In re S.C.
NELSON, J.
{¶ 1} In these consolidated cases, mother S.B. appeals from the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, that granted motions of appellee Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS,” or “the agency“) for permanent custody of S.B.‘s three minor children.
{¶ 2} On July 23, 2020, FCCS filed a motion (in common pleas case No. 18JU-9344) for permanent custody of M.M., then age ten. On August 3, 2020, FCCS filed a
{¶ 3} As S.B. recites in her brief, “the agency first became involved with this family based on an allegation of medical neglect after mother tested positive for drugs at M.M.‘s birth. However, the case was closed because the family could not be located.” Appellant‘s Brief at 1, citing Jan. 28, 2021 Tr. at 29-30. M.M. was born October 23, 2009, and B.M. “is alleged to be [his] father * * * but paternity had never been established.” Judgment Entry at 7.
{¶ 4} S.C. was born to S.B. and J.H.C. on June 4, 2013. At the time of birth, the infant S.C. “tested positive for an illicit drug.” Id. at 8. In 2013, the juvenile court granted FCCS temporary orders of custody as to both M.M. and S.C. J.C. was born October 17, 2014. Id. at 8. S.C.‘s father J.H.C. “is alleged to be the father of [J.C.] but paternity has not been established.” Id.
{¶ 5} In May 2015, after having been in FCCS‘s temporary custody for over 18 months, M.M. and S.C. “were returned to the custody of Mother with protective supervision by the Agency.” Id. In June 2016, FCCS terminated protective supervision of M.M. and S.C., and “the prior cases were closed.” Id.
{¶ 6} On May 31, 2018, however, the juvenile court granted FCCS “temporary orders of custody” with respect to all three children after reports of parental drug use, that the children had been left with a heroin using relative, that M.M. had not been enrolled in school, and more. Id. at 8, 9-10. M.M. “was placed in foster care by the Agency,” and S.C. and J.C. “were initially placed by the Agency with a paternal aunt and uncle.” Id. at 8. On June 12, 2018, S.C. and J.C. “were placed in the same foster home as [M.M.].” Id. All three children “have remained together in the temporary custody of the Agency and in the foster care of Mr. and Mrs. [C.].” Id. at 8-9.
{¶ 7} FCCS filed complaints on August 10, 2018, requesting custody of M.M., S.C., and J.C., and alleging the children “to be neglected and dependent children.” Id. at 9. Three days later, the juvenile court “granted temporary orders of custody” of the children to FCCS and “ordered random drug screens” of S.B. and J.H.C. Id. During “much of the first year” of the pending cases, J.H.C. “was incarcerated for F-5 Burglary and Theft.” Id. at 10.
{¶ 9} FCCS filed motions for permanent custody of M.M., S.C., and J.C. in April 2019. FCCS filed second motions for permanent custody on July 23, 2020 (for M.M.) and August 3, 2020 (for S.C. and J.C.). On January 24, 2021, J.H.C. filed a motion seeking legal custody of M.M. (apparently pursuant to his wish, as supported by S.B., albeit not by M.M.‘s father B.M., to exercise custody over all three children, see, e.g., Jan. 28, 2021 Tr. at 8, 9).
{¶ 10} The permanent custody motions proceeded to hearing on January 27, 2021. Although represented by counsel, neither S.B. nor J.H.C. appeared. The juvenile court accommodated counsels’ delay request by conducting in-camera interviews of all three children that day, while putting other matters off to the next. During the in-camera session, each of the children expressed a desire to stay with his or her foster family. Jan. 27, 2021 Tr. at 72, 108, 142.
{¶ 11} To quote from S.B.‘s brief: “When trial resumed the next day, the parents were still not in attendance. Mother‘s attorney noted that he had last spoken with her over a month before and had been unable to contact her since then. He also noted that mother had an active warrant from Franklin County. Mother last told her attorney that she wished to contest the permanent custody motion and supported custody going to [J.H.C.]. [The lawyer for B.M., putative father of M.M.] indicated that he had met with B.M. and B.M. no longer contested permanent custody, but did contest [J.H.C.‘s] motion for custody of M.M. [J.H.C.‘s] counsel noted that the agency did provide a ride [for his client], but it was not needed. [He] was unwilling to explain any further because it touched on confidential communications.” Appellant‘s Brief at 3-4, citing Jan. 28, 2021 Tr. at 6-11.
