In the Matter of M.S. (Minor Child in Need of Services); A.C. (Mother)
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JC-505
Indiana Supreme Court
February 20, 2020
Argued: October 15, 2019
IN THE
Indiana Supreme Court
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JC-505
In the Matter of M.S. (Minor Child in Need of Services); A.C. (Mother) Appellant,
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services Appellee.
Argued: October 15, 2019 | Decided: February 20, 2020
Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court No. 32D03-1711-JC-186
The Honorable Karen M. Love, Judge
On Petition
Opinion by Justice David
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
David, Justice.
Indiana law provides that a trial court must dismiss a petition alleging a child is in need of services if the court does not conclude a factfinding hearing within 120 days of the filing of the petition by the State.
Facts and Procedural History
On November 12, 2017, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received reports alleging several children, including M.S., were victims of neglect. The allegations stemmed from an incident in which one child received a critical injury that ultimately resulted in that child‘s death. M.S. was removed from the care of her mother, A.C., and placed with her maternal grandmother. On November 14, 2017,1 DCS filed a verified petition alleging M.S. was a child in need of services (CHINS) under
A factfinding hearing was held on December 13, 2017. At the hearing, both parents waived the requirement that factfinding be concluded within sixty days of the date the petition was filed and the matter was continued to February 23, 2018. In the meantime, Mother requested production of documents from the Danville Police Department relating to the investigation of the death of Mother‘s child. The Department moved to quash Mother‘s subpoena duces tecum and the matter was set for a hearing on February 16, 2018. At the hearing, Mother requested a continuance to resolve the discovery dispute, but the trial court expressed uncertainty over whether it could extend the factfinding hearings beyond the statutory 120-day deadline. Still, all parties agreed to waive the deadline and the trial court continued the factfinding hearing and ordered limited discovery of documents possessed by the Danville Police Department.
A full factfinding hearing was held on March 16, 2018. At the hearing, Mother submitted over 2,000 video recordings into evidence—each lasting about two minutes in length. The trial court granted Mother an additional seven days to identify which of the videos were most relevant to the CHINS petition. On April 10, Mother moved for an extension of time so she could continue her review of the recordings.
Factfinding concluded on April 17, 2018, but the final order adjudicating M.S. as a CHINS was not issued until October 8, 2018. In the intervening time, Mother requested judgment be entered immediately because M.S. was still placed outside of Mother‘s care. At the dispositional hearing on October 31, 2018, Mother requested that the matter be dismissed in light of recent caselaw from our Court of Appeals regarding formal deadlines for CHINS actions. The trial court entered a dispositional order on November 2, 2018, which denied Mother‘s oral motion to dismiss and ordered continued placement of the child with the maternal grandmother. After the
In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the matter with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice. Matter of M.S., 124 N.E.3d 1234, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In its opinion, the court relied on the plain language of
DCS petitioned for transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion.
Standard of Review
Matters of statutory interpretation present pure questions of law and are thus reviewed de novo. In re Adoption of B.C.H., 22 N.E.3d 580, 584 (Ind. 2014) (citing Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ind. 2010)). We “presume[] that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute‘s underlying policy and goals.” Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind. 2019) (citing Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010)).
Discussion and Decision
We are asked to consider whether a party to a CHINS proceeding may move for a continuance that places the action outside of the legislatively prescribed timeframe and then seek dismissal because the codified deadline has expired. Here, Mother moved for a continuance, albeit for good cause, to resolve a discovery dispute and sort through more than 2,000 different video recordings. In her motion to dismiss, however, Mother argued that the statute is clear: CHINS proceedings must be dismissed if factfinding is not concluded within the prescribed time limit. On the other side of this dispute, DCS argues that such a rigid interpretation would lead to a Catch-22. Stated differently, DCS believes the trial court faced two choices: either rush through the case without important evidence or allow the parties to build their case and risk dismissal for failure to complete the hearing within the statutory timeframe.
We begin our analysis with the statute governing the amount of time a court may take to complete a factfinding hearing in a CHINS case. In relevant part,
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), unless the allegations of a petition have been admitted, the juvenile court shall complete a factfinding hearing not more than sixty (60) days after a petition alleging that a child is in need of services is filed in accordance with IC 31-34-9.
