In Re Shahara Khan
593 F. App'x 83
2d Cir.
2015
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Docket

In re Shahara KHAN, Debtor, Karamvir Dahiya & Dahiya Law Offices LLC, Karamvir Dahiya, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Debra Kramer, as Trustee of the Estate of Shahara Khan, Trustee-Appellee.

No. 14-1151.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Feb. 5, 2015.

The IJ considered but rejected Li‘s explanation for this inconsistency that the smuggler who brought him into the country urged him not to mention his religion, for fear of reprisal by the Chinese government if he were deported. This explanation, even if considered plausible, did not have to be credited by the agency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); . While Li contends that his evidence contained a mere omission, rather than an inconsistency, Pet. Br. at 10, the two are “functionally equivalent.” . Moreover, as discussed, Li did not simply omit his claims of religious persecution; he explicitly denied that anyone in China sought to persecute him for his religion. C.A.R. at 128.

As the BIA recognized, credible fear interviews “warrant the close examination called for by” . ; C.A.R. at 3. Here, the credible fear interview “bears sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its consideration by the agency.” . There is no claim that Li was coerced or had difficulty understanding the interpreter, and question and answers at issue leave little room for ambiguity.

Li‘s argument that the IJ ignored evidence favorable to his claim is also meritless. The IJ explicitly considered Li‘s documentary evidence, which was reasonably found to be very limited and unpersuasive. See C.A.R. at 65. Accordingly, the IJ‘s adverse credibility determination in this case is supported by substantial evidence. .

Because the only evidence of a threat to Li‘s life or freedom depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See .

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.

Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Shapiro Arato LLP, (Karamvir Dahiya, Dahiya Law Offices LLC, on the brief), New York, N.Y., for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Avrum J. Rosen, Law Offices of Avrum J. Rosen, PLLC, Huntington, N.Y., for Trustee-Appellee.

PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges and J. GARVAN MURTHA,1 District Judge.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellants Karamvir Dahiya and Dahiya Law Offices, LLC2 appeal from the district court‘s judgment affirming the imposition of sanctions against Dahiya by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York (Stong, J.). In addition, Trustee-Appellee Debra Kramer moves in this Court to sanction Dahiya pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for filing a frivolous appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“A district court‘s order in a bankruptcy case is subject to plenary review, meaning that this Court undertakes an independent examination of the factual findings and legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court.” (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the district court‘s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. .

Dahiya argues as a threshold matter that the bankruptcy court lacked the authority to sanction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and its inherent authority to sanction. We need not reach the issue of whether bankruptcy courts possess the inherent authority to sanction attorneys. But see (noting that a bankruptcy court “may possess inherent power to sanction abusive litigation practices“) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1927, standing alone, plainly endows the bankruptcy court with authority to impose the sanctions at issue. See (“A bankruptcy court may impose sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 if it finds that ‘[a]n attorney‘s actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay.’ “) (quoting ).

We similarly reject Dahiya‘s sweeping argument that the very existence of bankruptcy courts violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; (stating it is “evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate“).

We next address the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed in this case. In order to impose sanctions under Section 1927, “a court must find clear evidence that (1) the offending party‘s claims were entirely without color, and (2) the claims were brought in bad faith—that is, ‘motivated by improper purposes such as harassment or delay.’ ” (quoting ). We review a bankruptcy court‘s imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion. (explaining that “[w]e review de novo the District Court‘s review of the Bankruptcy Court‘s decision to impose sanctions“). A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. at 152.

Upon an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we find no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court‘s imposition of sanctions here. We agree with the district and bankruptcy courts that Dahiya‘s counterclaims for abuse of process and an unspecified “constitutional tort” were not colorable claims. As to Dahiya‘s abuse of process claim, the record does not show that Kramer sought to obtain a collateral objective outside the legitimate ends of any regularly issued process, regardless of what constitutes the relevant “process” here. See (setting forth abuse of process elements). Similarly, the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Dahiya‘s “confused, ambiguous, vague, and otherwise unintelligible,” claim for a “constitutional tort” was lacking in merit. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court‘s finding of bad faith. The bankruptcy court noted Dahiya‘s general pattern of groundless litigation in the bankruptcy courts, premised not on actual disputes with the actions of trustees but rather on frivolous, obstructive objections to the bankruptcy system. Cf. (noting, in the context of a finding of bad faith, that “the record demonstrates that several courts had already instructed plaintiff‘s counsel that similar claims against New York State were barred by the Eleventh Amendment“). In addition, the bankruptcy court noted the significant delay in the resolution of the underlying bankruptcy proceeding occasioned by Dahiya‘s filing of the counterclaims. See (“Bad faith may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.“) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In light of these conclusions, we find no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court‘s finding of bad faith.

Finally, we deny Kramer‘s motion for sanctions. Although Dahiya‘s arguments on appeal lack merit, some at least are not frivolous, and they have not “multiplie[d] the proceedings ... unreasonably and vexatiously.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1927; .

We have considered Dahiya‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Notes

1
The Honorable J. Garvan Murtha, of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
2
For the sake of simplicity, we refer to appellants collectively as “Dahiya.”
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