{¶ 12} That is an apt summary. Counsel for S.B., in noting his client‘s absence, stated: “She indicated to me that she was in no position to take custody at this time.” Jan. 28, 2021 Tr. at 8. Counsel for B.M. stated that his client “is uncontested to the PCC at this time,” and that “[t]he only piece he would contest if it went forward” was J.H.C.‘s motion for custody of M.M. Id. at 9. Counsel for J.H.C. noting his client “is not here,” stated, “our motion remains pending and we are contested to the permanent custody motion.” Id. at 10.
{¶ 14} After FCCS opened its 2018 case as to all three children, she continued, J.C. and S.C. were placed with an aunt and uncle for “[l]ess than 30 days.” Id. at 41. They then were moved to the same foster family with which M.M. had been placed, and all three children remain in that home. Id. at 43. As reflected by stipulation, “all three children have been in the continuous temporary custody of the Agency for 12 or more months prior to the filing of this second motion for permanent custody.” Id. at 47.
{¶ 15} Ms. Dowell recited that S.B.‘s case plan objectives included “Drug Court, random drug screens [and] an [alcohol and other drug (“AOD“)] assessment,” in addition to a requirement that she “be available for home visits.” Id. at 52.
{¶ 16} S.B.‘s contact with an earlier caseworker was “[l]imited,” as “[w]e weren‘t able to locate her often.” Id. at 54. She was accepted into an out-patient addiction program with “Amethyst * * * but they felt that she needed to detox first and sent her over to Maryhaven.” Id. at 56. S.B. checked herself into the in-patient program at Maryhaven, but she did not successfully complete the program - - she remained there only “[t]wo hours.” Id. Ms. Dowell testified that S.B. did not complete any other AOD program, and that she had not successfully completed the alcohol and drug assessment specified in her case plan. Id. at 57. S.B. also did not successfully complete drug screens. “She‘s missed over 100 screens,” while completing only four; each of those four drug tests was positive for illicit drugs, and she never has provided a negative screen. Id. at 59, 65.
{¶ 17} S.B.‘s reunification case plan included goals of stable housing and income. S.B. “has stated that she‘s living between two separate houses.” Id. at 66. Ms. Dowell has attempted to contact S.B., but “[h]er voicemail is full and I‘m not able to leave a message.” Id. at 67. Ms. Dowell testified that she has received no documentation indicating that S.B. is currently on a lease or rental agreement, and S.B. has not provided documentation as to income or employment. Ms. Dowell is unaware of S.B. having a job during the time of the
{¶ 18} For his part, J.H.C. also was to complete an alcohol and drug assessment and submit drug screens. In 2019, he completed an alcohol and drug assessment with a provider in Hillsboro, Ohio, and he enrolled in alcohol and drug treatment services through that same provider. But when Ms. Dowell spoke with J.H.C. in July 2020 regarding his progress, “[h]e stated that he * * * no longer needed the treatment and that‘s why he wasn‘t attending.” Id. at 91. FCCS requested that J.H.C. complete orientation and screens at American Court Services, but “[h]e never completed the orientation.” Id. at 98. J.H.C. had not enrolled in or completed any other AOD programs. Id. at 92, 209.
{¶ 19} Ms. Dowell, who herself has spoken with J.H.C. only one time, described J.H.C.‘s contact with the previous caseworker as also “minimal.” Id. at 103. Phone calls from Ms. Dowell to J.H.C. since June 2020, with messages requesting that J.H.C. call her back, reached only “an unidentified voicemail.” Id. at 104. J.H.C. “reported that he lives with his mother” in Hillsboro, Ohio, and that he is employed, but he “has not provided” Ms. Dowell “with a name” or any evidence of employment or income. Id. at 100, 106. J.H.C. informed Ms. Dowell “he didn‘t want me to contact his boss.” Id. at 107. As part of his case plan, J.H.C. was requested to resolve “his legal issues“; J.H.C. indicated he “has resolved those issues, but he is still on parole.” Id. at 107, 116.
