IN RE ROBERT J. BRANSON
No. SC100870
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
April 29, 2025
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
IN RE ROBERT J. BRANSON, ) Opinion issued April 29, 2025
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Petitioner, )
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v. ) No. SC100870
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MICHAEL SHEWMAKER, WARDEN, )
SOUTH CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL )
CENTER, )
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Respondent. )
Robert J. Branson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging his life sentence is unlawful because there was an insufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to the class A felony of first-degree child molestation. By pleading guilty, Branson waived all challenges to the factual basis of his plea except for a Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. Branson‘s claim does not fit within any valid exception permitting habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims. Habeas relief is denied.
Factual and Procedural Background
The State charged Branson with six sex crimes for raping and sodomizing Victim while she was a child. The charges included three unclassified felonies, each exposing Branson to the possibility of a life sentence and mandatory lifetime supervision if he was granted probation.1
On the day of trial, Branson negotiated an Alford plea to one count of the class A felony of first-degree child molestation and two counts of second-degree statutory rape.2 The State filed an amended information consistent with the plea agreement. The State prefaced the child molestation charge as follows:
COUNT I Child Molestation 1st Degree – Victim Is Less than 12 Years of Age – The Actor Has Previous Conviction – Under Chapter 566 Or Inflicts Serious Physical Injury/displays Deadly Weapon Or Dangerous Instrument/offense Is Part of Ritual or Ceremony
The State alleged Branson “committed the class A felony” of first-degree child molestation by knowingly subjecting Victim to sexual contact while she was younger than 12 years old.
During the plea hearing, the State never asserted, and Branson never acknowledged, any fact enhancing the first-degree child molestation charge from a class B felony to a class A felony under the version of
Branson filed a Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. He did not allege a factual defect in his guilty plea or that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. The circuit court overruled the motion.
Branson appealed, claiming for the first time that the State failed to allege the facts necessary for a class A felony. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, holding Branson waived this argument by not raising it in his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. Branson v. State, 633 S.W.3d 871, 875-76 (Mo. App. 2021).
Branson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging his sentence was excessive because the factual basis for his guilty plea included only the factual elements of a class B felony and omitted the necessary factual elements of a class A felony. The circuit court denied the petition. Branson filed a habeas petition with the court of appeals. The court of appeals granted the petition.4 This Court granted the State‘s application for transfer and has jurisdiction. Mо. Const. art. V, § 10; Rule 83.04.
Habeas Corpus
“A writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution
The “manifest injusticе … standard requires the habeas corpus petitioner to show that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent[.]” Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Mo. banc 2000) (internal quotation omitted). The actual innocence component of the manifest injustice standard serves as a “gateway” for habeas review of a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim. Id. Branson does not allege actual innocence. He does not allege cause and prejudice. Branson‘s habeas petition rests solely on a rarely recognized claim that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.
Analysis
Branson claims habeas relief is warranted because he was “sentenced to life in prison when the maximum punishment allowed by law was fifteen years.” Branson concedes he entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea to the class A felony and never raised this claim in his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. By entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, Branson waived “аll nonjurisdictional defects, including statutory and constitutional guarantees.” State v. Rohra, 545 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Mo. banc 2018) (internal quotation omitted).5 He also waived “any challenge to the merits
of the underlying conviction” except for a “Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief to determine if the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily” or if the conviction or sentence is unlawful. Id. Rule 24.035(a).6 Despite his guilty plea, waiver, and procedural default, Bransоn claims he is entitled to habeas review under an excess sentence exception applied in cases like State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. banc 2010).
Because Branson pleaded guilty, Rule 24.035 provided the “exclusive procedure” to raise “in the sentencing court” any claim that “the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum sentence authоrized by law[.]” Rule 24.035(a). Effective since 1988, Rule 24.035 “is designed to avoid duplicative and unending challenges to the finality of judgment” in favor of “a
The understanding that Rule 24.035 is “used in place” of habeas corpus for postconviction claims dates to the origin of the rule. This Court‘s first decision addressing the effect of Rule 24.035 on habeas relief explained that, although “[a] confined person may always petition for habeas corpus[,] … [p]rocedural default in remedies previously
however, “is somewhat of an anomaly[.]” Id. All other “constitutional claims raised after a plea of guilty are nonjurisdictional” and waived. Id. In any event, Branson‘s claim there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea of guilty is not a constitutional claim. Booker v. State, 552 S.W.3d 522, 528 (Mo. banc 2018) (holding “a sufficient factual basis is not constitutionally required“).
available may provide the basis for denying a petition in habeas corpus, and the petitioner, at a minimum, would have to establish that the grounds relied on were not ‘known to him’ while proceedings under Rule 24.035 were available.” White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Mo. banc 1989). In State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc 1993), this Court reaffirmed the original understanding of Rule 24.035, explaining “habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal or post-conviction proceedings” and “may be used to challenge a final judgment after an individual‘s failure to pursue appellate and post-conviction remedies only to raise jurisdictional issues or in circumstances so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice results.” See also State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 S.W.3d 60, 76 (Mo. banc 2015).
