In Re Z.S.
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Bressler
OPINION
{¶ 1} Appellant, Z.S., appeals the decision of the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to impose a consecutive term of commitment to the Department of Youth Services (“DYS“). We affirm the juvenile court for the reasons outlined below.
{¶ 2} On December 8, 2004, appellant was found delinquent for committing four counts of burglary (three felоnies of the second degree if committed by an adult, and one felony of the fourth degree if committed by an adult), and one count of breaking and entering, a felony of the fifth degree if committed by an adult.
{¶ 3} Appellant was adjudicated delinquent and committed to DYS for an indefinite term of a minimum of four years after the juvenile court imposed threе 12-month minimum commitments and two six-month minimum commitments to be served consecutively to each other.1 Appellant filed this appeal, setting forth two assignments of error.
{¶ 4} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 5} “Ohio Revised Code Section
{¶ 6} Appellant argues that he was denied equal protection under the law because
{¶ 7} A review of the record indicates that appellant failed to raise this issue before the juvenile court. An appellate court will not consider any error which counsel for the complaining party could have called to the attention of the lower court at a time when such alleged error could have been avoided or corrected by the lower court. State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122. Constitutional rights “may be lost as finally as any others by a failure to assert them at the proper time.” Id. The question of the constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised in the trial court. Id. The waiver doctrine stated in Awan is discretionary. In re M.D. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 149, syllabus.
{¶ 8} We note
{¶ 9} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 10} “[Z.S.] was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel under the
{¶ 11} Appellant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to object to the juvenile court‘s imposition of consecutive terms in disposition.4 To decide appellant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must apply the two-tier test of Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. First, appellant must show that counsel‘s actions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Second, appellant must show that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel‘s actions. Id. at 687.
{¶ 12} A court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. To establish prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
{¶ 13} During our review of the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will consider the argument that
{¶ 14} Appellant argues that the 2002 changes to the juvenile code shifted the emphasis from rehabilitation toward punishment and, therefore, made the juvenile code more analogous to the adult sentencing scheme and its requirements that findings be made before imposing consecutive sentences.
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} Under the felony sentencing laws of the adult system,
{¶ 17} The guarantee of equal protection of the laws means that “no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the law which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances.” State v. Gledhill (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 372, 373; State v. DePascale (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 163. The Equal Protection Clause does not require that a state never distinguish between citizens, but only that the distinctions made are not arbitrary or invidious. Avery v. Midland County, Texas (1968), 390 U.S. 474, 484, 88 S.Ct. 1114; In re Vaughn (Aug. 13, 1990), Butler App. No. CA89-11-162. The Constitution does not require things that are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. Plyler v. Doe (1982), 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382. The standard for determining whether a statute or ordinance violates equal protection is the same under the state and federal constitutions. In re Joshua R.C., Erie App. No. E-05-016, E-050-17, E-05-018, 2005-Ohio-6248, ¶ 9.
{¶ 18} We begin our discussion by noting that the following cases from different appellate districts found no constitutional violation after considering the argument that
{¶ 19} All legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 289, 1992-Ohio-133. Courts must apply all presumptions and rules of constructiоn to uphold a challenged statute. Id.
{¶ 20} When determining whether a statute violates the right to equal protection, a court must determine whether the classification disadvantages a “suspect class,” or impinges upon the exercise of a “fundamental right.” Plyler v. Doe (1982), 457 U.S. 202, 216-217, 102 S.Ct. 2382. “With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce thе mandate of equal protection by requiring the state to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Id.
{¶ 21} We note that a review of the case law reveals that juvenile offenders previously challenged the constitutionality of
{¶ 22} Appellant now argues that the issue before the court involves a deprivation of liberty and affects a fundamental right. Appellant provides no authority to support his аrgument that a statute that permits a juvenile court to impose consecutive term of commitment without a statement of findings impinges upon his exercise of a fundamental right, and we found no authority for such proposition. See In re Slater at ¶ 7, appeal not allowed 105 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2005-Ohio-531 (appellant asserted that he was entitled to specific findings before consecutive sentences cоuld be imposed, court stated that it could find no authority that such a right was a fundamental right); see, also, In re Chappell at ¶ 45-49 (appellant argued that juvenile detention is a deprivation of liberty, but appellate court, finding no equal protection violation, stated that distinctions between juveniles and adults are permitted in the context of incarceration and detention); In re Estes, Washington App. No. 04CA11, 2004-Ohio-5163, at ¶ 31 (it is the nature of the conduct that resulted in the deprivation of liberty that determines the level of scrutiny utilized by the court and court declined to hold that juvenile had protected interest in violating terms of probation by bringing contraband into detention).