{¶ 20} Ms. Dowell testified, too, as to parental visitation. Before the Covid-19 pandemic with its various protocols, J.H.C. was “pretty consistent” with weekly visitations. Id. at 117. S.B. also was “pretty consistent” with visitations before the pandemic. Id. at 118. In March 2020, visitation was “taken off the schedule due to COVID shut down.” Id. at 123. Visits were scheduled again in July 2020, but S.B. “has not attended any visits” in person from that point. Id. at 126. She did participate in “Facetime or Zoom or phone calls,” but her contact was “inconsistent.” Id. J.H.C. did not attend his scheduled July 2020 visit or make subsequent visits. After a “seventh missed visit,” he was removed from the visitation schedule. Id. at 129. Added back to the visitation schedule by court order in December 2020, he failed to attend three consecutive scheduled visits and again was removed from the visitation schedule. Id. at 136.
{¶ 21} Ms. Dowell testified that S.B.‘s last visit with the children had been in March 2020. Id. at 142. J.H.C.‘s last visit with the children was also that month. Id. J.H.C. did
{¶ 22} The children refer to their foster parents as “[m]om and dad,” and the foster parents provide a potential adoptive home. Id. at 146, 150. Ms. Dowell testified that there is a close bond among M.M., S.C., and J.C., and that the foster parents are “extremely bonded” with the three children. Id. at 147. M.M. has special needs, and is “diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder,” as well as “ADHD” for which he is prescribed medication; he also has exhibited “behavioral concerns and outbursts.” Id. at 151. J.C. “is behind in school,” reads “at a lower level,” and receives “IEP services.” Id. at 153. The foster parents have special needs experience, having “adopted six other special needs children.” Id. at 194.
{¶ 23} Ms. Dowell believes that granting permanent custody to the agency is in “the best interest” of the children, and that neither S.B. nor J.H.C. would be “able to care for these [children] long term.” Id. at 155. In making that assessment, Ms. Dowell cited “continued homelessness issues,” as well as “concerns with alcohol and drug use.” Id.
{¶ 24} Lawyer Mark Murphy was appointed guardian ad litem (“GAL“) in both cases on May 31, 2018. He testified to concerns about S.B. related to “the substance issues and many of the accompanying issues that go along with that.” Id. at 232. S.B. “knew she needed to get help with her sobriety and she would tell me that * * * she was [going to] go into in-patient and move forward. And then unfortunately that just never occurred,” he recounted. Id. at 238.
{¶ 25} Mr. Murphy‘s only interactions with S.B. were at court hearings or child visitations. “I had gone to the house a few times and she was never there, they said she‘d give me a call right back [and she never did].” Id. at 232. He also “sent letters, called, never heard anything.” Id. at 237.
{¶ 26} Mr. Murphy‘s contact with J.H.C. was “extremely inconsistent.” Id. at 241. During the “first year of the case [J.H.C.] was incarcerated due to the * * * burglary and theft.” Id. Then, “[a]fter COVID nothing ever happened, no phone calls were responded to or a letter wasn‘t responded to.” Id. Attempts by Mr. Murphy to contact J.H.C. at an address in Hillsboro, Ohio, were unsuccessful.
{¶ 27} The current foster home is appropriate for the children, Mr. Murphy testified. The children “were happy,” and “there‘s no concerns; the needs are met there, the food‘s there, all their basic needs are met.” Id. at 245. As to the wishes of the children, Mr. Murphy
{¶ 28} Mr. Murphy urged granting the motion for permanent custody, saying again: “[W]e are at the point that the kids need permanency.” Id. He further testified: “I believe we‘ve had 16 court hearings now and [J.H.C.] appeared at one. Mother * * * probably has appeared at three or four.” Id. at 263. Noting that “even today, there‘s no parents in the courtroom,” GAL Murphy stated, “so much of being an adult is * * * showing up, proving that you are going to do everything that you can for these children. And I have not seen that.” Id. at 264.
{¶ 29} In its April 5, 2021 Judgment Entry as filed in both cases, the juvenile court found, among other things, that S.B. and J.H.C. had “utterly failed to complete essential components of the reunification case plan,” Judgment Entry at 13; that “[n]o other relatives ever visited with the Children” during that time and that no one other than J.H.C. had sought custody, id. at 14; that “the bond of the children with [J.H.C.] and Mother was likely diminished due to the lack of consistent visitation by either Parent subsequent to the resumption of allowing for weekly in-person visitations,” id. at 15; that the children are very bonded with their foster family and want to live there, id.; and that the children are bonded to each other and should remain together, id. The juvenile court concluded that, “returning [M.M., S.C., and J.C.] to a Parent would create a significant risk to his/her health, [and that] the best option for [each of the three] to have a full life is that they be adopted as siblings, and that granting the motion for permanent custody is in their best interest.” Id. at 16.
