In the Matter of Michael Chase
No. 69
Appellate Court of Maryland
July 8, 2026
Kehoe, S., J.
September Term, 2025
Holdings: The Court held that although
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – PUBLIC SAFETY § 5-306(a)(2)(i) – AMBIGUITY AS APPLIED TO OUT-OF-STATE CONVICTIONS
Although the language of
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – DISTINCTION BETWEEN “CARRIES” AND “HAS BEEN IMPOSED”
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – CHANGE FROM “COULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED” TO “HAS BEEN IMPOSED”
Legislative history shows that earlier draft language referring to a sentence that “could have been imposed” was replaced with the enacted text “has been imposed,” signaling an intent to rely on an applicant’s actual, individualized sentence rather than a hypothetical maximum penalty.
A sentence is “imposed” when the court pronounces it, even if execution is suspended; the imposed term includes both executed and suspended portions.
FIREARMS – DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSSESSION PROHIBITIONS AND CARRY PERMITS QUALIFICATIONS
FIREARMS – HANDGUN PERMIT ELIGIBILITY – OUT-OF-STATE CONVICTIONS – NO CONVERSION TO MARYLAND OFFENSE REQUIRED
The equivalency analysis used for “disqualifying crimes” under
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – PROPER BASIS FOR DENIAL – ERRONEOUS REASONING YET CORRECT RESULT
Even where the Administrative Law Judge misstated the statutory ground for denial, the agency’s ultimate decision must be affirmed if the record demonstrates that the denial was legally correct under the appropriate statutory provision.
Case No. C-08-CV-24-000133
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND
No. 69
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL CHASE
______________________________________
Berger,
Kehoe, S.,
Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Kehoe, J.
______________________________________
Filed: July 8, 2026
2026.07.08 ‘00‘04- 14:52:44
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
In this case, we consider the language of
The questions presented for our review, which we have rephrased and separated into three questions,2 are as follows:
- Whether
§ 5-306(a)(2)(i) is clear and unambiguous as it applies to out-of-state convictions? - Whether the Maryland equivalency analysis applies to out-of-state convictions under
§ 5-306(a)(2)(i) ? - Whether it was proper for the Department to deny Mr. Chase’s handgun permit application under
§ 5-306(a)(2)(i) ?
For the reasons stated herein, we answer in the negative to the first two questions and in the affirmative on the last question, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles County and the decision of the Department.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Denial by the Maryland Department of State Police
Mr. Chase applied for a handgun permit with the Licensing Division of the Department on October 9, 2022. Through a criminal background investigation, the Department discovered that in September of 2008, Mr. Chase was charged in Alexandria, Virginia with possession of burglarious tools, disregarding or eluding a law enforcement
The Department denied Mr. Chase’s Application due to his 2009 Virginia conviction. Initially, the Department denied the Application on December 12, 2022, based on
After consultation with Assistant Attorney General Mark Bowen, the Department revised the basis for the denial. In an updated denial letter dated June 28, 2023, Mr. Chase
B. Appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings
On May 30, 2023, Mr. Chase appealed the denial of his Application to the OAH. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on November 7, 2023. Senior Trooper Matthew Spencer (“Sr. Tpr. Spencer”), on behalf of the Licensing Division, Handgun Permit Unit, presented the Department’s case.7 Mr. Chase’s Application and criminal record were entered into evidence. Sr. Tpr. Spencer testified that the initial denial based on a disqualifying crime pursuant to
The evidence presented by Mr. Chase at the hearing detailed the restoration of his civil rights in Virginia and his subsequent eligibility for various firearms-related licenses,
Mr. Chase testified that he operates a firearms transfer business, MJ’s Properties d/b/a Guns and Ammo, purchasing and distributing firearms in the State of Maryland. Mr. Chase further explained that he has “a Federal Firearm License that allows [him] to distribute, sell, and deliver firearms federally, [] in any state where a customer might purchase a firearm.”
During his testimony, Mr. Chase acknowledged his conviction in Virginia and that the sentence imposed was three years of incarceration with all but 30 days suspended. He clarified that he never went “to prison” but instead completed 30 days of community service with the City of Alexandria as part of his sentence.
In closing argument, Sr. Tpr. Spencer asserted:
The argument as to what the Maryland equivalent charge would be and what statutory penalty is, is irrelevant in this matter. We’re not making the argument that Mr. Chase has been convicted of a crime prohibiting him from the possession of a handgun. We’re arguing that Mr. Chase received a sentence greater than [one] year for the conviction he received, which would prohibit him from the issuance of a handgun permit in the State of Maryland.