{¶ 23} In the absence of state action that involves a suspect class or fundamеntal right, an equal protection challenge is reviewed under the “rational basis” level of scrutiny. In re Chappell, ¶ 35. We find ample authority to consider appellant‘s issue under the rational basis level of scrutiny. Id.; In re R.L., ¶ 17; In re Slater, ¶ 7.
{¶ 24} Under this rational basis test, the court will uphold the statute as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate state interest. Romer v. Evans (1996), 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620; In re Chappell, ¶ 39. “Classifications are set aside only if they are based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the state‘s goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.” Clements v. Fashing (1982), 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836.
{¶ 25} We agree with the premise that it is constitutionally permissible for juveniles to be treated differently from adults in the eyes of the law. In re Joshua R.C., ¶ 13; In re Gillespie at ¶ 19. “[O]ur acceptance of juvenile courts distinсt from the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from adults.” Bellotti v. Baird (1979), 443 U.S. 622, 635, 99 S.Ct. 3035.
{¶ 26} The Ninth District Court of Appeals stated in In re Slater that “Ohio courts have previously held that systemic differences exist between juvenile and adult criminal courts.” In re Slater at ¶ 8. The Slater court noted that the overriding purpose of juvenile dispositions is to provide for the care, protection and devеlopment of children, protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the juvenile offender. Id. citing
{¶ 27} A rational basis exists for sentencing juveniles in a “different fashion” than adults because the purposes of felony sentencing and juvenile sentencing are different, and juvenile courts are given wider discretion in the early release of offenders. In re Slater at ¶ 10. “Either of these factors alone provides a rational basis for the legislature to treat adults and juveniles differently for the purposes of fеlony sentencing.” Id.
{¶ 28} The Eighth District Court of Appeals also concluded that a rational basis exists for treating juvenile offenders differently than adult offenders because the objectives of the juvenile system differ from the adult criminal justice system. In re R.L. at ¶ 18. The state‘s primary objective in the adult criminal system is to deter further criminal conduct and to punish the offender, while the state‘s objective in the juvenile system focuses on protection, development and habilitation. Id. at ¶ 18, 20.
{¶ 29} The distinction between the treatment of juvenile and adult offenders is “a hard-fought and well-deserved distinction,” that we see no reason to supplant with one that would “diminish the value society places on the development of youth.” In re R.L. at ¶ 25. The Seventh District Court of Appeals found that adult and juvenile justice systems, as a whole, were so different that it was “difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the relative importance of a single procedural difference dealing with consecutive punishments.” In re Chappell at ¶ 49.
{¶ 30} Appellant stresses that the changes in the juvenile code in 2002 shifted the focus to protecting the public and holding the offender accountable, and included a consistency in sentencing provision similar to the adult sentencing statutes. See
{¶ 31} “We cannot ignore the fact that the revisions in the juvenile code, which took effect in 2002, did not dramatically alter the basic purposes of juvenile dispositions. In re Chappell at ¶ 49. ”
{¶ 32} The record in the case аt bar demonstrates that the juvenile court was mindful of the dispositional purpose outlined in the juvenile code when it imposed the consecutive commitments to DYS for appellant‘s acts of delinquency. The juvenile court judge made the following statements from the bench at appellant‘s dispositional hearing:
{¶ 33} “For your benefit as well аs the benefit of everybody in the room. First of all, [trial counsel] has done an admirable job for you, keeping you from the adult system. You would have gone to prison for the same amount of time if not longer and you would not have the opportunities to turn your life around that you are going to have at the Department of Youth Services. You‘re gоing to have education opportunities. You can end up not only being a high school graduate but also getting a degree from a community college while you are there. So you have an opportunity for education, you‘ve had ample opportunity for substance abuse therapy and any other therapy that you may neеd.”
{¶ 34} “So, while in fact you‘re going away for a long time to protect the community from you and to protect you from you, you have a lot of opportunities there to * * * turn your life around. We‘ve seen it happen. Go for it, okay?”
{¶ 35} We have reviewed the arguments of counsel and the law discussed above. We find that
{¶ 36} Based upon our finding that
{¶ 37} Further, we disagree with appellant‘s argument that his trial counsel did not advocate on his behalf. The excerpt from the transcript quoted above indicates that appellant was facing transfer to the adult criminal courts. Trial counsel‘s negotiated agreement kept appellant in the juvenile system, and preserved access to educatiоnal and rehabilitative programs within the juvenile system. Trial counsel‘s representation did not fall outside the range of professionally competent assistance. Appellant‘s second assignment is overruled.
{¶ 38} Judgment affirmed.
Powell, P.J., and Young, J., concur.