Lead Opinion
OPINION
The question presented in this case is whether court approval is required before a guardian who has the power to consent to necessary medical treatment for a ward under Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) (2012), may consent to remove the ward from life-sustaining treatment when all the interested parties agree that such removal is in the ward’s best interests. The district court held that a guardian who possesses the medical-consent power under Minn.Stat. § 524.5 — B13(c)(4)(i), cannot consent to the removal of a ward’s life support without prior court approval. The court of appeals reversed, holding that unless otherwise limited by court order, a guardian given the statutory medical-consent power has the authority to consent to the removal of life-sustaining treatment without a separate order from the district court. Because we conclude that the guardian did not need further court approval, we affirm.
On September 24, 2007, a social worker at appellant Jeffers Tschumy’s nursing facility filed a petition asking the Hennepin County District Court to appoint a guardian for Tschumy. The social worker said 53-year-old Tschumy was “an incapacitated person” who “lack[ed] sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person.” According to the social worker, Tschumy was “facing multiple medical issues” and was “unable to make informed medical decisions.”
After a hearing, the district court appointed Tschumy’s then conservator to be his guardian. The court found “clear and convincing evidence” that Tschumy was “an incapacitated person” who needed a guardian. See Minn.Stat. § 524.5-310(a)(1) (2012) (“The court may appoint a ... guardian ... only if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ... the respondent is an incapacitated person.”). The court made several findings of fact regarding Tschumy’s needs at the time, many of which referred to his inability to make medical decisions for himself. The court said Tschumy needed assistance providing for his “health care, housing, food, transportation, and finances,” and acknowledged that Tschumy did not appropriately manage his diabetes. The court also found that Tschumy was “incapable” of exercising certain “rights and powers,” including the ability to consent to necessary medical care. In the letters of guardianship, the court gave the guardian the authority to, among other things, “[g]ive any necessary consent to enable, or to withhold consent for, the Ward to receive necessary medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment or service.”
On October 6, 2009, the court replaced the first guardian with respondent Joseph Vogel. The court gave Vogel the same powers as the prior guardian and also named Vogel to be Tschumy’s conservator. The successor letters of general guardianship said Vogel had the power and authority to “[g]ive any necessary consent to enable, or to withhold consent for, the Ward to receive necessary medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment or service.”
On April 28, 2012, Allina Health System, d/b/a Abbott Northwestern Hospital, filed a motion asking the Hennepin County District Court to amend the successor letters of general guardianship to “specifically authorize the guardian to request removal of life support systems.” The district court held a hearing the next day. Vogel opposed the motion to amend the successor letters, arguing that he already had the authority to approve the removal of life support. The court appointed attorney Michael Biglow to represent Tschumy, investigate what Tschumy would want, and make a recommendation to the court.
At a separate hearing the next week, Vogel testified that he had been a professional guardian and conservator for 24 years. Vogel said that prior to the April 2012 incident, he had tried to talk to Tschumy about what he would want to do in end-of-life situations, but that Tschumy “did not wish to talk about advanced directives.” Vogel was not surprised by Tschumy’s unwillingness because of Tschu-my’s “severe and chronic mental illness, and his attitudes towards the medical profession.” Nonetheless, Vogel testified that he believed he had the authority to direct the hospital to remove Tschumy’s life support. He said the court authorized him to “provide medical decision making for Mr. Tschumy when [he] was unable to do so and that medical decision making would be not only the provision of different medical services but the ending of those services ... [if] appropriate.” Vogel said he visited Tschumy, talked to doctors and nurses, and relied on his own observations of Tschumy over the course of the guardianship to decide that the hospital should remove Tschumy’s life support.
Tschumy’s attorney, Michael Biglow, also testified. Based on his investigation, Biglow said he believed Tschumy “would not want to be inside, confined to a hospital bed, having medical decisions made for him, by medical personnel and therefore, he would most likely opt not to have these life support services in place.” Tschumy, he said, “would prefer to be ... allowed to die naturally.” Biglow also noted in his report that the hospital’s ethics committee recommended that life support be removed because the “burdens and risks” of continued treatment “heavily outweigh any possible benefits.”
In an order filed May 11, 2012 (“May order”), the district court authorized the guardian and the hospital to remove Tschumy’s life support systems. The
On October 18, 2012, the district court filed a second order (“October Order”), explaining why it concluded guardians do not have the power under Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(e)(4)(i), to direct the Removal of life support without prior court approval. The court explained that the medical power granted to guardians under the statute does not give guardians the unrestricted authority to direct the removal of life support. According to the court, the power to direct removal of life support “is not inherent in any of the enumerated powers normally granted a guardian,” and therefore guardians seeking that power needed specific authorization from the district court.
Vogel appealed the district court’s October order.
With respect to the merits of the case, the court of appeals reversed the district court. In re Guardianship of Tschumy,
I.
We turn first to the question of whether we have jurisdiction to decide this case. The parties do not contend that we lack jurisdiction. But the existence of a
A.
There are several interrelated, potential jurisdictional problems in this case. Tschumy has died, and no ruling we make will affect him. Vogel has been discharged as Tschumy’s guardian, and similarly, no ruling we make will affect the scope of his guardianship over Tschumy. As a result, there are questions about the parties’ continuing interest in this case, as well as questions about Vogel’s standing to appeal the district court’s October order and Tschumy’s standing to appeal the court of appeals decision. See Twin Cities Metro. Pub. Transit Area v. Hotter,
We have not previously considered whether we should dismiss an appeal that arises in the unusual context presented itere.
Our precedent similarly permits us to exercise our discretion to consider a case that might be technically moot as an exception to our mootness doctrine. We have said that we have authority to decide cases that are technically moot when those cases are functionally justiciable and present important questions of statewide significance. E.g., State v. Rud,
For example, in State v. Rud, the question presented was whether a defendant, accused of criminal sexual conduct, could compel the alleged child victims and other potential child witnesses to testify at the defendant’s omnibus hearing.
With respect to the first requirement, we said that “[a] case is functionally justi-ciable if the record contains the raw material (including effective presentation of both sides of the issues raised) traditionally associated with effective judicial decision-making.” Id. We held that the requirement was met, noting the quality of both parties’ arguments and the fact that the parties “agree[d] that the appeal should not be dismissed as moot.” Id. In discussing the second requirement, we expressed concern about the “adverse impact” that could occur in pending criminal cases if we declined to resolve the issues in Rud but were to wait for those issues to be presented in a future case. Id. Based on that concern and the importance of the issues presented, we exercised our discretion to decide those issues in Rud. Id.
We reached the same conclusion in Jasper v. Commissioner of Public Safety,
We reached the opposite conclusion in Limmer v. Swanson,
B.
