as Sara Tomczik, but contains no similar provision naming Sara‘s “heirs-at-law.” The heirs-at-law are defined solely by the marriage relationship between Mathew and his then-wife Sara. I believe that this fact distinguishes the present case from our opinion in In re Est. of Kerr, 520 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 14, 1994), cited by the majority.
In Kerr, the will identified the recipient of the contested bequest as “my stepdaughter, Dawn M. Valentine.” 520 N.W.2d at 514. Thus, the will in Kerr identified the recipient not only by her relationship to the decedent—stepdaughter—but by her
[t]he will not only refers to a “stepdaughter,” but it mentions the name of a specific individual. In the absence of a contrary intent, the word “stepdaughter,” when used in conjunction with an individual‘s name, is a descriptive term which may not be distorted into a condition limiting the bequest.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, critical to the holding in Kerr was that the stepdaughter‘s name—Dawn M. Valentine—was included in the bequest, not just the familial designation of stepdaughter. The bequest in the residual clause in this case—to “my wife‘s heirs-at-law“—contains no names or similar identifiers. To be parallel to Kerr, the bequest would have to state that it was to go to “my father-in-law and mother-in-law, Calvin and Patricia Headley.” That is not the language of the will. Because the only element present here is the marriage-based classification, I conclude that Kerr is distinguishable.
As to the application of
The illogic of appellants’ argument becomes even more apparent if, for example, Sara had remarried. Under that scenario, if we were to apply appellants’ interpretation, Sara‘s new husband would be a beneficiary of a portion of Mathew‘s residual estate. That result would undoubtedly be contrary to both the testamentary intent of the decedent and
Instead of adopting appellants’ argument, I would follow the persuasive reasoning in the nonprecedential opinion of our court in Danca. That case involved the same type of residual clause—that, if the testator‘s spouse predeceases the testator, one-half of the residue of the estate is to go to the spouse‘s heirs-at-law. 1999 WL 232664, at *1. In Danca, we concluded that the residual clause, as is also the case here, involved “a devise to a class, the members of which were impossible to predict at the time of the will‘s execution and were defined solely by their relationship to the ex-[spouse].” Id. at *2.
We distinguished Kerr on the grounds that “[w]hile the testamentary intent with respect to the stepdaughter in Kerr was evidenced to some degree by the fact that she was identified by name, testamentary intent with respect to a class gift is less clear.” Id. We thus concluded in Danca that, because the residual clause identified the recipients only by their relationship to the ex-husband, distributing half of the testator‘s residual estate to heirs of the divorced spouse—after the divorced spouse already received his share of the marital assets—“would be contrary to the intent demonstrated by the will and surrounding circumstances at the time of execution.” Id. at *3.
The only potential distinction between the facts in Danca and the present case is that the will here expressly states that the references to “wife” and “spouse” in the will are