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prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 14,908 Alexander MacDonald (95-6028/6286) v. General Motors Corporation, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant (95-6030/6287)
110 F.3d 337
6th Cir.
1997
Check Treatment

*1 is, by comparison, no sub- injustice.” There as moti- liberty stake such interest at

stantial Baker, involving the a case court in vated probation violator to civil commitment length indefinite hospital for an psychiatric time, passed on below. an issue to resolve efficiency procedural promote

Nor would precedent upsetting the normal to establish by district of issues pattern of consideration appellate courts. VII above, the dis- For the reasons discussed injunction is preliminary trict order court’s AFFIRMED, stay of that order is remanded to The case

DISSOLVED. proceedings. for further district court F.Supp. 486.

See also: 784 al., MacDONALD, et

Alexander Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross- (95-6028/6286)

Appellees, CORPORATION, GENERAL MOTORS Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant

(95-6030/6287). 95-6028, 95-6030, 95- Nos. and 95-6287. Appeals, Court United States Sixth Circuit. Argued Oct. 1996. April Decided *2 conditions, Jr., Manier, Herod, braking Doran, front some Hol- wheels under M. James Nashville, TN, making the Smith, thus vehicle “rear-biased.” labough S. Jerome & Gascon, briefed), M. Todd Levy (argued and Ultimately, settled their Associates, IL, Chicago, Levy, Leopold & University of against claims Kansas and MacDonald, MacDonald, Of- Joan Alexander employees proceeded against to trial *3 Stanfield, Hall, Peter Cannistra. ray Susan 10, April 1995, Motors alone. General On Griffin, IL, jury plaintiffs’ I. the a verdict Hugh Chicago, Diane returned the C. favor, briefed), finding percent, (argued and Thomas J. General Motors one Jennings Brook, Burke, Jr., Lord, University employ- the Chicago, and of Kansas and its Bissell & Collins, IL, Stahl, ninety-nine percent & Nash- ees at fault. The district F. Cornelius Noel ville, TN, Corporation. judgment the court entered on verdict and for Motors General parties’ judgment denied the motions for as a MARTIN, Judge; Chief Before: a trial. matter of law and for new MOORE, Judges. Circuit WELLFORD plaintiffs appeal, On both the and General objections Motors raise to the district court’s MARTIN, J., opinion of C. delivered plaintiffs decision. The assert that the dis- MOORE, J., court, joined. in which it per- trict court abused its discretion when WELLFORD, 348-51), (pp. delivered a J. mitted Motors to offer evidence of General opinion parts separate dissenting as to II and University negligence of Kansas III. employees. its The this base Jr., MARTIN, Judge. F. Chief BOYCE objection their claim that certain remarks p.m. At on October approximately 10:30 during opening state- made General Motors’ 29, 1987, University six members of “judicial ment constituted admissions” that of their debate team and three In should have excluded such evidence. ad- driving a coaches were to tournament dition, argue that the district Georgia appeared deer front of when a applying the local of Kan- court erred highway on an interstate near their van to than that of North Dakota sas rather (cid:127) driver, Clarksville, Philip The Tennessee. the Mac- measurement of Voight, graduate student and a debate claim, ground death on the Donalds’ University had coach at family all MacDonald re: that members just a few months ceived his driver’s license of North Dakota. its were domiciliaries Voight to avoid the earlier. When swerved appeal, Motors asserts that the dis- General deer, up, the van locked the rear brakes of improperly its motion for trict court denied vehicle, Voight control of lost judgment as a matter of law. For the rea- highway rolled over van ran off the below, we. the district sons set forth hold that coming to rest. David several times before admitting challenged not err in court did MacDonald, a team student debate motion denying General Motors’ evidence or member, of the accident. died as result However, judgment as of law. a matter Cannistra, student, Peter ren- Another was court’s to we reverse district decision paraplegic. passengers, other dered a Two apply to the measurement Kansas law Stanfield, Ofray Hall Susan suffered for the MacDonalds’ injuries fully. but substantial recovered claim, and remand with instructions to that issue. North Dakota law Hall, Cannistra, Stanfield, and Mac- University initially sued the Donald’s estate I. employees, including and its of Kansas plaintiffs’ appeal issue on first negligence Voight, alleging caused their challenge of certain evi- to the admission the accident. The later added statements, During opening General dence. Motors, alleging against claim General following remarks: counsel made the purchaser adequate- failed to advise the van’s wrong in maintenance, [Voight] anything our didn’t do ly regarding proper brake probably have defectively He should designed be- estimation. the van was in a or tried brake struck deer cause the rear wheels would lock before Oscanyan, straight line than it. set forth in we are most reluctant rather swerve to avoid many probably what most of ambiguous He did us to hold that con such statements emergency have if would done the same judicial Oscanyan stitute admissions. As presented situation itself. clear, court made a doubt exists “[i]f suggest suggesting Let me we are not counsel, with the statement the court will Voight negligent. Phil he was What did directions, hold as where the evidence is Probably probably predictable. was conflicting, and leave the deter matter appropriate. jury.” mination of the Id. at 263. also sight. Don’t It an accident. It lose Chesapeake Ry. & Ohio Koserkoff negli- was an accident not the result (6th denied, Cir.1970), F.2d cert. gence any- or fault General or U.S. S.Ct. 28 L.Ed.2d body else. (1971) (holding “positive statement *4 trial, day admission, The next of the asked required binding fact” is for a not the court to bar from statements”). General Motors intro- “contradictory ducing any Voight’s driving expe- of evidence ground Second, negligence,

