IN THE MATTER OF THE CLOSING OF JAMESBURG HIGH SCHOOL, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE BOROUGH OF JAMESBURG, MIDDLESEX COUNTY.
Supreme Court of New Jersey
Argued November 13, 1979—Decided July 25, 1980.
83 N.J. 540
It is also clear that respondent entered into the plan with William Valyo motivated by the desire to obtain the funds due for legal services rendered. We are not convinced that he assisted Valyo in conduct that the respondent knew was illegal. Though this resulted in a preference to respondent, we do not find that his conduct in this respect was fraudulent. See
Respondent admittedly maintained no trust or business accounts. He was under a duty to do so.
Respondent is hereby reprimanded and ordered to reimburse the Administrative Office of the Courts for the costs of stenographic transcripts out of this disciplinary proceeding.
For reprimand ----Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK—7.
Opposed—None.
Stephen E. Klausner, argued the cause for appellant Monroe Township Education Association.
Alfred E. Ramey, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., argued the cause for respondent State Board of Education (John J. Degnan, Atty. Gen. of New Jersey, attorney; Erminie L. Conley, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel).
David B. Rubin, argued the cause for respondent Jamesburg Board of Education (Rubin, Lerner & Rubin, attorneys).
Philip H. Shore argued the cause for respondent Board of Education of the Borough of Spotswood (Golden, Shore, Zahn & Richmond, attorneys).
David W. Carroll, General Counsel, argued the cause for amicus curiae The New Jersey School Boards Association (David W. Carroll and Paula A. Mullaly, on the brief).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.
This case arises from an order of the Commissioner of Education, affirmed by the State Board of Education, which transferred tenured teachers previously employed at the now closed Jamesburg High School to the school districts of Monroe Township and Spotswood Borough. The issue is whether the Monroe and Spotswood districts can be required to treat the Jamesburg teachers as tenured faculty within their own systems. The Board of Education‘s decision answering that question in the affirmative was reversed by the Appellate Division, 169 N.J. Super. 328 (1979). That court held that in the absence of an agreement between the sending and receiving school districts under
I
On April 4, 1979, the State Board of Education ordered the Jamesburg Board of Education to close its only high school.
On May 1, 1979, the Commissioner found that upon the closing of Jamesburg High School, the tenured teachers employed at that facility should be transferred to the Monroe and Spotswood high schools in proportion to the number of Jamesburg students received by those districts.2 In the opinion of the Commissioner, the transfer was authorized by
The Commissioner‘s order was unanimously upheld by the State Board of Education.3 Acknowledging that no statute expressly authorized the Commissioner to order the transfer of the Jamesburg teachers, the State Board held that such action was justified by the public policy underlying education law with respect to the rights of tenured teachers. Citing other statutes concerned with employment security for tenured teachers, the State Board found they evinced a policy designed to “protect teaching staff members in their tenure, seniority and pension rights as far as practicable.” See
Applications by Monroe and Spotswood to stay the decision of the State Board were granted by the Appellate Division which, on its own motion, consolidated and accelerated the appeals. In re Closing of Jamesburg High School, 169 N.J. Super. 328 (1979). That court reversed and set aside the determinations of the Commissioner and the State Board of Education, concluding that the Commissioner lacked any authority, express or inherent, to transfer the instructors without the consent of the receiving districts. Id. at 333-34. Stating that “[a]dministrative officers
While a school district may be compelled to become a receiving district [for displaced students],
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8 , there is no provision in the law which compels a receiving district against its will to also accept the transfer of teachers from a school which has closed in another district. The desirability of such a provision is clеarly for the legislature and not the courts to determine. [Id. at 333-34.]
This Court stayed the Appellate Division judgment in order to maintain the Monroe and Spotswood teaching staffs in status quo for the 1979-80 school year.
II
Our discussion here necessarily begins with a review of the statute in question. Encaptioned “Tenure upon Discontinuance of School,”
Whenever, heretofore or hereafter, any board of education in any school district in this state shall discontinue any high school, junior high school, elementary school or any one or more of the grades from kindergarten through grade 12 in the district and shall, by agreement with another board of education, send the pupils in such schools or grades to such other district, all teaching staff members who are assigned for a majority of their time in such school, grade or grades and who had tenure of office at the time such schools or grades are discontinued shall be employed by the board of education of such other district in the same or nearest equivalent position * * *. Teaching staff members so employed in such other district shall have their rights to tenure, seniority, pension and accumulated leave of absence, accorded under the laws of this State, recognized and preserved by the board of education of that district. [
N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6.1 (emphasis added).]