With these cases in mind, we turn to the jurisdictional question presented here. Our analysis in the cases discussed above where we interpreted our mootness doctrine leads us to conclude that we should exercise our discretion to decide the issue raised in this case. The question of whether a guardian needs prior court approval to consent to the removal of life-sustaining treatment is functionally justiciable. The question was ably briefed and argued by the parties and the record contains the factual information necessary for a decision. In addition, there was thoughtful and informative amicus support for the position that each party advocated. We likely would not have any more information at our disposal if we were to wait for another case to present the same issue. See Rud,
In addition, this case presents an important public issue of statewide significance. Guardianship law exists as a function of the State’s parens patriae
The impact of uncertainty on such an important question also counsels in favor of exercising our discretion to resolve this issue in this case. The district court’s May order notes “that there are thousands of guardians in Minnesota holding the same power that Mr. Vogel has.” And in her amicus brief, the Attorney General represents that there are over 12,000 wards under State supervision in Minnesota. A decision from our court will help clarify for the guardians and their wards the scope of the guardians’ authority to make one of life’s most fundamental decisions.
We acknowledge the possibility that the issue presented here could arise in a future case. After all, the essence of the question presented in this case has been before our court previously. See In re Con-servatorship of Torres,
Indeed, the procedure used in Torres, which required the wdrd to be kept alive, would be unjust and unnecessarily cruel had it been forced upon Tschumy. This is so because even during the brief period that the district court deliberated about whether to allow the hospital tq remove Tschumy from life support systems, the evidence was that Tschumy suffered continual seizures that could not be cdntrolled unless his physicians forced him, through medication, further into unconsciousness: into “deep sedation.” And according to the physicians, continuing medical intervention was not only “futile,” but was likely “harmful” to Tschumy. The sound exercise of judicial discretion does not permit us to ignore the potential harm that the most vulnerable would face were we to dismiss this case in the name of preserving for appellate review the purity of an active controversy in a future case.
Because this case is functionally justicia-ble and the issue presented is one of public importance and statewide significance that we should decide now, our precedent provides us with the authority to decide this case even though it is technically moot. See, e.g., Rud,
We are asked to decide whether a guardian appointed under Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) has the authority to make a decision to discontinue a ward’s life-sustaining treatment without first seeking a court order. This is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. In re Welfare of J.B.,
The statute generally authorizes the district court to appoint a guardian for an “incapacitated person” in need of assistance with decision making. Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c). Guardians so appointed are “subject to the control and direction of the court at all times and in all things.” Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(a) (2012). And the statute authorizes the court to “grant to a guardian only those powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated needs of the ward.” Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(b) (2012).
Paragraph (c) in the statute is the focus of the dispute here. This provision provides:
The duties and powers of a guardian or those which the court may grant to a guardian include, but are not limited to:
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(4)(i) the power to give any necessary consent to enable the ward to receive necessary medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment, or service, except that no guardian may give consent for psychosurgery, electroshock, sterilization, or experimental treatment of any kind unless the procedure is first approved by order of the court as provided in this clause. The guardian shall not consent to any medical care for the ward which violates the known conscientious, religious, or moral belief of the ward[.]
Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c).
Section 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) gives guardians “the power to give any necessary consent to enable the ward to receive necessary medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment, or service.” The essence of the parties’ dispute is whether the medical-consent power includes the authority to direct that a ward be removed from life support systems. Vogel argues that it does.
For his part, Tschumy, through his attorney, contends that the statute does not give guardians the power to authorize the removal of life support systems. He offers several arguments in support of that contention. Tschumy argues that because decisions regarding life support are so significant, the district court must specifically authorize them. Tschumy next argues that because life-sustaining treatment was not necessary when the district court appointed his guardian, the guardian therefore does not have the power to withdraw such treatment. And Tschumy contends that because the decision to remove a ward from life support systems includes more than simply a medical decision, the medical-consent power in the statute does not cover decisions to discontinue life support. Finally, Tschumy argues that his right to due process compels the conclusion that his guardian did not have the authority to remove him from life support. We consider each of Tschumy’s arguments in turn.
A.
We turn first to Tschumy’s argument that because the authority to make deci
It is true, as Tschumy argues, that the statute does not directly address decision making regarding the provision of life-sustaining treatment through use of the words “withdraw,” “discontinue” or “terminate.” But Tschumy does not contend that the treatment at issue is not medical treatment, and he apparently agrees that Vogel had the authority, under Minn.Stat. § 524.5 — 313(c)(4)(i), to consent to Tschumy being placed on the life support systems. Tschumy argues, in essence, that the authority to discontinue such treatment, because of the consequences of such a decision, leads to the conclusion that the guardian lacks the authority to make the decision to discontinue the treatment. We disagree.
To adopt Tschumy’s reading, we would have to conclude that the power to “consent” to necessary medical treatment does not include the power to withdraw that consent. The plain and ordinary meaning of “consent” is “[a]greement, approval, or permission as to some act or purpose, esp. given voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent.” Black’s Law Dictionary 368 (10th ed.2014). The concept of “consent” is premised on the idea of voluntary decision making, which necessarily includes the ability to choose to say “no.” Indeed, when the continued medical treatment of the ward is no longer necessary and no longer in the best interests of the ward because the ward has no reasonable chance to recover, the guardian has not just the ability but likely the duty to decline to consent to continuing medical treatment that harms the ward. See In re Guardianship of Overpeck,
A contrary reading of the statute eliminates this duty and it would lead to a fragmentation of the power of consent that could allow health care providers to subject wards to useless medical procedures simply because the guardian would not have the power to withdraw consent to further treatment. Such a result would, in effect, “reduce the guardian’s control over medical treatment to little more than a mechanistic rubberstamp for the wishes of the medical treatment team.” Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming,
Tschumy’s reading of section 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) is also inconsistent with
In addition, many decisions about medical treatment, such as consent to certain surgeries or treatments with grave side effects, could be characterized as involving life and death determinations. If we were to adopt Tschumy’s reading of the statute, all of these types of medical decisions would require separate court approval unless each was specified in the guardian’s appointment order. There is no basis in the statutory language for such a restrictive reading of the broad medical consent power. The plain language of the statute supports the opposite conclusion. This is so because where the Legislature intended specific court approval for certain types of treatment, the Legislature expressly provided for that approval in the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 524.5 — 313(c)(4)(i) (requiring specific court approval “for psychosurgery, electroshock, sterilization, or experimental treatment of any kind”).
Tschumy relies on this same statutory language and argues that the language requiring court approval before a guardian may consent to psychosurgery, electroshock, sterilization, or experimental treatment of any kind supports the conclusion that guardians should similarly be required to seek court approval before removing life support. He contends that because these extraordinary powers “are by their nature, life changing with permanent and unknown consequences and side effects,” terminating life support “should be in the same category.” This argument, however, is fundamentally a policy argument rather than one based on the language of the statute.
The statute uses very broad language, providing the guardian with authority to give any necessary consent for necessary medical care and treatment, except for the four listed types of treatment that require court approval. Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i). The statutory language confirms that the Legislature did not intend that guardians come back to court to receive specific court permission to consent to the removal of a ward’s life support. See also In re Welfare of Colyer,
Tschumy also argues that our decision in In re Torres compels the conclusion that the guardian did not have the authority to authorize removal from life support.