rience or on that the the the were de statements not judicial above statements were admissions present right liberate of evi waivers the Voight negligent. that was not The court University’s negli of Voight’s dence and the plaintiffs’ request. denied the Later gence. The First has Circuit stated: trial, prior but to General Motors’ case in ju- binding consequences, of their Because chief, request by made a similar generally only dicial admissions arise from It, too, motion. written was denied voluntarily deliberate waivers that ex- appeal, plaintiffs challenge court. On fact____ pressly alleged concede ... an rulings. these policy of fairness [Considerations and the We review the district court’s deter judicial require encouraging of admissions particular mination as to whether a state judges given that trial be broad discretion judicial ment constitutes a admission that parties consequences to relieve of from certain excludes evidence under the abuse of judicial in appropriate admissions cases. Cohen, discretion standard. United States v. 941, v. Belculfine, United States 527 F.2d 944 (6th Cir.1991). 430, In 946 F.2d 435 (1st (citations Cir.1975) omitted). Under evidentiary ruling, context of an an abuse of principles, these the district well court was reviewing discretion exists when the court is within its discretion that to conclude General firmly convinced that a mistake has been Motors’ counsel’s statements not were bind- regarding made the admission of evidence. ing simply admissions. Nat’l, Counsel’s remarks v. Nida Plant Protection Ass’n 7 F.3d (6th Cir.1993). 522, voluntary were not 527 “deliberate waivers.” Applying this stan During statement, of present opening dard to the facts the same we counsel say cannot that court Voight’s driving the district abused of experience discussed lack in finding discretion that General explained Motors’ and original- had during opening remarks were statements not ly only Voight University sued admissions, judicial denying therefore negligence. Kansas for Such are comments plaintiffs’ request to exclude evidence fundamentally any odds intent challenged related to the statements. argument Voight’s negligence waive caused the accident. Our in Harri- decision qualify judicial In order to ad Turnpike son Construction Co. v. Ohio Com- missions, attorney’s an must statements mission, (6th Cir.1963) supports 316 F.2d 174 deliberate, unambiguous. clear and Oscan this conclusion. Harrison we held Co., yan 261, 263, v. Arms 103 U.S. 13 Otto Turnpike opening Commission’s counsel’s 261, (1880). 26 L.Ed. 539 The statements of regarding statement remarks proximate cau- General Motors’ counsel do not rise this judicial admissions, First, sation did not constitute level. counsel used words such as ground “probably” “suggesting” making the remarks were incon- his comments, indicating sistent with the pleadings, that such remarks Commission’s evi- guarded qualified. dence, principles closing argument. Under the Id. at 177.

341 present diversity such as the In a action Motors’ finally, General Third one, applies conflicts a federal opinions dealt with statements counsel’s Tompkins, R.R. v. the forum state. Erie conclusions, reluctant are thus and we legal 64, 817, 82 L.Ed.1188 304 U.S. S.Ct. binding judicial admissions. them as to treat (1938). Waller, Thus, apply Tennessee law to we v. See, Cas. Co. e.g., New Amsterdam denied, (4th Cir.1963), proper whether the district court 20, cert. determine F.2d 1124, ly applied 11 L.Ed.2d Kansas law to determine 84 S.Ct. 376 U.S. wrongful death claim. (1964). Motor MacDonalds’ v. White for the also Glick Cir.1972) (“The (3d scope significant 1287, 1291 adopted the “most Tennessee has F.2d matters relationship” approach is restricted of the Restatement judicial admissions require eviden- otherwise would of Laws Hata fact which of Conflict (Tenn. include counsel’s McKinley, tiary proof, way and does 830 S.W.2d 1992). legal theo conception of his statement case.”). negligence

ry Determinations of a explains 178 of the Restatement Section applica require the causation proximate application of “the law selected an pat complex factual of law to tion of rules § 175 determines the measure rule of contrast, admissions, typi Judicial terns. action for death.” an of fact. Since matters cally concern of Conflict Laws dealt counsel’s statements General turn, sets forth 178. Section *5 (i.e., Voight whether legal conclusions with significant relation- of the “most foundation the he caused and whether negligent test,” as follows: ship and reads not, reasoning accident), the they do under Right § of Action for Death. 175. Glick, constitute and forth Waller set death, the local In an action for to rule Were we binding judicial admissions. injury the occurred law of the state where otherwise, turning a valuable be we would of the rights and liabilities determines the device, voluntary use time-saving the unless, respect particu- parties with trap encouraged, into which should issue, has a more lar some other state unwary. the princi- under the significant relationship unpersuaded court was The district § the occurrence and ples stated in 6 to counsel of General the comments the local law of parties, in which event the light of the judicial admissions. applied. state will be the other po- authority against plaintiffs’ weight of of Laws of Conflict Restatement sition, abused say that the court we cannot § 175. to treat them it refused discretion when principles are Restatement Voight’s Other relevant evidence of and admitted as such 145, which are 6 and forth sections set University’s negligence. and the address, which by 175 and section referenced principles of law general choice respectively,

