In re K.J.
Rendered on September 10, 2020
On brief: John T. Ryerson, for appellant.
On brief: Robert J. McClaren, for appellee Franklin County Children Services.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch
NELSON, J.
{1} The trial court‘s decision in this permanent custody case may provide some ground for hope for all concerned with what has been an enormously difficult situation. The trial court‘s ruling could clear the way for adoption of K.J., who was almost four at the time of the hearing, by her current foster mother (who wants that result). And the foster mother has said that she is inclined to facilitate ongoing contact between K.J. and her biological mother T.J., who herself was only going on 17 when the hearing was conducted. T.J. wants her daughter but told the trial court that, “[i]f you decide [under the circumstances] to give her to whomever else, all I ask is that I still get to be in contact with her so she can see how much I have grown.” Aug. 15, 2019 Tr. at 201.
{2} K.J.‘s putative father is not in the picture; the evidence is that he remains in prison for raping T.J. when she was 12. It is to T.J.‘s great credit that she wants to be reunited with K.J.; she does not challenge, however, any of the trial court‘s specific findings
{3} T.J. was thirteen when she gave birth to K.J. on November 2, 2015. Birth Certificate of K.J., Tr. Ex. 4. The trial court‘s thorough decision recounts the history of this matter, but we note that Teyana Jones, a former FCCS caseworker, became involved with T.J.‘s own case, involving T.J., her mother, and her brother, in April of 2016. Aug. 14, 2019 Tr. at 13-14. FCCS had opened that case earlier based on a complaint that T.J.‘s brother had sexually abused her. Id. The investigation resulted in “multiple substantiated” incidents of T.J. suffering sexual abuse by her own father and by K.A., K.J.‘s father, and “indicated” sexual abuse by the brother as well. Id. at 15-16; Ex. 6.
{4} When Ms. Jones was assigned to the case, she discovered that T.J.‘s mother had allowed T.J.‘s brother to live at home again in violation of the safety plan to which FCCS and T.J.‘s mother had agreed. Id. at 19-20. According to Ms. Jones, T.J. “stated that she did not feel safe” at home “because her mother did not believe her that the sexual abuse [had] occurred,” that “the sexual abuse with [her brother] caused her to want to harm herself,” and that she was “having suicidal ideations and self-harming.” Id. at 17, 20-21.
{5} T.J. and K.J. were placed together in a foster home on April 20, 2016. Id. at 23. Five weeks later, T.J. attempted suicide. Id. at 24. Several weeks after that, she began self-harming with razor blades. Id. at 25-26. T.J. was admitted to the hospital for several days. Id. at 28. The foster mother at that point requested that T.J. and K.J. be placed in a different home. Id. at 29.
{6} On August 19, 2016, Ms. Jones received a report that T.J. had cut herself 12 times with razor blades in her new foster home. Id. Ms. Jones also testified that T.J. admitted that “she bit [K.J.] because she gets annoyed easily and [K.J.] annoyed her.” Id. at 34; see also Aug. 15, 2019 Tr. at 177-78 (T.J. testifies that while the bite did not draw blood, she did not know what she was doing). In late May of 2017, T.J. again cut herself multiple times, subsequently threatened suicide, and was placed in an inpatient treatment program at Nationwide Children‘s Hospital. Aug. 14, 2019 Tr. at 36, 38, 42-43.
{7} Ms. Jones testified that while T.J. and K.J. were in foster care, “the foster parents were [the] primary caregiver[s] of [K.J.] due to some safety concerns with [T.J.]‘s interactions” with her child. Id. at 47-48. T.J. “referred to [K.J.] more of like a sister” than her daughter. Id. at 96. Ms. Jones referred T.J. to a number of parenting programs “to help her interact” appropriately with and care for K.J. Id. at 48-50. Ms. Jones also referred T.J. to youth programs, as well as to counseling and psychiatric services. Id. at 51.