We declined to say whether the medical-consent provision alone could provide the court with statutory authority to authorize the removal of life support, Citing the medical-consent provision, Torres’s court appointed counsel argued that the conservator
B.
We turn next to Tschumy’s argument that the guardian did not have the authority to agree to remove tschumy from life support because Tschumy did not need life-sustaining treatment when the district court appointed the guardian. Specifically, Tschumy argues that under the statute, guardians possess only those powers that the district court grants, and district courts have the authority to grant only those powers that are “necessary” to take care of the “demonstrated needs” of the ward. Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(b). According to Tschumy, the removal of life support was not one of his “demonstrated needs” at the time the guardian was appointed, and therefore, that power was not granted to his guardian. In addition, Tschumy argues that the court has the power to control and direct the guardian “at all times and in all things,” so it is reasonable to conclude that the court can request the guardian to appear in court sometime after the initial appointment proceeding. See Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(a); In re Guardianship of Mikulanec,
Tschumy’s position misinterprets the “demonstrated need” of the ward. The “demonstrated need” of a ward for whom the medical-consent power is granted is that he or she is incapable of making medical decisions and cannot meet his or her medical needs. See Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c) (giving the court the authority to “appoint a guardian if it determines” the powers listed “are needed to provide for the needs of the incapacitated person ” (emphasis added)); Minn.Stat. § 524.5-102, subd. 6 (2012) (defining an “incapacitated person” as a person who “lack[s]
When the social worker at Tschumy’s nursing facility petitioned the district court to appoint a guardian for him, she primarily contended that Tschumy “lack[ed] sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person,” had “demonstrated behavioral deficits evidencing [an] inability to meet his needs for medical care,” and was “facing multiple medical issues and [was] unable to make informed medical decisions.” See also Mi-kulanec,
C.
We next consider Tschumy’s contention, advanced at oral argument, that the medical-consent power in Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) cannot include the ability to remove a ward from life support because such a decision encompasses much more than medical decision making. We disagree.
We certainly recognize that once medical decision making enters the arena of life and death decisions, different interests are at stake. Such decision making could implicate moral and religious considerations, and most importantly, the decision, once it is made, is a permanent decision. See Torres,
Finally, we turn to Tschumy’s argument that the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions support his reading of the statute. Specifically, he argues that the due process rights of wards would be violated if we were to interpret the statute as authorizing guardians to consent to the removal of life-sustaining treatment without first obtaining express approval for that removal from the district court. We are not convinced.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee that the State cannot interfere with a person’s right to life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
E.
Based on our analysis, we hold that a guardian given the medical-consent power in Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i), has the authority to authorize removal of a ward’s life-sustaining treatment, without court approval, when all interested parties agree that removal is in the ward’s best interest. As we noted in Torres, family members of comatose patients make the sort of decision that underlies this case with no court involvement.
Affirmed.
Notes
. "Anoxic brain injury” is an injury to the brain due to a lack of oxygen. See The American Heritage Dictionary 76 (3d. ed.1992) (defining "anoxia” as the “[ajbsence of oxygen”).
. "Encephalopathy” means “[a]ny of various diseases of the brain.” The American Heritage Dictionary 606 (3d. ed.1992).
. On October 24, 2Q12, the district court ordered that Vogel remain on the case as the conservator of Tschumy's estate pending resolution of the appeal. Justice Stras’s dissent therefore is mistaken iii arguing that Vogel pursued the appeal to assert a purely personal interest. The dissent is also wrong in suggesting that the fact that Tschtimy’s estate is paying for both Tschumy’s lawyer and Vogel is of any relevance in this case. The Legislature provided that Tschümy has the right to counsel and the district court was authorized to appoint counsel to represent Tschumy. See Minn.Stat. § 524.5-120(13) (2012). The Legislature also provided that the estate compensate both the guardian/conservator and counsel to the ward. See Minn.Stat. § 524.5-502 (2012).
During oral argument, an issue arose about the scope of the legal authority of the attorney the district court appointed to represent Tschumy. But the guardian-conservator did not question that authority, and no party briefed the issue. The record on the scope of the authority granted by the district court is, at best, ambiguous. Although we decide that the case is functionally justiciable, we express no opinion on the attorney’s authority or on the details of the process by which the case reached us.
. In contending that we lack jurisdiction, Justice Stras’s dissent argues that the district court's October order was an advisory opinion, which the court lacked the authority to issue. We disagree. As an initial matter, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that this case arises in the guardianship area, an area of law that does not contemplate adversity in the same way as a typical contested case. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Spangler,
But even more importantly, the parties in this case were adverse at the district court, as they are here, with respect to the statutory interpretation question. Vogel, the guardian, argued below and argues here that he had the authority under Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c) to discontinue the ward's life-sustaining treatment without court authorization. Tschumy, the ward, argued that court approval was required. The case on which the dissent relies — Schowalter v. State,
The dissent also relies on the fact that the district court authorized the removal of life-sustaining treatment in the May order to support the contention that the October order was an advisory opinion. This analysis is not persuasive. In the context of election disputes brought under Minn.Stat. § 204B.44 (2012), our court routinely issues our decision in order form with opinion to follow. See, e.g., Martin v. Dicklich, 2012 WL 4465588, at *1-2 (Minn, filed Sept. 25, 2012). For example, in Martin v. Dicklich, a question was raised as to which name a county auditor should place on the election ballot after one candidate withdrew from the election. Id. Recognizing the necessity for a prompt resolution of the question, we issued a short order on September 25, 2012, directing the auditor to prepare new ballots for the election. Id. The end of the order said: "So as not to impair the orderly election process, this order is issued with opinion to follow.” Id. at *2. More than 2 months later, after the election had been held, we issued our opinion. Martin v. Dicklich,
. In the only other case from our court where an issue was raised similar to that raised here, the order authorizing the removal of life-sustaining treatment was stayed pending appeal and the ward in that case was apparently kept alive pending appeal. See In re Conservatorship of Torres,
. See also Bartling v. Superior Court,
Justice Stras’s dissent argues that these cases are distinguishable from the case before us because in these cases, there was the "possibility that a court could order meaningful relief in favor of either the ward or the ward's estate.” That distinction is simply not borne out by the cases. In all of these cases, the ward had died, so there was no possibility that the court's decision regarding the extent of his or her rights would affect the ward. See, e.g., Eichner,
496,
. We are not alone in recognizing that we have authority to decide cases that might be technically moot as long as those cases present issues of significant public interest. The jurisprudence of 42 other states recognizes similar exceptions to the mootness doctrine, although the specific requirements of the exceptions vaty from state to state. See City of Birmingham v. Long,
Justice Stras's dissent attempts to discount the overwhelming weight of this support for our decision to exercise our discretion to resolve this case as an exception to the mootness doctrine by arguing — without citation to any authority — that these cases are distinguishable because the constitutions in these states do not have separation of powers provisions. The dissent’s lack of citation is not surprising. In fact, all of these states recognize separation of powers principles similar to those reflected in the Minnesota Constitution, most due to express provisions in their constitutions. Ala. Const, art. Ill, §§ 42-43; Ariz. Const, art. Ill; Ark. Const, art. IV, §§ 1-2; Cal. Const, art. Ill, § 3; Fla. Const, art. II, § 3; Idaho Const, art. II, § 1; Ill. Const, art. II, § 1; Ind. Const, art. Ill, § 1; Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 1; Ky. Const. § 28; Me. Const, art III, §§ 1-2; Mass. Const, pt.l, artXXX; Mich. Const, art. Ill, § 2; Miss. Const, art. I, §§ 1-2; Mo. Const, art II, § 1; Mont. Const, art. Ill, § 1; Neb. Const, art II, § 1; Nev. Const, art. Ill, § 1; N.H. Const, pt.l, art. 37; N.J. Const, art. Ill, ¶ 1; N.M. Const, art. Ill, § 1; N.C. Const, art. I, § 6; N.D. Const, art. XI, § 26; Okla. Const, art. IV, § 1; R.I. Const, art. V; S.C. Const, art. I, § 8; S.D. Const, art. II; Tenn. Const, art. II, §§ 1-2; Utah Const, art. V, § 1; W. Va. Const, art. V, § 1; State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc.,
. Justice Stras's dissent accuses that we "aggrandize” our power. The dissent is wrong. We ground our decision in our precedent, as is our obligation. The dissent’s apparent disagreement with our precedent that recognizes and applies exceptions to the mootness doctrine does not provide a basis for us to ignore that precedent. Indeed, even one of the cases the dissent cites recognizes that we have the authority to decide moot issues as an exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Schmidt,
. Parens patriae is defined as “the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.” It translates from Latin as "parent of his or her country.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1287 (10th ed.2014).