II. applicable tort principles choice of law sections is as full text of these actions. The appeal is the issue on The next follows: of dam for the measurement choice of law wrongful death ages Principles. for the MacDonalds’ § 6. Choice-of-Law law, applied The district claim. (1) court, re- subject to constitutional A $100,- damages to non-pecuniary limits which strictions, statutory directive will follow (1995). § 60-1903 Kan.Stat.Ann. 000.00. See of law. state on choice of its own Dakota argue that North MacDonalds The directive, (2) no such there is When damages, was law, cap on places no which appli- choice of the relevant to the factors § 32- N.D.Cent.Code appropriate. more See law include: cable rule of (1993). a district court’s review 03.2-04 We (a) and inter- the interstate the needs of de novo. Salve of law determination choice systems, national Russell, 225, 231, College 499 U.S. Regina forum, (b) policies of the the relevant 1217, 1221, L.Ed.2d 190 111 S.Ct. (e)the policies relationship relevant of other inter- cant to the occurrence and the parties. ested states and the relative interests of examining We do this the con- states in those the determination of the tacts set forth in section 145 of the Restate- issue, (1) particular place ment: injury where the oc- (2) curred; place (d) where the conduct justified expecta- the protection of (3) occurred; domicile, causing injury tions, residence, nationality, place incorporation (e) policies underlying par- the basic (4) place parties; of business of the law, ticular field of place where the between the (f) certainty, predictability uniformi- parties Hataway, centered. result, ty of guided analysis S.W.2d at 59. We are this (g) appli- ease in the determination and by general principles governing choice of applied. cation of the law to be law, including: interests each state § Principle. 145. The General having applied; policies its law the relevant (1) rights parties and liabilities of the forum; certainty, of the predictability and respect with to an issue tort are deter- result; uniformity of in the ease determina- which, mined the local law state application tion applied; of the law to be issue, respect to that has the most order; promotion of interstate significant relationship to the occurrence policies underlying basic the field of law. parties principles under the stated of Conflict of Laws §in § 6. Hataway, See also 830 S.W.2d at 59 (2) Contacts to be taken into account in (explaining general principles of choice applying principles of 6 to determine of law contained in section 6 of the Restate- applicable to an issue include: guide application ment sig- of the “most (a) place occurred, injury where the test). relationship” nificant proper appli- A (b) place causing where the conduct cation of these factors shows that the law of *6 occurred, injury the Dakota, Kansas, North not applied should be (c) domicil, residence, nationality, the to the measurement of for the Mac- place incorporation place and of busi- Donalds’ claim. parties, ness of the and simple A examination of the contacts listed (d) place the relationship, where the if in section importance 145 is of little in the any, parties between the is centered. case, present points as it toward several dif- These contacts are to be evaluated accord- injury ferent states. The occurred in Ten- ing importance to their relative with re- causing nessee. The injury conduct the oc- spect particular to the issue. Tennessee, accident, curred the site of the