Counsel for Mr. Chase in closing argument maintained that when the conviction originates from out-of-state, the Department must use the equivalent Maryland offense and penalty to determine whether the conviction is disqualifying. Here, the equivalent offense is theft from $100 to $1,500 and the statutory maximum penalty is six months incarceration. Accordingly, counsel argued that Mr. Chase is eligible for a handgun permit and the Department erred in their denial.
On February 2, 2024, the ALJ issued its written decision, sustaining the Department’s denial of Mr. Chase’s Application. The ALJ made the following factual findings:
- On October 9, 2022, [Mr. Chase] filed an original application to obtain a handgun permit, under the category of personal protection.
- As part of the application process, the Department conducted a criminal background check of [Mr. Chase].
- On September 25, 2008, in the Circuit Court [of] the City of Alexandria, Virginia, [Mr. Chase] was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Grand Larceny of Property with an aggregate value of $200.00 or more, a felony. On March 12, 2009, he was convicted of the crime and sentenced to three years[‘] incarceration, of which two years and eleven months were suspended. [Mr. Chase] was placed on supervised probation for two years. []
- [Mr. Chase’s] conviction has not been expunged.
- [Mr. Chase] operates a firearms business in Maryland in which he purchases and sells firearms. He has current federal and Maryland firearms licenses. []
On [September 17, 2020], the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria, Virginia restored his rights to purchase and maintain firearms. []
The ALJ disagreed with Mr. Chase’s argument that the Department must convert an out-of-state conviction to the equivalent Maryland offense and penalty. According to the ALJ, the “equivalency provision” that Mr. Chase advocates, originates from case law that does “not apply to felony convictions under section 5-101(g)(2) [] but instead apply only to misdemeanor convictions.”10 Moreover, the ALJ agreed with the Department that “Maryland is not required to follow another state’s decision to restore handgun rights.”11
Ultimately, the ALJ concluded:
The Department disapproved [Mr. Chase’s] application because he had a disqualifying conviction. It presented evidence showing that [Mr. Chase] has a conviction in [Virginia] for grand larceny, a felony conviction with a sentence for more than one year. As of the date of the hearing, this conviction was not expunged. [Mr. Chase] did not offer any evidence to dispute these facts. Accordingly, I conclude that [Mr. Chase] has failed to establish that the Department’s disapproval of his application was incorrect.
With that, the ALJ upheld the Department’s denial of Mr. Chase’s Application.
On February 23, 2024, Mr. Chase filed for judicial review of the ruling from the OAH in the Circuit Court for Charles County. The court held a hearing on February 24, 2025, during which the parties presented oral arguments.
Mr. Chase repeated the arguments previously made before the OAH, that an out-of-state conviction must be converted to the equivalent Maryland offense and penalty to determine eligibility for a handgun permit. In addition, Mr. Chase asserted that the “OAH’s ruling in this matter was not supported by substantial evidence, was erroneous as a matter of law, and was arbitrary and capricious.” As such, Mr. Chase requested that the circuit court reverse the ruling of the OAH and the Department’s denial of his Application.
The Department argued again that Mr. Chase’s conviction “for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than [one] year has been imposed,” pursuant to
From the bench, the circuit court affirmed the ruling of the OAH and the Department’s denial of Mr. Chase’s Application. In its ruling, the court explained:
I have reviewed the filings in this case. I read the memorand[a] and looked at the Office of Administrative [Hearings] record and the record in this case.
[. . .]
[Mr. Chase] makes some very interesting arguments regarding the inter-relation of the statutes, the legislative history regarding the statutes and the presentation was very enlightening in this, in all of that and how all of these matters tie together. And in light of the changes that are occurring in the Court’s interpretations of gun laws recently, there’s been substantial litigation in that field.
However, I have to go back to the requirement that the Court interpret the language if it’s clear and unambiguous.
In this case in looking at [§] 5-306[(a)(2)(i)], it indicates that the Secretary shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds has not been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment [] for more than one year has been imposed.
The way this statute is written is clear, it’s not ambiguous and the sentence doesn’t require any interpretation.
The court issued its written order on March 3, 2025. Mr. Chase now appeals the judgment of the circuit court to this Court.