Of central concern is the statute‘s provision that upon the discontinuation of a school, specified students and tenured
The Appellate Division found
We find unpersuasive the appellants’ contentions that the expressed legislative intent favoring the rights of tenured teachers should control this Court‘s interpretation of
Our duty is to construe and apply the statute as enacted. We are not at liberty to presume the legislature intended something other than what it expressed by its plain language. This Court will not engage in conjecture or surmise which will circumvent the plain meaning of the act. Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 10 (1957); Bravand v. Neeld, 35 N.J. Super. 42, 52 (App.Div.1955). Appellants’ recourse lies with the legislature, not with this Court.
III
Similarly without merit are the appellants’ contentions that the Commissioner of Education possesses the inherent authority under
Assessing the Commissioner‘s findings we must first note that
We must reject also the notion that the Commissioner has the inherent authority under
In holding the Commissioner was without the authority to compel the transfer in this case, the Appellate Division relied upon the decision of this Court in Burlington Cty. Evergreen Mental Hosp. v. Cooper, 56 N.J. 579 (1970). The reference is appropriate. In Cooper, the Court was presented with the question of whether the Public Employment Relations Law,
Whether PERC should be invested with authority to hear and decide unfair labor practice charges and to issue various types of affirmative remedial orders respecting them is an important policy question. In our judgment, a policy question of that significance lies in the legislative domain and should be resolved there. A court should not find such authority in an agency unless the statute under consideration confers it expressly or by unavoidable implication. [56 N.J. at 598.]5
The reasoning in Cooper is applicable to the matter at hand. Whether the Commissioner or, for that matter, the State Board of Education can enlarge the bounds of existing protection of teachers’ tenure is “an important policy question.” Clearly, such power is not conferred by the express terms of
Finally, we note that the invalid order of the State Board may have caused local school boards in Monroe and Spotswood to discharge instructors in their schools to accommodate tenured employees from Jamesburg. We therefore remand the matter to the Commissioner of Education to determine whether this has occurred, and to fashion any appropriate remedy. See
The stay is dissolved. The judgment of the Appellate Division is modified to provide for a limited remand, and, as modified, is affirmed.
SULLIVAN, J. (dissenting).
In this case, the State Board of Education (State Board) ordered the closing of the Jamesburg High School and the transfer of the students to the neighboring school districts of Monroe Township and Spotswood Borough. It also ordered the transfer of tenured teachers previously employed at the closed high school to the school districts to which the pupils were being sent. The majority opinion does not question the State Board‘s power to have ordered the closing of thе school and the transfer of the pupils, but holds that the Board lacked the power to reassign the tenured teachers from the closed school to the school districts to which the pupils were transferred. In the main, the majority bases its ruling on an interpretation of
I agree that the statute so provides but in my opinion this statute has nothing to do with the State Board‘s order. The statute deals with a situation where a local school district closes a school. In such case the statute provides that the students
The subject matter of this appeal is entirely different. Here, after public hearings on the question, the State Board ordered the closing of Jamesburg High School based on a determination by the Commissioner of Education that the school could not be operated in a thorough and efficient manner. There is no statute specifically providing for such an order. However, the majority notes that the closing was ordered pursuant to
shall have the power to issue an administrative order specifying a remedial plan to the local board of education * * *.
I agree that this broad authorization would empower the State Board to order the closing of a particular school if it found it necessary to do so in order to provide for a thorough and efficient education. By the same token, however, the remedial plan authorized would be incomplete unless it made provision for the students and tenured teachers in the closed school.
I do not understand how the majority can, in effect, sanction a State Board order closing a local school and transferring its pupils to neighboring school districts, but hold that the agency lacks the power to do anything about the tenured teachers affected by the closing. In so holding, the majority has failed to give any consideration to the obviously relevant provisions of
The majority has also declined to consider whether the broad legislative authority conferred on the State Board to provide for a thorough and efficient education could be used to justify the teacher transfer order, saying that neither the State Board nor the State Commissioner of Education attempted to justify the transfer order on this ground.
Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justice PASHMAN join in this opinion.
WILENTZ, C. J., dissenting.