Restatement of Conflict of Laws Michigan, and the state where General Mo- 6,145. §§ designed tors the van. The decedent was approach, Under the Restatement where domiciled in North Dakota but was a resi- wrongful issue, death are at the dent of Kansas at the time of his death. The applies local the law of the parents, state where decedent’s the in this occurred, injury the suit, unless some other state death are domiciled and reside significant has a relationship more to the North Dakota. General Motors’ domicile damages, issue of Delaware, the occurrence and the Michigan place incorpo- is its parties. Restatement business, of Conflict of ration and principal place of and it 175, §§ Laws In Kansas, the present Dakota, conducts business North parties agree the that the law of Ten- and Tennessee. The center the relation- nessee, occurred, injury state where the ship persons is Kansas: all in the van were applied should not be Kansas; because the location of residents of purchased, the van was Thus, accident there was fortuitous. garaged, sec- and maintained in Kansas a tion requires 175 of the Restatement organization; we Kansas passengers board- determine, respect with Kansas; to the issue of dam- ed the van in trip ages, which signifi- other state has the Thus, most scheduled to terminate there as well. parties agree no point toward that the first two con- contacts Restatement tacts, place injury place of conduct and cover Ten- particular, but rather one state (which point toward Tennessee and Michi- Kansas, Dakota, nessee, Michigan, North Thus, gan), controlling not be should here. Delaware. we must examine last two contacts to trial, argued, and the At General Motors determine which to to de- state’s law agreed, that Kansas was district court damages, giving to termine due consideration significant the most relation- state that had policy concerns discussed above. aspects ship all of the MacDonalds’ with domicile, The third set of contacts — claim. General Motors based residence, nationality, place incorporation ground on the that where this assertion place parties of business of the —in scattered, are the “center of contacts states, Delaware, including volves several relationship” important is the most factor in Kansas, A Michigan, and North Dakota. of law This making a choice determination. person’s permanent “domicile” is his or her premise is incorrect. The mere fact home, principal to she in which he or automatically contacts are scattered does not away. Snodgrass tends return whenever heighten importance the “center of Snodgrass, Tenn.App. 357 S.W.2d Here, may relationship” contact. be (1961) (defining “domicile” as “the relationship, no other the center of but place person principal home “where has his fortunes; are there: important place enjoyment contacts located of his leave, expect except for his which he does not was a resident of but decedent absent, purpose; from which when he remained Dakota. See domicile wayfarer; to himself a to which when seems (Second) of of Laws Conflict travel’”) (citations returns, he ceases he (1971) center of (noting 145 cmt. e omitted). See also Eastman v. Univ. of may important most Cir.1990) (6th Michigan, 30 F.3d 672-73 occasions, when a on rare such as contact (stating person’s or her domicile is his plaintiff injured X train from state in a “true, fixed, permanent princi home passing Y and through while state accident place which pal establishment” is “the contacts important other are also located absent”) ... [or she] he returns whenever state) added). Instead, (emphasis (6th Dictionary ed. (citing Black’s Law clear is to Restatement makes that the court 1990)). contrast, requires “residence” “according contacts to their rel- evaluate the presence to re “physical and an intention particu- importance respect ative time, period some indefinite main but *7 issue,” accomplished lar and that this is to be (citing necessarily permanently.” Id. at 673 by carefully examining policies behind 1308-9). Dictionary Under Black’s Law at laws of the states and the interested definitions, domi these North Dakota is the Re- interests of those states in the claim. par of David MacDonald and his cile both (Second) §§ of Conflict of Laws statement it parents’ It is his because ents. domicile (1971). 145(2); regard § 145 cmt. e In this permanent home. their established and emphasize specifi- we that the Restatement Likewise, North is David Mac Dakota importance in cally discusses the of domicile domicile Donald’s domicile because it was his determining of choice law for the measure- college prior to and there is no evidence that wrongful ment in a action. of death a intended to it to establish he ever abandon 178 exam- explains, Comment b to section Kansas, which is what he new domicile ple, a situation state is “[i]n where one change to to his would have had have done defendant, of domicil of the state to that state. In re Conserva domicile beneficiaries, seem decedent would (Tenn. Clayton, torship 89 S.W.2d of that, least, ordinarily wrongful at death (stating change to domi Ct.App.1995) applied to statute of this state should be cile, actually change his or person must damages.” the measure Re- determine of to a new to aban place, her residence intend (Second) § domicile, of statement Conflict of Laws old and intend to es don his or her residence). domicile the new cmt. b. tablish a new suggests That David resided Kansas while school contacts that North Dakota has nothing significant thus does to diminish the fact that most to the measure Dakota North was his domicile. wrongful of for the MacDonald’s death claim. parents While David MacDonald and his Dakota, clearly were domiciliaries of North The fourth contact —the center of the rela- note, and we General Motors makes much of tionship points to Kansas. As noted earli- — MacDonald, the fact that David who was er, persons all in the van lived in Kansas. Kansas, University attending the of purchased, garaged, The van was and main- technically a resident of Kansas at the time organization, tained in Kansas acknowledge of his we David’s death. While and the students and coaches boarded Kansas, we find connection nonetheless trip van Kansas for a that was to termi- the third set Restatement contacts nate in that state. Dakota, points where the law domiciled, parents David and his rather fourth third and contacts thus Kansas, than to where David alone was point to the law of North Dakota and merely a This resident. conclusion is based respectively. To determine which of these opinion although on our residence ais important, contacts is more we first examine contacts, factor in the third set of. it is not as policies behind the laws of these two significant a factor domicile. Not (Second) states. Restatement Conflict person’s to his connection or her domicile (1971). § § Laws 145 cmt. e See also In any more substantial than links he or she Boston, re Air Crash Disaster at Massachu may place, places, have to his or her or 31, 1973, 1106, 1112 July F.Supp. setts on residence, clearly but a state has more of an (D.Mass.1975) (noting policy that “[t]he un preserving interest the welfare of its domi- derlying important each statute is an consid persons ciliaries —those have who made the determining eration in which state has the true, fixed, permanent state their issue”). significant more connection with the home—than persons that of its residents — wrongful North Dakota’s death statute is necessarily who live the state without hav- designed compensate fully the victim any ing permanent there, connections pecuniary non-pecuniary both loss. may who are domiciled and have residences § N.D.Cent.Code 32-03.2-04 This Indeed, in other states. the Restatement purpose policy compen conforms with the suggests itself that domicile is the more im- underlying theory recovery sation portant factor in the third set of section 145 all tort actions. See Restatement contacts. See Restatement of Con- (1971) § Conflict of (stating Laws § flict of Laws cmt. (emphasizing b general principles choice of law include a importance defendant, of the domicile of the policies consideration of underlying decedent, and the beneficiaries in deter- law). comparison, relevant field of Kan mining which state’s death statute statute, sas’ Kan.Stat.Ann. damages), § to determine 145 cmt. d (1995), goals: compensat 60-1903 has two (noting that per- the state where interested ing eliminating the victim’s next of kin and typically sons are greatest domiciled has the *8 excessive jury verdicts that can result from in having applied interest its law to resolve a sympathy family. for the decedent’s In an action). reasons, tort For these we find that effort goals, to balance these two the statute David MacDonald’s domicile—North Dako- $100,000.00 imposes a cap non-pecuniary on important ta —is a more contact than his damages.1 limitation, Given this Kansas’ purposes applying residence for of the Re- statute does completely satisfy goal the significant relationship statement’s most test. plaintiff of tort actions —to make the whole. Given that both David MacDonald and his parents Dakota, were domiciliaries of North step Our next is to evaluate the interests we conclude that the third set of section of Kansas and North Dakota in applying cap 1. The Report Legislative was added to the Kansas statute in an on Kansas Interim Studies perceived effort to alleviate a crisis in the avail- 568-9, (Dec.1986). Legislature to the 1987 ability affordability liability of insurance. measurement of dam- contact that it was the site acci- their own laws dent. Id.2 wrongful particular death claim. ages for this (Second) of Conflict of Laws in As with Massachusetts’ interest the Air 6, § North Dakota’s § cmt. e claim, in Disaster Kansas’ interest Crash this North Dakota is the

