In re: The Hertz Corporation v.
Argued on October 25, 2023
Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed September 10, 2024)
Donald Burke
John B. Goerlich
Wilkie Farr & Gallagher
1875 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Daniel Forman
Mark T. Stancil (Argued)
Rachel C. Strickland
Wilkie Farr & Gallagher
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, NY 10019
Matthew B. Lunn
Edmon L. Morton
Joseph M. Mulvihill
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor
1000 N. King Street
Rodney Square
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Appellant Wells Fargo Bank, NA
Christopher Fong
Nixon Peabody
55 W. 46th Street
Tower 46
New York, NY 10036
Richard C. Pedone
Nixon Peabody
53 Exchange Place
Boston, MA 02109
Kevin S. Mann
Michael L. Vild
Cross & Simon
1105 N. Market Street
Suite 901, P.O. Box 1380
Wilmington, DE 19899
Counsel for Appellee US Bank, NA
Paul D. Clement (Argued)
Mariel A. Brookins
C. Harker Rhodes, IV
Clement & Murphy
706 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
Aaron Colodny
White & Case
555 S. Flower Street
Suite 2700
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Thomas E. Lauria
White & Case
200 S. Biscayne Boulevard
Suite 4900
Miami, FL 33131
David M. Turetsky
White & Case
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
Jason N. Zakia
White & Case
111 S. Wacker Drive
Suite 5100
Chicago, IL 33130
Ricardo Palacio
Ashby & Geddes
500 Delaware Avenue
P.O. Box 1150, 8th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19899
Counsel for Appellee Hertz Corp.
OPINION OF THE COURT
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Bankruptcy is a lesson in leverage. It involves money and to whom it goes. The more advantage (leverage) a party has, the
The debtors say so because of the Bankruptcy Code‘s general rule barring interest accruing post-petition (in bankruptcy lingo, “unmatured interest“). That is one way the Code deals with the difficult distributional problems of the typical case, where there is not enough money to go around. But this is not the typical case. At the end of the reorganization, the debtors here were so flush that they paid their former stockholders (the “Stockholders“) roughly $1.1 billion. While the parties agree that the Code requires debtors to pay post-petition interest if they are solvent, they disagree whether this entitles creditors to post-petition interest at the federal judgment rate or the contract rate—a dispute with teeth, because the latter exceeds the former by more than 30 times in this case.
What happened here is that the Hertz Corporation and certain affiliates (collectively, “Hertz“), crippled by the COVID pandemic, filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in May 2020. To give a sense of its then-bleak prospects, Hertz warned in an SEC filing of “a significant risk that the [Stockholders] will receive no recovery under the Chapter 11 [c]ases and that our common stock will be worthless.” Hertz Glob. Holdings, Inc., Prospectus Supplement (to Prospectus Dated June 12, 2019) S-4 (2020), https://perma.cc/9RJE-R6KT (June 15, 2020).
As the economy recovered, however, so did Hertz‘s financial prospects. It emerged from bankruptcy a year later via a confirmed plan of reorganization (the “Plan“) that sold the company to a group of private equity funds. The Plan promised to leave all of Hertz‘s creditors unimpaired—in other words, it would not alter any of their rights. (Compare that to a normal bankruptcy plan, which typically discharges creditors’ claims for cents on the dollar.) Therefore, none of Hertz‘s creditors could vote on the Plan; as a matter of law, they were all conclusively presumed to accept it.
To be precise, the Plan paid off Hertz‘s pre-petition debt, including unsecured bonds maturing biennially from 2022 to 2028 (the “Notes“). But the Plan did not pay holders of the Notes (the “Noteholders”2) contract rate interest for Hertz‘s time in bankruptcy. Instead, it paid interest for that period at the much lower applicable federal judgment rate. Hertz also did not pay the Noteholders certain charges provided in the Notes, specifically,
Applicable Premiums and contract rate interest, combined totaling more than $270 million. The savings effectively went to the Stockholders: The Plan gave them roughly four times that amount in a combination of cash and equity in the reorganized Hertz. The Noteholders, unsurprisingly, object to that result.
Among the issues we address are two questions of bankruptcy law unresolved in this Circuit: Does
Hertz argues that make-whole fees are the economic equivalent of interest and must be disallowed under
The Noteholders disagree. They claim the Applicable Premiums should not be disallowed as unmatured interest because they do not fit the dictionary definition of that term. In any event, they say that pre-Bankruptcy Code caselaw grants them an equitable right to payment in full (i.e., both contract rate interest and the Applicable Premiums) because Hertz is solvent. So, since the confirmed Plan classified them as unimpaired, they must receive interest at the contract rate. Per the Noteholders, if we side with Hertz and cancel the otherwise enforceable fees and interest at issue, we will bless an outcome anathema to our law—a windfall to the Stockholders, who sit at the lowest rung of payment priority, by letting them “pocket[] hundreds of millions of dollars that Hertz had promised to [pay] the Noteholders” that it “could easily afford to repay . . . in full[.]” Noteholder Br. 1. They reject Hertz‘s view that we are addressing only subtleties of insolvency law and see this dispute as more fundamental.
