In re Yolanda L.
Landon Villavaso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Assistant County Counsel and Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2015, four-year-old Yolanda and six-month-old Javier lived with mother and father in Montebello. Mother worked as a teacher in the Montebello school district. Father was a licensed security guard and had a permit to carry an exposed firearm, but he had been unemployed for several years and was the children‘s primary caretaker. Unbeknownst to the family, father was the subject of a narcotics investigation by a multi-agency task force including the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). That investigation brought the family to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on September 29, 2015. That morning, the family home was under surveillance by a task force team with a search warrant already in their possession. The team observed three vehicles registered to that location, including a Ford F-150 truck, parked in the driveway. Father was observed leaving the house, getting into the Ford truck and driving away. Father was on the northbound 605 Freeway when he was pulled over by the task force, which found three pounds of crystal methamphetamine in the truck. Father told Detective Steve Anderson that there was a gun in a bag in a hall closet at the family home. During a search of the family home that day, Detective Anderson found a black nylon
When the social worker arrived, the younger child, Javier, was inside the home in the care of paternal grandmother, who was visiting from Mexico. Father was being detained in a car parked in front of the house. Father admitted participating in a narcotics transaction but told the social worker that mother had no knowledge of his illegal activities. Father said this was the second time he had picked up a box containing illegal narcotics in exchange for $100. The social worker was still at the family home when mother arrived with daughter Yolanda. Mother said she had been told that father was under arrest for being in possession of illegal narcotics; mother did not use drugs and had never seen any illegal drugs at the house. Mother agreed to immediately relocate with the children to somewhere safe and to cooperate with DCFS. After discussing the matter with the law enforcement officers at the scene, the social worker concluded that mother did not know about father‘s illegal activities. The children were taken into protective custody and released to mother.
At the detention hearing on October 2, 2015, father was declared the children‘s presumed father. The juvenile court
According to the Jurisdiction/Disposition Report, mother and the children were living with maternal grandparents and the children were doing well. Mother told the social worker she never suspected father was involved in drug trafficking. She knew father owned a gun but father told her it was in a lock box; she did not know it was in the hall closet or that it was loaded (mother said that paternal grandmother told mother she observed police officers load the gun). Mother was not sure about the future of her relationship with father. She agreed that she would not allow father to live with the family if DCFS believes it would not be appropriate. Father told the social worker that he did not know about the methamphetamine found in his car; father thought he was transporting painting supplies for a friend. In any case, because the drugs were never in the house, father believed his possession of those drugs never jeopardized the children‘s safety. Father did not think the gun was loaded.
Father did not appear at the jurisdiction hearing on February 22, 2016.2 The juvenile court admitted into evidence
“[Father] created a detrimental and endangering home environment for the children in that a loaded handgun was found in the children‘s home within access of the children. On 09/29/2015, the children‘s father possessed three pounds of methamphetamine in the family vehicle. Such a detrimental and endangering home environment established for the children by the father endangers the children‘s serious physical health, safety and well being and places the children at risk of physical and emotional harm.”
The juvenile court explained that storing a loaded handgun “in a hallway closet on a low shelf accessible to the children in the residence” posed “an enormous risk to children, and these are young children who, just by their sheer curiosity at their age level, are placed at great risk. [¶] Furthermore, the house was being observed by law enforcement, and three pounds of methamphetamines were recovered from father‘s car. Father admitted to being involved in other narcotics transactions, and
Regarding disposition, father objected to any drug testing condition. He argued the case plan should be narrowly tailored to address the issues that led to dependency jurisdiction – father engaging in criminal activity and not properly storing items. Since jurisdiction was not based on any drug use, father argued the drug testing condition was inappropriate. DCFS countered that a drug testing condition was reasonable because the criminal activity in which father was engaged was possession and transportation of large amounts of illegal narcotics. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial danger to the children and no reasonable means to protect them other than removal from father‘s custody; it ordered the children removed only from father and remain placed with mother with family maintenance services. Father was ordered to participate in random, on-demand drug testing; if father missed a test or tested “dirty,” he would have to participate in full drug rehab program with random testing. In addition, father was ordered to participate in a parenting program and individual counseling to “address case issues.” Father was given monitored visits. Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
At the first stage of dependency proceedings, the juvenile court determines whether the child is subject to juvenile court jurisdiction; DCFS has the burden to prove jurisdiction by a
On appeal, we review both the jurisdictional and dispositional orders for substantial evidence. (In re D.C., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 55.) In doing so, we view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court‘s determinations, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court‘s findings and orders. Issues of fact and credibility are the province of the juvenile court and we neither reweigh the evidence nor exercise our independent judgment. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) But substantial evidence “is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on appeal. [Citation.] . . . ‘The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.’ [Citation.]” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393-1394, italics omitted.)
B. Jurisdiction
Father contends the jurisdiction order is not supported by sufficient evidence. He argues the evidence of three pounds of methamphetamine found in his car and a loaded handgun found stored in a location at the family home that was accessible to the children, was not sufficient to establish that the children were at
The
A
Here,
1. The methamphetamine
It is undisputed that father‘s possession of methamphetamine on September 29th was not an isolated event. It was at least the second time father had transported illegal narcotics. The evidence that father was involved in drug trafficking was strong: he was the subject of a drug trafficking investigation by a multi-agency task force, a large amount of narcotics was found in his possession on September 29th, he admitted he had engaged in similar conduct at least once before, his loaded gun was stored in a hall closet in the family home, and
We are not persuaded by father‘s argument that there was no evidence his drug trafficking activities put the children at any risk of harm because they had not been exposed to the narcotics found in his truck. The truck was one of three vehicles registered at the family home. Even assuming only father used the truck, it was undisputed that he was the children‘s primary caretaker. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer that father‘s use of the truck to engage in large scale drug trafficking exposed the children to a risk of harm because they were sometimes in the truck. Further, from the evidence that father stored a loaded gun in an easily accessible location in the family home, and a police dog “alerted” to a couch in the living room, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that father‘s drug trafficking activities did not occur only in the truck, but sometimes in the family home.
2. The loaded gun
Our independent research has found no published case, and the parties cite to none, discussing dependency jurisdiction based on a child‘s access to an improperly stored, loaded firearm. It takes little to persuade us that a young child with access to a loaded gun is at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
Our conclusion is supported by analogous case law involving a child‘s access to drugs. In Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th 814, an 11-year-old child testified at a
By analogy to the drug access cases, we hold that
New York courts have held that a parent endangers a child by leaving a firearm within reach of a child. In the Matter of Tajani B. (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 49 A.D.3d 876, the mother appealed from the trial court‘s finding she neglected her children. The appellate court affirmed, finding “the evidence . . . was sufficient to prove that the mother left a loaded gun on a bed accessible to her then three-year-old son and next to her then five-month-old daughter who was in a crib, thereby creating an imminent danger that their physical, mental, and emotional health would be harmed. [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see also Matter of Ninoshka M. (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) 125 A.D.3d 567 [parental
Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion. (See In re K.T. (Ohio Ct. App., Aug. 31, 2015, No. 2014–L–134) 2015 WL 5096005, *4 [finding dependent children at risk where they had “access to guns“]; In re De. S. (D.C. 2006) 894 A.2d 448, 452 [finding of parental neglect supported by evidence “there was a weapon and ammunition, unsecured” in the child‘s home]; Richmond v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) 658 So.2d 176, 177 [affirming an adjudication of dependency where mother “le[ft] a loaded handgun near [the child]” thereby “endanger[ing]” the child].)
We reject father‘s argument that the gun did not present a risk of harm to the children because (1) it was in a bag and would therefore not arouse the children‘s curiosity, and (2) the children were too small to reach the gun. Concealing an item in a bag would not deter a normal four-year-old from seeking to find out the contents of that bag. In addition, the average four-year-old can reach a shelf that is only four feet from the floor, and is capable of scooting a chair over and climbing up on it to reach items placed up high.
Nor are we persuaded by father‘s argument that the children were not at future risk from guns because law
On this record, the evidence was sufficient to support dependency jurisdiction based on such conduct.
C. Disposition
Father contends the juvenile court “erred when it made a removal order from [father] while allowing the non-offending mother . . . to retain custody of the three children with a plan that demonstrates she is able to protect.” The gist of his argument is that when both parents are custodial when the petition is initiated, removal from the offending parent and placement with the non-offending parent violates
In Michael S., our colleagues in Division One explained that “[s]ection 361, subdivision (c)(1)(A) clearly requires the court to consider the ‘option’ of removing an offending parent from the home as a possible alternative to removal of the child from the parent. However, that subdivision does not state that the option of removing a parent from the home will necessarily be sufficient to protect the child in all cases even if ordered. It does not, by its terms, preclude the possibility of ordering both removal of the parent from the home and removal of the child from the parent.” (Michael S., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) “By its language,
Under Michael S., the juvenile court in this case could reasonably conclude that it was appropriate to remove Yolanda and Javier only from father and allow them to remain with mother. There was substantial evidence that mother was unaware of father‘s negligent conduct until September 29th, and once made aware of it, was committed to doing what was necessary to protect the children from such conduct in the future.
Father‘s reliance on In re Damonte A. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 894, In re Andres G. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 476 and In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, for a contrary result is misplaced. As the Michael S. court explained, those cases “do not hold that a child may never be removed from only one custodial parent. Rather, those cases held that the statutory scheme does not permit removing a child from a parent and then immediately returning that child to the same parent.” (Id. at p. 986, italics added.) Damonte A., Andres G. and N.S. are inapposite because in this case, Yolanda and Javier were never removed from mother and were not returned to father.
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
FLIER, J.