Additional facts may be included in the discussion as they become relevant.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, such as the Department’s decision to deny a handgun permit application, we review:
the agency’s decision directly, not the decision of the circuit court. A reviewing court will affirm the decision of the agency when it is supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record and it is not erroneous as a matter of law. Because an agency’s decision is presumed prima facie correct, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency.
McCloud, 200 Md. App. at 729 (quoting McLean, 197 Md. App. at 437). Moreover, “[w]hen we review an agency decision that is a mixed question of law and fact, we apply the substantial evidence test, that is, the same standard of review we would apply to an agency factual finding.” Brown, 188 Md. App. at 467 (quoting Comptroller of Treasury v. Science Applications Int’l Corp., 405 Md. 185, 192–93 (2008)) (internal brackets and
As there are no facts in dispute here, the question of whether the Department’s denial of Mr. Chase’s Application was proper is a question of law. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. However, weight is given “to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing where the interpretation is longstanding and falls within the agency’s area of expertise.” Id. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, “administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, are not given weight.” McLean, 197 Md. App. at 438.
IV. DISCUSSION
On appeal before this Court, Mr. Chase argues that the language of
Because the statutory maximum penalty for a first offense under
The Department counterargues that
Similarly, the phrase “sentence imposed” is clear and unambiguous. The Department argues that Mr. Chase’s approach to disregard the actual imposed sentence and instead “invent a sentence based on what an individual hypothetically could have been sentenced to” creates an absurd result and contravenes the plain meaning of the statute. Lastly, the Department avers the rule of lenity only applies to criminal statutes, which
A. Handgun Permits: Public Safety § 5-301, et seq.
First, to purchase and possess a handgun legally in Maryland, one must obtain a Handgun Qualification License (“HQL”) from the Department, pursuant to
(a) Subject to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the Secretary shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds:
[. . .]
(2)(i) has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than 1 year has been imposed[.]
To ascertain the meaning of a statute, “[w]e first look to the language of the statute to determine its plain meaning[.]” McCloud v. Dep’t of State Police, Handgun Permit Rev. Bd., 426 Md. 473, 479 (2012). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, “we apply the language as written and in a commonsense manner.” McLean, 197 Md. App. at 440 (quoting Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 571 (2005)). “We do not add words or ignore those that are there.” Id. We read the statute as a whole, ensuring that “no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172 (2007) (quoting Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 420 (2007)). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to any other rules of statutory interpretation. McCloud, 426 Md. at 480.
However, if the language is ambiguous, that is, “subject to more than one interpretation,” we may look to “the statute’s legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose” to determine the meaning of the statute. Brown, 188 Md. App. at 468 (quoting Opert v. Crim. Injs. Comp. Bd., 403 Md. 587, 593 (2008)). When relevant, we may look at
[. . .]
(4) Has been convicted of:
(a) A crime of violence;
(b) Any violation classified as a felony in this State;
(c) Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that carries a statutory penalty of more than [two] years; or
[. . .]
C. Whether § 5-306(a)(2)(i) is Clear and Unambiguous as it Applies to Out-of-State Convictions
First, we address whether
Whether a statute is clear and unambiguous may depend on the issue presented in the case. See Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648 (1997) (“Statutes that are clear when viewed separately may well be ambiguous where their application in a given situation, or when they operate together, is not clear.”). For example, in Brown, this Court concluded
Brown was convicted in the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) for possession of a dangerous weapon, which was a misdemeanor offense that carried a maximum sentence of one year of imprisonment in D.C. Brown, 188 Md. App. at 459. Under D.C.’s statutory maximum penalty, Brown’s conviction would not be a disqualifying crime. However, Brown’s conviction was equated to the Maryland offense of wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon, which is a misdemeanor subject to imprisonment of up to three years, and thus considered a disqualifying crime under
The issue presented in Brown was “whether the Board erred in concluding that Brown was convicted of a misdemeanor in [D.C.] for which the equivalent Maryland offense carries a potential statutory penalty of more than two years.” Id. at 461. We concluded that the statute was ambiguous with respect to this issue and held that under
