In re S.K.G.
Fred S. Miller, 246 High Street, Hamilton, OH 45011, for defendant-appellant, R.K.G.
OPINION
YOUNG, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, R.K.G., appeаls a decision of the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, awarding custody of appellant‘s grandchild, S.K.G., to plaintiffs-appellees, D. & J. W., who are not biologiсally related to the child and reducing appellant‘s visitation with the child.
{¶2} S.K.G. was born in May 2006 to an unmarried mother. Shortly thereafter,
{¶3} Aрpellant, who is the mother of S.K.G.‘s putative father, had a paternity test conducted to establish whether or not her son was the child‘s father, and after the testing established thеre was a 99.99 percent probability that he was, appellant moved for legal custody of S.K.G. On October 10, 2006, the juvenile court adjudged S.K.G. to be a dependent child and рlaced the child in appellees’ temporary custody. Appellant was granted temporary visitation with the child on Sundays from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and Wednesdays from 5:30 p.m. to 8:00 р.m.
{¶4} A two-day hearing was held on the matter in December 2007. On July 16, 2008, the magistrate issued a decision awarding appellees legal custody of S.K.G. and awarding appellant grandparenting time with S.K.G. on the first and third Sunday of every month from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. and “such other times as can be agreed.” The trial court overruled appellant‘s objections to the magistrate‘s decision and affirmed the decision in its entirety.
{¶5} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following as error:
{¶6} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶8} Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded appellees legal custody of S.K.G. because the evidence shows that both parties are good and competent caregivers, and therеfore she should have been granted legal custody of S.K.G. by virtue of the fact that she is a blood relative of the child and appellees are not. We disagree.
{¶9} “Gеnerally, the standard of review in custody cases is whether the trial court abused its discretion. C.D. v. D.L., Fayette App. No. CA2006-09-037, 2007-Ohio-2559, citing Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 416-417, 1997-Ohio-260. Abuse of discretion implies that the court‘s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. The appellate court must be mindful that the trial court is better equipped to examine and weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of thе witnesses, and make decisions concerning custody. Terry L. v. Eva E., Madison App. No. CA2006-05-019, 2007-Ohio-916, ¶9. A judgment supported by some competent, credible evidence will not be reversed by a reviewing court as against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280.” Leeth v. Leeth, Preble App. No. CA2009-02-0024, 2009-Ohio-4260, ¶6.
{¶10}
{¶11} When a juvenile court makes a custody determination under
{¶12} A number of courts have held that while “blood relationship” and “family unity” are factors to consider when determining a child‘s best interest, neither one is controlling. See, e.g., In the Matter of Mitchell, Lake App. Nos. 2002-L-078, 2002-L-079, 2003-Ohio-4102, ¶18, and In re T.W., Cuyahoga App. No. 86084, 2005-Ohio-6633, ¶15. Nevertheless, the Mitchell court went on to hold that while statutes like
{¶14} Furthermore, in In the Matter of Halstead, Columbiana App. No. 04CO37, 2005-Ohio-403, ¶4, the court of appeals noted that while there are statutes that indicate preference for awarding custody to relatives over nonrelatives, the language in those statutes was “precatory, not mandatory,” and therefore the “trial court did not err by failing to rigidly apply those statutory preferences.” The Halstead court also stated that “courts should not casually disregard the relationship a very young child has established with a foster family in order to give a relative legal custody of a child.” Id. at ¶52.
{¶15} In this case, it appears from the recоrd that the juvenile court considered all the required factors listed in
{¶16} Appellant also points out that it took nearly two years for the trial court to
{¶17} Accordingly, appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶18} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶19} “THE TRIAL ERRED [sic] TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT WHEN IT ORDERED ONLY LIMITED VISITATION BETWEEN APPELLANT AND HER [GRANDCHILD].”
{¶20} Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it “drastically” reduced her visitation with S.K.G. since the record shows that she had had significant visitation with the child for about two years prior to the custody determination and there was no evidence of any problems between the parties or that the child had been harmed by the visitation. We find this argument unpersuasive.
{¶21}
{¶22} In this case, the evidence showed that S.K.G. had lived with appellees for
{¶23} Therefore, appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶24} Judgment affirmed.
BRESSLER, P.J., and POWELL, J., concur.