. Justice Stras’s disselit acknowledges that the statutory interpretation issue presented in this case is a "legal issue with státeWide importance.” The dissent nevertheless blusters that we are behaving as a “junior varsity legislature” because we are "making a pure policy decision” that "ignores the fundamental limitations on oür authority." interpreting statutes, however, is work the judicial branch has been doing since our State was founded. See, e.g., Olson v. Nelson,
. The court of appeals, while recognizing that this case "involves an important public issue of statewide significance,” felied on the exception to our mootness jurisprudence that allows courts to hear cases that are capable of repetition, yet evade review. In re Guardianship of Tschumy, A12-2179, Order at 4 (Minn. App. filed Feb. 20, 2013). In holding that we have jurisdiction to hear this case, however, we do not rely on the "capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. Rather, we rely on the separate exception that allows us to hear cases that are functionally justiciable and present important public issues of statewide significance. See Kahn v. Griffin,
Justice Stras’s dissent mistakenly refers to this portion of the opinion as a "plurality.” Four members of the court agree that we have jurisdiction to decide the statutory interpretation question presented in this case. Accordingly, the jurisdiction section of this opinion is the opinion of the court, not of a plurality.
. Tschumy also argues, in the alternative, that if we were to conclude that Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) is ambiguous, various canons of statutory construction and relevant legislative history support his contention that court approval was required to discontinue his life-sustaining treatment. Because we conclude, as set forth below, that the plain language of the statute gives the guardian authority to consent to the discontinuation of Tschumy’s life-sustaining treatment, we do not reach these alternative arguments.
. The statute at the time used the term "conservator” as well as “guardian,” but Torres’s use of the word "conservator” is synonymous with the use of the word "guardian” in today's statute. Compare Minn.Stat. § 525.56, subd. 2 (1982) ("The cobrt shall grant to a guardian or conservator dply those powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated needs of the ward or conservatee.”), with Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(b) (2012) ("The court shall grant to a guardian only those powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated needs of the ward.”).
. Consider, for example, a guardian who is appointed for a ward who has developmental disabilities and is therefore unable to make medical decisions for herself or meet her medical needs but who has no other medical conditions. Under Tschumy's position, a guardian given the medical-consent power for this ward would be able to make medical decisions related only to the ward’s development disabilities. If the ward later developed cancer or broke her leg, the guardian would need to get a court order to make medical decisions for these conditions as well.
. Due process protections provided under the Minnesota Constitution are "identical” to the due process guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. Sartori v. Hamischfeger Corp.,
. When a due process violation is alleged, a court must first determine whether the asserted violation was caused by state action. State v. Beecroft,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I begin by noting that today we announce a very narrow rule of law involving a ward with no family or friends to speak for him. The majority concludes that a guardian in such a situation has the ability to order the termination of the ward’s life-sustaining medical care, and that this power is implicit in the guardian’s ability to give consent for necessary medical treatment and so does not require specific authorization by a district court. For the reasons stated below, I respectfully disagree. More importantly, I worry that the consequences of this rule of law are not so limited.
I.
I turn first to the statutory interpretation issues and conclude that the language of the statute does not authorize the guardian to make a decision to terminate end-of-life medical care.
A.
We look first to the plain language of the statute, because if, as the majority claims, the language of the statute is unambiguous, no further analysis is required. In re PERA Police & Fire Plan Line of Duty Disability Benefits of Brittain,
The majority concludes that the termination of life support without a court order falls within the guardian’s ability to provide consent for necessary medical care. I do not believe that end-of-life decisions, including the termination of life support, fall within the statutory framework as neatly as the majority suggests. The statute discusses the guardian’s “power to give any necessary consent to enable the ward to receive necessary medical Or other professional care.” MinmStat. § 524.5-313(e)(4)(i) (emphasis ádjled). The most natural reading of this language envisions the guardian consenting to the provision of medical care to the ward, not terminating all care. Although I agree that the power of consent must also include the power to refuse conseiit, a decision to not pursue a particular course of action is different than terminating care that is currently in progress, espfebially when terminating care will cause the ward’s death. To state it more bluntly, the plgin language of the statute does hot authorize the guardian to take actiori that directly leads to the death of the ward.
Thus, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plain language of the statute unambiguously authorizes guardians to terminate life-sustaining care. The plain language of the statute, stated ⅛ the positive and focused on enabling the Ward to receive necessary care, is not well suited to addressing the circumstances before us here — circumstances in which the medical care is necessary to sustain the ward’s life, but the guardian wishes to terminate care. The statute makes no mention of withdrawing consent or enablihg the guardian to terminate medical care that is essential to the ward’s survival. The silence of the statute as to a guardian’s role in terminating necessary medical care could be read to permit termination or withdrawal of care, but it is equally reasonable to conclude that the statute does not authorize these actions by a guardian, and so I would conclude that the statute is ambiguous. See Rohmiller v. Hart,
B.