McLean was convicted of a misdemeanor that, at the time of his handgun permit application, carried a maximum sentence of more than two years, which would be disqualifying. McLean, 197 Md. App. at 432. However, at the time of the conviction, the offense carried a maximum sentence of not more than six months, which would not be disqualifying. Id. at 433. Therefore, the issue turned on the word “carries” in the phrase “a person who has been convicted of a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than two years may not possess a regulated firearm.” Id. at 440. We concluded that for the issue in that case, the statute was not ambiguous and held that in
The ultimate issue presented here is whether it was proper for the Department to deny Mr. Chase‘s Application under
Similarly, we need not address whether the statute means “all felonies and only misdemeanors with a year or more incarceration imposed,” or whether it means “either a felony or a misdemeanor where a year or more was imposed[.]” If we agree with Mr. Chase that his conviction should be converted to the Maryland equivalent, Mr. Chase‘s conviction becomes a misdemeanor, with a sentence of more than one year imposed. If we disagree that the conviction should be converted to the Maryland equivalent, Mr. Chase‘s conviction remains a felony, with a sentence of more than one year imposed. Under either scenario, Mr. Chase‘s conviction would either be: 1.) a felony; 2.) a felony with a sentence of more than one year imposed; or 3.) a misdemeanor with a sentence of more than one year imposed. Any one of these convictions would disqualify Mr. Chase from obtaining a handgun permit under
Next, we “look to the language of the statute to determine its plain meaning[.]” McCloud, 426 Md. at 479. Again,
A crime that is less serious than a felony and is [usually] punishable by fine, penalty, forfeiture, or confinement ([usually] for a brief term) in a place other than prison (such as a county jail). When punishable by confinement, a misdemeanor most commonly entails incarceration for less than a year. [. . .] Also termed minor crime; summary offense.
Misdemeanor, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
A sentence is a “judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.” Sentence, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Imprisonment is the “act of confining a person, [especially] in a prison [. . . .] Also termed incarceration. [. . .] The period during which a person is not at liberty[.]” Imprisonment, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). The word “impose” derives from the Latin imposui, which means “put upon.”18 Therefore, in this context, a sentence that has been imposed, is the actual and individualized sentence “put upon” a defendant by the court in a specific case, as opposed to a maximum (or minimum) sentence that a particular offense carries as indicated by law. Cf.
While the language used in
To resolve this ambiguity, we may look to any relevant case law, the statute‘s legislative history, the statute‘s purpose and structure, and how it relates to other similar laws to determine the meaning of the statute. See Brown, 188 Md. App. at 468. Even when the language of the statute is unambiguous, “it is useful to review legislative history to confirm that interpretation and to eliminate another version of the legislative intent alleged to be latent in the language.” Harford Cnty. v. Mitchell, 245 Md. App. 278, 283–84 (2020) (quoting Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113 (2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
D. Case Law of Title 5. Firearms
Mr. Chase is correct in that there are not any Maryland cases that discuss how
There are several cases in Maryland that interpret the meaning of “a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than [two] years” in
In McCloud, we reaffirmed the interpretation of
[A] “disqualifying crime” can be an offense committed out-of-state that, when looking to a comparable violation in Maryland, is a misdemeanor and
has a penalty of greater than two years imprisonment. To determine whether the out-of-state offense was a disqualifying crime, [. . .] we must look to the penalty for the equivalent Maryland offense in effect at the time the person convicted seeks to possess a regulated firearm. [. . .] [I]f the current penalty for the Maryland offense is different from the penalty in effect at the time of the offense, the current penalty determines whether the offense is a disqualifying crime.
McCloud, 426 Md. at 477 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Our Supreme Court also concluded that we did not err in applying the Attorney General‘s Opinion. Id. at 487.
The statutory interpretation of
E. Legislative History of § 5-306(a)(2)
Mr. Chase further alleges that the legislative history shows that
The Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code was enacted in 2003 through Senate Bill 1, “to revise, restate, and recodify the laws of the State relating to public safety, including laws relating to the State Police, [. . .] firearms, [. . .] etc.” Legislative Reference Bill File for S.B. 001, 2003 Gen. Assemb., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003) (hereinafter “2003 S.B. 001 Bill File“) at 1.
