In Re the Marriage Of: Bollermann v. NowlisIn Re the Marriage Of: Bollermann v. Nowlis
for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. Garretson, 232 Ariz. at 117 ¶ 10 n. 7, 302 P.3d at 642 n. 7. Nonetheless, because the City is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that issue, see
III.
¶ 35 We reverse the superior court‘s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the City, vacate the court of appeals’ opinion, and remand the case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Yvette D. Ansel (argued), Jennifer B. Rubin, David B. Goldstein, Hymson Goldstein & Pantiliat, PLLC, Scottsdale, for Karen Lynn Bollermann.
Sandra Burt, Burt & Feldman, Scottsdale; and Melinda K. Cekander (argued), Melinda K. Cekander PLLC, Flagstaff, for Stephen Michael Nowlis.
¶ 1 We granted review to determine whether a party may appeal a family court order that neither resolves a pending request for attorneys’ fees nor includes language making the order appealable pursuant to
I.
¶ 2 Karen Lynn Bollermann (“Wife“) and Stephen Michael Nowlis (“Husband“) divorced in 2006. Beginning in the fall of 2009 they filed a flurry of post-decree petitions, culminating in a hearing before the superior court on September 6, 2011. Four days before the hearing, Wife filed a petition seeking reimbursement for certain 2010-11 expenses under the terms of the decree of dissolution. Although the parties’ joint pretrial statement noted that these expenses were in dispute, the court did not consider them at the hearing.
¶ 3 On November 1, 2011, the court entered an order resolving all of the other issues listed in the pretrial statement. Although the court had instructed the parties that it would not decide attorneys’ fees until it resolved the 2010-11 expenses, it denied Wife‘s request for fees. Shortly thereafter, the court vacated this fee ruling.
¶ 4 Some ten months later, on September 12, 2012, the court entered an order that awarded Wife a judgment on the 2010-11 expenses and again denied her request for attorneys’ fees. On October 11, 2012, Wife filed a notice of appeal from both the November 1, 2011 and September 12, 2012 orders. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal from the November 1, 2011 order as untimely, citing Reeck v. Mendoza, 232 Ariz. 299, 304 P.3d 1122 (App. 2013). There is no dispute that Wife‘s appeal from the September 12, 2012 judgment is timely.
II.
¶ 5 We granted review because the appealability of family court orders is a recurring legal issue of statewide importance. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kassa, 231 Ariz. 592, 299 P.3d 1290 (App. 2013); In re Marriage of Johnson & Gravino, 231 Ariz. 228, 293 P.3d 504 (App. 2012); Ghadimi v. Soraya, 230 Ariz. 621, 285 P.3d 969 (App. 2012). We review construction of court rules de novo. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 502 ¶ 49, 314 P.3d 1239, 1257 (2013).
¶ 6 A party seeking to appeal a final family court judgment must do so within thirty days after the judgment is signed and filed with the clerk of the court. See
¶ 7
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. For purposes of this subsection, a claim for attorneys’ fees may be considered a separate claim from the
related judgment regarding the merits of a cause.
¶ 8 That rule is nearly identical to
¶ 9 The civil rules are admittedly clearer on this point than are the family rules.
¶ 10 Reeck held that a subset of family court decisions are “inherently final” such that “the very act of entering them functions as an express determination of finality by the court,” 232 Ariz. at 301-02 ¶ 8, 304 P.3d at 1124-25. This vague standard, however, offers little guidance for determining which decisions are immediately appealable and is simply unworkable in a context where clarity is of paramount concern.
¶ 11 Some family court decisions, as Reeck correctly recognizes, take effect upon entry. The Reeck court drew the proposition that dissolution decrees and child support orders are “inherently final” from statutes plainly concerned with effectiveness rather than appealability. See id. at 302 ¶ 9-10, 304 P.3d at 1125; see also
¶ 12 Finally, we seek to quell the concern voiced in Reeck that the rule we adopt today might allow parties to delay appeals, and thereby postpone finality of important family court orders, by declining to apply for attorneys’ fees. The family rules lack a counterpart to
III.
¶ 13 We vacate the court of appeals’ order dismissing Wife‘s appeal of the November 1, 2011 family court order and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.