In Re S.C.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Donovan, Brogan, Wolff
OPINION
{¶ 1} S.C. is appealing the judgment of the Montgomery County Court Juvenile Division, which declared him to be delinquent and ordered him to serve three and a half years with the Department of Youth Services (“DYS“).
{¶ 2} On April 27, 2004, S.C. was brought before the juvenile court on delinquency complaints. The State alleged that S.C. had committed оffenses that if he were an adult would have constituted three counts of burglary, a second degree felony, and one count of receiving stolen property, a fourth degree felony. At the hearing, S.C. admitted responsibility for the alleged offenses. The juvenile court adjudged S.C. to be delinquent.
{¶ 3} S.C. aрologized for his actions and stated that he was remorseful. Moreover, S.C. stated that he had accepted the charges and had been willing to take responsibility for what he had done. The juvenile court then heard from several of the victims of S.C.‘s acts. The court then entered its disposition, committing S.C. to DYS for a minimum of one year up to a maximum of his twenty-first birthday for each of the burglary offenses and to a minimum of six months up to a maximum of his twenty-first birthday for the receiving stolen property offense. The juvenile court ordered that the commitments be served consecutively. Neither S.C. nor his counsel оbjected to the consecutive commitments.
{¶ 4} S.C. has filed this appeal from his disposition, raising the following as his sole assignment of error.
{¶ 5} “R.C.
{¶ 6} S.C. argues that R.C.
{¶ 7} The equal protection clause of the
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} In this case, S.C. argues R.C.
{¶ 10} “If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing two or more acts that would be felonies if committed by an adult and if the court entering the delinquent child adjudication orders the commitment of the child for two or more of those acts to the legal custody of the department of youth services for institutionalization in a secure facility pursuant to section
{¶ 11} S.C. argues that R.C.
{¶ 12} In this case, the juvenile court ordered S.C. to be сommitted to the DYS for consecutive periods of time without making any findings such as those that would be required by R.C.
{¶ 13} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he general rule is that `an appellate court will not consider any error which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court‘s judgment could have called but did not call to the trial court‘s attention at a time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by thе trial court.’ * * * Likewise `[c]onstitutional rights may be lost as finally as any others by a failure to assert them at the proper time.’ * * * Accordingly, the question of thе constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised at the first opportunity and, in a criminal prosecution, this means in the trial court.” State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122. However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that this waiver doctrine is discretionary and that “[e]ven where waiver is clear, this court reserves the right to considеr constitutional challenges to the application of statutes in specific cases of plain error or where the rights and interests involvеd may warrant it.” In re M.D. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 149, syllabus.
{¶ 14} In this case, S.C. concedes that neither he nor his counsel raised the issue of the constitutionality of R.C.
{¶ 15} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Brogan, P.J. and Wolff,