Article 27, § 36 was enacted in 1972 through Senate Bill 205/House Bill 277, also known as the Handgun Control Bill. Md. Code, Art. 27, § 36E (1972 Cumulative Supp.) (repealed); see also Legislative Reference Bill File for S.B. 205, 1972 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1972) (hereinafter “1972 S.B. 205 Bill File“). Governor Marvin Mandel submitted to the 1972 Session of the General Assembly “a bill to control the wide-spread use of handguns in criminal activities in the State of Maryland.” 1972 S.B. 205 Bill File at 60. Governor Mandel‘s “concern was based upon the upsurge of crime in the State and particularly within Baltimore City where 62% of all homicides in 1971 were committed with handguns.” Id. Per the declaration of policy found within Article 27, § 36, “[f]urther regulations on the wearing, carrying, and transporting of handguns are necessary to preserve the peace and tranquility of the State and to protect the rights and liberties of its citizens.” Md. Code, Art. 27, § 36 (1972 Cumulative Supp.) (repealed). The purpose of the Handgun Control Bill was to curb “the widespread carrying of handguns on the street and in vehicles by persons who have no legitimate reason to carry them[,]” as indicated in Governor Mandel‘s letter to Delegate Donald B. Robertson dated December 21, 1971. 1972 S.B. 205 Bill File at 171. However, such purpose does not tell us how to interpret the language of Article 27, § 36E(a)(2), and in turn
We then ask whether there are any other indicia in the legislative history that may help us interpret the language of Article 27, § 36E(a)(2). In the legislative bill file for the
A permit to carry a handgun may be issued by the Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, upon application therefor, to any person who he finds:
[. . .]
(2) has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than one year could have been imposed[.]
1972 S.B. 205 Bill File at 161 (emphasis added). However, this language differs from the language that was ultimately used in Article 27, § 36E(a)(2) and later in
There is nothing found in the bill file that explains the change from “could have been” to “has been.” However, the change in the language alone reflects the legislature‘s
F. Whether the Maryland Equivalency Analysis Applies to Out-of-State Convictions Under § 5-306(a)(2)(i)
There are no cases that address how
Mr. Chase argues that because of the similarities of
Mr. Chase argues that the language of
We previously interpreted the language of “a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State” in
As a matter of grammatical construction, we are persuaded that it is most logical to construe the phrase “that carries a statutory penalty of more than [two] years” as modifying “misdemeanor” rather than “violation.” The conviction for the violation can be from any state; the disqualification under []
§ 5–101(g)(3) , however, is only for those violations “classified as a misdemeanor in this State,” and within that class of offenses, only those that “carr[y] a statutory penalty of more than [two] years” under Maryland law.
Id. The language “classified . . . in the State” in
Moreover, the language “that carries a statutory penalty of more than [two] years” in
[W]hen a court imposes a sentence and then [. . .] suspends execution of all or part of that sentence in favor of probation, and later strikes the probation and directs execution of all or part of the previously suspended part of the sentence, the court does not, at that time reimpose all or any part of the sentence. The full sentence has already been imposed and does not need any reimposition.
While the language of
Moreover, as explained in McCloy, the equivalency analysis used in the
Taken together, the case law, statutory language, purpose, and legislative history make clear that the interpretation of
G. Whether it Was Proper for the Department to Deny Mr. Chase‘s Handgun Permit Application Under § 5-306(a)(2)(i)
Upon holding that
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the sentence provision of
Applicants who have “been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than [one] year has been imposed” are disqualified from obtaining a handgun permit.
If we consider Mr. Chase‘s conviction a misdemeanor and that the sentence provision applies to misdemeanors, because the sentence imposed on Mr. Chase was more than one year, he is disqualified from obtaining a handgun permit. As previously discussed, even assuming the out-of-state offense is converted to the equivalent Maryland offense, it does not affect the sentence considering the language in the statute refers to a “sentence imposed.” Therefore, it was proper for the Department to deny Mr. Chase‘s Application under this scenario as well. Under any one of the three scenarios, Mr. Chase is disqualified from obtaining a handgun permit and the Department‘s denial of his Application was proper.26
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, although
Because the equivalency analysis is not required under
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Notes
A. Qualifications. In accordance with
[. . .]
(2) Is not prohibited from possessing a handgun under COMAR 29.03.01.03 or otherwise prohibited from purchasing or possessing a handgun under federal or State law;
(3) Has not been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than [one] year has been imposed, unless the person has been pardoned or the United States Attorney General has granted relief;
[. . .]
COMAR 29.03.01.03, as cited above, regarding the restrictions on the possession of regulated firearms, including handguns, in pertinent part, reads:
A. A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person:
A permit to carry a handgun shall be issued within a reasonable time by the Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, upon application under oath therefor, to any person whom he finds:
[. . .]
(2) Has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than one year has been imposed or, if convicted of such a crime, has been pardoned or has been granted relief pursuant to Title 18, § 925(c) of the United States Code[.]
Md. Code, Art. 27, § 36E (1972 Cumulative Supp.) (repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 26 § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 2002).