The canons of statutory construction, which operate once we conclude a statute is ambiguous, also do not support the majority’s conclusion that guardians have the authority to terminate the life support of a ward without a court order. If a statute is ambiguous, it is necessary to determine the intent of the Legislature. Brayton v. Pawlenty,
Vogel argues, and the court of appeals agreed, that because the termination of life support is not listed specifically in Minn. Stat. § 524.5 — 313(c)(4)(i) as a decision that requires court approval, a guardian does not need court authorization for this type of action. But this interpretation gives too much weight to the concept of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which loosely translates as “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” State v. Caldwell,
But this interpretation requires us to assume, despite a lack of evidence in the legislative history of this statute, that the process for a guardian to order the termination of a ward’s life support was an issue that the Legislature actually considered. In cases in which the legislative history is noticeably silent as to any discussion of the issue, it is improper to employ the expres-sio unius canon because there is no basis for believing that the missing item was considered, or even foreseen, by the Legislature. Caldwell,
Given the lack of evidence that the Legislature intended to speak on the necessity of court approval when a guardian seeks to terminate a ward’s life support, we look beyond the language of the specific statute to the rest of the statutory scheme and review how the termination of life support fits into the general scheme that the Legislature has created for the interactions between the courts and guardians. Erd-man v. Life Time Fitness, Inc.,
It is clear that the Legislature intended to ensure the well-being of wards by providing for court review and supervision of the more difficult and challenging decisions made by a guardian. When a guardian is faced with the decision to terminate life support, the potential harm that could be caused by a guardian’s abuse of discretion is far greater than the decision to consent to “experimental treatment” listed in Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i), which in some instances may not even involve particularly controversial decisions. An interpretation that a guardian’s actions require court approval for the latter but not for the former ignores the very reason for which the statute exists. But whether viewed as undermining the policy of the statutory scheme as a whole, or as an absurd result not intended by the Legislature, empowering the guardian to make these life-or-death decisions under these circumstances is not consistent with legislative intent. Therefore, the statutory language simply does not support the expansive powers for guardians that the majority grants.
I conclude that the guardian actions requiring court involvement set out in Minn. Stat. § 524.5 — 313(c)(4)(i) is not an exclusive list, and that the removal of life support given the facts presented here also requires court authorization.
II.
I turn next to the specific facts of this case and the troubling implications of the majority opinion.
It is to the everlasting credit of Allina here that management recognized the uncertainty in the law and the need to seek court approval for the withdrawal of medical care. The evidence mustered to support the claim that Tschumy would have wanted life support terminated is extremely weak,
We deal here not with the more typical end-of-life treatment circumstances in which competent adults have expressed their wishes, or better yet, have prepared health care directives, or in which family or even close friends may well know the wishes of the patient. Rather, for many of our fellow citizens who are cognitively impaired, it is a different story. It is not unusual for the disabled to have the assistance of court-appointed guardians. Perhaps those guardians have some training or knowledge on making end-of-life decisions, and perhaps not. Perhaps those guardians have the best interests of the ward in mind, and perhaps not. Perhaps the ward has expressed a view on medical care, and perhaps not. But once the decision is made by the guardian to withdraw medical care, for good or ill, whether for sound motives or base motives, whether that decision is well informed from a medical perspective or otherwise, it will be made in silence and with no check or review of the guardian’s judgment
The majority opinion recognizes none of these complications and simply empowers guardians to act. I acknowledge that the subset of cases subject to the rule announced today is likely small, but the consequences are great and the better course is to rely on judicial supervision and approval for the withdrawal of medical care unless and until the legislature provides a better framework for dealing with these decisions.
Therefore, because I believe that the best interpretation of Minn.Stat. § 524.5-318(c)(4)(i) requires guardians, in circumstances such as those found here, to obtain court authorization before terminating a ward’s life support, I respectfully dissent.
. This interpretation is also supported by our decision in In re Conservatorship of Torres,
. Although various assurances were offered that Tschumy would not want continued medical care under these circumstances, these statements were all conclusory and not based on any expressed intent by Tschumy. In fact, as Vogel observed, Tschumy did not trust doctors and specifically refused to discuss the issue. The closest Vogel comes to submitting evidence of Tschumy’s actual wishes was his observation that "Mr. Tschumy wanted to be outside much of the time,” which leads Vogel to conclude that Tschumy “would not want to spend his remaining days inside, confined to a hospital bed.” To say that the fact that Tschumy enjoyed the outdoors is underwhelming evidence of Tschumy's desire to have his life support terminated is an understatement of the first order.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
If the caption of this case accurately reflected the nature of this appeal, it would say In re the Interpretation of Minn.Stat. § 521p.5-318(c)(h)(i), rather than In re the Guardianship of: Jeffers J. Tschumy, Ward.
The reason is that this appeal has little to do with Jeffers Tschumy. When Tschu-my was alive, Abbott Northwestern Hospital sought and obtained a court order to cease providing life-sustaining medical treatment to Tschumy, who died shortly thereafter. At that point, there was nothing left for the district court, or any other court, to decide in order to resolve the parties’ dispute. It is now more than two years after the cessation of treatment and Tschumy’s death, and the parties to the original dispute have received exactly the relief that they requested. Yet the parties in this appeal still seek an answer to the question of whether a court order was required to remove life support, a controversial and difficult legal question that is purely academic at this point.
The parties’ request strikes at the very heart of judicial power. For nearly 150 years, we have consistently declined to answer purely academic questions, no matter how interesting or important they are, because courts do “not issue advisory opinions or decide cases merely to make prece-dente ].” Sinn v. City of St. Cloud,
I.
Jeffers Tschumy became a ward of the state in June 2005, when the district court appointed a conservator for him. A little more than two years later, the guardianship case underlying this appeal began when a social worker petitioned the district court to appoint Tschumy’s cohservator as his guardian. At the time, Tschumy was 52 years old and suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, anxiety, and a depressive disorder. The district court granted the guardianship petition in April 2008.
The district court later dismissed the original guardian for cause and appointed a professional guardian, Joseph Vogel, to act on Tschumy’s behalf. When the court appointed Vogel, it granted him the power to “[g]ive any necessary consent to enable, or to withhold consent for, [Tschumy] to receive necessary medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment or service.”
In April 2012, Tschumy suffered serious injuries when he choked on food. Tschu-my was admitted to Abbott Northwestern Hospital (the “Hospital”), and the medical staff placed him on life support. Medical tests determined that Tschumy had suffered a serious brain injury from lack of oxygen. One week later, the medical staff advised Vogel that any further medical intervention on Tschumy’s behalf would be futile, and possibly even harmful to him, and that all life-sustaining medical treatment should cease. VogeJ agreed and directed the hospital to withdraw life support.
The Hospital did not follow Vogel’s direction. Instead, it asked the district court to grant the power to Vogel “to specifically authorize the ... removal of life support systems.” The next day, the district court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, the Hospital explained that it was unsure whether the existing guardianship letter permitted Vogel to unilaterally direct the removal of life support, so it sought either “clarification” of the existing letter or an amendment that would grant such authority to Vogel. Vogel opposed the Hospital’s motion because he believed that he already had such authority and that it “would set an awful precedent” if a hospital had to “run to court to get an order for clarification” each time a guardian requested the withdrawal of life support from a ward. Nevertheless, Vogel emphasized to the court that “[t]here [was] no disagreement anywhere” and “really no controversy” over whether to withdraw life support.