Similar to the petitioner in Simmons, Branson “does not meet either of these tests.” 866 S.W.2d at 446. Branson does not allege an actual jurisdictional defect, nor could he. The circuit court plainly had subject mаtter jurisdiction over his criminal case and personal jurisdiction over him for the crimes he committed in Missouri. Branson does not allege he is actually innocent despite his guilty plea. And he does not allege cause and prejudice from a claim that was not “known to him” when he filed his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. Id. Instead, he claims the circuit court erroneously sentenced him to life imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to a class A felony because the factual basis for his guilty plea established only a class B felony.
Missouri courts traditionally have conducted habeas review of procedurally defaulted excess sentence сlaims on the assumption an excess sentence is a jurisdictional defect. Zinna, 301 S.W.3d at 517; see also State ex rel. Osowski v. Purkett, 908 S.W.2d
690, 691 (Mo. banc 1995); Merriweather v. Grandison, 904 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Mo. App. 1995) (stating “[a] sentence which is in excess of that authorized by law is beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing court“). That is incorrect. The circuit court‘s jurisdiction refers only to subject matter jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases and personal jurisdiction over thе parties. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. banc 2009). When, as in this case, the circuit court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a criminal case, an excess sentence is simply a legal error to be remedied on direct appeal, State ex rel. Zahnd v. Van Amburg, 533 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. banc 2017), or by a timely motion for postconviction relief. See Rule 29.15(a); Rule 24.035(a).
In addition to originating from a flawed premise, Zinna and Osowski rely on State ex rel. Dutton v. Sevier, 83 S.W.2d 581, 582-83 (Mo. banc 1935), a case that аssumes an excess sentence is a jurisdictional issue and pre-dates Rule 24.035‘s “single, unitary, post-conviction remedy” by more than 50 years. See Swallow, 398 S.W.3d at 4 (internal quotation omitted). Zinna and Osowski, therefore, are doubly flawed, as both cases flow from both a misunderstanding of an actual jurisdictional defect and misplaced reliance on cases
The fundamental misunderstanding of jurisdiction and reliance on cases pre-dating Rule 24.035 is compounded by the lack of any sound reason to perpetuate excess sentence claims as a special exception permitting habeas review of prоcedurally defaulted claims. As established, this Court has consistently held “a writ of habeas corpus will be denied if
one raises procedurally barred claims that could have been raised at an earlier stage[.]” Johnson, 668 S.W.3d at 576 (internal quotation omitted). Branson clearly could have raised his claim at an earlier stage. Even after a guilty plea, an excessive sentence claim “can be raised on direct appeal.” State v. Russell, 598 S.W.3d 133, 140 (Mo. banc 2020).7
Likewise, Rule 24.035(a) specifically provides an avenue for claiming “the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law[.]” Despite the procedural avenues for timely raising his excess sentence сlaim, Branson first raised the issue on appeal from the judgment overruling his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. As the court of appeals recognized, Branson‘s procedural default in failing to raise his excess sentence claim in his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief in the circuit court resulted in a waiver of the claim. Branson, 633 S.W.3d at 875-76. Because Branson‘s habeas claim does not rest on an alleged manifest injustice, cause and prejudice, or an actual jurisdictional defect, there is no basis for utilizing habeas corpus to excuse his failure to raise the claim at an earlier stage.8
What remains is an alleged legal error in sentencing that could have been raised and remedied earlier. There is no reason to further indulge the mistaken assumption that a sentencing error is a jurisdictional defect or to treat habeas
corpus as a successive opportunity to review a procedurally defaulted sentencing claim. Zinna, Osowski, and Merriweather are overruled to the extent thеy hold sentencing errors are an independent ground for habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim.
Here, the record conclusively shows Branson knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to a class A felony with full knowledge he faced a potential life sentence. Branson acknowledged he was making an “open plea” with no sentencing recommendation, he faced a potential life sentence, his counsel explained the plea to him and answered all his questions, and he was pleading guilty voluntarily.9
The record
injustice in holding Branson to the consequences of the plea he knowingly and voluntarily entered.
Conclusion
Branson waived his sentencing claim by not raising it in his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. There is no jurisdictional defect, cause and prejudice, or manifest injustice warranting habeas review of this procedurally defaulted сlaim. Habeas relief is denied.
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Zel M. Fischer, Judge
All concur.