interest is substantial. is not great claim as North Dakota’s. heirs, the decedent his in ensuring domicile of both Kansas does an interest have compensat- assuring adequately in that that its “strong and it interest residents are has a injuries, for their ed but this interest ade- fully compensated for the next of kin are quately by applying served North Dakota its Air tortious death” of domiciliaries. Moreover, applying law. the Kansas statute Disaster, F.Supp. Signif- Crash policy of would frustrate North Dakota’s ful- icantly, emphasizes im- the Restatement ly for compensating its domiciliaries their the law of portance applying of the state injuries. And an while Kansas also has in- persons are domiciled to where interested protecting terest in its residents from exces- wrongful damages in determine death verdicts, jury sive this interest is not as (Sec- other actions. See Restatement tort compelling in where all residents this ond) § (stating 178 cmt. of Laws b Conflict (the University, employees, Kansas that is the state of domicile where one state Voight) who have were defendants settled decedent, defendant, bene- by jury’s and will not dam- be affected ficiaries, wrongful that death statute of Motors, course, ages calculations. General applied ordinarily be to deter- state should suit, party remains a and Kansas has damages), (noting mine 145 cmt. d in protecting an interest the automobile man- persons state are domiciled where interested verdict, ufacturer from an excessive since “greatest in typically will have interest that manufacturer does within Kan- business determining extent to which shall each However, sas’ borders. General Motors also recovery”). And share in a tort while no Dakota, business in so there is does no directly Tennessee case has addressed the weight compelling give greater reason issue, held in other courts have Kansas’ in this matter. We there- interest important death that the most contact eases fore find the domicile of the decedent analysis in is the the Restatement domicile of survivors, his than the center rather or her In Air decedent or his heirs. impor- parties’ relationship, the most Disaster, example, Crash residents of application tant contact in this Re- brought wrongful death aris- Vermont claims keeping analysis. statement In with this ing in airplane out of an crash occurred finding, we law of North Dako- hold that the court, ap- Id. at 1107. The Massachusetts. ta, rather should than that of test, plying significant relationship the most determining for the Mac- applied determined that Vermont law should claim. Donalds’ since the decedents were domiciled in Ver- argues We note that General kin mont and their next of were residents relationship” the “center of the element finding Vermont. The court made this de- applica factor in this should be the dominant spite accident the fact that the occurred test, significant tion of the most and that did Massachusetts defendant apply. thus that law should Massachusetts business both and Ver- support argument, General Motors this mont. The court Id. at 1112. noted cites this Bowman v. Court’s decision strong assuring (6th interest Vermont had a Koch F.2d 1257 Cir. Transfer fully compensated 1988). kin held, next of applying Bowman Re domiciliaries, while, test, deaths of its an Ohio resident statement’s that where hand, a vehicle driven an significant other Massachusetts’ sole was killed Illinois *9 We that the fact that the Air Crash court also case shows that the court found note that Disaster based on the fact that was its decision Vermont were most of the decedents and domi- par- the center of the between the the more ciled and in was com- resided Vermont Disaster, F.Supp. ties. Air Crash at 1112. pelling id. contact. See However, reading opinion of the in that a close resident, Liability pro- Act and the contact with Kansas Product Act. The Illinois vides, part: in relevant was that the decedent was domiciled Ohio there and certain beneficiaries domi- injury-causing aspect of the When live) (but there, not law ciled did Illinois manufacture, was, product at in the time Id. at 1262. applied. should be regulatory compliance legislative with regulatory or administrative standards While Bowman may support lend some safety relating design per- standards or position, General Motors’ our decision here is formance, product shall be deemed not by not controlled that case. The Restate by design perfor- defective reason of or approach ment test is a fact-driven that nec proves mance ... claimant a unless the essarily varies from case to preponderance of the evidence that a rea- Bowman decision was not based on an analy sonably prudent product seller could and relationship” sis of the “center factor. precautions. would have taken additional Bowman, Moreover, 862 F.2d at 1258-62. 60-3304(a) (1995). if even we assume Illinois was the “center of Kan.Stat.Ann. Bowman, relationship” had Illinois General asserts that satisfied its ap several contacts that other made its proving initial burden of the van was propriate Kansas does not have —contacts compliance appropriate regulatory with the Illinois was the site of the Bow- this case. relating design performance, standard or accident, man id. and all the defen- and thus that it was a entitled to rebuttable dants in Bowman were residents of Illinois. presumption that the van not defective Id. at 1261. Furthermore, plain- while the design. Specifically, pro- General Motors tiff-survivors in Bowman favored application evidence, undisputed by plaintiffs, duced Ohio, of the law of none of them lived in that braking system on the van success- Here, contrast, Kansas, Id. state. fully passed performance testing the brake relationship, center of the was neither the Highway mandated the National Traffic any site the accident nor the residence of Safety Administration’s Federal Motor Vehi- defendants, remaining and the claim- (FMVSS) Safety cle Standard and thus ants reside and are domiciled in North Dako- fully complied applicable with the federal ta, they the state whose law to have wish safety, standards set forth in FMVSS 105. applied to determine their Act, Liability Under the Kansas Product ar- wrongful death claim. The Bowman gues Motors, compliance General this created favored simply Illinois law not because Illi- presumption rebuttable the van did parties’ nois was the center of the relation- defect, design from shifting suffer ship,3 many but because Illinois had other proof burden to demon- contacts with the occurrence and the claim— prudent strate that seller nevertheless contacts which Kansas does not have with precautions. could and would take additional Therefore, Bowman does not dispute. this dispute At appeal this are two issues: alter our conclusion that the district court first, regulates inju- whether FMVSS 105 applied law, should have North Dakota rath- van, ry-causing aspect of the and thus wheth- er than that of to determine dam- compliance er FMVSS entitled Gen- ages for the MacDonalds’ presumption eral Motors to a rebuttable claim. Act, second, non-defectiveness under the whether successfully rebutted III. presumption by this demonstrating