{¶ 30} The juvenile court granted FCCS‘s motions, committed M.M., S.C., and J.C. to FCCS for the purpose of adoption, and divested S.B., B.M., and J.H.C. of their parental rights. The court also denied J.H.C.‘s motion for legal custody of M.M. and dismissed FCCS‘s first motions for permanent custody.
{¶ 32} S.B. mounts one assignment of error:
Appellant‘s Due Process rights were violated by a grant of permanent custody that was not supported by the weight of the evidence.
{¶ 33} Under that single assignment, S.B. poses two questions. She asks: “When parents maintain a bond with their children, is it in the best interests of the children to terminate their relationship with parents?” “Can the children be placed with mother within a reasonable time when mother made efforts to remedy the conditions causing the removal?” Appellant‘s Brief at ii.
{¶ 34} When the state seeks to exercise the authority to terminate parental rights, a parent “must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.” In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist.1991). “Where procedures have been followed in accordance with statute, ‘[a] trial court‘s determination in a permanent custody case will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” In re K.J., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-727, 2020-Ohio-4391, ¶ 17, quoting In re K.L., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-218, 2013-Ohio-3499, ¶ 13, further citation omitted. ” ‘In determining whether the trial court‘s ruling on the permanent custody motion is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must consider whether the evidence on each element of the agency‘s case satisfied or failed to satisfy the burden of persuasion, i.e., whether clear and convincing evidence supports each element.’ ” K.J. at ¶ 17, quoting In re T.M., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-943, 2020-Ohio-815, ¶ 8.
{¶ 35}
{¶ 36} Here, the juvenile court concluded that
{¶ 37} S.B.‘s challenge to the juvenile court‘s decision instead implicates what we have called the second part of the statutory review, under which the juvenile court “must determine whether ‘by clear and convincing evidence, * * * it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody.’ ” K.J., 2020-Ohio-4391, at ¶ 16, quoting
{¶ 38} In determining the best interest of a child, a juvenile court “may apply one of two different tests.” In re J.P., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-834, 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39. “Under
In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section * * * the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
(d) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶ 40} The April 5, 2021 Judgment Entry reflects that the juvenile court considered all these statutory factors in concluding that an award of permanent custody to FCCS was in the best interest of the children.
{¶ 41} S.B. does not even attempt an argument with regard to the
{¶ 42} We have observed that “no single best interest factor is controlling.” In re N.W., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-590, 2008-Ohio-297, ¶ 19. Rather, “the best interest test is a balancing test.” Id. Moreover, the juvenile court‘s analysis of the first factor to be weighed (as with its analysis of the other factors) was based on what the record reflects.
{¶ 44} ” ‘Courts have considered the consistency of a party‘s visitation with a child when resolving the
{¶ 45} Turning to
{¶ 46} In addressing this factor, the juvenile court also cited the GAL‘s recommendation that “the motions for permanent custody be granted,” as well as testimony by the GAL that the children “should remain together and be adopted by the same family.” Judgment Entry at 15. GAL Murphy‘s recommendation came “in part because: ‘Parents need to show up and do what is needed.’ ” Id. The court further cited testimony by the GAL indicating that, of approximately “16 court hearings, [J.H.C.] appeared for 1 hearing and Mother appeared for 3 or 4 hearings.” Id. There existed “no conflict” between the recommendation of the GAL “and the wishes of the Children.” Id. at 7. The juvenile court‘s findings as to the best wishes of the children are fully consistent with the record, including Mr. Murphy‘s testimony, and are not contested by S.B.
{¶ 47}
{¶ 48}
{¶ 49} With regard to
{¶ 50} The record demonstrates that the juvenile court reviewed and weighed the evidence as to the relevant factors under
{¶ 51} In addition to finding that permanent custody was in the best interest of the children under
{¶ 52} Moreover, were we to assess the juvenile court‘s
{¶ 53} And S.B.‘s view that the juvenile court misstated the content of an alternative finding under
{¶ 54} S.B. mounts no other arguments against the juvenile court‘s (D)(2) analysis. On this record,
{¶ 55} We overrule S.B.‘s single assignment of error, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.
Judgment affirmed.
SADLER and JAMISON, JJ., concur.
NELSON, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, assigned to active duty under the authority of the
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