2012 COA 162
Colo. Ct. App.2012Background
- This is an appeal by Taylor, mother Trista Wamsher's former partner, from a trial court’s judgment in a parental responsibilities action concerning M.W.
- Taylor sought an allocation of parental responsibilities for M.W. and was found to have standing as a psychological parent under section 14-10-128(1)(c), but the court declined to allocate parenting time over objections of M.W.'s biological parents due to Troxel's framework.
- Mother and Taylor were in a relationship during pregnancy; Taylor helped care for M.W. and was treated by mother as effectively a father, with M.W. identifying Taylor as his father for a period.
- After the relationship ended, mother and M.W. moved out of Taylor’s home; Taylor petitioned for parental responsibilities, while father (M.W.’s biological father) later intervened after paternity was confirmed and began participating in care.
- A parental responsibilities evaluator recommended Taylor as M.W.'s primary caregiver based on Taylor’s role as a psychological parent; a clinical psychologist highlighted stability concerns and Taylor’s impact on predictability.
- The trial court concluded Taylor could not be allocated parenting time unless the parents were unfit or unlikely to act in M.W.’s best interests, and it denied Taylor’s post-judgment Rule 59 motion; the court then remanded for application of proper standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard governing nonparent allocation | Taylor argues Troxel allows nonparent allocation with special factors. | Mother contends the Troxel framework forecloses allocation absent parental unfitness or clearly contrary decisions. | Court erred; remand required applying the 14-10-124(1.5) test with special factors. |
| Effect of standing and special factors on remand | Taylor contends standing plus special factors justify allocation. | Mother argues best interests mirror parental fitness; Troxel controls unless special factors exist. | Remand to determine best interests with special factors; presumption favoring parents, rebuttable with clear and convincing evidence. |
| Parental presumption for the father | Taylor seeks a parental presumption in favor of the father and himself as a strong contender. | Mother asserts both parents should be treated under Troxel with fit-parent presumption; no weaker presumption for Taylor. | On remand, grant a parental presumption to both parents consistent with Troxel. |
| Appropriate burden of proof | Taylor argues clear and convincing standard should apply to rebut presumption and to prove best interests. | Mother contends standard alignment with prior cases is appropriate and that bifurcated burdens are unnecessary. | Remand requires clear and convincing standard for rebutting presumption and for proving best interests. |
| Remand procedure and evidence | Court should re-evaluate best interests with updated evidence and existing record. | Court should rely on existing record but may consider new evidence on remand. | Remand to consider current circumstances; existing order remains in effect pending new rulings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. Supreme Court 2000) (parents have fundamental right to determine care; state intrusion requires special factors)
- In re Parental Responsibilities of B.J., 242 P.3d 1128 (Colo. 2010) (three-part test; presumption for parental determination; special factors; clear and convincing standard)
- Reese, 227 P.3d 900 (Colo. App. 2010) (parental unfitness not required for nonparent allocation; emphasis on best interests)
- In re Parental Responsibilities of E.S., 264 P.3d 623 (Colo. App. 2011) (special factors can justify interference with parental rights)
- In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006) (parental best interests control over nonparent objections; parental fitness not sole determinant)
- In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1995) (best interests standard paramount in custody disputes)