that a turn appeal We now to General Motors’ prudent seller nonetheless could and would the district court’s denial of its motion precautions. have taken additional The dis- judgment pursuant court, as a matter denying of law trict General mo- 50(b). law, F.R.Civ.P. General Motors’ judgment motion is tion for aas matter of found based on a defense that upon jury arises under the that there was evidence which the above, sion, 3. As noted it is not aspect even clear whether the as the court did not discuss this relationship” "center of the contact was a factor the Restatement test. at all in the Bowman court’s choice of law deci- *10 presumption creates a that a against Kansas statute General have based its decision could “injury- if Motors, product non-defective is this matter. General Motors product” compli- causing aspect of the is course, Because we find argues otherwise. regulation, plaintiffs argue that ance with a reasonably have conclud- jury could that the compliance with 105 fails the van’s FMVSS not relate to the 105 did that FMVSS ed presumption of non-defective- van, create aspect and thus injury-causing Motors, sought by ness General thus not entitled to a Motors was that General never had the burden of rebut- non-defectiveness, hold, we presumption ting presumption. General Motors of whether the reaching the issue without “metaphy- that such differentiation is claims presump- successfully rebutted ground that hairsplitting” sical on the “brake tion, properly denied that the district stability” concept a does not even which judgment for as Motors’ motion General exist, 105, pur- and that FMVSS stated of law. matter provide pose of is to standards for which diversity sitting in federal court A performance, necessarily encompasses brake whose substan applies the law of the state aspects perfor- all of brake standards for governs the action to determine tive law mance, stability.” including so-called “brake judgment a matter as whether motion in turn. We address each of these criticisms Barlow, Siggers granted. of law should be First, asserts that General Motors (6th Cir.1990). 241, 247 Under F.2d concept stability” “brake does not exist as a law, court, ruling on a motion for performance, the focus independent of brake pursu notwithstanding the verdict judgment Thus, ar General Motors of FMVSS 60-250(c) (1995) (the ant Kan.Stat.Ann. injury-causing aspect of van gues, the 50(b) motion for equivalent of a F.R.Civ.P. necessarily scope within the of FMVSS falls law), judgment a matter of must “resolve as compliance 105 and General reasonably to be all facts inferences regulation it to a rebuttable entitles from the evidence favor of drawn presumption non-defectiveness under the ruling sought and whom the party against however, point plaintiffs, out that Act. The different reasonable minds could reach where only stopping dis 105 addresses FMVSS motion based on the evidence the conclusions specific tances and contains no standards v. Halliburton must be denied.” Turner balance and design as it relates to brake 1106, 240 Kan. 722 P.2d turn, Motors, chal stability. General Thus, uphold will the district court’s deni we by regu noting that the lenges this assertion unless, motion resolv al of General Motors’ stops made “with requires lation that all be from the evidence ing all facts and inferences leaving a twelve- any part out of the vehicle” plaintiffs, we determine that in favor of the permits roadway, and that foot wide only conclude that reasonable minds could greater than ten speeds “locked wheels” statutory Motors was entitled to the General during “spike stops.” per While miles hour and that presumption of non-defectiveness may in that “sta be correct General Motors presumption. to rebut failed bility” may encompassed of some sort however, evidence, impossible it is Given minds find that reasonable we FMVSS Reasonable minds to reach this conclusion. conclude, pre based on the evidence could General Motors could differ as whether trial, 105 did sented at FMVSS of non-defec presumption to a was entitled injury-causing aspect of the van relate Act, under the and therefore Gener tiveness (the problem) it did not rear-bias because judgment a matter Motors’ motion for al stability, design encompass brake district properly denied of law was not entitled thus that General Motors Id. court. presumption of non-defective a rebuttable testimony at trial plaintiffs presented Act. ness under the regulation question, FMVSS Second, argues that General concern the issue of brake does not even 105 is (i.e., purpose of FMVSS since the stated stability whether the brakes balance rear-biased). regulation necessari- performance, the brake are front or Given *11 WELLFORD, ly encompasses aspects perfor- Judge, dissenting. all of brake Circuit mance, including stability. This rea- brake agreement part I I While am of the soning unpersuasive. The fact that majority opinion regarding the admission of purpose per- FMVSS 105’s formal is brake negligence evidence Phil as to driver regulation formance does not mean that the Kansas, Voight University I must all necessarily encompasses aspects of brake parts dissent from II and III for the reasons performance. quite possible It to conclude indicated. aspects 105 covers certain FMVSS performance. The fact that of brake FMVSS applicable A. Choice of Kansas law as (albeit primarily stopping tests distance death claim. requirement with the the vehicle panel I differ with the other members in roadway during leave twelve-foot wide application their of North Dakota law to this test) lends credence to the notion that claim. Mr. and Mrs. MacDonald sued as something 105 is than all- FMVSS less Bismark, Dakota, residents of based encompassing performance brake standard upon diversity citizenship. They allege General Motors claims it to be. that David a “resident of was the home of the Plaintiffs” when the fatal accident occurred possible itWhile would be to conclude that MacDonald, however, in Tennessee. David injury-causing FMVSS 105 did relate to the passengers and other who were van, aspect jury of the was free decide vehicle, clearly Lawrence, resided in evidence, from the and inferences to be Kansas, immediately before the accident as therefrom, drawn whether the FMVSS regular faculty University students or at the presump- standard was sufficient to create Kansas, panel as the has concluded.1 tion of non-defectiveness. Given the evi- presented, jurors reasonably dence could The vehicle at issue was sold and delivered conclude that the FMVSS 105 standard was University of Kansas in Kansas for inapplicable problem, to the rear-bias university serviced, operated, use. It was therefore that presumed the van could not be kept acquisition. Kansas after its non-defective under Kan.Stat.Ann. 60- vehicle was manufactured in Canada.2 At 3304(a) (1995). Thus, say accident, we cannot the time of the MacDonald and the district court in denying erred General Mo- others the vehicle because of their judgment students, tors’ motion for as a matter University of law. status as of Kansas operated aegis was under the of the Uni- versity by subject a Kansas resident to Uni-

