In re Zen T.
All opinions are subject to modificatiоn and technical correction prior to official publication in the
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the
Amor C. Rosario, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Lisabeth B. Mindera, for the minor child.
PER CURIAM. The self-represented respondent mother, Heather S., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to oрen the judgment terminating her parental rights. On appeal, she sets forth a variety of issues, none of which has merit. We conclude, therefore, that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to open. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This court recently affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating thе respondent’s parental rights as to Zen T., the respondent’s minor child.1 See In re Zen T., 149 Conn. App. 376, 88 A.3d 1286, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 911, A.3d (2014). In that opinion, we set forth the following facts and procedural history, which are relevant to the present appeal. ‘‘The petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families . . . filed a petition with the court, requesting that the parental rights of the respondent be terminated. The statutory ground alleged in the petition against the respondent mother is that the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission, including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pаttern of abuse, the care, guidance, or control necessary for the child’s physical, educational, moral, or emotional well-being, [pursuant to]
‘‘After the trial concluded, the court held that the petitioner proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, as required by
The sole issue raised in the respondent’s first appeal was that she was denied effective assistance of counsel and was prejudiced thereby. Id., 377. We rejected her claim, concluding that she hаd ‘‘not demonstrated that her trial counsel’s representation resulted in prejudice to her.’’ Id., 382.
After she had filed her first appeal, the respondent filed a motion in the trial court to open or set aside the judgment on December 30, 2013, approximately four months after that court’s judgment.3 She alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, unethical practices by the
The court held a hearing on January 16, 2014, at which time the respondent filed an amended motion to open and set aside the judgment. The court issued an oral ruling denying the respondent’s amended motion because she failed to allege or establish that granting the motion was in the best interest of Zen T. as required by
We begin by setting forth the legal principles that guide our anаlysis. ‘‘Our review of a court’s denial of a motion to open . . . is well settled. We do not undertake a plenary review of the merits of a decision of the trial court to grant or to deny a motion to open a judgment. . . . In an appeal from a denial of a motion to open a judgment, our review is limited to the issuе of whether the trial court has acted unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion. . . . In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. . . . The manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed so long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41, 45, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘As to a termination of parental rights judgment, before granting a motion to open, the court must also consider the best interest of the child.
The respondent first claims that the court improperly found that it was not in Zen T.’s best interest to remain with her. We review this claim under the сlearly erroneous standard of review. In re Travis R., supra, 80 Conn. App. 786. The court initially noted that the respondent had not raised the issue of the best interest of Zen T. in her motion as required by
The respondent also argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel during the termination proceedings and, therefore, the court should have granted the motion to open. As noted previously, in the respondent’s appeal from the judgment terminating her parental rights, the sole issue raised was that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the respondent is barred from raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of res judicata. See State v. Jones, 98 Conn. App. 695, 700–701, 911 A.2d 353 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 916, 917 A.2d 1000 (2007); see also State v. Collazo, 115 Conn. App. 752, 757, 974 A.2d 729 (2009) (doctrine of collateral estoppel barred defendant from relitigating claim decided in prior appeal), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 929, 986 A.2d 1057 (2010). We conclude, therefore, that the respondent’s claim that the court improperly found that it was not in Zen T.’s best interest to remain with her must fail.
The respondent next claims that she was not allowed to present evidence to support her motion to open. Our review of the record reveals that the respondent did not request an evidentiary hearing, and she has not pointed us to any authority requiring the court to conduct such a hearing. See, e.g., American Honda Finance Corp. v. Johnson, 80 Conn. App. 164, 168, 834 A.2d 59 (2003). We conclude, therefore, that the court did not аbuse its discretion in not holding an evidentiary hearing with respect to the respondent’s motion to open.
The respondent next claims that her fourteenth amendment right to due process was violated because she was not appointed counsel for the motion to open. A parent has a statutory, not constitutional, right to appointed counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings. See In re Isaiah J., 140 Conn. App. 626, 640, 59 A.3d 392, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926, 64 A.3d 333, cert. denied sub nom Megan J. v. Katz, U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 317, 187 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2013); see also In re Elysa D., 116 Conn. App. 254, 265, 974 A.2d 834 (no federal or state constitutional right to appointed counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 936, 981 A.2d 1079 (2009). We are unaware of any statute requiring the court, sua sponte, to appoint counsel for a party who has moved to open a judgment terminating parental rights. We conclude, therefore, that this claim must fail.
The respondent next claims that her fourteenth amendment right to due process was violated because the trial judge did not recuse herself from deciding thе motion to open. Specifically, the respondent alleges that Judge Elgo ‘‘may have recused herself from the [respondent’s] original termination of parental rights
The respondent finally claims that the court improperly failed to grant her a continuance in order to finish her amended brief or obtain private counsel. The petitioner counters that the respondent never made an explicit request for a continuance and, even if she had, the denial of such a request would not amount to an abuse of discretion. Our review of the record reveals that although the respondent contemplated requesting a continuance, she never actually made such a request. In the absence of such a request, the court could not abuse its discretion in not granting a continuance.
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
‘‘[B]ecause the defendant did not file his motion to open within twenty days from the date of the judgment, the appeal from the denial of that motion can test only whether the court abused its discretion in failing to open the judgment and not the propriety of the merits of the underlying
‘‘And, based on the court’s prior decision, as well as representations, not only made by the state and the child but even the [respondent’s] own statements with respect to best interests . . . are not adequate or a sufficient basis to find that it’s in the best interest.
‘‘I listened very carefully to the [respondent’s] arguments and the [respondent’s] arguments continue to be really focused on her own ideas of what is in the best interest of her child but not necessarily what is in Zen’s best interest based on whаt his . . . needs are and what his situation is. She’s not been able to address some of the underlying issues that supported Judge Gleeson’s claims regarding—or Judge Gleeson’s findings with respect to best interest.
‘‘So I believe she has not alleged that it’s in the best interests of Zen for the motion to open to be—for the motion to set aside а judgment. It was not claimed in her motion.
‘‘The court also finds it is not in the best interests for this case—for this child’s case to be further litigated in this venue. There’s already . . . an appeal that has been filed that I understand is pending before the Appellate Court that raises some of these issues.
‘‘And so, given the strength of the evidence, the failure of [the respondent] to make an adequate prima facie claim regarding a motion to reopen, the court is going to deny the motion.’’