The district court expressed concern that Tschumy’s “voice [wasn’t] being heard, except as expressed by Mr. Vogel, based on an appointment from a few years ago.” The court therefore appointed Michael Biglow as Tschumy’s attorney “to do some foot work to get a sense of Mr. Tschumy’s situation[,] what his desire would be[,] and what the medical situation would be.”
Soon thereafter, Biglow filed a report with the court. Tschumy was completely nonresponsive following the choking incident, so in drafting his report, Biglow relied on Tschumy’s medical records and information that he had gathered from others, including Vogel, who purported to have knowledge of Tschumy’s preferences. In the report, Biglow did not take a position on the legal issue of whether Vogel had the authority to unilaterally direct the hospital to withdraw life support. Instead, Biglow “advocate[d] on [Tschumy’s] behalf that moving
The district court then held another hearing. The hearing addressed two questions: (1) whether to withdraw life support; and (2) whether Vogel had the legal authority to direct the Hospital to remove life support. As to the first question, both Biglow and Vogel testified. Following their testimony, the Hospital’s attorney stated that “there doesn’t seem to be any dispute” among the parties that “[t]he best course of treatment would be to withdraw care.”
As to the second question, the court heard testimony from Stephen Grisham, a professional guardian whom Vogel offered as an expert witness. Grisham did not address Tsehumy’s case specifically, but instead testified generally about the role of guardians in making end-of-life decisions. He discussed the training that he and other professional guardians receive, and gave his opinion on “what would happen [if] the Court were to issue an order that basically said that [guardians] had to come to court for a review on every one of these termination of life support cases.” He said that it would “change the landscape dramatically.”
After Grisham’s testimony, Vogel’s attorney reiterated his belief that Vogel “already has the authority” to direct the withdrawal of life support. At the court’s invitation, Biglow provided his own opinion and took the opposite view. The attorney for the Hospital then pointed out that the broader legal question regarding the authority of guardians to direct the removal of life support “is [not] necessarily something that needs to be decided in this case,” and that the court could instead limit its decision to whether the Hospital could withdraw life support from Tschumy in this particular case. The court responded that the question regarding the scope of a guardian’s authority in end-of-life decisions “obviously creates a lot of complications and no[n-]uniformity across the state,” such that “there may be some value in getting some uniformity” on the question.
The district court issued two orders after the hearing. In the first, the court described the case as involving “two questions of ultimate significance for Jeffers Tschumy: First, should Mr. Tschumy be taken off life support and allowed to die? Second, who has the power to decide whether Mr. Tschumy will live or die: the Court or the guardian?” With respect to the first question, the court authorized the Hospital to withdraw life support. The court promised to address the second question in a later order, saying:
The issue of who has the power to order the removal of life support — the Court or the guardian — is of great significance to thousands of wards, guardians, and family members throughout Minnesota. It is also one subject to a variety of perspectives, practices, and practicalities. If there could be only one thing in our judicial system that is consistent, fair and practical, it should be the process by which our justice system allows death to come to its citizens. The issue is of statewide significance; it is subject to a range of practices and policies; it does not lend itself to easy appellate review; it has escaped the attention of our legislature; and it relates to the fundamental beliefs of life and death. The Court would not serve the people of Minnesota well if it danced around the issue and left the power and process of death as uncertain as it is now. Accordingly, the Court will address that issue, but by separate order so as to allow Mr. Tschumy to be removed from life support.
The order granted the precise relief that the Hospital had sought in its motion—
Tschumy died on May 10, 2012, one day after the court authorized the removal of life support, and seventeen days after the Hospital had sought relief in the district court. Under Minn.Stat. § 524.5-317 (2012), “[a] guardianship terminates upon the death of the ward or upon order of the court,” so Vogel’s appointment as Tschu-my’s guardian terminated by operation of law on the date of Tschumy’s death. Vo-gel nevertheless petitioned for discharge as Tschumy’s guardian, and one week later, the district court granted the petition. Thus, Vogel sought and received his discharge as Tschumy’s guardian.
The district court issued its second order approximately five months later, in October 2012. As framed by the district court, the question before it was whether, as a general matter, a guardian or a court must decide whether to remove a ward from life support. The district court noted that, in In re Conservatorship of Torres,
Although the court labeled its opinion an “order,” the opinion did not actually order anyone to do anything, nor did it decide a disputed legal question of significance to Tschumy or to his estate. In fact, other than briefly reciting the facts of Tschumy’s case, the order did not say anything at all about Tschumy. The order concluded with the following statement:
Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313 grants broad power to guardians to consent to necessary medical treatment on behalf of their wards, but it does not specifically convey the power to terminate life support. Hopefully, the Legislature or higher judicial authority will definitively determine who can make end-of-life decisions, and how those decisions must be made. Until that time, this Court concludes that guardians under the Court’s jurisdiction must ask the court for authorization to terminate life support when there is not a valid health care directive addressing end-of-life circumstances.
A few days later, the district court ordered Vogel to “remain on the case pending ... appeal.” And despite his earlier discharge as Tschumy’s guardian, Vogel filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s October order. Recognizing the complications created by the odd procedural posture of the case, the court of appeals directed the parties to “file informal mem-oranda on the questions of whether the order filed on October 18, 2012, is independently appealable, whether appellant has standing to appeal, and whether the appeal is moot.” The court of appeals ultimately concluded that the October order was ap-pealable, Vogel had standing to appeal, and the appeal was not moot. As to the merits, the court of appeals concluded that a guardian who has been granted medical-consent authority under Minn.Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) may, “absent objection by an interested person and with advice from available family members, physicians, and an ethics committee, ... direct the disconnection of life-support systems without further authorization from the district court.” In re Guardianship of Tschumy,
II.
It is still unclear why, or how, this case is before us, and on whose behalf the two parties are acting. For its part, the plurality asserts that the legal issue in this case is important and the case is functionally justiciable, so we should just go ahead and decide it. The problem is that this case has all of the hallmarks of a nonjusti-ciable controversy. The parties appealed from an advisory opinion of the district court, the same pot of money is paying for the legal fees incurred by both parties, and there is no way to order meaningful relief for anyone in this litigation regardless of the legal conclusion that we reach. Under these circumstances, in which there is no case or controversy, it is our duty under the Minnesota Constitution to dismiss the appeal.
A.
The Minnesota Constitution does not grant us the authority to “decide cases merely to make precedents.” Doyle v. Ries,
We are not a junior-varsity legislature. The parties ask us to decide a legal question that is completely disconnected from any case or controversy and to make a pure policy decision about how guardians should act in the future when making life-ending decisions for a ward.