{8} After her discharge from Nationwide Children‘s Hospital, T.J. was placed in a new foster home on August 4, 2017. Id. at 129. K.J. remained at the previous home; a dependency complaint had been filed and the trial court had granted temporary custody of K.J. to FCCS on June 23, 2017. See Sept. 24, 2019 Judgment Entry at 8. T.J. remained at her third foster home until October 26, 2017, when she was placed in another home. Id. at 9.
{9} On November 9, 2017, the trial court adjudicated K.J. to be a dependent child, committed her to the temporary custody of FCCS, and adopted the agency‘s case plan. Id. at 9-10. The next day, K.J. was placed in T.J.‘s foster home, as “[i]t was hoped that with the intervention of [T.J.]‘s therapist and with parent mentoring, Mother and Child could be together in the same foster home.” Id. at 10. K.J. remained in that foster home through the date of trial. Tr. at 134-35. Reunification was hoped for, with T.J. designated to be “the primary care giver (bathing, grooming, clothing, feeding, and comforting) for her daughter. This plan was not successful.” Sept. 24, 2019 Judgment Entry at 10. At various times, T.J. refused K.J.‘s “requests for holding and instead * * * hid in the bedroom.” Id. T.J. did not heed K.J.‘s cries to stop “tickling and roughhouse” play. Id. The foster mother “modeled parenting” for T.J. with her own child, and T.J. “had the additional help of a parenting mentor” and ongoing therapy; nevertheless, after complaining that “she had no privacy,” K.J. started sleeping in the foster mother‘s bedroom. Id. T.J. candidly acknowledges that she was not ready for a parenting role at that stage. Aug. 15, 2019 Tr. at 192.
{10} T.J. engaged in self-harm again in March of 2018. In June of 2018, she injured herself again and expressed suicidal intentions, resulting in another inpatient hospitalization followed by placement into a “secured, self-contained residential treatment facility in Cleveland to stabilize her mental health.” See Sept. 24, 2019 Judgment Entry at 10-11. From then until the date of trial, August 15, 2019, T.J. was either hospitalized or in
{11} The trial court extended FCCS‘s temporary custody of K.J. on July 9, 2018. FCCS filed its motion for permanent custody of K.J on November 15, 2018.
{12} T.J. had a number of supervised visits with K.J. between May and August of 2019. See id. at 13-15. The first visit made the social worker observing “uncomfortable,” due to “boundary issues, [including] the rough play, [T.J.] not recognizing cues from [K.J.].” Id. at 14. The two “were bonded like siblings” rather than as mother and daughter. Id. Subsequent visits in July and August were more successful; “parent/child comfort level” and “interaction with all parties” were described as “good.” Id. at 15.
{13} The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion for permanent custody on August 14 and 15, 2019. On September 24, 2019, the trial court granted the motion, committing K.J. to the permanent custody of FCCS and divesting T.J. of her parental rights. Judgment Entry at 12.
{14} T.J. appeals and asserts the following assignments of error:
- The Court below erred in finding that the granting of permanent custody of K.J. to Franklin County Children Services was in the best interest of K.J.
- The Court below erred in finding that Franklin County Children Services made reasonable efforts to reunify K.J. with her minor mother T.J.
- The Court below erred in finding that K.J. could not be [re]unified with her minor mother within a reasonable amount of time.
- The Court erred in failing to find that minor mother T.J. should have additional time to reunify with her daughter K.J. because she was a minor and in the custody of Franklin County Children Services.
{16} Second, the trial court then must determine whether “by clear and convincing evidence, * * * it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody.”