We determine that the Applicable Premiums must be disallowed under
I. Background
A. Procedural History
Hertz‘s Plan proposed to pay the Noteholders about $2.7 billion, reflecting the Notes’ principal, contract rate interest that accrued before Hertz filed for bankruptcy, post-bankruptcy interest at the federal judgment rate (as applied in this case, 0.15% annually), and certain other fees. It would not pay them post-petition interest at the contract rate or any fees for redeeming the Notes early, including the Applicable Premiums. The Plan offered the Stockholders a package of
stock, warrants, and cash that it valued in the aggregate at around $1.1 billion. App. 1514-15; Bankr. D.I. 4759 at 12, 18-19.5
Hertz and the Noteholders were aware of their disputes about contract rate interest and early redemption fees but did not let those issues delay emergence from Chapter 11. Instead, the Plan designated the Noteholders unimpaired, reserved their right to litigate their disagreements post-confirmation, and committed to pay whatever was necessary to ensure they were unimpaired under the Plan. The Noteholders were not allowed to vote on the Plan because, as unimpaired creditors, they were conclusively presumed to accept it.
In July 2021, the Noteholders filed a complaint seeking payment of post-petition interest at the contract rate, the Applicable Premiums, and the flat fees for early redemptions found in the 2022 and 2024 Notes. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed their claims for contract rate interest. It concluded that, as unimpaired creditors of a solvent debtor, they were entitled to interest at the “legal rate,” per
caselaw, required Hertz to pay them interest at the contract rate. It also dismissed their claims for flat redemption fees on the 2022 and 2024 Notes because those fees were
After discovery, Hertz and the Noteholders cross-moved for summary judgment on that issue. Because the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the “economic substance” of the Applicable Premiums was interest, it disallowed the claims of the Noteholders. App. 73. They moved for reconsideration on post-petition interest in light of the intervening decisions in Ultra and PG&E, which both required solvent debtors to pay unimpaired creditors post-petition interest at the contract rate. The Bankruptcy Court did not change its mind: It had “considered all [the] arguments” on post-petition interest “and simply reached a different conclusion from that reached by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.” App. 77. It then sua sponte certified its decision for direct appeal to us.
The Noteholders ask us to reverse the Bankruptcy Court by ruling that Hertz owes them the fixed redemption fee on the 2024 Notes, the Bankruptcy Code does not prohibit payment of the Applicable Premiums, and (as unimpaired creditors of
the very solvent Hertz) they are entitled to post-petition interest at the contract rate.
B. Jurisdiction, Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction under
II. Analysis
A. The 2024 Notes’ Fee
The Noteholders appeal the ruling that they were not entitled to an early redemption fee on the 2024 Notes.6 Those Notes required Hertz to pay a flat fee if they were redeemed “after October 15, 2019 and prior to maturity[.]” App. 520. We agree with the Bankruptcy Court; this fee was not triggered because the 2024 Notes by their terms matured when Hertz filed bankruptcy and their redemption followed around a year later when it left Chapter 11.
True, the Bankruptcy Court‘s ruling allows Hertz to redeem the 2024 Notes well before 2024 without a fee. But, viewed in the complex context of modern leveraged finance, that is not as “bizarre” a result as the Noteholders suggest.
Noteholder Br. 54. Those Notes only mature early upon an acceleration approved by the lenders or a bankruptcy filing, which would not happen unless the lenders threatened to accelerate. There is fierce debate whether borrowers should pay fees in that case, and both sides have valid points.7 So this result, likely stemming
The Noteholders also argue that certain provisions of the 2024 Notes “refer to maturity arising ‘on acceleration’ or ‘otherwise[,]’ ” so maturity here must mean the day they are
scheduled to mature in 2024. Noteholder Br. 54. We disagree. The referenced sections of the 2024 Notes do not use the word “maturity” but the defined term “Stated Maturity,” which means “the fixed date [here, October 15, 2024] on which the payment of principal is due[.]” App. 404. That is different from maturity, which occurs whenever a debt obligation “become[s] due.” Mature, Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). And, when interpreting contracts, we read defined and undefined terms as having distinct meanings. See Derry Fin. N.V. v. Christiana Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Robertshaw US Holding Corp. v. Invesco Senior Secured Mgmt. Inc. (In re Robertshaw US Holding Corp), No. 24-90052, Adv. No. 24-03024, slip op. at 11-14 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. June 20, 2024) (deciding debt dispute on the basis that “subsidiary” and “Subsidiary” have different meanings in the same document).