To be sure, this case has its roots in what was once a justiciable controversy. Vogel, acting on Tschumy’s behalf, directed the Hospital to cease giving life-sustaining medical treatment to Tschumy, but the Hospital refused to do so without a court order. The Hospital, in refusing to follow Vogel’s instructions, was necessarily adverse to Tschumy, and by extension, Vo-gel, who represented Tschumy’s interests. Thus, the controversy between Tschumy and the Hospital — neither of which has any interest in the proceedings before this court — was justiciable at its inception. See Onvoy, Inc. v. ALEETE, Inc.,
When the district court authorized Tschumy’s removal from life support in May 2012, however, the controversy ended and there was nothing left to decide. The Hospital, which had commenced the litigation, received the court authorization that it sought and advised the district court that it did not seek any other relief. In fact, the Hospital’s attorney told the district court that “the decision about Mr. Tschumy can be made without [addressing the broader legal question] at all, and may[]be [it] should be.” Tschumy also received the relief that he, as represented by Vogel (his guardian) aiid Biglow (his court-appointed attorney), had sought: authorization for the cessation of life-sustaining treatment. Yet, nearly 5 months later, the district court issued a second order, in which it broadly concluded that guardians do not have the authority to unilaterally withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from a ward under the guardianship statutes, even though by the time of the second order, the case had long been moot.
The only person left unsatisfied by the district court’s decision was Vogel. In his capacity as Tschumy’s guardian, Vogel received exactly the relief he sought, and he has never contended otherwise. However, in his personal capacity as a professional guardian — entirely separate from his role in this particular case — Vogel would have preferred to win in a different way. Instead of obtaining court approval to withdraw treatment, Vogel wanted a court order saying that he already had the authority to direct the withdrawal of life support. Vogel made his opinion clear when he said that, if the district court decided to say (as it eventually did) that court approval was required to terminate treatment, such a ruling would be “an awful precedent.”
Vogel’s position, which the plurality must necessarily view as sufficient to create a justiciable controversy, suffers from several problems. First, Vogel’s standing in this litigation has always been derivative of Tschumy’s interests, and he has thus lacked standing throughout the appellate process, both because neither Tschumy nor his estate has any further interest in the case, and because Vogel is no longer serving as Tschumy’s guardian. See infra Part II.C. To my knowledge, we have never held that a person who had a purely representational interest in the district court can assert a personal interest on appeal. There is, after all, a reason why the caption of this case says In re the
Second, even if Vogel could now assert a purely personal interest on appeal, “[y]ou cannot persist in suing after you’ve won.” Greisz v. Household Bank (III.), N.A.,
Third, the personal interest asserted by Vogel on appeal — that the district court adopted the wrong legal rule — is clearly insufficient in light of the fact that district court orders have no precedential value and govern only the rights of the parties to the litigation. See Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,
Fourth, it is questionable whether there are any adverse parties in this case at all. Vogel, ostensibly acting as Tschumy’s guardian, is depleting the funds in Tschu-my’s estate in an effort to obtain a non-“awful precedent” from this court. But Tschumy’s estate is also paying the legal fees incurred by the other side — represented by Biglow, the court-appointed attorney who ostensibly represents Tsehumy in this appeal — to advocate against Vogel’s position. Tschumy’s estate cannot simultaneously have an interest in two totally opposite rules: on the one hand, a rule that a court order is not required to remove life support (advanced by Vogel), and on the other, a rule that a court order is required to remove life support (advanced by Biglow). Cf. Minn.Stat. § 524.5-502(b)-(e) (2012) (authorizing compensation when an attorney “render[s]
What is clear, therefore, is that Vogel and Biglow seek an advisory opinion — that is, they do not truly wish to resolve a current dispute, but instead seek our advice, as they sought the advice of the court of appeals, on an abstract legal question. We have said that a justiciable controversy exists “if the claim (1) involves definite and concrete assertions of right that emanate from a legal source, (2) involves a genuine conflict in tangible interests between parties with adverse interests, and (3) is capable of specific resolution by judgment rather than presenting hypothetical facts that would form an advisory opinion.” Onvoy,
First, no one is asserting a legally cognizable interest on appeal. Vogel’s only interest in the appeal is his dissatisfaction with what he perceives to be an “awful” rule from a nonprecedential district court opinion. Biglow, for his part, does not articulate any continuing interest in this “dispute,” let alone a legally cognizable one. Even aside from the fact that Tschu-my, whom Biglow ostensibly represents, no longer has any interest in this case, Biglow is not a professional guardian, and he has never asserted that the outcome of this case will have any impact on his legal practice. In fact, at oral argument, Biglow all but acknowledged that the driving force for his legal position on appeal has been taking a position opposite to Vogel, rather than a personal or professional interest in obtaining a particular result. Second, there is insufficient adversity in this case because Tschumy’s estate is paying the legal fees of both sides, and it is not clear why, or to what extent, either side is opposing the other. Third, as stated above, our judgment in this case (as well as that of the court of appeals) is meaningless, other than as an attempt to create precedent. Thus, even though this case presents a legal issue with statewide importance, the Minnesota Constitution requires us to exercise restraint and await a different ease — one with a justiciable controversy — to decide the issue. See St. Paul City Ry. Co. v. City of St. Paul,
The controversy must be justiciable in the sense that it involves definite and concrete assertions of right and the contest thereof touching the legal relations of parties having adverse interests in the matter with respect to which the declaration is sought, and must admit of specific relief by a decree or judgment of a specific character as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Mere differences of opinion with respect to the rights of parties do not constitute such a controversy.
Id. at 281,
As in Seiz, the parties here — Vogel and Biglow — do not really have “adverse interests.” Id. at 281,
The requirement of a justiciable controversy is not an excuse for courts to decline to decide tough or important questions. Rather, it is a constitutional constraint on the authority of the judiciary. The Minnesota Constitution divides the powers of the government into three “distinct departments,” and provides that “[n]o person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly provided in this constitution.” Minn. Const. Art. Ill, § 1. The judiciaiy is limited to “judicial act[s].” Application of the Senate, 10 Minn, at 81 (
The district court recognized the policy-making nature of its actions when it deeid-ed this case. In its May 2012 order, the district court said that “[t]he issue of who has the power to order the removal of life support — the Court or the guardian” is one that “has escaped the attention of our [Legislature.” In its October 2012 order, the court expressed the hope that “the Legislature or higher judicial authority will definitively determine who can make end-of-life decisions, and how those decisions must be made.” The court pointed out that the legal question was “of great significance to thousands of wards, guardians, and family members throughout Minnesota” and said that “[t]he Court would not serve the people of Minnesota well if it danced around the issue and left the power and process of death as uncertain as it is now.”