IV. versity policies. alleged Plaintiffs (and specifically system) vehicle its brake reasons, foregoing For the we affirm the defectively was maintained in Kansas district court’s decision to admit evidence University, contributing alleged to its unrea- relating opening to General Motors’ state- sonably dangerous condition. It is clear that ment remarks and its denial of General Mo- traveling David MacDonald was on a Univer- judgment tors’ motion for as a matter of law. sity function. The vehicle en was route to However, because we have determined that Georgia trip origi- from where the the law of inappropriate Kansas was to de- nated. termine the MacDonalds’ claim, wrongful death we reverse the district In pretrial an amended order submitted to judgment 22,1992, court’s and remand for further the district court on June defendant proceedings applying North Dakota governs law to maintained “that Kansas law that issue. disposition trial and case.” majority opinion 1. The majority opinion concedes that "the de- 2. The indicates that the vehicle ceased was a resident Kansas the time of his question designed Michigan. added.) (Emphasis death." David had lived in majority during for the vast of the time death, years prior the two to his and this was the period of his adult life. order, February residence of the filed on was Ver pretrial final mont, also 1995, any legal place departure issue was which was mention month, expected place ill- submit- of return on the Later omitted. *12 Disaster, trip. apply plane Dakota law to fated Air 399 a motion to North Crash ted wrongful F.Supp. at 1112. These facts in Air measure of on essential Disaster, supra, “Kan- Plaintiffs conceded that Crash form a clear basis for death claim. liability distinguishing and it from used to determine the instant case. The sas law will be only place damages issues.” similar circumstance was that the certain injury “happen death of and was mere agree with parties The the district therefore, stance,” and, Massachusetts law Hataway McKinley, v. 830 S.W.2d that clearly apply. did not Id. also Vermont was (Tenn.1992), adopts law rule as conflicts of relationship in that the center case of approach significant relationship” the “most significant the most had contacts. Restatement of the by plain- In an affidavit This court observed in Bowman v. Koch death. submitted (6th Cir.1988), tiffs, averred that 862 F.2d 1257 the deceased’s brother Transfer “[sjection decision, paid non-resident tuition to Kansas conflict of laws that David 145(2)(c) a North Dakota driver’s license. does not confine itself to consider and retained that, parties, further after his of the domicile of ex The affidavit set out ation but Kansas, year spent the sum- itself to a of their resi David tends consideration second added). living Minneapolis, (emphasis in Minnesota. Id. at 1262 mer of 1987 dence.” Bowman, appear spent sig most of most It would thus that he we determined that the Illinois, life, early relationship late or fall of nificant in not in his from the summer was accident, Ohio, plaintiffs. of the in Kansas the domicile em 1986 to the date of We moreover, phasized, Da- away in Minnesota and from North that had not position actually in plaintiffs’ applicability on lived Ohio for one an one-half kota. The entirely years. appears far of Dakota law rested almost Bowman to me to be applicable than alleged on domicile of the deceased more facts of this case court, Disaster, parents. supra. The after also Foster that of his district Air Crash States, (11th parties’ positions, of the ruled 768 F.2d 1278 Cir. consideration United 1985) residence, apply. (holding should I consider that Kansas law determined, par mat- domicile the district court as a the law of the of the deceased that fact, ents, plane Michigan, crash in the factor of domicile after a Lake ter of I plaintiffs’ would should favored assertions. test). significant the district court in its determination under the “most contacts”