I join Justice Sullivan‘s dissent. The protection of teachers’ tenure rights is part of the legislative effort to ensure a thorough and efficient education, a constitutionally based aspect of a clear and compelling State policy of furthering the interests of school children. See
The majority accurately recognizes the absence of express authority under
More aptly applied, this doctrine leads to the conclusion that where the Legislature saw fit to condition only one exercise of the power to close a school (by the district) on the transfer of tenured teachers, another exercise of that same power (by the Commissioner) is therefore not so limited and the Commissioner retains the power to decide whether or not to order the transfer of tenured teachers.
I would avoid a dispute over the axiom, however, for it obscures the real question, which is “whether in a given context an express provision with respect to a portion of an area reveals
The real question presented by this appeal, then, is whether this Court will give effect to the Legislature‘s intent, оr will seek a way not to do so. The majority apparently believes it is compelled to limit its evaluation of the correctness of the Commissioner‘s action to his erroneous reliance upon
I.
Simply put,
The majority opinion has converted
Moreover, the cases make it clear that the institution of tenure is much more than a mere labor relations device. Tenure laws were designed to protect teachers in their positions, Downs v. Board of Educ. of Hoboken, 13 N.J. Misc. 853 (Sup.Ct.1935), аnd by virtue of the security they engender to promote a “competent and efficient” school system, Viemeister v. Board of Educ. of Prospect Park, 5 N.J. Super. 215 (App.Div.1949). The fundamental and overriding purpose of tenure is to benefit children by furthering the constitutional and legislative goal of a thorough and efficient education. See
A review of those statutes which deal directly with the question of tenure rights reveals a legislative design to protect tenure rights in a multitude of situations when a school district undergoes organizational or administrative change. See
More particularly,
Although the Legislature clearly contemplated both voluntary and involuntary sending agreements, see
Teachers in elementary and secondary schools which regionalize or consolidate hаve long been accorded this same protection by law.
In fact, the majority has failed to accord proper weight to another significant difference between the two versions. The first version provided that non-tenured teachers as well as tenured teachers were to be employed in the receiving district. The deletion of non-tenured teachers from the final version reinforces the articulated purpose of the bill: to protect tenure rights by requiring that the tenured teachers follow their students.
Given this stated objective, it is erroneous to conclude that the phrase “by agreement” in
Nevertheless, that which the Legislature so wisely refused to allow local boards to do, even if by agreement they wish to do so, a majority of this Court is prepared to force the Commissioner to do. Two resultant evils are immediately suggested. First, in any future case where for educational reasons the Commissioner must consider whether to close a school, his decision will necessarily be affected by the specter of unemployed teachers whose conscientious performance has earned them worthless
In Jenkins v. Township of Morris School Dist., 58 N.J. 483 (1971), this Court found that the Commissioner had sufficiently broad powers under the Constitution and the then-existing7 statutes to direct a merger оf school districts when they were unlikely to merge voluntarily under
The statutory scheme then in effect included
More recently, the Legislature has emphatically declared that it is the policy of this State to provide every child between 5 and 18 years of age a thorough and efficient education, monitored and corrected when necessary to realize that goal,
Thus, to the extent that a gap in the tenure protections of the School Law is perceived, it is filled not only by the policy considerations which underlie the statutes cited supra at 557-558, but also by the Commissioner‘s powers under that law and under the Public School Education Act of 1975,
II.
I also take issue with the majority‘s reliance on Burlington Cty. Evergreen Mental Hosp. v. Cooper, 56 N.J. 579 (1970). In
The totality of the history before the Burlington Hospital Court reveals not only the impossibility of judicial implication of power in that case, but the crucial distinction between it and the case before us today. The inclusion of labor practices in the jurisdiction of PERC represented a far-reaching extension into a broad and hitherto unlegislated area.
The school law and its tenure provisions, however, deal both in general concept and in detail with a multitude of related issues. The issue decided today represents merely a small gap in this overall scheme of tenure protection. The question is how best to fill that gap, not whether to fill it at all. Such interstitial lawmaking has always been within the scope of delegated authority to administrative agencies.
I would reverse the Appellate Division and reinstate the decision of the State Board.
Justice PASHMAN joins in this opinion.
For modification and affirmance—Justices CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK—4.
For reversal—Chief Justice WILENTZ, Justices SULLIVAN and PASHMAN—3.