(b) The juvenile court may extend the time to complete a factfinding hearing, as described in subsection (a), for an additional sixty (60) days if all parties in the action consent to the additional time.
...
(d) If the factfinding hearing is not held within the time set forth in subsection (a) or (b), upon a motion with the court, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice.
While our Court has previously weighed in on other aspects of this provision, see, e.g., In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. 2012) (discussing the requirement to hold a factfinding hearing under
One such case is Matter of J.R., 98 N.E.3d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. not sought. Over the parents’ objection, the trial court in Matter of J.R. continued a CHINS case to a date outside of the sixty-day limit imposed in subsection (a) of the statute. The child was adjudicated as a CHINS and the parents appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding:
[T]here is no longer any reason to believe that the General Assembly intends
Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1 to mean anything other than what its clear language indicates, i.e. that a factfinding hearing shall be completed within sixty days of the filing of a CHINS petition and that the failure to do so is grounds for dismissal.2
Id. at 655 (emphasis in original). Further, the court noted, “if we were to allow the deadline to be ignored here, trial courts could habitually set these matters outside the time frame and there would be no consequence whatsoever.” Id.
This statute was again interpreted in Matter of T.T., 110 N.E.3d 441, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. not sought. In that case, the mother acquiesced to DCS‘s motion to continue a CHINS action outside of the 120-day window. Once beyond 120 days, the mother moved to dismiss on grounds that the factfinding hearing had not been completed within the statutory timeframe. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the General Assembly clearly intended the 120-day period to be a hard deadline. Id. Further, the court found that although the statute allowed for waiver of the sixty-day deadline, no such provision enabled waiver of the 120-day deadline. Id. Thus, the court held, “[t]o allow the parties to agree to dates beyond the maximum 120-day limit would thwart the legislative purpose of timely rehabilitation and reunification of families that are subject to CHINS proceedings.” Id.
These cases are instructive though not controlling. We agree, for example, that the sixty-day deadline may be waived with the consent of both parties for any reason. See Matter of J.R., 98 N.E.3d at 655. Further, we accept that the General Assembly has made CHINS actions a priority by placing time constraints on these proceedings and has provided a mechanism for dismissal if the requirements are not met. See Matter of T.T., 110 N.E.3d at 443. However, we do not think that the trial court acted contrary to law in denying Mother‘s motion to dismiss for several reasons—each interrelated.
First, both Matter of J.R. and Matter of T.T. present different circumstances from the present action. In Matter of J.R., both parents timely objected to the extension of the factfinding deadline beyond the initial
Second, it bears repeating that CHINS proceedings are civil in nature. Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1209 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253). For its part, the General Assembly has codified significant procedural and substantive provisions outlining the purposes and procedures of CHINS proceedings. See id. at 1209-10;
We think that here,
Because our trial rules trump statutes on matters of procedure,
Allowing a “good cause” continuance beyond the 120-day deadline not only provides fairness for the parties involved but also allows the legislature‘s intent to “prevail[] over the strict literal meaning of any word or term.” State v. Int‘l Bus. Mach. Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 2003)). See also Matter of J.S., 130 N.E.3d 109, 113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (same). We have consistently observed the principle that “the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents.” Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1209 (quoting In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258). Accordingly, trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in ruling on motions for continuances, including determining whether the moving parties have shown good cause for requesting a continuance. See F.M. v. N.B., 979 N.E.2d 1036, 1039-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a request for a continuance if good cause has been shown). There are no “mechanical tests” for determining whether a request for a continuance was made for good cause. See Blackford v. Boone County Area Plan Com‘n, 43 N.E.3d 655, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Rather, the decision to grant or deny a continuance turns on the circumstances present in a particular case, id., and the circumstances of this particular case justified the trial court‘s decision.3
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Mother‘s request for a continuance. Mother showed good cause when requesting additional time to resolve her discovery dispute with the Danville Police Department and sift through over 4,000 minutes of video evidence. Because Mother showed good cause, the trial court did not err in denying Mother‘s motion to dismiss the action after the 120-day period expired. While we are mindful of the importance of the statutory deadline imposed by the General Assembly, the facts of this case justify the trial court‘s action in continuing the case beyond the prescribed timeframe.
In light of these observations, we hold that
Conclusion
We hold today that, unlike the sixty-day deadline imposed by
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Zachary J. Stock
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana