Opinion by
T1 In this action concerning parental responsibilities for M.W., who is the child of Trista Ann Wamsher (mother) and Edward Day (father), mother's former boyfriend, Shane Jonas Taylor, appeals from the trial court's. judgment. The trial court determined that, although Taylor has standing under section 14-10-128(1)(c), C.R.8.2012, it could not allocate parental responsibilities to him consistent with Troxel v. Granville,
I. Factual and Procedural History
A. Mother and Taylor's Relationship
1 2 Mother and Taylor entered into a relatiоnship while mother was pregnant with father's child. Taylor was present when M.W. was born and lived with mother and M.W. for the first two years of M.W.'s life. During this time, Taylor participated with mother in M.W.'s daily care, and also cared for the child by himself on several occasions when mother was away overnight. Mother considered Taylor as effectively M.W.'s father. Mother also encouraged MW. to identify Taylor as his father, and M.W. did so.
1 3 When M.W. was two years old, mother and Taylor ended their relationship, and mother and MW. moved out of Taylor's home. Several months later, Taylor petitioned for an allocation of parental responsibilities for M.W.
14 After mother moved out of Taylor's home, she sought public assistance, which resulted in father, who was living in North Carolina at the time, being notified that a child support action had been initiatеd against him. Father initially doubted that he was M.W.'s father and had had no contact with mother or MW. Several years later, in the course of a child support proceeding, he arranged for genetic testing, and his paternity was confirmed. Thereafter, father intervened in the parental responsibility proceeding initiated by Taylor, and moved to Colorado with his girlfriend. With mother's consent, father and his girlfriend then began exercising parenting time with M.W.
C. Trial Court Proceedings
T5 The trial court held a three-day hearing at which numerous witnesses, including a parental responsibilities evaluator (PRE), testified concerning the parties, their relationships and interactions with M.W., and M.W.'s best interests.
T6 The PRE recommended that Taylor, as M.W.'s psychological parent, be the child's primary caregiver. A clinical psychologist, who evaluated the parties, tеstified that Taylor was very motivated to continue being a loving parent to M.W., that father had just recently met M.W. for the first time, and that mother did not understand M.W.'s need for predictability and routine in terms of who was taking care of him.
¶ 7 Mother testified that although she ree-ognized Taylor as a father to MW., it was in M.W.'s best interests for her to be the child's primary parent. Mother further testified that M.W. was enjoying his parenting time with father and referred to both Taylor and father as "daddy."
T8 Father testified that he appreciated Taylor's role in helping mother care for M.W., but that the child now had both biological parents in his life, and that father and mother were co-parenting successfully and should be able to continue doing so.
T9 The trial court found that although Taylor was M.W.'s psychological parent and had established standing under sectiоn 14-10-123(1)(c), the court could not allocate parenting time to Taylor unless it found that mother and father were unfit or that they would likely make parenting decisions that were not in M.W.'s best interests. Because, based on the evidence presented, the court did not find either of these two elements, it further found that it could not legally allocate parenting time to Taylor over M.W.'s parents' objections. Aftеr Taylor's C.R.C.P. 59 motion was denied by the trial court, he appealed.
II. Legal Standard
110 Taylor contends that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by ruling that it could not allocate parenting time to him unless it found that mother and father were unfit or that they would likely make parenting decisions that were not in M.W.'s best interests. We agree.
111 We review de novo the legal standard applied by the trial court in a parental responsibility dispute between a parent and a nonparent. See In re Parental Responsibilities of B.R.D.,
A. Parental Responsibilities Proceedings Involving Nonparents
"12 Onee a nonparent has established standing under section 14-10-123(1), C.R.S. 2012, to pursue an allocation of parental responsibilities for a child, the trial court then considers whether to allocate parenting time or decision-making authority to the nonpar-ent based on the factors in section 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S.2012. In re Parental Responsibilities of B.J.,
113 A parental responsibilities dispute between a parent and a nonparent is not a contest between equals, however. See B.R.D., ¶ 28; In Interest of C.T.G.,
{14 Further, when a nonparent seeks parental responsibilities for a child contrary to a parent's wishеs, the court is required to give special weight to a parent's determination whether to grant the requested responsibilities See id. Giving special weight means that the presumption favoring the parent's decision can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that granting parental responsibilities to the nonparent is in the child's best interests. See id.; In re Parental Responsibilities of E.S.,
In allocation of parental responsibilities proceedings, the court must emplоy a three-part test before issuing an order granting a nonparent's request for parental responsibilities. See B.J.,
B. Best Interests
{$16 When determining whether to allocate parental responsibilities to a nonpar-ent under these standards, a court must consider the section 14-10-124(1.5) factors, giving paramount consideration to the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child. B.J.,
C. The Trial Court's Ruling
117 Here, the trial court did not apply these standards. It concluded that, although Taylor had standing under section 14-10-123(1)(c), the constitutional determination established in Troxel "trumps the Colorado statute,
118 In so ruling, the trial court relied on the following statement from Troxel:
[Slo long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State toinject itself into the private realm of the family to further questiоn the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.
{19 Here, however, the trial court found, with record support, the existence of unique circumstances involving the parties and their relationships and interactions with M.W., including: (1) Taylor was a psychological parent for MW.; (2) mother encouraged M.W. to identify Taylor as a parent for the first two years of the child's life, and M.W. believed that Taylor was his father; (8) Taylor provided as much or more of M.W.'s care than mother did during this time; (4) father was completely absent from the child's life and had just met the child shortly before the hearing; and (5) the PRE recommended that Taylor, not M.W.'s parents, should have primary parental responsibilities.
120 Thus, although, as the trial court found, mother and father were fit parents, the situation they created for M.W. was unusual, and not indicative of a normal parent-child relationship in which intervention into the private family realm cannot be justified under Troxel.
{21 When a nonparent is involved in a child's life to the degree that he or she becomes a psychological parent and meets the strict standing requirements under seetion 14-10-128(1), a court may intervene, without violating Troxel, and determine, after according special weight to the parent's determination, whether it is in the child's best interests to allocate parental responsibilities to the nonparent. See E.L.M.C.,
€22 Thus, under the circumstances involved here, we conclude that the trial court erred by finding that it could not allocate parental responsibilities to Taylor, and by failing to determine, under section 14-10-124(1.5), whether it would be in M.W.'s best interests to do so.
123 We are not persuaded otherwise by mother's argument that the trial court adequately considered M.W.'s best interests under section 14-10-124(1.5) by finding that the evidence did not establish that mother and father would likely make decisions that were not in M.W.'s best interests. We agree with Taylor that the court's consideration of whether the parents would likely make decisions contrary to M.W.'s best interests is tantamount to considering whether the parents are fit. See Troxel,
€24 The statute requires, however, that the court determine parental responsibilities in accordance with the child's best interests, considering all relevant factors, including those listed at subsections (1.5)(a) and (b). See § 14-10-124(1.5); Reese,
1 25 We are also not persuaded otherwise by the trial court's statement, in the order denying Taylor's C.R.C.P. 59 motion, that it properly applied the facts to the law, including the best interests of the child standard. Contrary to the court's statement, the court did not make any findings concerning whether (1) the parents' parental responsibilities determination was in M.W.'s best interests, (2) Taylor had rebutted that determination by clear and convincing evidence, or (8) Taylor had established that it was in M.W.'s best interеsts to have parenting time with him. Rather, the court erroneously ruled that it could not make those required findings.
126 On remand, the trial court should apply the relevant statutory factors and determine whether it would be in M.W.'s best interests to allocate parental responsibilities to Taylor. In doing so, the court must (1) begin with a presumption favoring mother's and father's parental responsibilities determination; (2) determine whether Taylor rebutted this presumption by clear and convincing evidence that the parents' determination is not in M.W.'s best interests; and then (@@) place the ultimate burden on Taylor to establish by clear and convincing evidence that allocating parental responsibilities to him would be in M.W.'s best interests. See B.J.,
127 We recognize, however, that M.W.'s cireumstances may have changed since the trial court entered judgment in this case, and that the court must determine M.W.'s best interests based on his circumstances existing at the time of remand proceedings. See In re Marriage of Miller,
28 Contrary to the parents' argument, however, Taylor's status as M.W.'s psychological parent is not only significant in determining Taylor's standing under section 14-10-128(1), but is also relevant in determining M.W.'s best interests on remand. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), C.R.S8.2012 (court must consider the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the parents and with any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests); of C.A4.,
T29 Although we remand the case for reconsideration of Taylor's petition under the standards set forth above, we address certain additional issues raised by the parties because they are likely to arise on remand.
III. Father's Parental Presumption
130 Taylor further contends that because father was not involved in M.W.'s life until shortly before the hearing, father is not entitled to a parental presumption, or alternatively, if he is entitled to a presumption, that Taylor need only rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. We disagree.
The trial court found that although father initially doubted that he was M.W.'s father, after his paternity was confirmed, he intervened in the parental responsibilities action, and moved permanently to Colorado to begin actively participating in M.W.'s care. Accordingly, the court found that father was a fit parent.
132 Taylor relies on Lehr v. Robertson,
133 We also reject Taylor's contention that father is entitled to only a weaker presumption, and that Taylor may rebut father's presumption by a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to by clear and convincing evidence. Taylor relies for this contention on In Interest of D.I.S.,
1 34 Father here is not in a similar situation to the parents in D.1.S8. and B.R.D., who made conscious decisions to formally transfer primary care of and authority over their child to third parties. Thus, we do not view D.I.S. as controlling the standard of proof On remand, the trial court should herе. accord a parental presumption to both mother and father consistent with Troxel.
IV. Rights of Psychological Parents
1 35 Taylor suggests that we should recognize a constitutional right for him, as M.W.'s psychological parent, and that under the facts here, Taylor's constitutional right should take precedence over father's rights. We decline to address this argument because Taylor concedes that it is not necessary to resolve this appeal.
1 36 We do not address any of the amict's arguments not also raised by the parties. See Beaver Creek Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bachelor Gulch Metro. Dist.,
V. Attorney Fees
T37 Mother requests her attorney fees incurred on appeal under section 14-10-119, C.R.S.2012, contending that her financial resources are limited as compared to Tаylor's resources. Because the trial court is better equipped to determine issues of fact regarding the parties' current financial resources, we remand mother's request to the trial court. See CAR. 39.5, In re Marriage of Williamson,
$38 The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings as provided herein.
Notes
. We do not read the trial court's use of the phrase "the [clonstitutiоnal determination delineated above trumps the Colorado statute" as a declaration that section 14-10-124(1.5) is unconstitutional. Such a reading would deprive us of jurisdiction over the appeal under section 13-4-102(1)(b), C.R.S.2012 (the court of appeals does not have initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of district courts in cases in which a statute has been declared unconstitutional). Rather, we understand the trial court to have concluded, based in part on decisions of divisions of this court, that section 14-10-124(1.5) must be construed in light of the constitutional holding in Troxel. See Reese,