In the Matter of David Thomas Dorer
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for voluntary discipline filed by Respondent David Thomas Dorer (State Bar No. 934408) prior to the filing of a formal complaint. In his petition, Dorer, who has been a member of the Bar since 2012, seeks a Review Panel reprimand for his admitted violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4), the maximum penalty for which is disbarment. The State Bar has responded, recommending that this Court accept the petition.
In his petition, Dorer states that in November 2014, a client hired him to represent her husband in a state forfeiture matter. In order to meet the statutory deadlines, Dorer states that he prepared a verified answer to which he signed the client‘s name, indicating that he had express permission to do so. Dorer had the signature notarized by his assistant and filed the document in court in response to the forfeiture petition. Dorer further states that he met
“In performing any notarial act, a notary public shall confirm the identity of the document signer, oath taker, or affirmant based on personal knowledge or on satisfactory evidence.”2
Dorer later filed this petition for voluntary discipline.
Dorer contends that his actions did not violate Rule 8.4 (a) (3)3 because, in his view, his misdemeanor conviction did not involve a crime of moral turpitude. What Dorer expressly admitted in his guilty plea is that he
Dorer asserts that his proposed discipline is in line with this Court‘s precedent. See In the Matter of Davis, 291 Ga. 169 (728 SE2d 548) (2012) (Review Panel reprimand for two violations of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) arising from attorney‘s action of falsifying client‘s signature on court documents and having those signatures notarized); In the Matter of West, 301 Ga. 901 (804 SE2d 340) (2017) (Review Panel reprimand an appropriate sanction for violations arising out of attorney‘s having signed his client‘s name to an application for asylum without any intent to deceive or falsify).5 In mitigation of discipline, Dorer asserts that he has no prior disciplinary history; that he has cooperated in this disciplinary proceeding; that he is remorseful; and that he otherwise has good character and reputation in the
In its response, the Bar agrees that it is best to consider this case solely as a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4)6 but contends that the mitigating factors should include only that Dorer has no prior disciplinary history; that he has displayed a cooperative attitude; and that he is inexperienced in the practice of law. The Bar contends that under the circumstances of this case, a Review Panel reprimand is appropriate. See Davis, supra; West, supra; In the Matter of Swain, 290 Ga. 678 (725 SE2d 244) (2012) (public reprimand for notarizing a signature outside the presence of the signer). But while the conclusions that Dorer violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) and that a Review Panel reprimand is appropriate may ultimately, in fact, be sound ones, they cannot be drawn reasonably from the sparse admissions contained in the petition.
By definition, a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) involves “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” To conclude, therefore, that the petition shows a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4), the petition must admit facts that would establish dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. We find no such admission in the petition. According to the petition, Dorer signed a
Perhaps the deceit and misrepresentation was not the signature itself, but instead, the representation that Dorer had permission to affix the signature to the verification. But no admission in the petition supports such a conclusion. Indeed, the petition is silent about whether Dorer had permission to sign the verification. Dorer does admit in the petition that he entered a plea of guilty to a criminal violation of
Dorer may have lacked permission to sign the verification, but the petition does not show a lack of permission. Perhaps the petition is incomplete, or maybe it misrepresents what actually happened.7 But we find no basis in the petition for discipline under Rule 8.4 (a) (4). In the absence of a better understanding of exactly what Dorer did to violate that Rule and why Rule 8.4 (a) (3) is not applicable, we reject his petition. That is what this Court has done in other cases in which petitions for voluntary discipline lacked sufficient detail for us to determine that a violation actually occurred or for us to understand the nature of the conduct amounting to the violation. See, e.g., In the Matter of Braziel, 303 Ga. 154, 156 (810 SE2d 476) (2018) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline in part “[b]ecause of the uncertainty regarding the underlying facts“); In the Matter of West, 299 Ga. 731, 732 (791 SE2d 781) (2016) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline where “the facts admitted by West simply do not support the conclusion that he violated Rule 1.2 (d)“). Especially considering that a Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation is among the most serious charges that can be leveled against an attorney — it is a violation that commonly warrants disbarment8 — we do not accept a Review Panel reprimand as a sufficient sanction for a putative Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation without a full understanding of the underlying facts.
Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. Nahmias, P. J., Benham, Hunstein, Blackwell, Boggs, and Peterson, JJ., concur. Melton, C. J., dissents.
Based on Dorer‘s petition for voluntary discipline, the majority concludes that there is insufficient evidence to show that David Thomas Dorer violated Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 (a) (4), and, concomitantly, a Review Panel reprimand is not appropriate. I believe, however, that Dorer‘s admissions show that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4), and a Review Panel reprimand is an appropriate sanction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Dorer pled guilty to violating
Petition for voluntary discipline.
R. Gary Spencer, for Dorer.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.