In sum, Hertz never promised to pay the Noteholders a fee in this situation. Contract law does not bind parties to promises they did not make. If the commercially sophisticated Noteholders think this outcome is unfair, they should not have agreed to the terms of the 2024 Notes that compel it. Cf. Schron v. Troutman Sanders LLP, 986 N.E.2d 430, 434 (N.Y. 2013) (“[H]ad these sophisticated business entities . . . intended [a different result], they easily could have included a provision to that effect[.]” (citations omitted)).
B. The Applicable Premiums
We turn to whether the Bankruptcy Court should have allowed the Noteholders’ claims for the Applicable Premiums, which were triggered by Hertz‘s early payoff of the 2026 and 2028 Notes when it emerged from bankruptcy in 2021.
A bit of corporate finance knowledge is helpful here. Many bonds—including the 2026 and 2028 Notes—pay interest semi-annually via so-called coupons while outstanding. So, if a bond is redeemed before its scheduled maturity, lenders lose interest they otherwise would have received. In a compromise, many bonds—again, including the Notes—allow borrowers to redeem them before they are scheduled to mature in return for a flat fee. William J. Whelan III, Bond Indentures and Bond Characteristics in Leveraged Financial Markets: A Comprehensive Guide to High-Yield Bonds, Loans, and Other Instruments 171, 173 (William F. Maxwell & Mark R. Shenkman eds., 2010). It offers some compensation for lost interest
However, there is another early release mechanism. Bonds sometimes allow borrowers to pay them off before the Redemption Date if lenders are “made whole,” i.e., if they receive the present value of the profits they would have booked in the alternate world where they were paid off on the Redemption Date. These make-whole fees guarantee lenders a minimum return, no matter how quickly a borrower pays them back. See Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Creditor‘s Guide to Make-Whole Enforceability in Bankruptcy 7 (2d ed. 2023), https://perma.cc/HZ2U-RL4F (a “make-whole provision ensures that creditors receive a minimum return on their investment . . . independent of when the debt instrument is repaid“); In re Energy Future Holdings Corp. (EFH II), 842 F.3d 247, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2016) (make-wholes are “meant to give the lenders the interest yield they expect” in the event of an early redemption); In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., 874 F.3d 787, 801-02 (2d Cir. 2017) (make-wholes provide “additional compensation to make up for the interest [lenders] would not receive” if bonds are redeemed early).
As noted above, the Applicable Premiums are make-whole fees. While their language appears complicated,8 their
substance is not. The Premiums are made of three parts: interest coupons owed through the Redemption Date, the Redemption Fee, and a present value discount.9 They seek to ensure that Noteholders
With that background, we can now consider the parties’ positions. Hertz argues that the Applicable Premiums must be
To clarify further, the Applicable Premiums can be calculated by summing (a) the present value of a redemption on the Redemption Date (i.e., principal and Redemption Fee) and (b) the present value of unaccrued interest through the Redemption Date, and then subtracting (c) the Notes’ undiscounted principal. Ross Hallock, The Math of Make-Wholes, Covenant Rev., May 22, 2023, at 10. Doing some math, the Applicable Premiums can be restated as (a) the present value of the Redemption Fee and unpaid interest minus (b) the present value discount applicable to the early payment of the Notes’ principal.
disallowed under
Because make-whole fees are common in bonds and can be quite large, Chapter 11 debtors and creditors have repeatedly and vigorously disputed whether they must be paid in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Ultra, 51 F.4th at 144 (challenge to $201 million make-whole); EFH II, 842 F.3d at 252 ($431 million make-whole); MPM, 874 F.3d at 805 (nearly $200 million make-whole). Practitioners and academics have written extensively on the subject as well, including the issue here—whether make-whole fees must be disallowed under
There are two common approaches to this question. One suggests that the appropriate analysis is whether a make-whole fee best fits within dictionary and caselaw definitions of interest. See, e.g., In re Trico Marine Servs., Inc., 450 B.R. 474, 480-81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). The other approach, reflecting a concern that the definitional test puts form over substance, asks whether the make-whole at issue is the economic equivalent of interest. Ultra, 51 F.4th at 145-46 (warning the definitional approach is “susceptible to easy end-runs by canny creditors“).
The Bankruptcy Court used the latter approach, concluded the Applicable Premiums are the economic equivalent of interest, and disallowed the Noteholders’ claims. Hertz backs that rationale to us. The Noteholders primarily argue that the Applicable Premiums are not interest using the definitional approach, though they also disclaim any economic equivalency.11 To us, the Applicable Premiums are interest
4, 2018; Bruce A. Markell, Dead Funds and Shipwrecks: Ultra Petroleum, 39 Bankr. L. Letter, no. 4, 2019; Douglas G. Baird, Making Sense of Make-Wholes, 94. Am. Bankr. L.J. 567 (2020).
underThe Noteholders’ implicit definitional argument, boiled down, is that interest is a fee accruing while borrowed money is used. By contrast, the Applicable Premiums do not slowly and steadily accrue over the life of the Notes; they come into being fully formed upon an early redemption. In their words, the Applicable Premiums are “not compensation for Hertz‘s ongoing use of the Noteholders’ money,” one of their preferred definitions of interest, “but rather compensation for the termination of Hertz‘s obligations to the Noteholders[.]” Noteholder Br. 45 (emphasis omitted).
The problem with the Noteholders’ definitional approach is that the definitions are broader than that. Look at their prime cases on the subject. Deputy v. du Pont defines interest as “compensation for the use or forbearance of money.” 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940). Love v. State marks it as “the cost of having the use of another person‘s money for a specified period[.]” 583 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (N.Y. 1991). Black‘s Law Dictionary says it is “[t]he compensation fixed by agreement or allowed by law for the use or detention of money, for tax purposes. Id. at 833. As Prudential demonstrates, whether a prepayment charge is interest for purposes of another field of law does not automatically resolve the question for bankruptcy. Subject-specific considerations irrelevant in bankruptcy may have driven the analysis in those cases. And, in any event, many non-bankruptcy decisions agree with our broader view of interest. See Bruce A. Markell, “Shoot the . . .“: Holes in Make Whole Premiums, 36 Bankr. L. Letter, no. 5, 2016 (citing cases).or for the loss of money by one who is entitled to its use; esp[ecially] the amount owed to a lender in return for the use of borrowed money.” Interest, Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). See Bruce A. Markell, “Shoot the . . .“: Holes in Make Whole Premiums, 36 Bankr. L. Letter, no. 5, 2016 (collecting definitions of interest and concluding that “payments which the lender collects for itself” above cash actually extended are interest).
These definitions of interest do not require that a charge accrue daily or be contingent on “ongoing” use of money. Contrary to the Noteholders’ claims that the Applicable Premiums are not definitionally interest, they are “compensation” Hertz committed to pay (upon a contingency) in order to borrow (i.e., use) the Noteholders’ money. That the relevant contingency occurred—redemption of the Notes and the early return of the Noteholders’ capital—does not change this conclusion. Cf. Ultra, 51 F.4th at 146 & n.8. To state it even from the Noteholders’ perspective, the Applicable Premiums are among the suite of fees they extracted from Hertz in return for their credit. So Hertz‘s commitment to pay them was “compensation” for its use of their funds.12
The Noteholders also claim that the Applicable Premiums are definitionally not interest because they reflect the “reinvestment costs” that the Noteholders will suffer from redeploying their capital earlier than anticipated. Noteholder Br. 42.
This case is a good example. The Noteholders describe their reinvestment costs as the losses they will suffer when “reinvest[ing] their prepaid principal in a less-advantageous market environment.” Noteholder Br. 42. That is, the reinvestment costs are the unmatured interest the Noteholders will not recover in the market.
We also think the Applicable Premiums (which, to repeat, are composed of interest coupons owed through the Redemption Date, the Redemption Fee, and a present value discount) are the economic equivalent of interest. They are mathematically equivalent to the unmatured interest the Noteholders would have received had Hertz redeemed the Notes on their Redemption Dates. We take each component in turn.
The coupons that would come due before the Redemption Date are no doubt interest. Applying the logic we used above, the Redemption Fee is interest; it is a fee for the Noteholders’ profit that Hertz agreed to as a condition for issuing the Notes. The Bankruptcy Court reached the same result, noting that the Redemption Fee is equal to “one semi-annual interest payment” on the Notes. App. 74. To the Noteholders, this is “entirely arbitrary” because a larger Redemption Fee without a superficial similarity to a coupon would survive under that logic. Noteholder Br. 50. But our conclusion that the Redemption Fee is interest—because it is a fee for the Noteholders’ ultimate return that Hertz committed to pay in exchange for the right to use the Notes’ principal—has nothing to do with its relationship to the Notes’ annual interest rate:
That leaves the significant present value discount (accounting for early payment of principal, coupons, and the Redemption Fee). Correctly adjusting for present value, however, does not defeat the mathematical identity. Because a “dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow,” Ultra, 51 F.4th at 148, discounts are applied to early payments to account for risk of default and the time value of money, thus making sure that lenders receive the benefit of their bargain—the value they would expect to receive through a scheduled, rather than premature, paydown. If early payments were not discounted, lenders would receive an unjustified windfall. In other words, accounting for present value makes the Applicable Premiums even more mathematically equivalent to the disallowed unmatured interest by correctly pegging its actual worth. Applying a present value discount
In any event, a claim for less than all the unmatured interest owed by a debtor (like the Applicable Premiums, here discounted by present value) is still a claim for unmatured interest. Self-imposed discounts do not defeat
To sum up,
C. Solvent Debtors and Post-Petition Interest
Despite our holding above, does the Bankruptcy Code as a whole nonetheless require solvent debtors to pay unimpaired creditors interest accruing post-petition at the contract rate? It is a technical question of bankruptcy law, and we give that issue its nuanced due below. We can rephrase it in a way that makes the answer predictable: Can Hertz use the Bankruptcy Code to force the Noteholders to give up nine figures of contractually valid interest and spend that money on a massive dividend to the Stockholders? The answer is no. As the Supreme Court told us more than a century ago, “the rule is well settled that stockholders are not entitled to any share . . . until all the debts of the corporation are paid.” Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 409-10 (1868).
We start, however, with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ decisions on which the parties spend a significant portion of their briefs. Ultra and PG&E are close analogues, each involving solvent debtors who sought to save immense amounts by paying unimpaired unsecured creditors post-petition interest at the federal judgment rate instead of the higher rates applicable outside bankruptcy. In both cases, the creditors won.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits took similar approaches to the issue. Both Courts found in Supreme Court decisions a requirement to respect pre-Code practice absent a clear statement in the Bankruptcy Code, Ultra, 51 F.4th at 153-54; PG&E, 46 F.4th at 1057-58, concluded that pre-Code practice required solvent debtors pay contract rate interest, Ultra, 51 F.4th at 150-52; PG&E, 46 F.4th at 1053-55, and decided that the enacted Bankruptcy Code did not clearly reject thattradition, Ultra, 51 F.4th at 154-56; PG&E, 46 F.4th at 1058-59. They therefore ruled that the Code gives creditors of solvent debtors the equitable right to contract rate interest “before allocation of surplus value” to equityholders “absent compelling equitable considerations[.]” PG&E, 46 F.4th at 1064; Ultra, 51 F.4th at 159-60.
The PG&E Court backstopped its decision with the Bankruptcy Code‘s logic of impairment. 46 F.4th at 1060-61. “[I]mpaired” creditors—those whose bundle of “legal, equitable, and contractual rights” are “[]altered” by a bankruptcy plan—are entitled to a host of procedural protections.
Hertz primarily challenges those decisions by suggesting they misread Supreme Court precedent. Rather than require us to continue pre-Code practices absent a clear statement to the contrary, Hertz says the Supreme Court relegates historical bankruptcy law to a minor role; it is a mere “tool of construction” relevant only when the Code isgenuinely ambiguous. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 10 (2000). Instead, the Circuits impermissibly used it as an “extratextual supplement[,]” id., to require contract rate interest without reference to the Bankruptcy Code‘s actual text.
But we do not think those decisions disregard Hartford or the statutory text. As the PG&E court correctly noted, pre-Code solvent debtor practice sprung from the pre-Code absolute priority rule. 46 F.4th at 1054. And, as we explain below, the Bankruptcy Code adopted the pre-Code version of that rule. So the common law absolute priority rule is not an “extratextual supplement” to the Bankruptcy Code. It is an enacted part of it that we must respect.
What is that rule? Our quote from Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific at the beginning of this section sums it up well: in bankruptcy, equity comes after debt (unless the latter consents). The absolute priority rule serves as an essential governor on the bankruptcy process to protect creditors. “Shareholders retain substantial control” over the debtor during Chapter 11, which gives them a “significant opportunity for self-enrichment at the expense of creditors.” In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 100 (2d Cir. 2011). One of those opportunities comes from the debtor‘s functionally exclusive right14 to propose the plan of reorganization that determinescreditors’ ultimate treatment. Id.; see Stephen G. Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investments, 329-31 (2005) (Exclusivity is a “powerful weapon wielded by management in the battle with creditors[.]“). A “danger inherent in any reorganization plan proposed by a debtor” (including this Plan proposed by Hertz) is that it might “turn out to be too good a deal for the debtor‘s owners.” Bank of Am. Nat‘l Tr. and Sav. Ass‘n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P‘ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444 (1999) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 225 (1973)); DBSD, 634 F.3d at 100 (noting that debtor‘s proposed plan offered its shareholder almost thirty times more value than “unsecured creditors . . . despite the latter‘s technical seniority“).
History proves that to be a substantial risk. Around the turn of the 20th century, American railroad owners used so-called
The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected those tactics, most prominently in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). It ruled that creditors have “superior rights against the subordinate interests of stockholders . . . . [Therefore,] [a]ny device whereby stockholders [of an insolvent business] were preferred before the creditor [is] invalid.” Id. at 504. Boyd is seen as announcing the absolute priority rule, which promptly “thereafter passed into the language and lore of the corporate lawyer.” Ayer, supra, at 973.16 Applied in bankruptcy, itprevents business owners, “the most junior claimants[,]” from recovering anything “unless creditors . . . are paid in full” or consent. Markell, Absolute Priority, supra at 72.
Today, the absolute priority rule is housed in
That process is known as “cramdown.” See generally Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 133 (1979) [hereinafter Klee, Cram Down].17 In practical terms, that offers plan proponents a choice: “compensate creditors in full[,]” leaving them unimpaired, or confirm a plan paying them less (i.e., impairing them) in the face of “the Code‘s substantive and procedural protections” for impaired creditors—including the ballot
With that throat-clearing complete, we turn to our case. The Plan promised to pay the Noteholders whatever amount was necessary to “render [them u]nimpaired” (i.e., to leavetheir rights unaltered). App 1512. Hertz submits that the “critical question . . . is [what interest rate] an unimpaired class in a solvent debtor case is entitled to.” Tr. of Oral Arg. at 30. But that “elides the antecedent question of what constitutes unimpairment in the first place.” PG&E, 46 F.4th at 1062.18
A creditor is impaired if its treatment violates the absolute priority rule because every creditor has a right to treatment consistent with that principle. This squarely follows the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451 (2017). There, a debtor sought to pay friendly junior creditors while giving nothing to hostile creditors with higher priority. Id. at 459-60. It could not do so via a plan, because this distribution would violate the Bankruptcy Code‘s absolute priority rule. Id. at 460-61. So it instead obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court dismissing the case and distributing the cash to the junior creditors. Id. at 461. Our Court affirmed, reasoning that “Congress codified the absolute priority rule . . . in the specific context of plan confirmation . . . [,] and neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever said that the rule applies” to dismissals. Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp), 787 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing
The Supreme Court reversed. Whereas our Court saw the absolute priority rule as a procedural protection that applied only when
That result also flows from Jevic‘s condemnation of “backdoor means” to defeat the absolute priority rule. 580 U.S. at 465. The Bankruptcy Code offers a creditor consent at the ballot box as a “front door” to confirm a plan that violates absolute priority.
Accordingly, the Noteholders’ right to treatment consistent with absolute priority must be honored to leave them unimpaired. Hertz still maintains that any such right does not require post-petition interest at the contract rate. In its view, we cannot rule based on the principle announced in Boyd—that equity cannot recover until debt is paid in full—because theCode‘s treatment of absolute priority lists “very specific principles about . . . priorities,” and that list is silent on post-petition interest. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 47. It argues there is a “common law absolute priority rule,” id., following Boyd and its progeny, and a separate absolute priority rule enumerated in the Code that we are
As noted above, a plan satisfies the enacted absolute priority rule only if it is “fair and equitable.”
When interpreting “fair and equitable” in the Bankruptcy Act (the Code‘s immediate predecessor), the Supreme Court concluded that those words incorporated the common law absolute priority rule. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118-19 (1939) (fair and equitable is a “term of art” that includes Boyd and its progeny); Markell, Absolute Priority, supra at 85 & nn.102-04. Congress very deliberately included those exact words in the Bankruptcy Code. And the Supreme Court is clear: When Congress imports into a statute a “judicially created concept,” it takes that concept whole unless it makes its contrary “intent specific,” a rule “followed . . . with particular care inconstruing” the Bankruptcy Code. Midlantic Nat‘l Bank v. N.J. Dep‘t of Envt‘l Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986). We thus see Congress‘s choice to reuse “fair and equitable” as deliberately incorporating the common law absolute priority rule into the enacted Bankruptcy Code.
Further support comes from the precise language of
That jurisprudence required solvent debtors to pay contract rate interest before making distributions to equity. See, e.g., Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 527-28 (1941) (citing absolute priority cases, includingBoyd);23 see generally PG&E, 46 F.4th at 1054 (pre-Code solvent debtor jurisprudence flowed from “[t]he common-law
That makes sense. To repeat, the absolute priority rule requires creditors’ obligations be paid in full before owners, with junior rights to the business, take anything at all. So it should be no surprise that several thoughtful decisions conclude that the Bankruptcy Code‘s absolute priority rule, which incorporates common law and Bankruptcy Act jurisprudence, can require payment of contract rate interest in solvent debtor cases. Dow Corning, 456 F.3d at 678-80; In re Energy Future Holdings Corp. (EFH I), 540 B.R. 109, 117-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015); In re Mullins, 633 B.R. 1, 10-16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2021); cf. PG&E, 46 F.4th at 1060-61. We join their reasoning.
But while the absolute priority rule can require payment of contract interest in solvent debtor cases, it does not always do so. Rather, it imposes the equitable rate of post-petition interest, whatever that may be. See, e.g., Dow Corning, 456 F.3d at 678-80; EFH I, 540 B.R at 117-18. This equitable concern is not for former owners. Rather, courts primarily worry that paying one creditor contract rate interest might give it an inequitable leg up over its peers if there is not enough to pay everyone their full rate. See, e.g., PG&E, 46 F.4th at 1064. The ordinary course, with which we generally agree, thus would be to remand to the Bankruptcy Court and ask it to determine whether any “compelling equitable considerations” counsel against awarding the Noteholders their contract rate. Id. (citations omitted).
For two reasons, however, we do not do so here. The first is procedural: Hertz never suggested we remand to the Bankruptcy Court rather than award the Noteholders their requested interest. Our forfeiture doctrine counsels against rewarding that choice. Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 146-48 (3d Cir. 2017).
The second is equitable. In the normal case, the equitable rate of post-petition interest will be determined before plan confirmation—i.e., before the money goes out the door. But here, the Stockholders received $1.1 billion in value from Hertz when the Plan went effective more than three years ago. No party suggests we can unscramble that egg. So our equitable calculus must reflect that the Stockholders already took their dividend. Therefore, the equities demand theNoteholders recover post-petition interest at the contract rate. It would be profoundly unfair to scrimp on the Noteholders’ interest when the junior Stockholders already received a billion dollar distribution. To be clear, the post-petition interest we award includes the Applicable Premiums, which Hertz persuaded us were contractual interest accruing after the bankruptcy filing. Supra II.B; Ultra, 51 F.4th at 160 (“[T]he traditional solvent-debtor exception compels payment of the Make-Whole Amount[.]“); cf. Dow Corning, 456 F.3d at 680 (“[T]here is a presumption that default interest should be paid to unsecured claim holders in a solvent debtor case.“).
Our result is supported by the requirement that we interpret the Bankruptcy Code “holistic[ally.]” United Sav. Ass‘n of Tex. v Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc‘s, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). We do so with an eye to “produc[ing] a substantive effect that is compatible with the” Code. Id. Hertz‘s theory that the Noteholders should not recover contract rate interest creates significant tensions with the Code‘s basic structure. We briefly note two of them. First, when a plan sticks only one class of creditors with losses, it cannot be confirmed over their objection.
Our colleague dissenting in part believes that we offer short shrift to
III. Conclusion
The Noteholders loaned Hertz billions and received back a contractually valid promise to pay fees and interest. The COVID pandemic resulted in a liquidity crisis and a Chapter 11 filing. Bankruptcy gave the then-insolvent Hertz, among other things, the opportunity to disallow claims
With more than a quarter billion dollars at stake, it is no shock that Hertz looked to maximize its leverage over the Noteholders rather than simply giving in. Its argument was creative and reflects a deep familiarity with the details of the Bankruptcy Code. But it misses the bigger picture. The Code does not award leverage arbitrarily. Rather, it assigns leverage in ways that ensure the “plan will achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the . . . Code.” Madison Hotel, 749 F.2d at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And there is no question that Hertz‘s proposal—paying the Noteholders a fraction of the interest they were contractually promised, while distributing more than a billion dollars to the Shareholders—is contrary to those objectives and purposes. Once again, “the familiar rule [is] that the stockholder‘s interest in the [bankrupt company] is subordinate to the rights of creditors. . . . [A]ny arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate rights . . . [are] secured at the expense of . . . creditors comes within judicial denunciation.” Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899). The accretional array of cases, topped by Jevic, carries this “fixed principle,” Boyd, 228 U.S. at 507, through to today. Marbled in the Bankruptcy Code, it disfavors nonconsensual distributions to equity over creditors.
So it should be no surprise in this solvent debtor case that Hertz‘s strategic maneuvering comes to naught. The Code‘s careful design does not give Hertz enough leverage to subvert that law‘s foundational goals. We thus affirm in part and reverse in part the Bankruptcy Court‘s decisions. To comply with the absolute priority rule, and thus fulfill the Plan‘s promise to “leave[] unaltered the [Noteholders‘] legal, equitable, and contractual rights[,]”
PORTER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the majority‘s opinion except for Part II.C, which holds that Hertz must pay the Applicable Premiums and post-petition contract-rate interest to the Noteholders. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have reached the same result as the majority. See Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Comm. of Opco Unsecured Creditors (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), 51 F.4th 138 (5th Cir. 2022); Ad Hoc Comm. of Holders of Trade Claims v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (In re PG&E Corp.), 46 F.4th 1047 (9th Cir. 2022). But I largely agree with the dissents in those cases, which recognize that the Bankruptcy Code plainly disallows claims “for unmatured interest” like the Noteholders’ claims for the Applicable Premiums and post-petition interest.
I
The majority‘s core argument concerns
To honor that promise, the majority concludes that Hertz must pay contract-rate interest. That is because, according to the majority, one of the “rights” protected under
I disagree with the majority for two reasons. First, treatment consistent with the absolute priority rule is not one of the “rights” protected under
II
In making the argument discussed in the previous section, the majority relies on Jevic to support the proposition that treatment consistent with absolute priority is “a right . . . for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.” Maj. Op. 33. But the majority separately appears to rely on Jevic for an argument that does not depend on impairment under
Jevic dealt with a bankruptcy court‘s power to dismiss a case under
The Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy court lacked the power to order such a dismissal. Jevic, 580 U.S. at 464. As the majority emphasizes, the Court noted “[t]he importance of the
I disagree that Jevic requires Hertz to pay contract-rate interest for at least two reasons. First, the posture of this case is distinguishable from that of Jevic. There, the bankruptcy court exercised a power without any express basis in the Code, thereby violating absolute priority, so the Supreme Court concluded that the bankruptcy court was not so empowered. Jevic, 580 U.S. at 464-67. Here, the Code expressly disempowers courts from allowing claims for post-petition contract-rate interest over an objection.
Second, even if the majority is correct that Hertz violates the common law absolute priority rule, Hertz‘s violation differs significantly from the violation in Jevic. There, the structured dismissal violated the codified absolute priority rules for Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 plans, insofar as low-priority creditors were paid something but some mid-priority creditors were paid nothing. Jevic, 580 U.S. at 460. Here, Hertz has not violated the codified absolute priority rules because it has paid the Noteholders’ allowed claims in full. For both Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 plans, codified absolute priority requires payment of allowed claims, not payment of disallowed contractual entitlements. See, e.g.,
For those two reasons, even assuming that Jevic announces a clear-statement rule, it does not apply to the facts here. Instead of a clear-statement rule, I would apply the Supreme Court‘s typical approach to harmonizing pre-Code practice with the Code‘s text, under which pre-Code practice “can be relevant to the interpretation of an ambiguous text” but is irrelevant if there is “no textual ambiguity.”2 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012). Because the Code‘s disallowance of the Noteholders’ claims is clear and unambiguous, I would not use the common law absolute priority rule as an “extratextual supplement” to supplant
III
In addition to their arguments regarding impairment and Jevic, my colleagues appeal more generally to policy. They argue that treating the Noteholders as unimpaired and allowing Hertz to pay them less than contract-rate interest would produce odd results. For example, they argue that the unimpaired Noteholders would be treated worse than impaired, dissenting creditors, insofar as the latter would be entitled to “fair and equitable” treatment that would include contract-rate interest. My colleagues may well be correct that “unimpaired creditors [will] be treated worse than impaired creditors” under Hertz‘s interpretation, but we are bound to “enforce[] the Code‘s express terms” regardless of such policy considerations. PG&E, 46 F.4th at 1075 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
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For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
Notes
U.S. Bank National Association also appeals in its capacity as indenture trustee for other unsecured notes; its only issue is whether Hertz should have paid post-petition interest on its notes at their contract rate rather than the federal judgment rate. Beyond adopting the arguments made by the Noteholders, it did not offer any arguments of its own. Assuming that Jevic‘s clear-statement rule applies here, it is satisfied because
App. 662 (cleaned up).“Applicable Premium” means, with respect to a 2026 Note at any Redemption Date . . .[,] the excess of (A) the present value at such Redemption Date, calculated as of the date of the applicable redemption notice, of (1) the redemption price of such 2026 Note on August 1, 2022 (such redemption price being that described in Section 6(a)), plus (2) all required remaining scheduled interest payments due on such 2026 Note through such date (excluding accrued and unpaid interest to the Redemption Date), computed using a discount rate equal to the Treasury Rate plus 50 basis points, over (B) the principal amount of such 2026 Note on such Redemption Date . . . .