affirm residency many the state Corp., v. General Patten contacts, most was state with the other (W.D.Okla.1987), supports F.Supp. 1500 also significant relationship. most that Kansas has the the conclusion relationship opinion significant of the Patten I am of the that the “center this ease. relationship relationship” emphasized contact the center test important is the most question, in a pursu the van involved the circumstances of this case where under accident, Oklahoma, “was titled ant to the Colorado Conflict case, Bank, regularly by an In this Kansas was “the owned Oklahoma Laws.3 resident, by majority an relationship,” of the used Oklahoma Oklahoma center being majority posi used residents concedes this. The rested and was Oklahoma Id. entirely on of the time of the time of the accident.” importance almost at the tion domicile, relying reasoning at 1505. The center state of on the Boston, great signifi parties was found to have In re Air Crash Disaster at (D.Mass.1975). multistate important because of F.Supp. 1106 It is cance scattered Similarly, involved. in our note that the domicile contacts ease both agree majority opinion important contacts here. would I injury place place are less of conduct (W.D.Okla.1975) (conceded F.Supp. majority Corp., to be the residence, crash, “homeplace” (arising plane holding of the out state of of same vehicle, relationship”) plane place the “center the law of the where the was unquestionably of the most place the state kept and maintained and of business of relationship. significant prevailed defendant over law of domicile significant deceased under the con Furthermore, North Dako- the Kansas and Cir.1976). (10th test), aff'd, tacts 544 F.2d 442 damages, wrongful death ta statutes on view, respect. I cannot my equal deserve majority applies North Dakota law adopt policy agree that this court should fuliy ... both compensate which “would denigrate statute which sets a the Kansas *13 loss,” non-pecuniary pecuniary and $100,000 damages cap non-pecuniary greater would allow to realize statute not. whereas the North Dakota does law, recovery than allowed under Kansas “eliminating The Kansas notion of excess apply under which would otherwise the cen- jury sympathy” from verdicts that can result residency ter of test and the unsatisfactory an nor an undesir- neither in representatives Personal such standard. surely signifi- concept. Kansas has a able majority situations under the rationale would protecting in cant interest its residents and encouraged to be move their domicile to the university application in the of its state affording generous recovery state the most wrongful death statute. Lee, wrongful Huang death. v. Considering policy the matter of of the (E.D.N.Y.1990) F.Supp. (applying 75-76 limiting non-pecuniary damages, Kansas law the law of the decedent’s residence because I would find that Kansas has a declared “strong public policy [of New to York] interest in the awarded measure ‘specifically recovery in [limit] where, here, in ” death cases as resi- (cita- pecuniary damages’ death actions to of Kansas were involved in an dents accident omitted)). tion regularly with a defendant conducted Kansas, in and other individual de- of the business One bases for mistaken decision majority who were residents of and domiciled of the fendants is to refer to David Mac- “strong “technically within Kansas. Kansas has a inter- Donald as resident limiting non-pecuniary was, in est” its law dam- at the time of his death.” The deceased sense, ages, purpose every truly and the “fit” between the of its a resident of time, strong.” law and “our facts is See In re Air and had been for some as were all of Chicago, Crash Disaster Near 644 F.2d the others involved in the accident. The Cir.1981) (7th (discussing majority Restatement cites Air In re Crash Disaster 6, 145, e, Boston, §§ denying favoring and comment a district court as law, punitive damages although application the law of the of North Dakota a case dis- domiciliary tinguishable states of several decedents from the situation in the instant permitted damages); domiciliary crash would have such case. To the rule of “con- does, Corp., see majority very also Bruce Martin-Marietta 418 trol” as the little (W.D.Okla.1975)(the F.Supp. precedential support, bring 839-40 be to would about place misconduct and defendant’s different if measures there had place prevailed of business over among the domicile been two deaths the Kansas residents plaintiffs’ involving persons of deceased law in a conflicts of law domiciled in different involving situation illogical unprinci- states. This seems an suit), product liability aff'd, pled 544 F.2d 442 resulted where the center of relation- (10th Cir.1976); ship admittedly Bruce v. Martin-Marietta is established Kansas.4 (Second), majority original parties 4. The cites Restatement Con- All defendant. residents of Laws, b, emphasizing § majority opinion part flict of 178 cmt. Kansas. The in another importance "merely But that “[i]n domicile. is so refers to MacDonald as a resident.” deceased, Why say situation where one state is the state of domicile is it more accurate to defendant, away the decedent and the beneficiaries.” who had been from North Dakota most of added.) Dakota, course, life, (Emphasis “technically” "merely” his adult or defendant, any not the state of domicile of the or domiciled there? where he One wonders would 60-3304(a) notwithstanding statute similar to K.S.A. Judgment the ver- nessee B. and determined that on a motion for sum- dict. mary judgment the nonmovant must majority are observes The showing “‘make a sufficient to establish disagreement that General Motors of an element essential existence appropriate reg- compliance with the “was ” party’s case.’ It further held that a ulatory relating design perfor- or standard plaintiff any who fails introduce evi- majority mance” of the vehicle at issue. challenge compli- dence to the defendant’s produced undisput- also notes that defendant regulations ance with must federal system braking on the evidence “that the ed presump- found to have failed to rebut the successfully passed perfor- the brake van product tion that a was not defective. National testing mandated mance plain- Id. 881 P.2d at 586. I would hold that Safety Highway Traffic Administration” expert tiffs and their “failed to overcome the 105). (Standard FMVSS presumption df nondefectiveness created following presumption such To rebut 60-3304(a).” pru- K.S.A. Id. Reasonable and 60-3304(a), under Kan.Stat.Ann. facts not, dent factfinders could from the evidence question is deemed not be defec- vehicle presented, have found that estab- *14 proves prepon- claimant tive “unless the lished, must, they reasonably pru- that “a reasonably evidence that a derance manufacturer could and would have tak- dent prudent product seller could and would have precautions by incorporating additional en Lee precautions.” Miller v. taken additional any of safer alternatives into the manu- those 1015, Company, Apparel Kan.App.2d facture” of the vehicle at issue. Id. See also added). (1994) 576, 2, (emphasis Giv- Corp., P.2d Motors 207 Kan. Garst General (1971): expert’s ing plaintiffs the benefit of their 484 P.2d “One of the most testimony, Limpert’s significant factors is whether others disputed at best Dr. using design ... [and] field are the same testimony opinion, contrary to indicates his design yet whether a safer not use is opinion qualified at as well of others least pro- to be feasible.” The evidence known could or regard, in this that General Motors that a supports duced at trial the conclusion improved design “to be more might have any prudent not take additional seller would ‘front-biased,’” have and that this would not to be precautions, but this deemed Dr. been safer under the circumstances. enough any reference to the Garst without Limpert brake balance of was critical of the I do not believe that reasonable decision. manufacturers, GM; just many he con- differ as to whether General minds could question ceded that in tests of the vehicle statutory pre- was entitled to the lock the fronts and both rears did not before sumption of non-defectiveness of the brake for brak- he was dissatisfied with standards system. country Europe. The ing both in this I hold that the federal standards would undisputed no vehicle of this proof was clearly performance met brake type in did or would meet Dr. the world defendant, meet and that failed to Limpert’s design notions. proof to overcome Gen- or establish sufficient au- majority does not controvert the therefore, would, showing. I eral held, thority of As the Miller court Miller. in error that the district court was also hold “[testimony product that a ‘could have been judg- motion for granting in not defendant’s ways ... lot or in alternate made a safer’ notwithstanding the verdict. ment jury question under does not create a K.S.A. enter Accordingly, I and would DISSENT 60-3304(a).” (citing Id. 881 P.2d Kansas law. judgment for defendant under Service, Inc., 219 Kan. v. Hittle Jones (1976)). 631-32, The court 549 P.2d 1383

added: v. Clorox 926 F.2d Goins

(6th Cir.1991), a Ten- the court examined University graduation of Kansas. after have established domicile from

Case Details

Case Name: prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 14,908 Alexander MacDonald (95-6028/6286) v. General Motors Corporation, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant (95-6030/6287)
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 3, 1997
Citation: 110 F.3d 337
Docket Number: 95-6028, 95-6030, 95-6286 and 95-6287
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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