OPINION
¶ 1 Sоheila Soraya (“Wife”) appeals from a decree of dissolution of marriage entered by the trial court on September 7, 2010. We do not reach the merits of the appeal, however, because we determine that Wife’s notice of appeal was premature and ineffective to invoke our apрellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 Nima Ghadimi (“Husband”) filed a petition for dissolution of non-eovenant marriage, without childrеn, in November 2008. The family court ordered dissolution of the marriage by unsigned minute entry in July 2010. The court ordered Husband to submit a proposed
¶ 3 On September 10, 2010, the family court entered a signed, fifteen-page decree of dissolution of marriage. This decree mirrored the unsigned minute entry requiring Wife to pay 65% of Husband’s attorneys’ fees and costs, with the actual amount yet to be determined. On October 7, 2010, Wife filed her only notice оf appeal.
¶ 4 Husband requested $306,014.10 as the 65% calculation of his total fees and costs. Wife responded, arguing that she should be required to pay $126,596.22 instead. In Husband’s reply, hе adjusted his request to $300,497.60.
¶ 5 On November 16, 2010, the court entered a signed order entitled “Judgment,” awarding fees and costs of $275,000.00 in favor of Husband against Wife. In this Judgment, the court also ordered: “Pursuant to [Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure] 58, final judgment is settled, approved and signed by the Court and shall be entered by the clerk.”
¶ 6 We requested supplemental briefing addressing whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal, and both parties submitted supplemеntal briefs.
ANALYSIS
¶ 7 This court has an independent duty to examine whether we have jurisdiction over matters on appeal. See Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz.,
¶ 8 A notice of appeal filed in the absence of a final judgment is premature. See Barassi v. Matison,
¶ 9 Both Wife and Husband contend that the trial court’s September 10, 2010 signed decree was a final, appealable judgment under Arizona Rules of Family Law Prоcedure (“Rule(s)”) 78 and 81. We conclude otherwise.
¶ 10 To accomplish formal entry of a judgment, the judgment must be in wilting, signed by an officer of the court, and filed with the clerk. See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 81(A). Rule 78(A) rеcognizes a divorce decree may be a final judgment. See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 78(A). The decree of dissolution entered by the court on September 10, 2010, however, was not final and aрpealable because it neither determined the amount of Husband’s attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid by Wife nor contained an express determinatiоn complying with Rule 78(B) that there was no just reason for delay coupled with an express direction for the entry of judgment. Rule 78(B) provides:
When more than one claim for rеlief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry оf final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upоn an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, thаt adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or partiеs, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. For purposes of this subsection, a claim for attorneys’ fees may be considered a separate claim from the related judgment regarding the merits of a cause.
(Emphasis added.) See also Nat’l Broker Assocs., Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc.,
¶ 11 Because the decree of dissolution entered on September 10, 2010 was not а final judgment, Wife’s notice of appeal filed on October 7, 2010 was premature. We must therefore examine whether Wife’s premature notice of appеal fits within the limited “Barassi exception” to the requii’ement that a notice of appeal be filed after entry of final judgment, not prior thereto.
¶ 12 In Craig, the parties filed a nоtice of appeal and notice of cross-appeal while a motion for new trial was pending.
¶ 13 The Barassi exception does not apply here because the family court had not issued a final judgment and the remaining task— determining the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid by Wife — was discretionary and not merely ministerial. To determine the actual amount of fеes and costs to be awarded, the court was required to make a determination after receiving significantly differing factual presentations and arguments. See Smith,
The general distinction between ministerial and judicial acts seems to be that, where the duty to be performed is described by law with such certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion or judgment,the act is ministerial, but, where it requires disсretion or judgment to determine whether the duty to act exists or not, it is judicial. In other words, the necessity of the exercise of judgment or discretion is generally held to be thе distinguishing test.
Bryant v. Bryant,
¶ 14 Thereforе, Wife’s notice of appeal was premature and did not come within the limited Barassi exception under which some premature notices of appeal аre effective. In accordance with Craig, Wife’s notice of appeal was “ineffective” and a “nullity.”
CONCLUSION
¶ 15 For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Notes
. Although the court cited Rule 58 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, the applicable rule is Rule 81 of the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure.