{17} Where procedures have been followed in accordance with statue, “[a] trial court‘s determination in a permanent custody case will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re K.L., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-218, 2013-Ohio-3499, ¶ 13, citing In re Andy-Jones, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1167, 2004-Ohio-3312. The
{18} In T.J.‘s first assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erred by determining that granting permanent custody of K.J. to FCCS was in the child‘s best interest. But the arguments she presents do not relate directly to the child‘s best interests: Her briefing does not address or challenge any of the trial court‘s findings under
{19} With regard to the “interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers” under
{20} Because K.J. “was not able to comprehend the situation nor able to express her wishes,” the trial court relied on K.J.‘s guardian ad litem in making its findings under
{21} In addressing the “custodial history of the child” under
{22} The trial court further addressed the need for a legally secure permanent placement under
{23} The trial court noted that “[n]o evidence was offered as to the best interest factors listed in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of
{24} The trial court concluded that, “having considered the best interest factors of
{25} On this record, we cannot gainsay the trial court‘s assessment of the evidence, in light of the
{26} The second assignment of error posits that FCCS did not engage in reasonable efforts to reunify T.J. with her daughter. T.J. argues that as “a minor in the care of FCCS” herself, “her freedom to move and establish her own home was impossible, until the agency would agree,” and that the caseworker “testified that minor mother T.J. had essentially complied with her case plan requirements in the instant case.” Appellant‘s Brief at 12-13.
{27} Under governing precedent, the question is whether the record reflects either that reasonable efforts findings were made at some point before the permanent custody
{28} T.J. argues that “this entry is merely a cursory document submitted by the agency routinely,” and it was “filed eight months prior to the trial dates“; thus, her “position about ‘reasonable efforts’ made in her case toward reunification with her daughter had shifted.” Appellant‘s Brief at 14. That position is not consistent with In re CF or with our own case law. See, e.g., In re J.C., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-766, 2011-Ohio-715, ¶ 21-22 (previous “reasonable efforts” finding by magistrate meant that the issue did not need to be addressed at the permanent custody hearing). But here, moreover, just as recited in paragraph 22 of In re J.C., “although not required, the judge also made a finding of ‘reasonable efforts’ at the permanent custody hearing.” See Judgment Entry at 23 (“Franklin County Children Services has made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the Child from the Child‘s home, eliminate the continued removal of the Child from the Child‘s home, and safely return the Child to the Child‘s home; and * * * has made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan in effect for the Child“).
{29} The trial court extensively addressed T.J.‘s compliance (or lack thereof) with the case plan, when making additional rulings under
{30} Under her third assignment of error, T.J. argues that the trial court should have given her more time to reunify with K.J. because she herself is a minor. She emphasizes that she is not challenging the permanent custody statute on constitutional grounds, and that the only statutory basis for her argument is the “catchall” factor under
{31} Because T.J. does not challenge the finding that K.J. had been in the custody of FCCS for 12 or more months of the consecutive 22-month period, and because the trial court was justified in concluding that permanent placement with the County was in her best interest, this assignment of error is moot. “When a child has been in the temporary custody of FCCS for 12 or more months in a consecutive 22-month period, the court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.” In re D.G., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1122, 2010-Ohio-2370, ¶ 11, citing In re Williams, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-924, 2002-Ohio-7205, ¶ 46. “Thus, when considering an award of permanent custody, pursuant to
{32} Moreover, mootness aside, the “public policy” arguments from which T.J. argues that the parental rights of a minor never should be terminated, no matter what the circumstances and best interest of the (younger) child, see, e.g., Appellant‘s Brief at 16, find no support in the legislative language that the General Assembly actually used in establishing public policy in this realm. Contrary to the suggestion of her brief, see id. (invoking
{33} We overrule T.J.‘s third assignment of error.
{34} T.J.‘s fourth assignment of error is related to her third and is moot for the same reason. Under this assignment, T.J. reiterates her argument that the trial court “erred in implicitly finding that K.J. could not be reunited with her Mother T.J. within a reasonable amount of time.” Appellant‘s Brief at 19. She premises that contention on a view that she “was about to be released to foster care within a brief, reasonable amount of time (about 30 days) where it would have been possible to place minor mother and her child together.” Id. at 19-20.
{35} In addition to its finding under
{36} We overrule T.J.‘s fourth assignment of error.
{37} The trial court underscored that “while [T.J.], herself a minor and the victim of great trauma, is owed great sympathy and the protection of the community, the focus of ‘best interest’ must be upon [K.J.], * * * as required by
Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.