Consistent with its self-appointed task of filling in the gaps left by the Legislature, the district court took testimony from a professional guardian, Stephen Grisham, about the training of guardians with respect to end-of-life care and about whether guardians can be trusted in a typical case — not in this specific case — to make end-of-life decisions for their wards. Such testimony would be entirely appropriate at a legislative hearing about the
It should be clear at this point, as the district court’s language in its second order implicitly acknowledged, that this case no longer involves any real controversy between the parties. It is now a manufactured controversy involving an abstract and hypothetical legal question that the parties, if the question is still sufficiently important to them, should direct to the Legislature. Accordingly, rather than adopting an approach that would expand our own power at the Legislature’s expense, I would instead follow precedent and dismiss the appeal in this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B.
Not only does this case fail to satisfy our general definition of a justiciable controversy, which alone warrants dismissal,
The plurality concludes, and I agree, that this case is moot because we are unable to grant effective relief to anyone,
The plurality correctly observes that we have recognized certain exceptions to the mootness doctrine. It is also true that we have described mootness as “a flexible discretionary doctrine, not a mechanical rule that is invoked automatically whenever the underlying dispute between the particular parties is settled or otherwise resolved.” State v. Rud,
An animating principle underlying the various exceptions to the mootness doctrine is a recognition that a case may become moot at such an “advanced stage” that it may prove “more wasteful than frugal” to dismiss it. Friends of the Earth,
This case did not become moot at such an “advanced stage” that a dismissal would prove “more wasteful than frugal.” In fact, it became moot just 16 days after the Hospital filed its motion, when the district court granted the Hospital’s motion to discontinue treatment. At that point, there was nothing else to decide. In contrast, in none of the cases cited by the plurality to support its view that the case is functionally justiciable did the case become moot before the district court entered final judgment. See, e.g., Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
The distinction is significant. The longer a case has been moot, the further divorced it becomes from the personal inter
It is true, as the plurality notes, that courts in other jurisdictions have decided controversies that are similar to this one. But these foreign cases were all decided under different constitutions — some of which permit advisory opinions in certain circumstances — and in the face of different facts — none of which required an appellate court to review what was itself an advisory opinion. Most importantly, these other courts have adopted an approach that is inconsistent with this court’s interpretation of Article III, Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution.
C.
This appeal is nonjusticiable for yet a third reason: Vogel lacked standing to appeal the district court’s second order. See In re Custody of D.T.R.,
Standing must exist at all stages of the litigation, “including when a plaintiff brings a cause of action and when a party appeals a decision.” D.T.R.,
With respect to statutory standing, Vo-gel cannot identify any statute, nor am I aware of any, that grants a former guardian the right to appeal from the adjudication of a legal question related to a former ward. To be sure, a guardian — that is, a
The second basis for standing requires a party to have suffered an injüry-in-fact— that is, “a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected Merest.” D.T.R.,
Once the district court authorized the withdrawal of life-sustaMng medical treatment in May 2012, Vogel received the only relief of interest to Tschumy. At that time, Tschumy no longer had a legally cognizable injury and it follows that, in his representational capacity, neither did Vo-gel. While it is possible that Vogel may one day sustain an injury in fact if he is unable to make a unilateral life-ending decision for some future ward to which he may be assigned, any such injury is, at most, only a “‘possible, remote consequence, or mere possibility arising from some unknown or future contingency.’ ” See D.T.R.,
III.
The scope of a guardian’s authority to make end-of-life decisions for a ward is, without question, an exceedingly important question. But it is a bedrock constitutional principle that Minnesota courts lack the authority to decide any legal question, even an exceedingly important one, in the absence of a justiciable controversy. When a justiciable controversy is missing, as it is here, and as it was in the court of
. There is no question, as the plurality states, that the judiciary’s job includes interpreting statutes. However, we do not engage in statutory interpretation for its own sake. Rather, we interpret statutes only in the context of a justiciable controversy in order to provide meaningful relief to one or more of the parties. When we do so for any other reason, we cross the boundary from performing a judicial duty- — that is, resolving disputes — into the realm of performing a legislative duty — that is, resolving policy questions in the abstract. Such an observation is hardly novel. The Supreme Court of the United States has observed that ruling in the absence of a justicia-ble controversy ”create[s] the potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort[s] the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open[s] the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing government by injunction.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm, to Stop the War,
. The plurality is correct that guardianship cases do "not contemplate adversity in the same way as a typical contested case.” See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Spangler,
. The plurality concludes that this cáse is justiciable based on its view that a disagreement between the parties over (he legal issues in this case is not only necessary, but is also sufficient to present a justiciable controversy. For example, in explaining why the district court’s second order was nof an advisory opinion, the plurality stresses that "the parties in this case were adverse at the district court, as they are here, with respect to the statutory interpretation question.” The plurality makes the same point in distinguishing Seiz, but in doing so, fails to accord significance to the actual words we used in our opinion. As Seiz makes cleat, a "mere difference[ ] of opinion with respect to the rights of the parties do[es] not constitute ... a [justiciable] controversy.” Seiz, 207 Minn, at 281,
. The term “justiciable” refers to a case or controversy that is "capable of being disposed of judicially” or one that is "properly brought before a court of justice.” Black’s Law Dictionary 997 (10th ed.2014). The central concept of "justiciability” is then divided into "more specific categories of justiciability— advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and administrative questions.” 13 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3529, at 612 (3d ed.2008) (citing cases); see also McCamey v. Ford Motor Co.,
When we announced the three fundamental requirements for a justiciable controversy in Onvoy, we provided a general definition that every case must satisfy. For example, in Schowalter, we refused to decide one of the issues presented in the case because there was insufficient adversity between the parties, and we did not refer to any of the specific justiciability doctrines — such as mootness, ripeness, or standing — in reaching our conclusion.822 N.W.2d at 299 . Applying Schowalter’s analysis here, this case is nonjus-ticiable because it does not meet the definition of a justiciable controversy, regardless of whether it satisfies the requirements of one of the more specific justiciability doctrines such as mootness. By examining only the question of mootness, the plurality’s analysis ignores an entire line of cases beginning with Application of the Senate and culminating with our most recent decision in Schowalter.
. If the absence of a justiciable controversy does not preclude us from deciding this case — -in which there was no live controversy when the district court issued the order now under review — it is hard to imagine a case that the plurality would dismiss. Perhaps the plurality would dismiss an abstract controversy based on nothing more than a straightforward philosophical disagreement between two parties, but given that this case has evolved into precisely such a disagreement between Vogel and Biglow, such a possibility provides little comfort. There is also little comfort in the fact that the exception invoked by the plurality requires the case to present a question of statewide importance. After all, virtually every case on our discretionary docket presents a question of statewide importance. See Minn. R.App. P. 117, subd. 2 (setting forth the criteria on which we should grant review, including whether "the question presented is an important one upon which the Supreme Court should rule”).
. The plurality’s approach, extended to its logical end, would provide standing to an attorney who is dissatisfied with a decision received by a client, even if the client chooses not to appeal the decisipn. If the requirement of standing is to be stretched so far that it arguably becomes nothing more than a formality, the change should come by means of a constitutional amendment, not through a decision of this court.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Stras.